J. Indian Hist

Vol. 61 1983

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JOURNAL *of* INDIAN HISTORY

Vol. LXI April, August, December 1983 Parts 1–3

Vol 61
1983

CONTENTS

	PAGE
DID THE BUDDHA IMPART AN ESOTERIC TEACHING ?—by Rod Bucknell and Martin Stuart Fox	1
PALACE PAINTINGS OF CHAMBA AND KERALA: STYLE AND TECHNIQUE IN THE JEWELLED REALM —by Ronald M. Bernier	19
THE COASTAL MESOLITHIC INDUSTRIES OF SOUTH INDIA —by P. Rajendran	25
THE INFLUENCE OF BUDDHISM ON THE CULT OF JAGANNATH —by P. K. Behera	31
GANAPATI WORSHIPPED AS VIGHNESHA—by B. R. Sharma	41
PANCHANGULANKA —by A. L. Srivastava	47
WOMEN WORKERS IN THE JATAKAS —by Anil Kumar Tyagi	55
HAKIM SANA'I AND HISTORICAL MILIEU: TWO DIMENSIONAL STUDY—by V. C. Srivastava	65
MARE CLAUSUM THE DUTCH REGIONAL TRADE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 1650–1740 —by S. Arasaratnam	73
THE JAHANDARNAMAH OF NUR-UD-RIN—by S. B. P. Nigam	93
A STUDY ON THE MATAK COINS —by S. Dutta	117
THE ENGLISH ACQUISITION OF CHICACOLA CIRCAR by M.S.R. Anjaneyulu	127
THE EVALUATION OF SAFDAR JANG'S CAMPAIGN OF JAUNPUR IN 1738 by Dr. A. L. Srivastava Re-examined—by Hamid Afaq Qureshi	135
IDANKAI AND VALANKAI DISPUTE IN TAMILNADU–A CASE STUDY —by B. Sobhanan	139
LORD LYTTON AND THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF INDIA —by Ramesh Chandra Sharma	147

Continued on last page

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UNIVERSITY OF KERALA
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JOURNAL OF INDIAN HISTORY

PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR

April, August and December

Annual Subscription:

Inland Rs. 35/- Foreign Rs. 60/-

Contributions, remittances, books for review (two copies each), and correspondence should be sent to:

Dr. T. K. Ravindran
Editor
Journal of Indian History
University of Kerala
TRIVANDRUM–695581.

Vol. LXI April, August, December 1983 Parts 1–3

JOURNAL
of
INDIAN HISTORY

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University of Kerala, Trivandrum

Published by
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF KERALA
1983

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CONTENTS

PAGE

DID THE BUDDHA IMPART AN ESOTERIC TEACHING?—by Rod Bucknell and Martin Stuart Fox, Dept. of Studies in Religion, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Australia – 4067. .. 1

PALACE PAINTINGS OF CHAMBA AND KERALA: STYLE AND TECHNIQUE IN THE JEWELLED REALM—by Ronald M. Bernier, University of Colorado, Boulder, Dept. of Fine Arts, Colorado – 80309, U. S. A. .. 19

THE COASTAL MESOLITHIC INDUSTRIES OF SOUTH INDIA—by P. Rajendran, Deccan College, Puna–6. .. 25

THE INFLUENCE OF BUDDHISM ON THE CULT OF JAGANNATH —by P. K. Behera, Reader and Head of the Dept. of History, S. C. S. College, Puri, Orissa. .. 31

GANAPATI WORSHIPPED AS VIGHNESHA—by Dr. R. S. Sharma, Dept. of History, H. P. University, Simla. .. 41

PANCHANGULANKA—by Dr. A. L. Srivastava, 5 D/4, Liddle Road, George Towns Staff Quarters, G. M. P. College, Allahabad. .. 47

WOMEN WORKERS IN THE JATAKAS—by Anil Kumar Tyagi, A–332 Surya Nagar, Ghaziabad, U. P. – 201011. .. 55

HAKIM SANA'I AND HISTORICAL MILIEU : TWO DIMENSIONAL STUDY—by Dr. V. C. Srivastava, Visiting Professor of Indian Studies, Kabul University, Kabul. .. 65

MARE CLAUSUM, THE DUTCH AND REGIONAL TRADE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN—by S. Arasaratnam, University of New England, Armidale, N. S. W, 2351, Australia. .. 73

THE JAHANDARNAMAH OF NUR–UD–DIN—by Dr. S. B. P. Nigam, Reader, Dept. of History, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra – 132119, Haryana. .. 93

PAGE

A STUDY ON THE MATAK COINS—by Dr. S. Dutta, Dept. of History, Pasighat, Jawaharlal Nehru College, Arunachal Pradesh. .. 117

ENGLISH ACQUISITION OF CHICACOLE CIRCAR—by M. S. R. Anjaneyulu, Lecturer in History, Andhra University, Visaghapatam - 530020. .. 127

THE EVALUATION OF SAFAR JANG'S CAMPAIGN OF JAUNPUR IN 1738 by Dr. A. L. Srivastava Re-examined—by Dr. Hamid Afaq Qureshi, B. 11 / H Road, Mahanagar Extn., Lucknow - 226006. .. 135

IDANKAI AND VALANKAI DISPUTE IN TAMILNADU — A CASE STUDY—by Dr. B. Sobbanan, Lecturer, School of Historical Studies, Madurai Kamaraj University, Madurai-21, Tamilnadu. .. 139

LORD LYTTON AND THE NORTAERN FRONTIER OF INDIA —by R. S. Sharma, Head of the Dept. of History, St. John's College, Agra. .. 147

THE PROBLEMS OF THE INDIAN IMMIGRANTS TO MAURITIUS, 1834–1878—by Pravina Bhim Sain, Researcher, University of Jabalpur, Jabalpur. .. 175

THE HIMALAYA FRONTIER DURING THE BRITISH RULE IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE BHUTANESE FRONTIER—by Dr. Kapileshwar Labh, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-67. .. 185

LANDHOLDERS AND LANDTENURE IN PANCHMAHAL DISTRICT DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY A.D.—by Dr. B.Suryavanshi, Reader in Ancient History and Culture, A/2 Viarambaug, Pratapganj, Vadorada - 390002. .. 197

GANDHIJI'S LEADERSHIP OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL MANAGEMENT—by Dr. P. K. Jose, Dept. of History, St. Joseph's Collage, Calicut. .. 219

LAHUL—AN OUTLINE HISTORY—by Tobdan, C/o SL. C. R. Negi Niwas, Sanjoli, Simla-171006 (H. P.) .. 261

PAGE

M. C. RAJA, THE CHAMPION OF THE DEPRESSED—by Dr. (Mrs.) V. Balambal, Lecturer in Ancient History, University of Madras, Madras. .. 273

REVIEWS: (i) INSCRIPTIONS OF ANCIENT ASSAM—by Mukunda Madhava Sharma (2) POETIC AND SOCIETY DURING THE EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIOD—by Prof. K. A. Nizami (Ed.) (3) EIGHTEENTH CENTURY INDIA—Published by Prof. A. P. Ibrahim Kunju Felicitation Committee, (4) ROMANCE OF HISTORIOGRAPHY—by Jagadish Narayan Sarkar (5) FEUDATORIES OF SOUTH INDIA, 800-1070 A. D.—by Dr. (Mrs.) V. Balambal (6) THE APOTHEOSIS OF IMPERIALISM, INDIAN LAND ECONOMY UNDER CURZON—by Dr. V. C. Bhutani, (7) THE BHAKTI-RATNAKARA OF SANKARADEVA AND THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF BHAKTI—by Maheshwar Neog, (8) HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DYNASTIC HISTORY OF ORISSA—by Dr. Dilip Kumar Ganguly (9) JAINISM IN EARLY MEDIEVAL KARNATAKA—by Dr. R. B. P. Singh (10) COINS AND ICONS, A STUDY OF MYTHS AND SYMBOLS IN INDIAN NUMISMATIC ART—by Dr. Bhaskara Chattopadhyaya (11) DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST RELATIONS IN AGRICULTURE—by A. Ghosh and K. Dutt. .. 281

Did the Buddha impart an Esoteric Teaching?

BY

ROD BUCKNELL & MARTIN STUART – FOX

The question whether Gotama the Buddha imparted an esoteric teaching has long been a major point of controversy between the two main branches of Buddhism. The Mahāyānists maintain that Gotama did impart an esoteric teaching; the Theravādins maintain he did not.

The Mahāyāna claim for an esoteric teaching is threefold. First, certain sūtras recognized only in the Mahāyāna, and containing doctrines not found in the Pali canon, are ostensibly records of discourses delivered by Gotama to select groups of advanced disciples, often in special and remarkable circumstances.[1] Second, the obscure symbolism of the tantras is considered by the Vajrayānists to be part of a well-developed symbolic language devised by spiritual adepts as a means of preserving and secretly transmitting a higher teaching imparted by Gotama.[2] Third, in the Ch'an/Zen schools there is a strong tradition of a special unwritten transmission preserved by a succession of masters beginning with Gotama himself.[3]

The Theravāda claim that Gotama did not impart an esoteric teaching is based on the lack of any positive reference to such a teaching in the Pali canon, and on Gotama's seemingly explicit denial of it in an often-cited passage from the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta.[4]

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[1] Most of the earlier Mahāyāna sūtras are said to have been delivered at places where Gotama lived and taught, eg. Rājagṛha or Śrāvasti (see "The questions of Suvikrāntavikramin" and "The Diamond Sūtra" in Edward Conze, *The Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts* (London: Luzac, 1974). However, later sūtras and tantras dispense with any pretence to historical realism.

[2] For a discussion, see Agehananda Bharati, *The Tantric Tradition* (London: Rider, 1965), pp. 164–184.

[3] See Heinrich Dumoulin, *A History of Zen Buddhism*, transl. by Paul Peachey (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 68.

[4] D ii 100.

In this paper these two competing claims will be evaluated. The Mahāyāna and Theravāda evidence outlined above will be critically examined, with particular attention to two questions: (1) Given our knowledge of conditions in the early Sangha, is Gotama likely to have made public his entire course of practice leading to enlightenment — or is he more likely to have withheld certain information, revealing it to only a few chosen disciples? (2) Is Gotama's description of the path to enlightenment, as found in the Pali Sutta-piṭaka, complete and adequate as a guide for a practising aspirant — or does it contain gaps, suggesting that important information has been omitted? On the basis of this discussion, and particularly on the "evidence from silence", it will be argued that Gotama probably did impart an esoteric teaching, and inferences will be drawn regarding the nature and content of that teaching.

The Mahāyāna Evidence

Mahāyānists account for the claimed esoteric teachings in terms of "the three turnings of the Dharma-wheel". They maintain that the Pali suttas represent only the first turning of the wheel, the most basic presentation of the Dharma, sufficient for the majority of disciples; the Mahāyāna sūtras represent the second turning, a more profound exposition containing material which only advanced disciples were fit to hear and apply; and the tantras of the Vajrayāna, with their obscure symbolism, represent the third turning, a presentation of the highest and most difficult doctrines, for the benefit of the most competent or advanced students.[5]

The Mahāyāna sūtras and the tantras, associated with the second and third turnings, usually begin with the familiar formula: "Thus have I heard — At one time the Lord was staying at..." However, the places and situations named are sometimes biographically improbable or even fantastic, and in extreme cases can only be taken as symbolic. For example, the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra is said to have been delivered in Sri Lanka; and the Hevajra-tantra begins: "Thus have I heard — at one time the Lord dwelt in bliss with the Vajrayoginī who is the Body,

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[5] Tenzin Gyatso, *The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the Middle Way*, transl. Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 20. Cf. W.Y. Evans-Wentz, ed., *The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 122, note 1, where the three turnings of the wheel are called the Three Secret Doctrines.

Speech, and Mind of all the Buddhas".[6] Thus the fact that a sūtra begins with this formula is, as scholars have long recognized, no guarantee that it presents an authentic record of Gotama's teaching.

The wide historical gap between the time of Gotama and the first appearance of such sūtras would make it most unlikely that they originated from Gotama. The Mahāyāna claim that these sūtras were handed down in a special esoteric tradition, independently of the mainstream exoteric tradition preserved in the Pali canon, would be difficult to prove or disprove because, it could be argued, an esoteric tradition is, by its very nature, unlikely to leave any historical trace. Evidence against the Mahāyāna claim is provided by the fact, revealed by even the most superficial textual analysis, that many of the philosophical doctrines expressed in the Mahāyāna texts (*śūnyatā*, *prajñā-upāya,* etc.) did not become current until some centuries after Gotama‘s death. The claim that these doctrines were known only to certain chosen disciples charged with secretly transmitting them is unconvincing.

More telling as evidence for an esoteric transmission is the existence of the elaborate symbolic language associated with the Vajrayāna of Tibet, and its Chinese/Japanese extensions, the Chen–yen/Shingon schools. This system of symbols, known as the Twilight Language (*saṃdhyā–bhāṣā*)[7] incorporates various symbolic devices (*maṇḍalas*, *mudrās*, etc.), often explicitly sexual in nature. It is mentioned in certain important tantras, for example the Hevajra, where it is referred to as "the Twilight Language, that secret language, that convention of the *yoginīs,* which the *Śrāvakas* and others cannot unriddle".[8] The Twilight Language is said to have been created by *siddhas*, adept masters in an esoteric meditative tradition, to aid in preserving and communicating secret doctrines.[9] The symbols are generally recognized as denoting aspects of the meditative path to enlightenment; however, their detailed significance is said to be known only to certain spiritually advanced gurus and their immediate disciples.[10]

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[6] D. L. Snellgrove, *The Hevajra Tantra, Part* 1, *Introduction and Translation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 47.

[7] We follow Wayman in the debate over whether the term should be *samdhā–bhāṣā* or *samdhyā-bhāṣā*. See Alex Wayman, *The Buddhist Tantras: Light on Indo–Tibetan Esotericism* (New York: Rider, 1960), pp. 128–132.

[8] Snellgrove, *The Hevajra Tantra*, Part 1, p. 99.

[9] The *Siddhas* are referred to in Lama Anagarika Govinda, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism* (London: Rider, 1960), pp. 52–53.

[10] Cf. Mircea Eliade, *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*, transl. Wiliard R Trask 2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 249–254.

The existence of the Twilight Language provides tangible evidence for some form of esoteric transmission in the Vajrayāna at least. The tantras would clearly have required interpretation by adepts holding the key to the secret language in which they were written. In view of the frequent references to this symbolic language, there seems little doubt that secret doctrines did exist and that knowledge of them was closely guarded and handed down only to the initiated. Although most of the tantric symbols demonstrably originated long after the time of the Buddha, it could be that their hidden message—the concepts or practices to which they refer — originated from the Buddha himself. In other words, it is possible that the authors of the tantras invented new symbols for the components of an ancient transmission.

The Zen claim of an unwritten transmission goes back to an incident described in the Sūtra on the Questions of Mahāpiṭaka Brahmarāja. According to that Sūtra, Gotama, when asked to preach the Dharma, merely held up a flower, "But none of them could comprehend the meaning of this act on the part of the Buddha, except the venerable Mahākāśyapa, who softly smiled and nodded."[11] Mahākāśyapa thus became the first in a line of twenty-eight Zen patriarchs in India, the last of whom, Bodhidharma, carried the secret teaching to China.

This tradition is considered by most scholars to be apocryphal. Only a few of the Zen patriarchs in the Indian line of transmission are known by name, and it may be questioned whether twenty-eight patriarchs would have been sufficient to span the ten centuries separating Bodhidharma from Gotama. On the other hand, the Zen claim has this in its favour that the information allegedly transmitted has to do not with abstruse philosophical concepts (as is usually the case in the Mahāyāna sūtras) but with advanced meditation and the drawning of enlightenment; for while it is hard to see why the teaching of philosophical notions should have been restricted to a small circle of initiates, there are, as will be shown below, good reasons why the teaching of advanced meditative practices and attainments should have been limited in this way.

Overall, the Mahāyāna evidence for an esoteric transmission is inconclusive. The positive evidence is relatively late historically, indicating that even if an esoteric tradition did exist, it may have originated centuries after Gotama's death. The attribution of Mahāyāna texts to Gotama himself is most reasonably interpreted as an attempt to lend an appearance of authenticity to new doctrines or meditative practices. On the other hand, the lack of historical evidence does not constitute a conclusive refutation of the Mahāyānist claims; for, as pointed out above, an esoteric transmission is unlikely to leave tangible traces.

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[11] Related by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, *Studies in Zen*, ed. Christmas Humphreys (New York: Delta Books, 1955), p. 12, and p.45, note 2.

The Theravāda Evidence

Before examining the Theravādin argument against an esoteric transmission, we shall consider the one passage from the Pali Tipiṭaka that has sometimes been advanced as evidence *for* such a transmission. This passage occurs in the chapter entitled "The *simsapā* grove", in the Mahāvagga of the Saṃyutta. There it is related that on one occasion Gotama held up a handful of *simsapā* leaves and asked the monks which were more, the leaves in his hand or those in the trees overhead. When the monks pointed to the latter, Gotama declared:

> Just so, monks, much more in number are those things I have found out, but not revealed; very few are the things I have revealed.[12]

This passage makes clear that Gotama did withhold a large part of his knowledge. However, Gotama went on to explain that the knowledge he withheld would be of no value to his disciples in their progress along the path to enlightenment. He was apparently referring to the "unanswered questions" (*avyākata-vatthūni*), questions such as whether the universe is or is not eternal, and what becomes of the Tathāgata after death.[13] These were, according to Gotama, irrelevant matters of speculation, which could only distract a disciple from the practices leading to enlightenment. The texts mention many cases of disciple monks and laymen alike, becoming *arahants*. Clearly, then, the information which Gotama withheld was not essential for the supreme attainment; Gotama taught as much as his disciples needed to know in order to attain enlightenment. In any case, and despite the claims made by Humphreys and others, the fact that Gotama withheld a large part of his knowledge has little bearing on the problem of an esoteric teaching.[14] The question that concerns us is not: "Did Gotama withhold part of his knowledge?" but rather; "Did Gotama withhold part of his knowledge from the majority of monks, while revealing it to a select minority?" On this crucial question the incident in the *siṃsapā* grove sheds little light.

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[12] S.v 437. The translation is from *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, Part V. transl. F.L. Woodward (London: Luzac, 1956), p.370.

[13] Much discussion has centred around these "unanswered questions". See for example, Troy Wilson Organ, "The Silence of the Buddha" *Philosophy East and West* 4 (1954), pp.125–140; K.N. Upadhyaya, "The Significance of the Buddha's Silenee", *Philosophical Quarterly* 39 (1966), pp.65–80; and Richard H. Robinson, "Some Methodological Approaches to the Unexplained Points", *Philosophy East and West* 22 (1972), pp.309–323.

Having thus disposed of the one passage from the Pali Tipiṭaka which has been taken as evidence *for* an esoteric transmission, we turn now to the passage mentioned earlier, which is often cited as evidence *against* such a transmission. This passage, which occurs in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta and again in the Saṃyutta, is translated by T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids as follows:

> I have preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine; for in respect of the truths, Ānanda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher, who keeps some things back.[15]

T. W. Rhys Davids took this as an explicit rejection of an esoteric teaching, and concluded: "There is no 'esoteric doctrine' in true Buddhism."[16]

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[14] Humphreys maintains that the esoteric tradition is "none the less potent, none the less reliable for the fact that it is nowhere, in more than fragments, written down". Christmas Humphreys, *Buddhism* 3rd ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), p. 14. A propos of Gotama's withholding of knowledge, the Buddha is popularly believed to have been omniscient, and on that ground alone, could arguably never have taught all he knew.

[15] D ii 100. The translation is from *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Vol. 11, transl. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (London: Luzac, 1971), p. 107.

[16] *The Questions of King Milinda*, transl. T.W. Rhys Davids (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965), p. 143, note 3. See also pp, 267–268, note 3. Rhys Davids argues that if there had been any such secret transmission in early Buddhism it would have been referred to in the *Milindapañhā* either where it is said that the good teacher holds no secrets from his disciples, or where reasons are given why the Pāṭī mokha is kept secret from lay followers; i.e., at Milindapañhā 94 add 96. That Nagasena himself believed there was no such secret knowledge is apparent from the section where he explains Gotama's refusal to answer the speculative questions posed by the Elder Māluṅkyaputta; see *Milindapañhā*, 144–145. The commentary on this section of the *Milinda* states that other teachers, on their death beds, confide to

In the Pali, the passage in question reads: *Desito, Ānanda, mayā dhammo, anantaram abāhiram katvā. N' atth', Ānanda, Tathāgatassa dhammesu ācariya-muṭṭhi.*[17] A word–by–word translation of this would be: "Shown, Ānanda, by me (is) the Dharma, no–inner no–outer having made. There is not, Ānanda, of the Tathāgata in dharmas a teacher–fist."

The Rhys Davids render the key phrase *anantaram abāhiram katvā*, as "without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine"; however, F. L. Woodward, in his tanslation of the same passage in the saṃyutta, prefers the literal rendering: "making no inner and no outer."[18] In support of this rendering Woodward cites the explanation given in the commentary:

> With the thought: I will not teach thus much to another, one makes doctrine inner (*antaram*).
> With the thought: I will teach thus much to another, one makes doctrine outer (*bāhiram*)
> With the thought: I will teach this particular person, he admits another person (*abbhantaram karoti*).
> With the thought: I will not teach this particular person, he bars out a person (*bāhiram karoti*).

Here the meaning is that he did neither of these.[19]

The commentary makes clear that the reference is to non–exclusion of any part of the Dharma or of any person: *Anantaram abāhiran ti dhamma–vasena vā puggala-vasena vā ubhayam akatvā.*[20] In view of this, the sense of the first sentence in the controversial passage appears to be: "I have taught the Dharma without omitting anything or excluding anyone".

If this claim by Gotama is to be reconciled with his statement in the *Simsapā* grove, it clearly has to be understood as subject to the same implicit qualification: Gotama meant that he had taught the Dharma without omitting anything his disciples needed to know in order to attain enlightenment.

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favourite pupils things they have kept back until then; but the Buddha does not. See *Milinda's Questions*, Vol. I, transl. I. B. Horner (London: Luzac, 1969), p.201, note 4.

[17] D ii 100 and S v 152.

[18] *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, Part V, p. 132.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 132, note 2.

[20] Sārattha–ppakāsinī iii 203.

The question now arises whether some similar qualification applies to the second part of Gotama's claim — that he taught the Dharma without excluding anyone. Gotama imparted as much of his knowledge as his disciples needed to know in order to attain enlightenment; but did he give the same complete teaching to every disciple who came to him? *Some* discrimination, on the basis of ability or some similar criterion, would surely have been essential. There would, for example, have been little point in giving detailed instruction in the *arūpa jhānas* to a lay disciple who the Master knew had neither the ability nor the opportunity to practise such advanced meditative techniques. Even in the case of a monk such advanced instruction would have been of little value unless that monk had already mastered the more basic forms of *jhāna* practice. Examination of the texts indicates that Gotama did discriminate in this way, on the basis of his listeners' ability. It is apparent throughout the nikāyas that he adapted the content of his teaching according to his audience. For example, suttas addressed to lay followers usually stress morality, while suttas addressed to monks in the Sangha more often deal with meditative practice.[21] Such discrimination would be expected in a teacher of Gotama's calibre; it would have been in his disciples' best interests.

An important consideration in this connection is the traditional Indian view on methods of teaching, and on the nature of the Guru-disciple relationship. In all Indian traditions, Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina, it has, since earliest times, been considered that the only proper way to impart spiritual knowledge — the interpretation of sacred texts, the teachings of yoga, the techniques of meditation, etc., — is through direct instruction by a guru to each of his disciples individually. This was the method used in handing down knowledge of the Vedas and the speculations of the Upaniṣads.[22] It was also the method whereby Gotama himself learned the basic techniques of meditation from his teachers Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta.[23]

The importance of the guru-disciple relationship has been recognized throughout the history of Buddhism. As Eliade says: "The importance of the *guru* as initiatory master is no less great in Buddhism than in any other Indian soteriology."[24] In the *Visuddhimagga*, the monk wishing to practise the *jhānas* is enjoined to move to a monastery where there is "either a teacher or an equal of a teacher, a preceptor or an equal of preceptor."[25] Mahāyāna sūtras and tantras similarly stress the importance of the guru–disciple relationship.[26]

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[21] Important suttas dealing in detail with meditation were addressed to monks rather than lay people; e.g. Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna (D ii 290–315), Satipaṭṭhāna (M i 55–63), Kāyagatāsati (M iii 88–100), Vitakkasaṇṭhāna (M i 118–122), Ānañjasappaya (M ii 261–266).

[22] See A. L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India* (New York: Grove Press, 1959), pp. 163, 250.

[23] M i 164–165.

This approach to teaching has persisted down to the present day. It is still widely recognized that meditation can be learned only by practising under the direct guidance of a competent master, and instruction is still usually given in the time–honoured manner. General principles may be taught to large groups of students, but the actual details of practical technique are imparted step by step to individual students in series of private meetings. Furthermore, students are usually urged to refrain from discussing their techniques and attainments with less experienced meditators; all instruction at that level must come from the guru himself.[27]

This traditional mode of instruction is based on sound pedagogical principles. Different students of meditation progress at different rates and encounter different individual problems. Also, detailed information on advanced stages is best withheld from the student until he is fully ready to apply it; otherwise he would be tempted to move ahead too rapidly, to the detriment of his long–term progress.

It is therefore very likely that Gotama employed essentially the same method, giving detailed instruction on meditative technique only to individual students in private, while limiting the content of his public discourses to morality and general outline summaries of basic meditation. To each of his advanced students Gotama would have taught the higher stages of the path step by step, imparting at any one time only as much as the student was capable of putting into practice. In short, Gotama *would* have discriminated in imparting the Dharma; he would have taught the most advanced aspects of the Dharma only to the most advanced students.

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[24] Eliade, *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*, pp. 165–166.

[25] *Visuddhimagga*, 121.

[26] See, eg, Snellgrove, *The Hevajra Tantra*, p. 30. Also Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), p. 271.

[27] This description is based on R.B.'s personal observations in Thai meditation centres and on firsthand reports by practising meditators. The prohibition on openly discussing one's meditative experiences is noted in Winston L. King, "A Comparison of Theravāda and Zen Buddhist Meditational Methods and Goals", *istory of Religions* 9 (1970), pp. 304–315.

Gotama's statement that he had omitted nothing and excluded no-one was made in the context of a request by his favourite disciple, Ānanda, for instructions concerning the leadership of the Sangha after the Master's death.[28] Gotama's answer was that no leader was needed. The Sangha was already in possession of the truth he had taught, in particular the truth about the path to enlightenment; knowledge of this path was all the Sangha required. But in claiming that the Sangha was in possession of his teaching, Gotama clearly did not mean that *every member* of the Sangha knew and understood that teaching *in its entirety*; for the highest knowledge — knowledge of the final stages on the path to enlightenment — would have been possessed only by the most advanced monks. What Gotama evidently meant was that, since a number of monks were already *arahants*, the Sangha *as a whole* possessed knowledge of the full course of practice leading to enlightenment.

The above considerations indicate that Gotama's claim to have taught the Dharma without omitting anything or excluding anyone has to be understood as subject to two qualifications: He taught the Dharma without omitting anything *that was necessary for attaining enlightenment;* and he taught it to every student who came to him *to the extent that he or she was capable of applying it.* The second of these qualifications would have created conditions conducive to the development of an esoteric transmission; for advanced students would have had access to knowledge that was denied to less advanced ones. Since the passage containing this ambivalent claim is the one and only passage in the Pali suttas that can plausibly be taken as denying an esoteric transmission, it must be acknowledged that the Theravāda evidence relevant to this question is as inconclusive as the Mahāyāna evidence.[29]

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[28] D ii 99-100.

[29] The idea of an esoteric transmission is not entirely lacking in the Theravāda. Cf. *Manual of a Mystic*, transl. F. L. Woodward (London: Luzac, 1962). In his Prefatory Note (p. xviii) Woodward mentions the guru of a monk whom he knew in Sri Lanka in 1900 who tested his disciples to determine who was "worthy to receive the ancient secrets which had been handed down to me [the guru], the secrets of *Parampara Yoga* (traditional secret meditation practices handed down by word of mouth from guru to śiṣya)".

The Evidence from Silence

In any claim for an esoteric teaching in Buddhism it is implied that the information contained in the Pali Tipiṭaka is in some important respect incomplete, that certain information essential for attaining enlightenment did not find its way into the canonical texts. The possibility of such incompleteness has largely been overlooked by Buddhists because it would imply criticism of the Buddha, and by scholars because they have naturally been more concerned with the massive amount of information that *is* recorded. A few conspicuous lacunae have, nevertheless, been noted. For example, Conze, writing on *jhāna*, makes the following observation about the information he found in the Buddhist canon:

> About the psychological mechanisms of trance [*jhāna*] itself, a detailed analysis of the changes which take place step by step in the mind, and concrete advice on how it should be done — the sources seemed to contain little information. If the subject fails to come to life, it is perhaps because the secret, known 2,000 years ago, has, with so much else, been lost in the meantime.[30]

Conze observes that essential information about the technique of *jhāna* practice is missing from the Tipiṭaka. *Jhāna* is described only in respective stereotype formulae; there is no information on practical technique, no "concrete advice on how it should be done".

What Conze says of the *jhānas* is no less true of the higher meditative practices that are supposed to follow once the *jhānas* have been mastered. The Buddha frequently stated that a monk who had perfected the four *rūpajhānas* should go on to develop a series of three supernormal knowledges (*vijjās*):

(1) knowledge of his former existences;
(2) knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings; and
(3) knowledge of the destruction of the *āsavas* (cankers).

These are the same three knowledges which Gotama claimed to have attained beneath the Bodhi tree on the night of his own enlightenment.[31] That they follow each other in sequence is clear from the statement that one knowledge was attained in each of the three watches of the night. Enlightenment dawned and liberation was realized upon perfection of the third knowledge.

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[30] Edward Conze, *Buddhist Meditation* (London: Unwin Books, 1972), p. 32.

[31] For an account of Gotama's enlightenment see M i 22–23; and for a more extended description, D i 81–84. Exhortations to monks to do likewise can be found at M i 182, M i 348, etc.

The three knowledges are clearly of supreme importance in the Buddhist course of practice. They correspond to *paññā* in the threefold division of the course of practice into *sīla*, *samādhi*, and *paññā* (morality, concentration, and insight); they correspond to *vipassanā* in the twofold division of meditation into *samatha* and *vipassanā* (tranquility and insight); and they correspond to *sammā ñāṇa* (right insight), the ninth stage in the tenfold path, of which the more familiar eightfold path, appears to be an abbreviated version.[32] As Pande says in his *Origins of Buddhism:* "His [Gotama's] originality appears to have consisted in the association of Samādhi and Paññā in order to advance from the Jhānas to the Three Vijjās and Sambodhi".[33] The transition from the fourth *jhāna* to the first of the three knowledges therefore represents a crucial stage on the path to enlightenment.[34]

Yet in spite of their evident importance, the three knowledges are described quite inadequately in the Tipiṭaka. For example, the description of how a monk should develop the first knowledge merely states: "Thus with the mind composed,. . . immovable, he directs his mind to the knowledge and recollection of former habitations. He recollects a variety of former habitations, thus: one birth, two births, three. . . four. . . five. . . ten. . . twenty . . . thirty . . . forty . . . fifty . . . a hundred. . . a thousand. . . a hundred thousand births, . . ."[35] In some suttas the description is accompanied by a statement that the practice of recollecting former existences resembles the process whereby a person may recollect the route he had followed on a journey through several villages,[36] but this information is of little help to the practising meditator. (The Visuddhimagga and other manuals give little clarification,[37] and present-day meditation masters appear unable to explain the three practices.)[38] Whereas the account of the *jhānas*, despite its incompleteness, does provide certain instructions that the meditator can attempt to put into practice, the account of the three knowledges makes virtually no sense in practical terms.[39]

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[32] On these equivalences and on the stages of the tenfold path, see Roderick S. Bucknell, "The Buddhist Path to Enlightenment: An Analysis of the listing of Stages", forthcoming.

[33] Govind Chandra Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, 2nd rev. ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974, p. 538, note 145.

[34] The accounts of Gotama's own enlightenment could plausibly be interpreted as implying that the three knowledges arose spontaneously as a result of his abiding in the fourth *jhāna*. However Gotama's exhortations to the monks to develop the same three knowledges indicate that, far from arising spontaneously, they needed to be actively developed. The same is clear from instructions given by Buddhaghosa. For example: "Therefore the monk who is a beginner, wishing to recall this[i.e. to recall his former existences] should ... contemplate, in reverse order all that he had done..." (*Visuddhimagga* 412). The three knowledges are therefore three forms of meditative practice to be actively developed once the four *jhānas* have been mastered.

[35] M i 348.

Given Gotama's policy of not discussing the nature of higher states of consciousness, it is not surprising that he says little about the three knowledges themselves. One would, however, have expected some account of how in practice the meditator could go about *attaining* these knowledges, instructions on how to recollect one's former existences, etc. Such information is totally lacking. Nowhere in the Tipiṭaka do we find any indication of how the meditator should effect the transition from the one-pointedness and equanimity of the fourth *jhāna* to the knowledge of former existences, vital as this transition would appear to be for the attainment of enlightenment. We conclude, therefore, that there are serious gaps in the Tipiṭaka account of meditative practice. The description of *jhāna* is inadequate, as Conze has observed, and the description of the three knowledges is so terse and cryptic as to be useless as a guide for a practising meditator.

This finding has a direct bearing on the question of an esoteric teaching. The Sutta Piṭaka is said to be a record of those discourses which Ānanda heard and later remembered.[40] But Ānanda could hardly have known what Gotama said in private meetings with advanced meditators. The observed lack, in the Tipiṭaka, of detailed information on the practical technique of the *jhānas* and the three knowledges therefore supports our earlier observation that information on advanced meditative practice would have been imparted only to individual students in private. Such information did not find its way into the Sutta Piṭaka because it was never part of Gotama's public teaching.

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[36] D i 81.

[37] Eg *Visuddhimagga* 410–423.

[38] This, at least, was R. B.'s impression on questioning some of the most respected meditation masters in Thailand.

[39] However, for an interpretation in terms of practical meditation see Roderick S. Bucknell ang Martin Stuart–Fox, "The Three Knowledges of Buddhism: Implications of Buddhadasa's Interpretation of Rebirth", forthcoming.

[40] It is irrelevant whether the suttas were originally recited by just one monk, as the tradition implausibly claims, or were compiled by many monks over a period of decades after Gotama's death. The point is that any record could only be of Gotama's *public* teaching.

But although excluded from the memorized canon, the higher teaching on meditative practice would hardly have died out following Gotama's death. Many monks had already attained arahantship, so must be assumed to have had a complete mastery of even the highest stages of meditation. Such monks would therefore have been qualified to pass on their knowledge. Thus conditions at the time of Gotama's death in the Sangha were such that his teaching in all likelihood continued to be propagated on two levels: the more elementary and general teaching was memorized and became the Sutta Piṭaka, while the teaching on advanced meditative technique was known to a limited number of *arahants*, who taught it to such disciples as they deemed capable of putting it into practice.

Available evidence indicates that developments in the Sangha after Gotama's death would have tended to reinforce the distinction between these two levels of teaching. A "division of labour" soon arose in the early Sangha, with monks assuming different roles according to their individual inclinations, abilities, and views on monastic duties. Some monks, the *jhāyins* devoted themselves to the practice of meditation; others, the *suttantikas* and *vinayadharas*, memorized the suttas and vinaya (code of discipline) respectively; and others again, the *ābhidhammikas*, discussed and analysed the contents of the suttas.[41] There is clear evidence in the suttas of strong rivalry between the *jhāyins* (meditators) on the one hand and the memorizers and analysers on the other.[42] The *jhāyins*, whose retiring, contemplative lifestyle held little attraction for lay Buddhists, were at a material disadvantage. The memorizers and analysers, able and ready to chant suttas, preach household Dharma, or engage in intellectual debate, fulfilled much more effectively the religious needs of lay devotees. Increasingly, therefore, newly ordained novices tended to avoid the more austere path of meditation.

[41] Cf. Sukumar Dutt, *The Buddha and five After–Centuries* (London: Luzac, 1957), pp. 99, 116–117.

[42] Cf. A iii 355. see also Louis de Lavllée Poussin, "Musīla et Nārada", *Mélanges chinois et bouddnhiques*, 5 (1937), pp. 210–222.

The substantial material support provided by dedicated lay Buddhists probably contributed to this decline in the meditative tradition by encouraging a more comfortable and less withdrawn lifestyle. This process of decline was greatly accelerated during the reign of Aśoka, when the Sangha received unprecedented imperial patronage. Great monasteries were built as centres of popular worship, and monks, no longer homeless ascetics, were accorded high social standing and began to wield considerable social and political influence. As the Sangha became a powerful worldly organization, providing ambitious men a means of social advancement, the number of monks increased rapidly, while their commitment to the pursuit of enlightenment declined.[43] Under such circumstances the *hāyins* soon dwindled to a small minority.

Now it is clearly in the *jhāyin* tradition, if anywhere, that knowledge of Gotama's advanced meditative techniques would have been kept alive. The most experienced meditators would have taught less experienced ones, who would later have become teachers in their turn. In other words,any special higher teaching imparted by Gotama would in all probability have continued to be transmitted in semi-secretive fashion to succeeding generations of monks within the ever-diminishing *jhāyin* tradition, while at the same time the public teaching was transmitted openly by the memorizers and analysers.

Did the Buddha Impart an Esoteric Teaching?

We have seen that the Tipiṭaka account of higher meditation is incomplete at the very points where detailed information is most needed. We have also noted that Gotama is likely to have adhered to the longstanding Indian practice (still followed in many meditation centres at the present day) of teaching meditation to individual students in private, and withholding the details of advanced techniques from all but those actually practising them. The lack, in the Tipiṭaka, of detailed information on higher meditation is therefore as would be expected, because such information would not have been made available to any but those few *jhāyins* who were already well advanced in their meditative practice. The Tipiṭaka records only Gotama's public discourses. The monks responsible for compiling and transmitting it (the *suttantikas*) knew of the higher practices only as stereotype lists of stages, which they dutifully memorized and recited to novices and lay devotees. Hence the inadequacy of extant accounts of higher insight meditation.[44]

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[43] Massive purges of the Sangha became necessary. For the changes which took place in the nature of the early Sangha, see Dutt, *The Buddha and Five After-Centuries*, and Sukumar Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India* London: Grorge Allen and Unwin, 1962), Part I.

On balance, then, the evidence indicates that Gotama very probably did impart what may be called an esoteric doctrine, a special higher teaching on advanced meditation, reserved for an elite minority of monks. However, in withholding detailed information on higher meditation from all but his most competent disciples, Gotama was not guilty of having "the closed fist of a teacher, who keeps some things back". Rather he was acting in the best interests of his students. Any monk who had advanced sufficiently along the meditative path could become eligible for membership of that elite group and receive some individual instruction.

How long such an elite tradition would have persisted after Gotama's death is another question. Because of the steady decline in the relative standing and influence of the *jhāyins*, progressively fewer monks would have been motivated to seek and hand on the precious knowledge. It seems likely, therefore, that the lines of transmission could have died out or become seriously weakened within a few centuries of Gotama's death.[45] However, it is not impossible that, as is believed in the Ch'an/Zen schools, an unbroken line of adepts has kept the tradition alive, albeit in somewhat altered form, down to the present day. The Vajrayānists' claim that their meditative tradition (represented symbolically in the Twilight Language) goes back to the Buddha, also deserves to be taken seriously.[46] On the other hand, the claim that Mahāyāna sūtras such as the Prajñāpāramitā represent Gotama's esoteric doctrine appears to have little to support it, for the content of such sūtras, with its emphasis on philosophy and relative neglect of meditation, is not in keeping with what we may infer the secret higher teaching to have been.

The above analysis has necessarily rested largely on "the evidence from silence"; as always in the case of a claimed esoteric transmission, full account has to be taken of what is *not* recorded. To date scholars have given little consideration to the implications an esoteric transmission would have for the history of early Buddhism. Our conclusion that the Buddha probably did initiate an esoteric transmission indicates the need for a reappraisal. Alongside the two well–recognized streams in Buddhism, the philosophical–monastic and the popular, a third, esoteric–meditative stream should also be given proper scholarly recognition and attention.

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[44] What Conze says with reference to higher yoga is equally applicable to accounts of higher insight meditation: "Our difficulty lies in that this aspect of the teaching was 'esoteric' ... and thus never received systematic treatment in documents accessible to the general public". *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 183.

[45] It is always possible that individual meditators later stumbled upon a method similar to that practised by Gotama and taught it to their disciples.

[46] However, the symbolism is clearly a later development, probably not earlier than 5th century A. D.

Palace Paintings of Chamba and Kerala: Style and Technique in the Jewelled Realm

BY

RONALD M. BERNIER

Improved communication is needed if South Asian art is ever to receive the kind of attention in the western world that is already given to the arts of Japan and China. Indian aesthetics should be no less strange to American audiences than are the rarified tastes of the tea ceremony, for example, but the understated wares of the *tokonoma* alcove are more widely known and appreciated than even the most famous images of India. *Ikebana* is admired everywhere.

Far Eastern literature in translation is generally more graspable than that of South Asia; school children *Haiku* in Dubuque; television has provided no Indian "Shogun." The general public is not drawn to the puzzle of iconography in Indian art and classical terminology is difficult, but it is somehow easy to ignore philosophical meaning in East Asian landscape painting, porcelain, even calligraphy. A broadly appealing focus is needed if the initiate is to be moved by South Asian art, and several good possibilities exist. Medieval sculpture could be the choice, for India produces the most and the best, or it could be mural painting.

Ajanta comes immediately to mind in terms of wall painting in India, but Ajanta is not easy to explain. The *jataka* tales, complex continuous compositions, damaged surfaces, and lengthy period of development and execution require time and many illustrations in the classroom, while the experience of being enclosed by dark, excavated space is hard to convey. To reveal the direct impact of Indian mural art, Ajanta may not be the place to begin. Later works may be more obvious, with better preserved colours and clearer stories that are both secular and religious. They are dramatic yet delicate, luxurious even when understated, and even without their specific messages they appeal to the eye and the emotions.

Palace paintings in the Dīwān Khānā counsel room of the palace at Arki (c. 1860–76)[1] near Kangra in southern Himachal Pradesh are surprisingly international in their European-influenced landscapes, but their lively story telling belongs to Rajput tradition. Odd characters march along the walls as battles are fought with the fresh Rajput excitement that came to affect Himālayan mural art also. Scenes that portray Kṛṣṇa and Rāma serve as reminders that worship of Viṣṇu in his many incarnations was introduced into the western Himālaya from the plains by teachers like Śri Kṛṣṇadās Piuhāri of Galtā in Rajasthan who travelled to Kulu and established a Vaiśṇava centre at Nagar.[2] His disciple, Bhagwānji, was given a land grant at Pindorī by the Mughal Emperor Jahāngir, and the hill chiefs took notice, including the ruler of Chamba. Kṛṣṇa is easy to enjoy.

At Chamba in central Himachal Pradesh the full richness of north-west Himālayan painting is preserved. Mid–19th century works from the residence called Rang Mahal, still used by palace women until 1947, have been removed to the National Museum in New Delhi, while closely allied paintings that are also devoted to stories of Kṛṣṇa and Śiva are still part of a small audience hall in the main palace. Velvety colours are defined by wire–width lines to create flat shapes within crystalline space–cells of a jewelled realm. Painted, stage–set architecture leads the viewer into these cells, while the paintings as a whole are adapted to the actual building setting. Small pictures enclose Hindu gods and other characters of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* like transplanted album paintings while large compositions record the exploits of kings. Typically, the main character or event is placed at the centre of a painting while minor figures converge toward it. The colour of the background or of the frame around a scene reinforces its mood. As borrowed Rajput tradition requires dramatic narration, Pahāṛī tastes of the hills demand saturated chroma: red is crimson. Together they produce operatic power in two dimensions with galloping action that is hardly contained by wall surface boundaries. At their best such murals are much more than enlarged miniatures like the small 19th century works at the temple of Devī–rī–Koṭhī or the plastered panel that survives in the Himachal State Museum. And they are more easily read than the *maṇḍala*–like map of Devī (Durgā Tripurāsundāri,) dated 1808 A.D.,[3] that was brought from the verandah of Sultānpur Palace, Kulu, to the National Museum. The best Chamba palace painting is both textile–like (in the way of embroidered Chamba *rumals*) and illusionistic. It captures extraordinary tension between lively action and frozen pattern in the way of southern murals and, also like those, it is much more than a catalogue of iconography.

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[1] Mira Seth, *Wall Paintings of the Western Himalayas*, New Delhi, 1976, p. 84.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

Western Himālayan wall paintings are not made like those of Ajanta. The walls themselves are manmade, not cut from living rock, and they are built of stones, rubble, and mud to be enclosed by wooden battens. At Chamba's Rang Mahal the surface is recorded to have been covered by a layer of mud mixed with straw to a thickness of 5 to 31 mm. before a layer of lime plaster (*makaul*) was put on with 6 to 44 mm. thickness, usually over a mixture of lime and mortar. A final coating consists of lime wash to receive paint.[4] Brushes, probably made of squirrel hair, were used to make preliminary drawnigs in black on the walls of Chamba, although charcoal was used elsewhere in the hills. The drawings were probably enlargements from model paintings like those in a set of nine that is in the collection of O. C. Sood of Simla.[5] Opaque mineral colours plus indigo were put down, sometimes in layers, after notes on colour choices were put onto the wall drawings by the master artist.[6] Pigments have resin, glue, or gum as their vehicle, and late paintings are sometimes covered with varnish shellac, like some rare Kṛṣṇa pictures in the private house of Mohan Lal near the Chamba palace. Any of the painting should be considered as essentially an art of *line*.

South Indian murals in Kerala are much larger than those in the northern hills and much less bound by niches and other structural elements, but they are equally evocative, elegant, and didactic. Their stories are sacred but also seemingly candid, and their style is even more unique. As in Chamba, palace and temple paintings make up a unified tradition in Kerala. Major royal works are found at Krishnapuram from the early 18th century, Padmanabhapuram of the 17th/18th century, the 18/19th century Kuttippuram Palace of the Rāja of Kudathanadu, and Mattancheri Palace, first constructed by the Portuguese in 1555 and renovated and enlarged by the Dutch in 1663.

Mattancheri paintings are like those of Chamba in that they are murals made for the apartments of Hindu kings, but they have fewer

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[4] Tests carried out by the National Museum indicate that a thick layer of lime was sometimes put over the walls without any other coatings (Seth, p. 93.)

[5] The models are partly illustrated in Seth, pp. 93–94.

[6] *Ibid.*, p.95.

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secular references and their style is bolder, more emotionally charged, and "bigger" than that of Chamba. At the same time, colour is more subtle than in the north; not crimson but malachite green and gold set the mood as unmodulated line again defines brilliantly hued shapes and forms. Once more the hues are mineral plus indigo. But, moreso than in the hills, tension is created between flat pattern and illusionary three dimensions — as dot stippling creates shadow that pushes forth "projecting" volumes. Form is thus exaggerated to almost manneristic degree, and large scale figures seem to undulate over wall surfaces. It is as if Kṛṣṇa has been unleased from his northern bonds. The *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Kṛṣṇa Līla* communicate theatrical excitement that may be partly explained by comparison to Kathakaḷi theatre as it is performed in Kerala. In addition, beaded lines of pearl-like beads are painted to define the edges of figures, electrifying them in staccato silhouette. Much more than in Chamba, the visitor feels part of a proper audience as sacred characters, like the painters, "perform."

Technique of Kerala mural painting is impressive by any measure. A layer of plaster made from lime, sand, and other materials is spread on to a wall surface that consists of laterite or, rarely, granite. This layer contains *chunam* (*sudha*) as a powder that is made of burned shell (conch, mother-of-pearl, etc.) used in a method called *sudhalepa* and this is mixed with a solution made of molasses and small peas (*mudga*). Also added is sand that is mixed with a pulp of unripe plantain fruit. All of this is stored in wood for about two months, being mixed daily before it is used for plaster. First it must be ground on granite and sprinkled with more molasses until a buttery paste results. No fibrous admixture is employed. The coating is trowelled with a tool made of metal or wood and after the surface dries it is brushed with cold water. Finally it is whitewashed. Finished dry fresco paintings on this surface are not quite as tenacious to the wall as in other parts of India but they are unusually smooth.[7] Three distinct layers of the surfaces have been noted with two lines of cleavage — one under the paint itself and one under the white layer that covers the plaster — and the rough plaster itself is unusually thin at both Padmanabhapuram and Mattancheri. Proportions vary, with Silica content of 28.98% at Tirunandikara temple compared to 62.42% Silica at Padmanabhapuram, yet the wall surfaces always have a fine gloss due to trowel polishing.[8]

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[7] Jayantil R. Parekh, "The Technique of Mural Painting," *Silpi* (Madras), Vol. I, No. 2 June, 1947), pp. 28–32.

[8] P. Anujan Achan, "The Marriage Scene of Umā as depicted on the Walls of the Mattancheri Palace at Cochin," *The Journal of Indian Studies*, Vol. III, No. 1 (June, 1935), pp. 13–14.

Black is used to define completed Kerala paintings and to give them stippled illusion but it is not the first colour put down. Preliminary drawings are freely and sketchily made with yellow (Cadmium sulphide) that is overlain by red (Mercuric sulphide) on the white walls before a final red drawing is made.[9] This survives best at Mattancheri palace in some of India's happiest sacred scenes, including the marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī. Then colours are used to fill the outlines and final black details are added along with stippling marks for shading. Yellow is shaded by red, green by black, etc. Highlights are produced by leaving parts of the white wall untouched. Pigments are mixed with coconut water and a binder made from red seeds (*Arbus precatorius*), later replaced by gum arabic. Shellac varnish is not used.[10]

The extreme physical types that are shown in Kerala painting are uniquely local and they fill the compositions, so much so that background colour is almost incidental to mood. Line may be said to "costume" the figures, with contour boundaries sometimes doubled to have white trapped between in an almost appliquė pattern that contrasts outline to swelling, fleshy volume — the flat to the round. More than anywhere else, India's preference for taut, *praṇa*–filled volume in sculpture is here captured by painting. The closest stylistic comparison may be found in the painted "cloud maidens" at Sigiriya in Śri Lanka dating from the 6th century, with later Pāṇḍya and Pallava connections, rather than an Ajanta or even Tanjore with its Chola Dynasty paintings.

Palace murals of northern and southern India are more than merely special and they should appeal to any audience. They are strong, even theatrical statements in luscious colour and they may be appreciated without prior knowledge — so that the viewer is lured to understand more. One can't help but question the appearance of *gondolas* in a north Indian painting (Arki's Rājā Kṛṣan Chand evidently sided with the British during the 1857 revolt and he was exposed to European prints as curios[11]) and one is drawn by the universal appeal of deities who are both sensuous and superhuman. Battles are exciting and lovers are passionate as both are shown with unrivaled skills in colour and line. Through palace mural arts Indian aesthetics achieve mass appeal.

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[9] S. Paramasivan, "An Investigation into the Methods of Mural Paintings — A, In Cochin and Travancore," *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art*, Vol. VII (1939), pp. 18–38.

[10] Ronald M. Bernier, *Temple Arts of Kerala*, New Delhi, 1982, p. 38.

[11] Seth, p. 84.



Ceiling and Wall details of the palace at Arki in Himachal Pradesh



Detail of mural with Garuda at Mattancherry Palace, Cochin, Kerala.

The Coastal Mesolithic Industries of South India

BY

P. RAJENDRAN

The area covered in this paper includes the coastal regions of Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh; it is a major portion of the coastal regions in the south–west and south–east coasts of India. South India differs in many of the natural environmental aspects from north Indian regions. They include the nature of the terrain, availability of raw materials, eco–system, climate, closeness to the sea etc., which themselves differ from region to region. These factors definitely must have influenced the prehistoric cultures of the regions.

West coast of India is a narrow strip of land with steep gradient, flanked on the west by the Arabian sea and the east is bounded by the high scarped Western Ghats. The region comprises high terrain of different elevations dissected by numerous west flowing rivers. The region is broken here and there by the isolated hill ranges. One of the most important geomorphological formations of this region is of varied type of laterite, and it is more formed between the latitudes of 15 m and 200 m ASL. However, they are also found at high elevations as well as on the sea–coast. At some places they are also found below the present sea level which definitely indicate that the land–sea relationship had changed sometimes during the Tertiary or early Quaternary period.

The region is one of the most favoured monsoonic tract in India which experiences both the south–west and north–east monsoons. The eco–system enjoys rich fauna and floral stock which were some of the basic necessities to the prehistoric man. As far as the rock type is concerned quartzite is the most common one up to north Karnataka while south Karnataka and Kerala have quertz and gneissic rock. These are found in massive forms as well as vains, nodules and pebbles.

Unlike on the west coast, east coast of India comprises vast alluvial plains or surfaces which have gentle slope towards the sea. The lowest surface hardly exceeds of an average height of 10 m ASL. The lateritic formations are not so prominent as on the west coast. However, they are found on several elevations. Unlike on the west coast this region enjoys the availability of various types of rocks including the crypto-crystaline types.

The present eco-system indicates that they are not as rich as on the western side. Shrub vegetation is still seen in many of the places which is usually found in semi-arid regions. Some of the regions in the south-east coast, especially in Tinnevelli and Kanyakumari districts, have evidences of arid to semi-arid climate during the late Pleistocene (Joshi, Rajaguru and Rajendran, 1980). On the contrary except in the extreme south-west in Kanyakumari district nowhere in the west coast, south of Tapti, has any kind of sand dune formation which infact indicates that the region never had experienced aridity in the past.

Since Foote's discoveries a number of Stone Age sites have been unraveled from various environmental set-up in the country. However, very few Stone Age sites were reported from the coastal regions of India. Some of the mesolithic industries discovered earlier from these regions include a few sites from Bombay (Todd, 1950), Konkan (Joshi and Bopardikar, 1972), a solitary site at Chevayur near Calicut in north Kerala (Todd, ?), Tinnevelli district (Foote, 1916; Aiyappan, 1945, Zeuner and Allchin, 1956) and Andhra Pradesh (Foote, 1916; Cammiade and Burkitt, 1930; Rao, 1966; Murty, 1966; Reddy, 1968 etc.).

Till recently some of the coastal regions were left unstudied, and it was believed on the basis of certain hypothesis that these areas were uninhabited by the Prehistoric man. However, due to the combined effort made by Prof. R. V. Joshi and Dr. S. N. Rajaguru, and their students many more new sites have been discovered from various parts of the coasts. The common tool types from these sites include various types of scrapers, points, borers, burins, blades, lunates, small pebble choppers etc. With the Stone Age discoveries from the coastal Karnataka and Kerala the prehistoric studies of the west coast have taken a new dimension. Recent studies in the Tinnevelli region have recorded the high antiquity of the Mesolithic industries in these regions. (Rajendran, 1980: Joshi, Rajaguru and Rajendran, 1980). Similar industries have been reported from various parts of the coastal Andhra-Pradesh, and the industries reported from the Gambheeram river valley is one of the most classical sites on the east coast.

The mesolithic evidences from the coasts of South India is suggestive of the occurrence of an almost similar type of industries in the region (Figs. 1–6). It is observed that the mesolithic industries in South India have definitely a separate identity in their morphology, typology, technology, and on raw material utilization. The first and the foremost phenomenon is about the size of the artifacts. The artifacts from the coastal Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu show more or less similar nature in their length, breadth and thickness ratio. In the case of South Kanara artifacts they range in length from 14 to 61 mm, in breadth from 10 to 44 mm and in thickness from 5 to 33 mm, with a mean measurements of length, breadth, thickness being 37.5/27/19 mm, while Kerala implements show the range from 15 to 80 mm, 6 to 74 mm and 4 to 48 mm, with a mean measurements of 47.5/40/26 mm, and Tamil Nadu artifacts have the range from 13 to 65 mm, 5 to 63 mm and 2 to 39 mm, with a mean measurements of 39/34/20.5 mm.

Secondly the blade element is not prominent as in the case of central and north Indian industries. The rare occurrence or the absence of most of the geometric forms in these coastal industries is conspicuous. The utilization of more flakes is very prominent eventhough they were well versed in making implements on pebbles, nodules and blades as well. The occurrence of bifacial points and small choppers are some of the salient features of these coastal industries. Above all they are unassociated with pottery and metal objects.

The utilization of the locally available raw material is common and some of the industries on the south–west coast are entirely made on quartz. Quartz and chert are used in an equal proportion in some of the sites in the south east coast. Shells and bones have also been rarely utilized for tool making at Idindakarai and Athankarai sites in Tinnevelli district (Pl. 5). Implements made on indurated shells had been earlier reported from Bombay (Todd, 1950).

Eventhough the natural environmental settings on these coastal regions marginally vary from place to place the Mesolithic material cultural evidences obtained from these areas show more or less identical nature in their general characteristics unlike in the earlier cultures of the region. A common standardized morphological and typo–technological features have been observed, and they show certain differences from the central and north Indian mesolithic industries where the true microlithic assemblages are represented. Thus it is obvious that the coastal mesolithic industries in south India have a separate identity in their general features such as the occurrences of comparatively larger tools, prominence in flake element, lesser blade forms and the absence of geometric types, pottery, metal objects etc.

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

PLATE I Mesolithic Artificials from Uppinangadi, South India.



PLATE II Mesolithic Artifacts from Malampuzha, Kerala.



PLATE III Mesolithic Artifacts from Podippara, South India.



Plate IV Mesolithic Artifacts from Sawyerpuram, Tamil Nadu.



Plate V

Reddy, K. T., and P. V. Prakash, 'Microlithic Industries from north–east coast of Andhra Pradesh', Xth ICAES post–plenary symposium on the Recent Advances in IPPA, Poona, 1978. (It is under print.)

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The Influence of Buddhism on the Cult of Jagannāth

BY

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Jagannāth is a unique institution. It is represented by the cult images of some primitive people. Yet it has no exclusiveness about it and in the caste-ridden Hindu society the worship stands for the boldest universalism in principle. In practice it is unreservedly cosmopolitan. In the course of time it has developed no fanaticism, not even any ceremonial initiation. The aggression of time has undoubtedly somewhat screened the spirit of Jagannāth. "All Gods and goddesses attacking and appealing, have found place in the compound of the temple. Jagannath has welcomed and embraced all, but been overwhelmed by none and has lost Himself in none".[1]

However, the origin of Jagannāth is shrouded in mystery. Some scholars trace it to the Jaina or Buddhist sources while others are inclined to ascribe it to the philosophy of Vaishnavism. A number of historians and scholars have traced the evolution of this complex cult of Jagannāth through its different stages and phases and the influence of different religions shaping its course. As a result of this there have accumulated a mass of tangled, conflicting and contradictory accounts which have made the task extremely difficult on our part to discover the truth. Here a fresh attempt has been made to present an objective account of the origin of the cult of Jagannāth with particular reference to the influence of Buddhism on it.

The Temple Complex

It is a fact that from time immemorial many religious cults and sects from the North as well as from the South of India have found their abode in Orissa. Here, they had shed their angularities and gradually came to assimilate to a common type finally gathering themselves under the shadow of Jagannāth. Therefore "it is next to impossible, however interesting the problem might be, to reduce this chequered mosaic of faiths and fables to any systematic or regular pattern".[2] Hence, only a few outstanding features can be recovered on the basis of adequate linguistic equipment, patient industry and the spirit of enquiry untinctured by dogmatism or love of airy theorising.

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[1] Pt. Nilakantha Dash, "The Cult of Jagannath" *Orissa Review*, Vol. xxxiii, July, 1977, p.1.

All great religious movements in Orissa have ultimately converged in the Jagannāth. Thus traces of Buddhist, Saivite and Tāntric forms of worship are to be discerned in the worship of Jagannāth. "Of this religious syncretism, Jagannāth forms the ultimate result. He has assimilated to himself a wider range of attributes than any of the Gods of Rome and Greece".[3] It was during the reign of Chodaganga (1078–1147 A. D.) that the Jagannāth was firmly rehabilitated as a Vishnuvite deity, but non–Vishnuvite elements in his worship were not rejected. Thus even now "the worship of Jagannath is carried on according to the Tantras"[4]. Hunter was of the opinion that Jagannāth was originally a Buddhist deity. He says "Vaishnavism at Puri is but the successor of older Buddhist creed".

It has also been pointed out that the "Philosophy of the Upaniṣhads gave rise to Buddhism and Jainism in Eastern India and to the worship of Krishna–Vāsudeva in western India almost contemporaneously."[5] Thus it is clear that Jagannāth did not originate with Krishna–Vāsudev. Though religious beliefs were based on different schools of philosophy, they were nevertheless interrelated. Consequently Brāhmanism, Buddhism and Jainism were not different religions in the same sense as Hinduism and Islam. All these three religions were like the different branches of the same tree. They flourished side by side. Sometimes one had the ascendancy and sometimes another. Orissa welcomed religious preachers of various sects—Shankarācharya, Rāmānuja, Nānāk and Sri Chaitanya. It had a tradition of religious toleration. That is why by about the first century B. C. Kharavela, an ardent Jaina, declared that he was a "Sava–Pāsaṇḍa–Pujaka" (worshipper of all religions) and "Sava–Devayātana-Samkāra–Kārako" (repairer of temples of all sects). Narasinghadēva, who built the Sun Temple, was a worshipper of Durgā–mahīṣamardini (Durgā–putra), Jagannāth

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[2] Sir J. N. Sarkar in Foreword to *History of Medieval Vaishnavism in Orissa*, by P. Mukherjee, p. iii.

[3] Hunter, *Orissa*, Vol. I, p. 300,

[4] S.N. Rai *The Early Temple in Orissa – The Prachi*, Vol. II, p. 2.

[5] R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaishnavism, Saivism and other Minor Religious Systems* India, Edn., Poona, 1938, p. 89.

(Puruṣottama) and Śiva Liṅga (Parama Maheśwar). The Guptas were Vaiṣnavas and naturally patronised Vaiṣhnavism in Orissa during their rule. Buddhism received most liberal patronage from Aśōka and Harṣhavardhana as well as from the local Bhauma–Kara rulers. There was also a time when an attempt was made on the part of Brahmanism to absorb the declining Buddhism in its fold while Buddhism was also making efforts to retain its identity by taking in part of Brahmanism, viz., Tāntricism. From the Buddhist ruins discovered at Udayagiri and Lalitagiri we find traces of influence of Tantra cult. It has to be borne in mind that this influence was not confined to Buddhism alone. Śaivism and Vaiṣhnavism also were influenced by it. When Buddhism, Śaivism and Vaiṣhnavism were all strongly influenced by Tāntricism they tended to lose their separate identities. Therefore "in Orissa under aegis of Jagannāth a noble attempt was made to achieve a synthesis of all religions. He appears before devotees in many guises as Vishnu, Siva, Buddha, Krishna, Rama and as the universal god."[6] It has again been admitted by almost all the scholars that there was an earlier shrine for Jagannāth from very ancient time, but the Temple which Chodaganga began to erect was destined to make Jagannāth Puri one of the most renowned centres of religion in all India. The Temple of Jagannāth, as the supreme abode of Vaishnavism, has invited millions of Hindus, the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Śaivas alike from all parts of India for all these centuries. Chodaganga's immortal work was meant not for Orissa but for India, not for his time, but for all times. His worthy successors completed and developed the Temple complex and made Puri a city of religious splendour and of fabulous ceremonies.[7]

Buddhist Influences

The first mention of Jagannāth as a manifestation of the Buddha is found in the work Jñānasiddhi of Indrabhuti, the King of Uddiyāna, who was the founder of Vajrayāna system of Buddhism and the son of the King of Sambhal of Sambalpur (district). Indrabhuti's monumental work in Sanskrit *Jñānasiddhi* begins with an invocation to Jagannāth who is said to have been manifestation of the Buddha.[8] This work has been assigned to 717 A. D. Jagannāth has been described as the famous deity of Odra or Utkal in the famous Tāntric works like *Kālikā Purāṇa,*[9] *Rudrayāmala* and *Brahmayāmala.* There are many other literary references which may be cited to support the Buddhist origin of Lord Jagannāth. In *Dharma Pujā Vidhān* we find perhaps the earliest literary reference to Jagannāth's identification with Buddha. It records, "Appearing as Buddha on the sea coast, oh Lord, Thou lookest graciously".[10] According to *Mahāyanists,* Ādi Buddha or Svayambhu created in the beginning five Dhyānī Buddhas" for the duration of the present systems of the world. This theory of creation is, exactly what is to be found in Chaitanya Dasa's work *Vishnugarbha Purāṇa*".[11] The Lord said, "Listen, Achyuta, to what I say. In the Kaliyuga I have made myself manifest again as Buddha."[12]

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[6] Dr. K. S. Behera, Indian History Congress Souvenir, Bhubaneswar Session, 1977, p. 42.

[7] Dr. M. N. Das, Indian History Congress Souvenir, Bhubaneswar Session, 1977, p. 34.

[8] Two Vajrayana works published by O. R. Institute, Baroda, First Verse, Chapter I "Pranipatya Jagannāthaṁ Sarvajinavararehitam
Sarva Buddhamayam Siddhivyapinam Gaṅganopam".

According to a tradition recorded in the 'Dāru–Brahma–Gitā' of Jagannāth Dāsa, after Lord Krishna left the world his earthly remains were placed on the funeral pyre but the navel portion could not be consumed by fire. So it was floated on the sea and it reached Nilāchala. King Indradyumna was ordered by Vishnu to place the navel portion in a wooden image and worship it as Vishnu. But Brahmanism does not advocate the worship of any part of the dead body as Buddhism does. So this tradition simply indicates that some Buddhist story had been later modelled to give it a Brāhmanic appearance.

There are also various other traditions which are found in the Utkala Khaṇḍa of the Skanda Purāṇa, Brahma Purāṇa, Nārada Purāṇa, Padma Purāṇa, Kapila Samhita, Nilādrī Mahōdaya as well as in ancient works in Oriya, Bengali and Telgu. The substance of all these traditions is the same viz., that Jagannāth was being worshipped by a Savar and King Indradyumna subsequently installed him in a temple. In the Buddha-Gāna-O-Dohā (8th Cen. A.D.), edited by M. Haraprasad Sastri, there is mention of King Indrabhuti who has been identified with Indradyumna by some scholars. Indrabhuti was the king of Uddīyana, which is also identified with Orissa. "Discovery of the images of Kurukulla of the Uddiyan Tantra in many places of Orissa fully supports the above identification."[13] In no other place of India worship of Kurukulla has been found. Indrabhuti was a learned scholar of Vajrayāna. Therefore it is clear that Jagannāth had a Buddhist origin.

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[9] Panchanana Tarkaratna, (ed). *Kālika Purāna*. Ch. 64, p. 410. "Katyayinim Jagannath maudera cha Prapujayet"

[10] Dharmapujā Vidhān, pp. 206–207. "Jaladhir tire sthana Baudha rupe Bhagavan haiya tumi Kripabalokana."

[11] N. N. Basu, *Modern Buddhism in Orissa*, p. 295.

[12] Achyutānandas' Surya Samhitā — Ch. XXVIII – Prachi Society Publication. "Kalijuga Buddharupe Prakaśilu Puṇi'.

Śaṅkarāchārya (788–825 A. D.) visited Puri and founded the Bhogavardhan Pīṭha and according to tradition by his vast learning and irrefutable arguments converted many of the Buddhists. It therefore seems probable, though definite evidence is lacking, that Śaṅkarāchārya "converted Jagannāth from the Buddhist to a Brahmanical deity. So Puri was a strong centre of Buddhism before his time."[14]

It has also been pointed out that the principal Buddhist symbol is the Tri–Ratna or 'Trippl Gem' symbol which is found in all the countries wherever Buddhism is prevailed. Here in Orissa the three uncouth figures of Jagannāth, his sister and brother have been derived from three of these symbols. "I may add that the Jagannāth figure in Orissa is universally believed to contain a bone of Krishna, but as Brahmans do not worship the relics of their Gods I conclude that this bone must be a relic of Buddha and rude figure of Jagannath in which it is contained is one of the old Tri–Ratna or 'Trippl Gem' symbol of the Buddhist Triad."[15] Recently a stone of Asoka, polished with the symbols of Buddha, Dharma and Sangha at the top, has been found at Bhubaneswar. These symbols are a little different from those found at Sāñchi, but the Bhubaneswar symbols are almost exactly like the images of Jagannāth, Balabhadra and Subhadrā. It proves that the worship of symbols were prevalent in Orissa since the period of Aśōka.

It is therefore believed that the 'simple–minded' Savaras of Orissa were converted to Buddhism during the reign of Aśōka. When Mahāyanism was introduced, worship of images came into vogue and the three symbols were represented on pieces of wood and naturally an attempt was made to give them the appearance of human beings as far as possible. Of the three images Jagannāth was considered to stand for Buddha of Buddhism.

Dharma in Buddhism is believed to be a female. In Sangha i. e., the monastic order of Buddhists the relationship between the monks and the nuns is that between brother and sister. The Savaras accordingly treated two of the images as brothers and the third as their sister.

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[13] Dr. H. K. Mahatab, *History of Orissa*, Vol. II, 1960, p. 518.
[14] Dr. B. Bhattacharya, *Buddhist Iconography*, Introduction, p. xxvii.
[15] SirA. Cunningham, Bhilsa Tops–Chap. xxvii. p. 351.

Festival such as Snānayātra (bathing festival) and Rath Yātrā (car festival) were introduced after these wooden images came into existence. Snānayātra is celebrated in the full moon day of Jaishtha. To bring out the image of Buddha once a year and then give it a bath was a part of the Buddhistic origin. Again as in Buddhism there is absolutely no caste distinctions inside sanctuary. All the castes are represented on equal footing. Priests of Jagannāth belong to both Brāhmin and Śūdra castes. Even Jagannāth's offerings (Mahāprasād) play a significant role in overcoming caste–hindrances. A Brāhmin and a low born Chaṇḍāla may partake mahāprasād from the same plate. The non–sectarian character of Jagannāth will be all the more apparent if only one goes through a list of monasteries (Maṭhas) situated at Puri. Scholars have enumerated as many as 133 monasteries, most of them having connection with temple of Jagannāth in one way or the other. The fact that different sects co–exist here proves the non–sectarian catholic spirit of the presiding deity of the place. Fa–hien (5th cen. A. D.) gives a graphic account of the Car Festival at Khotan which is exactly similar to the Car Festival of Jagannāth in modern days. In Khotan the festival was held in the month of Aṣhāṭha and the King swept the floors of the cars. It should be remembered that there is no place for Car Festivals in the ceremonials in connection with the worship of Krishṇa–Vāsudēva or any other manifestation of Vishṇu. So we may say that the Car Festival is a "distinct Buddhist contribution".

Again in the 8th and the 9th centuries Brāhmaṇism tried to absorb Buddhism in its fold by accepting Buddha as an incarnation of Vishṇu and thus dealt a death blow to Buddhism as a separate religion. It may be pointed out here that "in the ten incarnations of Vishnu, inscribed on the gateway of the temple of Jagannāth in Puri, Buddha, the ninth incarnation, has been replaced by Jagannāth."[16]

It is difficult to ascertain the exact date when the Buddha was regarded as an incarnation of Vishṇu. Scholars generally suppose that it was in the eighth century and in the 12th century the celebrated sanskrit poet Jayadēva in his work *Gita Govinda* had sung the glory of Buddha as one of the ten incarnations.[17] Thus we may conclude that in the 7th and 8th century A. D. when the Buddha was taken as an incarnation of Vișhṇu, Jagannāth was considered to be an incaration of Vișhṇu. So when Buddha was regarded as an incarnation there was no change in the form of Jagannāth's worship, but he came to be considered as a God of the Vaișhṇavas. "In this way Buddhism lost itself in Vaishnavism."[18] Again, Jayadēva in his book associated Hari with Jagadīśa. The same title was given to Buddha by Indrabhuti in his Jñānasiddhi. "The choice of the word 'Jagannāth' by Indrabhuti and that of the word 'Jagadīśa' by Jayadeva are not of an accidental coincidence".[19]

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[16] S. P. Dasgupta, *Obscure Religious Cults*, p.319.

Several other instances may be cited to establish the Buddhist origin of the cult of Jagannāth. In 1200 A.D., a Buddhist pilgrim by name Lāmā Tāranath[20] gave an account of the mysterious tradition regarding the construction of a Buddha image, which has some resemblance with the construction of the image of Lord Jagannāth. A certain Brāhmin named Kalyāṇa wanted to make an image of Buddha. Accordingly he built a temple and engaged many carpenters including Viśvakarmā to make the image. The temple was to be closed for seven days so that construction of the image could be completed. After five days Kalyāṇa's mother apprehended the death of her son inside the temple and opened it before the scheduled date and found there an image half made. Such a tradition is also prevalent in Orissa regarding the construction of the image of Jagannāth.

It is necessary to point out here that the insignia of the *Chakra* was recognised even from the time of Aśōka when the symbol of *Dharma Chakra* was first introduced. In some Pali texts, i.e., the Aṅguttara Nikāya and Mahāsudarśana Sutta[21] we find that an emperor should possess seven precious things, one of which is the Chakra Ratna. So also the Nila Chakra (Blue Wheel) majestically takes the topmost position on the *S'ikhara* of the Jagannāth Temple, which is regarded as a centre of hope and aspiration and as an object of awe and wonder by the multitudes.

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[17] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in Foreward to 2500 *Years of Buddhism*, p. xiv.
"nindasi Yajña bidherahaha Sṛtijātam,
S'adaya hṛdaya darsitapasughātam,
Keśavadhruta Buddha Śasīra Jaya Jagadisahare."

[18] Dr. H. Mahatab, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

[19] Dr. K. C. Misra, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[20] Tales of Taranath-quoted in *Prajatantra Special Issue*, 23 June, 1963.

[21] *Indian Culture*, Vol. XV No. 1-4, p. 181.

A close study of the archaeological and literary sources of the history of Orissa reveals that centuries before the birth of Christ, Kaliṅga was the cradle of various religions. Some of her children appear to have come in personal contact with the Buddha in his life time. The Burmese legends credit Tapasu and Bhallika, two merchants of Utkal, with the rare privilege of receiving the doctrine of Buddhism from the Lord Buddha himself.[22]

Synthesis of Buddhism with Śaivism as well as Vaishṇavism

Thus Buddhism continued to receive royal patronage and popular support in Kaliṅga. The Buddhists during the Sailodbhava period, seem to have embraced Śaivism and adopted Liṅga worship. They also inscribed a part of their sacred verse namely "Yo Dharma hetu Pravabhā heturjasya Tathāgatah" on a Liṅgam. One such Liṅgam was discovered from the district of Balasore in Orissa."[23] Similarly Vishṇu worship by a Buddhist king of Jāva may be taken as a significant reference while considering the above synthesis. The inscription runs, "Honour be also to him who is well known in the world as Trivikrama (Vishṇu), who is at all time saluted by the Lord of the Dēvas (i.e., Indra)[24] .... In another inscription on the same island found at Kelurak (incised in Śāka 704 i. e., 782 A. D.) we find Buddhist God Mañjuśrī whose symbolic feature corresponds to two rounded eyes and the mouth of the present image of Jagannāth. Buddhists of this island probably borrowed these ideas from the Mahāyanists of the coastal tracts of Kaliṅga and also from the Brahmanical sects who worshipped Vishṇu.

Jagannāth is regarded as the presiding deity of Orissa—the Rāshṭradēvatā. This idea of a Rāshṭradēvatā who is supposed to protect the kingdom where he is worshipped, has come down to us from the Buddhist Jatakas of the 5th or the 6th century B. C.

For example, in the 'Culla Kaliṅga Jātaka', it is mentioned that once there was a war between the Kings of Kaliṅga and Aśvaka and their Rāshṭradēvatās fought each other in the shape of two bulls, black and white.[25] Similarly a most popular legend in vogue in Orissa records the exploits of Purusottama Gajapati, the King of Orissa, against the king of Kañchi in order to compel him to give his daughter Padmāvati in marriage to the Gajapati King. It is said that Jagannāth and Balabhadra mounted on the white and black horses respectively, participated in the war and contributed to the ultimate victory of Kaliṅga.

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[22] Olden Berg's Vinaya Pitaka, pp. 1–3; Anguttaranikāya, part–1, Ch. x.
[23] *O. H. R. J.* Vol. I, pp. 271–73.
[24] Translation by B. R. Chaterjee 'India and Java', pp. 65–66.

Conclusion

The evidences cited above establish the unmistakable impress of Buddhism in the origin of the cult of Jagannāth. But it will be a mistake to think that it was Buddhism alone which went into the formulation of the cult. Jagannāth has housed an infinite multitude of different sects and creeds. This is the Jagannāth Dharma and this is the Sanātana Dharma, the faith which refuses to be eclipsed—which rejuvenates itself at every stage—and absorbs and integrates the basic tenets of all historical religions. This is "precisely the reason why we find even today the remnants of different ritual performances associated with a single religious system in this land."[26]

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[25] E. B. Cowell, *The Jatakas*, Vol. III, No. 301, p. 4.

[26] W. J. Wilkins, *Hindu Mythology, Vedic and Puranic*, pp. 254–55.

Gaṇapati Worshipped as Vighnesha

BY

B. R. SHARMA

Gaṇapati (Gaṇeśa) has been worshipped as 'Vighnesha' — the Lord of obstacles since hoary past in India. 'Vighneśvara' has been probably the most important aspect of Gaṇapati. Being the 'Lord of Obstacles', he has been regarded to be capable enough either to create or to eradicate obstructions, and it is because of this concept that he has been considered both as malevolent as well as a benevolent deity. The Maṅgaladātā (giver of auspiciousness) and Sidhidātā (bestower of success) traits have been closely associated with Gaṇapati's Vighneśvara aspect because while destroying the impediments and hardships from the path of his devotees, he has also been acting as Kalyāṇakārī and Sidhidātā and thus paving the way for progress and prosperity.

After scanning the entire vedic literature, we come to know that the vedic people were quite conversant with the 'Vighneśvara aspect of Gaṇapati. A Rigvedic verse speaks of Brahmṇaspati, i.e., Gaṇapati, as being propitiated to destroy poverty and famine.[1] At some other place in the same text, while invoking Gaṇapati, it is described that no work can be done without his presence,[2] and this adequately indicates Gaṇapati as the 'Lord of Obstacles'. A verse in the second *maṇdala* of the Rigveda clearly points to the benevolent aspect of Vighneśvara where he is addressed as the 'best protector' and the text also assures that who ever it safeguarded by Brahmṇaspati (Gaṇapati) he is neither beaten by the enemies nor does he suffer from sins; the obstacles cannot impede for progress and no one can cause any pain, sorrow or misery to him.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, 10/155/2.
[2] *Ibid.*, 10/112/9.
[3] *Ibid.*, 2/23/5,

An important hymn, which occurs both in the Rigveda[4] and the Yajurveda,[5] sufficiently speaks of the auspicious aspect of the deity. In the Yajurveda we find a devotee seeking refuge in Gaṇapati and invoking him for protection.[6] The Atharvaveda also makes an important insinuation regarding his benevolent trait where he is prayed to mould the dangerous teeth of the child into auspicious ones.[7] This aspect of Gaṇapati is again hinted at in the same text where he is propitiated for protection from various types of demons.[8]

The Vināyaka-kalpa of the Bauddhāyana-Gṛhya-Sūtras also indicates towards the Sidhidātā aspect of Gaṇapati where it is described that in order to propitiate the deity (Vināyaka), he should be offered prasāda (presents).[9] Where a description of vighnas (obstacles) is found in this text there also it speaks of the worship of Vighneśvara (the Lord of Obstacles) for the destruction of various kinds of obstructions and hindrances.[10] The Manusmṛti, while pointing towards the malevolent aspect of Gaṇapati[11] says that the worshippers of Gaṇapati were debarred from being entertained at the Srādha ceremony.[12] The Yājñavalya Smṛti describes him both as the creator of obstacles as well as the averter of troubles.[13] The Bṛhat-Prāśara Smṛti after describing several types of vighnas (obstacles)[14] also prescribes the worship of Gaṇapati (Vighneśa) for removing the evil influences of Vighneśa (Gaṇapati).[15] The Mahābhārata, the great epic, which speaks of the omnipresence and the plurality of Gaṇapati-Vināyaka, also assures us that though basically a malevolent deity yet Gaṇapati can be made benevolent by proper propitiation.[16]

The Rṣi of the Brhajjabala Upanishad while addressing him as Vighneśa[17] also points out towards this important aspect of Gaṇapati.

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[4] *Ibid.*, 2/23/19; 2/24/16.
[5] Yajurveda, 34/58.
[6] *Ibid.*, 3/30.
[7] Atharvaveda, 6/140/1.
[8] *Ibid.*, 8/6/15.
[9] Bauddhāyana Gṛhya Sūtra, 3/10/1.
[10] *Ibid.*, 3/10/2.
[11] Mānava Gṛhya Sūtra, 2/14.
[12] Manusmṛti, 3/64.
[13] Yājñavalkya Smṛti, 2/293.
[14] Brhat Parāśara Smṛti, 11/9.
[15] *Ibid.*, 71/31.
[16] Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana Parva, 151/26/57.
[17] Brhajjabala Upaniṣad, 4/22.

The Gāṇapatya-tharvaśīrṣopaniṣad also directs to worship Gaṇapati as the Destroyer of Obstructions which is a clear cut indication of the vighneśvara aspect of Gaṇapati.

In the Amarakośa Gaṇapati has also been addressed as "Vighnarāja" which sufficiently speaks of his vighneśvara aspect.[18]

The entire Purāṇic literature describes in detail the vighneśvara aspect of Gaṇapati. According to Śiva Purāṇa, Lord Śiva himself bestowed upon Gaṇapati the competence and ability to destroy vighnas.[19] The author of the Purāṇa enjoins that whoever is ambitious for achieving anything whatsoever, must propitiate Gaṇapati as he is competent enough to fulfil all sorts of aspirations and realize all types of ambitions.[20]

It is also assured that sincere devotees of Gaṇapati would automatically achieve every sort of success; and all types of obstructions and impediments would be eradicated from his path of progress.[21] Even listening of the glories and prayers of Gaṇapati is said to be enough to confer all the desired objects.[22]

The Brahmā Purāṇa also refers to the vighneśvara aspect of Gaṇapati.[23]

The Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa of the Padma Purāṇa describes in detail the vighneśvara aspect of Gaṇapati where vighnarāja is invoked to destroy the enemies and to protect the yajñas.[24]

In the Mudgala Purāṇa Gaṇeśa has been described as the giver of the boon of fearlessness to the devotees, and also as destroyer of the wicked beings.[25]

The Liṅga Purāṇa believes that Vighneśvara was incarnated to destroy the demons and to assist the gods, the Brāhmaṇas and the spiritualists in the performance of good deeds. It is also said that Bala Gaṇeśvara protects his devotees by all means, and that Vighneśvara has also been worshipped even by the Trinity — Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva. This Purāṇa also emphasises that for the destruction of the obstructions and for obtaining the desired results, the worship of this god, Gaṇapati, is certainly very significant.[26]

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[18] Amarakośa, V, 38.
[19] Śiva Purāṇa, Rūdra Saṁhitā, Kumāra Khaṇḍa, 18/31.
[20] *Ibid.*, 18/60.
[21] *Ibid.*, 18/21.
[22] *Ibid.*, 18/75, 79.
[23] Brahma Purāṇa, 119/6; 114/8; 114/22.
[24] Padma Purāna Sṛṣṭi Khaṇḍa, 61/26–28.
[25] Mudgala Purāṇa, 2/52/11.

In the Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa the vighneśvara aspect of Gaṇapati has also been stressed upon. While tendering the salutations to Gaṇapati, the author of the Purāṇa explains that "Vighnanāyaka" stands for the destroyer of misfortunes and hardships.[27] Obeisance is also offered to "Vighnavināśaka" — the Destroyer of obstructions in the Sṛikṛṣṇa Janmakhaṇda of the same Purāṇa.[28] In the same Khaṇda of the Purāṇa he is invoked to eradicate impediments and also prayed for auspiciousness.[29] In the Gaṇapati Khaṇda of the same text, he is also addressed as "Vighnavināyaka" — the Lord of Obstacles.[30]

The Brahmāṇda Purāṇa also speaks in the same strain of the Vighneśvarasvarūpa of Gaṇapati.[31] The author of the Garuḍa Purāṇa too adores him as Vighnarāja.[32]

The Gaṇeśa Purāṇa, naturally, throws much light on this important aspect of Gaṇeśa. The author of this Purāṇa lays sufficient stress on this aspect of Gaṇapati when he directs that the aspirants and devotees who wish to obtain the auspicious things, must worship Gaṇapati.[33] While tendering the devotional salutations to Gaṇeśa, he is addressed as "the Destroyer of the enemies of the gods"[34] and also as "the Destroyer of the demons."[35] The reciting of his name, according to the

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[26] Liṅga Purāṇa, 105/15, 204/21, 27.

[27] Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa, Gaṇapati Khaṇda, 44/90, 92.

[28] *Ibid.*, Sṛkṛiṣṇa, Janmakhaṇda, 121/100.

[29] *Ibid.*, 121/103–104.

[30] *Ibid.*, Gaṅapati Khaṅda, 3/44, 85.

[31] Brahmaṇda Purāṇa, 4/42–44

[32] Garuda Purāṇa, 1/29–20

[33] Gaṇeśa Purāṇa, 2/55/28

[34] *Ibid.*, 2/16/11

[35] *Ibid.*, 2/16/13

Gaṇeśa Purāṇa is capable enough of drying up the ocean of obstacles.[36]

From the above discussion it has to be deduced that "Vighneśvara" is an important aspect of Gaṇapati. It is also clear that this has been recognized and respected from very ancient times in India — right ftom the vedic times, but gradually, with the passage of time, this aspect of Gaṇapati gained more popularity — especially in the Purānic period.

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[36] *Ibid.*, Upāsanā. Khanda, 1/1.

Panchangulanka *

BY

A. L. SRIVASTAVA

Auspiciousness has been an important feature in Indian life. In literature and art we come across many auspicious motifs (*māṅgalika pratīka*) such as *Svastika, Śrīvatsa, Triratna, Chakra* (wheel), *Kalaśa* (vase), *Darpaṇa* (mirror), *Paraśu* (axe), *Āsana* (seat), *Mālā* (garland), *Mīna–mithuna* (fish–pair), *Chhatra* (parasol), *Chāmara* (fly–whisk), etc. *Pañchāṅgula* is one of them. It is a mark of the right palm with all its fingers stretched out. The mark is impressed with a paste called *aipana* or *pīṭhī* (*pishṭa*) made of rice–flour and turmeric. It is, therefore, rightly called *pishṭa-pañchāṅgulāṅka* which means the impression of five fingers taken from the paste of rice.

Pishṭa–pañchāṅgulāṅka has been used as an auspicious motif from very early times. Even today the motif *pañchāṅgula* is used on the occasion of the birth of a son, the inaugural ceremony (*gṛihapraveśa*) of a newly built house, the marriage and other ceremonies. The motif is particularly favourite with the women–folk. The *pañchāṅgulāṅka* is referred to in ancient literature and also in certain inscriptions. The motif is depicted along with some prehistoric cave–paintings, early stone bas–reliefs and a detached terracotta hand found at Mathura.

The marks of *pañchāṅgula* are made one above the other, on both the sides of the door–jamb, specially of a room wherein the birth of a child, mainly that of a male one, takes place. Besides, the lintel of the door of the room is decorated with hanging garlands of mango leaves and flowers (*bandanavāra*). The tradition was known even in the seventh century A. D. In the *Kādambarī*, the door–jamb of the labour room (*prasūti–gṛiha*) of the queen Vilāsavatī, has been described as decorated with hanging garlands (*mālā*, *jhālara* and *bandanavāra*), studded with small tinkling bells and with the motifs of *Svastika* in rows made of cow dung on which the *cowries* and coloured cotton were imbeded. The picture of the goddess Shashṭhī wearing yellow cloths was made on one side of the door and that of the Kārttikeya seated on a peacock on the other. Figures of the moon and the sun were also drawn on either side and a cloth bearing coloured impression of *pañchāṅgula* was placed between them.[1]

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* The paper was presented at the 39th Session of Indian History Congress held at Osmania University, Hyderabad on December 28–30, 1978.

The auspicious *pañchāṅgulāṅka* is used on the occasion of marriage in Indian society. At the time of *tilaka*, a pre–marriage ceremony, people from the bride's side bring a large *thāla* or tray filled with coins, new cloth pieces, fruits and sweets and present the same to the house of the bridegroom. Amongst the presents, the cloth pieces are imprinted with the bride's right hand marks i. e., the marks of her *pañchāṅgula* or *thāpā*. The purpose of imprinting these pieces of cloth with the bride's finger prints might have been, in the beginning, to identify the girl with whom the marriage had been settled and subsequently it might have become a custom.

The pillar (*stambha* or *khambha*) of the marriage pavilion (*maṇḍapa*) is either marked with the motifs of the *pañchāṅgula* made of *aipana* or wrapped with a cloth having imprints of *pañchāṅgula* motifs on it. These *pañchāṅgulāṅkas* or five–finger prints are also made at the entrance to the house and also at the place of *kohabara* where immediately after the marriage ceremony the bride and the bridegroom are taken for performing some rites. The motif is also marked on the auspicious pot (*maṅgalakalaśa*) placed beneath the bridal pavilion. After the marriage ceremony is over the pavilion is dismantled and the *pishṭa–pañchāṅgulāṅka* is imprinted on the back of every member of the family.

Bāṇa, in the *Harshacharita* gives a graphic description of the marriage ceremony of Rājyaśrī. At one place he says that all the domestic articles like mortar, pestle, *sil*, etc., were being imprinted with *pishṭa–pañchāṅgulāṅkas*. On that occasion several kings had come and they all remained busy in various activities. Some of them were engaged in polishing and shining the floor; others erected the marriage–pole; the third group decorated the pole with garlands, flowers and coloured pieces of cloth bearing *pishṭa-pañchāṅgulāṅkas*.[2] Even the weapons of war were also decorated with this auspicious motif. In the *Rāmāyaṅa* the weapon *parigha* of Nikumbha, a *rākshasa*, is described as decorated with garlands and imprinted with the auspicious *pañchāṅgulāṅka*.[3]

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[1] *Kādambarī*, Ch. 64, *vinvastālaktakapatalapatalam*, vide Agarwala, V.S., *Kādambari: Eka Sāṁskṛitika Adhyayana*, Varanasi, 2026 v. s. p. 84.

The practice of decorating building-walls with the motifs of *pañchāṅgula* is known from ancient times. The *Mahāvaṁśa*, a chronicle of Ceylon, describes how Duttagāminī, the king of Ceylon, constructed the great stūpa over the relics of the Buddha. This stūpa had a covering of white cloth bearing designs such as railing (*vedikā*), a row of full-vases (*pūrṇa-ghaṭa*) and a row of five-finger marks (*pñchāṅgulāṅkas*).[4]

The literary evidence of the *Mahāvaṁśa* is corroborated by some *Śuṅga* bas-reliefs from Mathura and Bharhut. In them can be seen a row of the *pañchāṅgulāṅkas* depicted on the terrace (*medhi*) or the body (*aṇḍa*) of the stūpa. A *Bodhi*-temple with a *chaitya* doorway is sculptured on a stone slab from Mathura. The trunk of the tree is pictured inside the door of the temple. The roofing is finished with battlements (*kapi-śirshaka*) and decorated with a garlanded umbrella in the middle with streamers flaring on either side. On the terrace-wall of the temple there is seen a row of five-finger symbols.[5]

Pañchāṅgula marks are noticeable on the two examples of the stūpa and two of the *chaṅkrama* (walking stone) carved on the Bharhut railing. Of the two stūpas one has a row of *pañchāṅgulāṅkas* on its terrace (*medhi*)[6]; the other has the same on its body (*aṇḍa*)[7]. In another panel from Bharhut there is a covered room with three *chaitya* windows above. In the pillared hall there is a long *chaṅkrama* with flowers on its top and a row of *pañchāṅgulāṅkas* on the supporting wall.[8] A panel on the coping stone also contains *chankrama* or throne bearing the marks of *pañchāṅgula*[9].

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[2] *Harshacharita*, Ch. IV, *Pishtapañchāṅgulāmaṇḍramānolūkhala-musalasilād-yupakaranam*; *Vide*: Agrawala V. S., *Harshacharita*: *Eka Sāṁskṛitika Adhyayana*, Patna, 1964, pp. 70–72.

[3] *Râmā*., VI. 77. 2:

Tataḥ srgdāma-saunaddhaṁ, dattā pañchāṅgulaṁ śubham.
Ādade parighaṁ dhīro, mahandra śikhroopamam.

[4] *Mahāvaṁsa-Tīkā*, XXXII. 3–5 (ed. S. V. Sohoni), Nalanda, 1971, p, 540:

Chittakārehi kāresi vedikaṁ tattha sādhukam,
Pantī puṇṇa-ghaṭanaṁ cha Poñchaṅgulaṅka pantikam.

[5] See Joshi, N. P., *Life In Ancient Uttarāpatha*, Varanasi, 1967, fig. 99: Vogel' Ph., 'La Sculoturc de Mathura; *Ars Asiatica*, Vol. XV, Paris, 1930, pl. 14 A.

[6] See Cunningham, A., *The Stupa of Bharhut*, Varanasi, 1962, pl, XXXI.1.

[7] National Museum, New Delhi, Archaeological Gallery, No. 72.331.

[8] See Cunningham, A., *op. cit.*, pl. XXXI.4.

The *pañchāṅgula* motif is also used in various religious ceremonies. The women generally make seven marks of the *pañchāṅgula* (*thapiyā*) at the entrance of a temple dedicated to a goddess. It was probably intended to be the symbolic representation of the Seven Divine Mothers (*saptamātṛikās*). When Bāṇa was invited by Harsha, the former performed several religious rites before starting his journey. He worshipped Lord Śiva, granted charities to the Brāhmins, made circumambulation of a cow, put on white cloths, applied *tilaka* of white sandal on the forehead and wore a white garland. Thereafter he glanced over the full–vase (*Pūrṇa kalaśa*) which was decorated with a *pañchāṅgula* motif.[10]

The popularity of the *pañchāṅgula* motif is also supported by epigraphic evidence. At the very beginning of the Mandsaur Pillar Inscription of Yaśodharman, there is a prayer to Śiva in which it has been stated that the long banner of the god Śūlpāṇi bearing the representation of Nandī, the bull vehicle of the god, may destroy the enemy. The figure of Nandī is described here as having a mark of *pañchāṅgula* on its body imprinted by pārvatī herself.[11] It is evident from the example that during ancient days this motif was imprinted on the bodies of domestic animals on some special occasions. On the next day of *Dīpāvalī*, the festival of light, the *go–dhana–pūjā* (cattle worship) is still celebrated, in which the domestic animals are cleaned, bathed and decorated. Their horns are smeared with some greasy stuff. On the body of the animals the mark of five fingers are also made with a mixture of ochre and oil. The practice of imprinting the body of the sacrificial animals with the marks of the *pañchāṅgula* is corroborated by a reference in the *Mṛichchhakaṭikam*. When the hero Chārudatta was being taken to the place of execution, he said, "by decorating my body with the five–finger marks of red sandal, paste of rice and til, I have become a sacrificial animal."[12] The utterance of Chārudatta also makes it clear that the *pañchāṅgula* marks were imprinted even on the body of a person who had been sentenced to death.

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[9] *Ibid.*, pl.7.XLVII.7

[10] *Harshacharita*, Ch.II, *Pishṭa-pañchāngula pāṇḍuram*; *Vide* Agrawala, V. S., *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[11] Fleet, J. F., *Corpus Inscription Indicarum*, Vol. III, p. 146: Upadhyaya, Vasudeva, *Gupta Abhilekha*, Patna, 1974, p. 224.

[12] *Mṛichchhakaṭikam*, X.V:

Sarva gātreshn vinyastaiḥ raktachandana hastakaiḥ,
Pishṭa chūrṇāvakīrṇaścha purushoham paśūkṛitaḥ.

Not only the marks of *pañchāṅgula* were imprinted but their figures were also made which might have been used in some special rites. This fact has come to light with the discovery of a terracotta hand from Sonkh near Mathura.[13] R. Hartel, a well–known archaeologist from Germany unearthed this example which measures 3.1 × 2.1 cms. from the 27th strata assigned to the first century B. C.[14] All the five fingers are stretched open with its palm bearing three motifs, the Śrīvatsa, the Nandipada and the Svastika. This terracotta hand is not a detached part of an image but is an independent *pañchāṅgula* and appears to have been used in some tāntric rite.[15]

On a coping stone from Bharhut there is a curious representation of a *pañchāṅgulāṅka*. The scene shows an altar or throne behind which are four lions; on the right are five persons standing in an attitude of adoration, while one is seated on the left in mournful attitude, his head leaning against the left hand. In front are two demonical heads and a bundle of faggots burning; at one end of the bundle is a small serpent and at the other a small human figure lying prostrate. Between the two demonical heads there is a motif of *pañchāṅgula*. Above the scene there is an inscription in Brāhmī characters, *Dadani Kamo Chakamo*.[16]

Scholars are at variance about the correct identity of the scene. According to Cunningham, the scene represents one of the sixteen Buddhist hells.[17] Barua, on the other hand, says that the scene relates to a cremation ground (*śmaśāna*) referred to in the *Urga Jātaka*.[18] Lüders thinks that the scene shows the victory of a saint or the Bodhisattva over Māra who is in a mourning mood while the devas are seen praising the saint.[19]

None of these scholars has mentioned the significance of the *pañchāṅgula* motif depicted in the scene. The purpose of the mark of five fingers in this scene, however, is not very clear. It may represent the five elements (*pañcha tattva*) namely the earth (*kshiti*), the water (*jala*), the fire (*pāvaka*), the sky (*gagana*) and the air (*samīra*). The composition of all these five elements is symbolised by birth and the decomposition of the body by death. The posture of the outstretched five fingers of the right hand is also indicative of the gift of fearlessness (*abhayadāna.*)[20]

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[13] 'Sabhyatā kī Saintīsa Paraten, *Nayā Pratīkā*, Delhi, May, 1974, p. 60, fig. 2.

[14] Through personal correspondence with Shri R. C. Sharma, Director, Govt., Museum, Mathura.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] See Cunningham, A., *op. cit.*, pl. XLVII.7; Barua, B. M., *Bharhut* Bk. III,

[17] Gunningham, A., *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[18] Barua, B. M., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 121.

[19] *Corpus Inscription Indicarum*, Vol. II, pp. 174–76.

The use of this *pañchāṅgula* in human life extending from the birth to the death shows the wide popularity of the motif. The *pañchāṅgula* motif is indeed of great antiquity. Its marks are noticeable in prehistoric rock–paintings. Sorhoghāṭ, Kobhar and Kaṇḍākoṭ rocky hills in the Mirzapur district of Uttar Pradesh contain a number of *pañchāṅgula* marks made in ocher colour.[21] At some spots there is mark of a single hand, while at others the marks of both the hands are found imprinted.[22] Recently *pañchāṅgula*, with certain marks have been noticed at Rock–shelter No. III F–17[23] and 2 from No. III E–12[24] at Bhimbetka in the Hoshangabad district in Madhya Pradesh. Similar *pañchāṅgulāṅkas* have been seen in the rock–shelters of Barkherā in the district of Raisen and also at Sagar,[26] both in Madhya Pradesh.

Alam, a long banner–pole wrapped with a coloured cloth and crowned with a silver *pañchāṅgula*, is carried by Muslims in a procession on the eve of Moharram. The *alam* or the banner is also called *pañjā*. It carries different meanings. According to a legend, at the time of *alam* at Karbalā both the hands of Hazrat Abbās were cut, but he held the *alam* erect with his teeth and arms (*bhujamūla*). Subsequently he died of the wounds inflicted by a lance (*gurja*) on his head. Owing to this sacrifice and to commemorate the event the *pañjā*, a symbol of his hand, is taken out in procession. According to another view Hazrat Mohammad went on *merāj* (a journey to divine worlds) and after visiting all the heights (*bulandī*) he met Khudā, the Almighty. The distance between them was merely that of the size of the two bows (*kamāna*). There was a curtain in between them when they chatted. The hand of Hazrat Alī was seen through the curtain by Hazrat Mohammad. The same hand is taken out in procession as *alam* during Moharram.[27]

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[20] For detailed discussion on the panel see author's another paper 'Fresh Light on Bharhut Panel' to be published in the *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art*, Calcutta.

[21] Jagadish Gupta, *Pragaitihāsikā Bhāratīya Chitrakalā*, Delhi, 1967, p. 439; see *Pujā-pratika*, pl. VIII, 3.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] Maṭhapal, Yaśodhara, 'Bhimbeṭakā ke Śailachitron kā Kāla-Nirdhāraṇa,' *Prāchya Pratibhā*, Vol. III, No.2 p. 108.

[24] See Wakankar, V. S., 'Bhimbetka: The Prehistoric Paradise', *Prācya Prātibha*, Vol. III, No. 2 Fig.4.

[25] See *Mārg*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4 (September, 1975), pl. VII, Figs. 7, 8.

[26] *Ibid.*

There is plenty of evidence to show that the *pañchāṅgulāṅka*, a symbol of five, was an auspicious one. The number of five is indeed significant, *pañcha-tattva*, the five elements, *pañchāmṛita*, the five nectars and *pañcha-parameśvara* or *pañchāyatana* the five judges in a community–court, are conspicuous in Indian life. The Sikh community gives importance to five things namely, *kaṅghā* (comb), *keśa* (hair), *kṛipāṇa* (sword), *kachchhā* (underwear) and *kaḍā* (an iron ring). Even the Indian Muslims feel that number five is auspicious. The five great persons in their eyes are called *panjatan*. They include Hazrat Mohammad, his daughter Fātimā, nephew and son–in–law Hazrat Alī and his grandsons Hasana and Hussaina.[28]

Obviously, the *pañchāṅgulāṅka* represents the hand. The hand has power of action (*karma*) and action is the means of worldly duties (*dharma*). We take our meals with hands; write with hands; swim with hands; excavate ponds, canals and hills with hands; throw weapons, plough fields, manufacture the clothings, ornaments, furniture and different tools and express sorrow and happiness with hands. Hands have a vital role in human activity. This importance of the hand constitutes the basis for saying *Apanā Hātha Jagannātha* (our own hand is the lord of the world). Not only this, even the auspicious look of the palm has been ordained in *Prātaḥ-smaraṇa* because of the fact that the goddesses Lakshmī and Sarasvatī and the god Gōvinda are said to have been residing on it.[29] The tradition of *pañchāṅgula* still continues in our society in some form or the other but many people are ignorant of its real significance.

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[27] For these informations the author is thankful to Dr. S. M. H. Rizvi, now Lecturer in the Department of Urdu, University of Hyderabad.

[28] *Ibid*.

[29] *Prātaḥ–smaraṇa:*

Karägre vasate Lakshmī Karamadhye Sarasvatī
Karamūle tu Govinda rabhāte kara–darśanam.

For this reference I am greatly indebted to Prof. V. D. Divakar of the Gokhale Institute of Economic Studies, Pune.

Women Workers in the Jatakas

BY

ANIL KUMAR TYAGI

The Jatakas which form a part of the *Khuddaka–Nikaya* of the *Sutta–Pitaka* are of great value from the point of view of the cultural history. As stories they refer to the day–to–day life of the people and supply valuable material for reconstructing the history of working class.

But there is a lot of controversy among scholars over the date of the *Jatakas*. On the one hand, it has been assumed by some scholars that the extant *Jataka* stories offer us a picture of the narrative literature and the condition of civilisation at the time of the Buddha or of a still earlier period.[1] But on the other hand, it has been suggested that the *Jatakas* represent a state of society which provided suitable conditions for trade, perhaps during the Satavahana period.[2] We are not going to reconsider this controversy over the date of the *Jatakas*. But we may accept that the post–Mauryan date of the Jataka appears all the more plausible in view of the fact that the stories are often permeated with the atmosphere of flourishing trade and commerce.[3] This concept may be correct in relation to the prose portion of the *Jatakas*, but the antiquity of most of the *gothas*, belonging as they do to the Buddhist canon, goes back to a very early period.[4]

The poorer classes had no alternative but to allow their female members to co–operate with men in the cultivation of soil, in reaping the harvest and in other processes of production.[5] Women kept their own paddy fields, gathered and parched the seeds of rice and grew cotton and used to spin fine threads and to manufacture their own cloths.[6] This was not the case with the women of the two upper varnas. They had little to do with economic activities and were more dependent on their husbands. But the continued employment of the womenfolk of lower castes in the producing activities (working in the fields and pastures) etc., was due to the economic necessities for the subsistence of their families.[7]

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[1] For early date of the Jatakas see T.W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p.207: Rhys Davids, 'Notes on early economie condition in North India' *Journal of the Royal Asiaiic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, London, 1910, p.59; Ratilal Mehta, *Pre–Buddhist India*, Bombay, 1949, p XXIII.

[2] D. D. Kosambi, *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History*, 2nd Revised Edition, (Popular Prakashan: Bombay, 1975), p. 147: C. P. Daniel He Ingalls, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Baltimore, IXXVII, 223–24.

[3] Dwijendra Narayan Jha, *Revenue System in Post Mauryan and Gupta Times* (Punthi Pustak: Calcutta, 1967), p.4.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

The role of women in weaving occupation was very significant in the period of the Jatakas. The Jatakas provide a graphic scene of the weaving operation. Women were employed for carding cotton as evidenced by the expression: *Itthīnam–kappāsa–potthana–dhanukā*.[8] There are references in the Jatakas to the weaver (*Pesakāra*)[9] the loom (*Tanta*)[10] the place of weaving (*Tantavita–ṭṭhānam*)[11] and so on which suggest that weaving was fairly common in society. It is said that fine silk and muslin cloth of Varanasi were highly prized and appreciated by the people.[12] According to the *Guna Jataka*, the price of a piece of cloth of special quality went up to one thousand pieces of money.[13]

Separate references to the spinning and weaving industries, where women workers were largely employed, again show a further division of labour with the growth of the industry. Specialisation must have created new classes of textile workers like the embroiders, ornamental workers and workers in rugs and furs who specialised in their distinct crafts.

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[5] M. A. Indra, *The Status of Women in Ancient India*, Second Revised Edition, 1955, Motilal Banarasidass, Banaras, p. 246.

[6] Jataka, 526, 546.

[7] R. S. Sharma, *Sudras in Ancient India*, Second Revised Edition, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1980, p. 185.

[8] *Jataka* VI, p. 26 – G. 105, See also Haripada Chakraborti, Textile Industry in India (B. C. 300 — 300 A. D.) *Journal of Indian History*, Golden Jubilee Volume, 1973. p 76.

[9] *Jataka*, IV, 475, *Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 28.

[10] *Jataka*, I, 356.

[11] *Ibid*.

[12] N. C. Bandopadhyaya, *Economic Life and Progress in Ancient India* 2nd Edn. 1980, Abinash Prakashan: Allahabad, p.217.

[13] P. C. Jain, *Labour in Ancient India*, Delhi, 1971, p. 95.

Women workers in the textile industry probably belonged to the lower castes. In spite of the highly developed state of the weaving industry, the standard of living of the weaver (worker) does not seem to have been very high.[14]

At the time of the *Jātakas* women workers adopted the profession of wet–nurses or dhobis to earn their livelihood. It is not known much about their legal status, whether they were slaves or free servants receiving wages. One thing, however, is certain, the wet–nurse of a princess aecompanies her all her life and follows her to her husband's home. This is something characteristic of slavery.[15] The expression *dhati–dasi*[16] slave–wet nurse, cannot be taken, however, as a definite proof of their slave status.[17]

Sometimes, up to sixty four nurses were employed for a single prince.[18] From time to time the kings assigned nurses to all the children born on the same day as the royal children. The children of the rich were also brought up in the same manner. We also find some people, imitating the kings, assigning a nurse to each boy born on the same day as their own child.[19] Girls were also looked after by nurses.[20]

The essential qualities for a nurse were that she should not be too tall or too short, should be free from deformities and should be a giver of sweet milk.[21]

The responsiblity of the nurse was total and without limit. Because of the very nature of her function and the intimacy that the nurse had with her 'daughter', sincere affection was bound to grow up between the two. It is this sentiment that explains why such a nurse would sometimes help her 'child' to elope with her lover.[22] That their function was regarded as unclean is evident from the fact that when attempts were made to display the human conditions as repulsive, frequent metaphorical use was made of their cloths as soiled with spit, mucus, urine and exerements.[23]

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[14] *Ibid.*, p.96.

[15] Dev Raj Chanana, *Slavery in Ancient India*, New Delhi, 1960, p. 48.

[16] *Jataka*, III, 309.

[17] D. R. Chanana, *op. cit.*, p. 48

[18] *Jataka*, No 538, 537

[19] *Ibid.*, VI, 332.

[20] *Ibid.*, II, 224.

[21] *Ibid.*, No. 538, 547; see also Meena Talim, *Women in Early Buddhist Literature*, Bombay, 1972, p. 181.

[22] *Jataka*, II, 325.

The harem of a prince consisted of three types of women—the wives, the suite and the *nataka–itthis.* The rich people also had their suites for each member of their family. We are told that the suite of a queen consists of women only. The queens are surrounded by attendants,[24] even in the bedroom.[25] A queen going on a journey is protected first of all by her suite.[26] Princess Ruju is said to have been surrounded by many attendants (including female slaves) who were busy in providing her with garlands, precious sandal wood, gems, shells, pearls and precious garments to decorate her person.[27] The retinue accompanying a rich woman to the garden feels very happy hoping to have a good time eating and drinking.[28] In the houses of the rich these attendants look after everything; they bring water for the bath, clean and sweep the house and carry the dirt out.[29]

The urban surrounding the break–up of the old tribal family treated a class of alienated women who took to prostitution as a source of livelihood.[30] The courtesans were the special feature of the city life, and they added to its gaity and dignity. The presence of a courtesan in a royal city was a matter of pride for its citizens.[31] The *Jātakas* inform us that generally the courtesans enjoyed sound financial status. They tell us that sāmā,[32] sulasā,[33], Kālī[34] and others,[35] earned one thousand *katāpaṇas* every night. Sulasā lived with a train of five hundred girls.[36] Kālī used to spend daily five hundred pieces of money for cloths, perfumes, garlands, and one who visited her had to put on cloths supplied by her.[37] Such accounts in the popular stories are no doubt undue exaggerations. We may say that the courtesans who were financially assisted by the state or by the rich merchants and traders led a luxurious life. But this picture did not apply to lower caste prostitutes. Lower caste prostitutes, who sold their flesh for money, were looked down upon. The profession is described as a vile trade.[38] The expression like a house of ill fame[39] and a low woman[40] indicate that the profession of the prostitutes was not considered to be respectable.

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[23] *Ibid.*, III, 309.

[24] *Ibid.*, VI, No. 544.

[25] *Ibid.*, V, 234.

[26] *Ibid.*, I, 52.

[27] *Ibid.*, No. 544.

[28] *Ibid.*, IV, 370.

[29] *Jātaka*, I, 290.

[30] R. S. Sharma, "Material Background of the Origins of Buddhism," *Das Capital Centenary Volume*, 2nd ed. 1977, P. P. H. New Delhi, p. 64. See also D. N. Jha, *Ancient India, An Introductory Outline*, 1977, P. P. H. New Delhi, p.45.

[31] M. M. Singh, *Life in North–Eastern India in Pre–Mauryan Times*, Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi, 1967, p. 64.

[32] *Kanavera Jataka*, No. 318.

[33] *Sulasa Jataka*, No. 419.

[34] *Takkariya Jataka*, No. 481.

[35] *Aṭṭhana Jataka*, No. 425.

The female slaves were very often kept as concubines. In the primitive concepts of social ethics this was the natural destiny for the wives and daughters of the one slain in battle or made captive in war.[41] There are numerous instances of slave women bearing children to their master, and this is referred to in post–vedic literature, down to the period of the *Jātakas.*[42] The harems of the kings are described in the *Jātakas* as having sixteen thousand women.[43] The *Khaṇḍakāla Jātaka* mentions that out of the sixteen thousand women in a king's harem, only seven hundred were his legal *bhariyās* or wives. Others, it can be safely inferred, must have been slave women (*nātak–itthis*) who were kept as concubines.[44]

It is also said that these concubines were gifted from a master to his favourite, and even from father to son. The prince offered one of his concubines (*nataka–itthis*) to one of his sons.[45] In another story, the concubines themselves envisage their transfer to the son of their master when the latter becomes an ascetic and leaves the house.[46]

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[36] *Jataka* No. 419.

[37] *Ibid.*, No. 481.

[38] *Jataka*, III, 60 *nīchakamma.*

[39] *Ibid.*, III, 61, IV, 249, *nīchecha–ghard* or *gaṇika-ghara.*

[40] *Ibid.*, VI, 238, *duratthi Kumbhadasi*, According to *Manu*, VIII, 261–63, same sections of the sudras such as aetors and singers, were living on the intrigues of their wives; also see, R. S. Sharma, *Śūdras*, p. 215.

[41] A. N. Bose, *Social and Rural Economy of Northern India*, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1945, p. 415.

[42] *Aitareya Brahmana*, II, 19, *Arthasastra*, XIII, 3 *Jataka*, IV, 145, 298.

[43] *Kusa Jataka*, No. 531.

[44] *Jataka*, VI, 144.

[45] *Jataka* V, 278.

[46] *Ibid.*, V, 259.

Apart from these stories of princes, we have the case of a counsellor who transferred 500 of his concubines to his guest.[47]

These concubines were often trained in dancing to entertain their masters.[48] In the *Mahājanaka Jātaka*, the *nataka–itthis* are described as surrounding the king to entertain him.[49]

At the time of the *Jātakas* the institution of slavery largely existed in society. It has been mentioned in the *Jātakas* that slavery can be attained in many ways.[50] Slaves, male and female, were bought and sold. A Brāhmaṇa after collecting seven hundred *Kārsāpaṇas* thought that the amount was sufficient for buying some male and female slaves.[51] The frequent use, of the expression 'meek as a hundred–piece slave–girl' sheds light on the slave trade.[52] Most probably the price of a slave (male and female) was generally one hundred *kārsāpaṇas*, but it might have varied in a few cases. *Vārṇa* or caste and beauty might have been the main factors of determining the price of a female slave. The lower caste persons often accepted slavery at a low price in comparison with higher caste. We find instances of a sum of one thousand *kārsāpaṇas* being paid for a princely slave.[53]

We read in the *Cullanārada–Jātaka* that in the reign of Brahmadatta, the king of Varanasi, the borderers raided the countryside, and having assailed a town and taken prisoners they returned to the border laden with booty. Amongst the prisoners was a beautiful maiden who thought herself: "These men, when they have carried us off home, will use us as slaves, I must find some way to escape."[54]

As regards women, we have the example of the prostitute who offered herself as slave to save her life.[55] Prince Vessantara gave away in donation, seven hundred slaves, men and women.[56] A Brahmin demanded and received seven hundred slave women from a king.[57] These examples show that in most cases female slaves were given as gift. We have also references to persons being deprived of their freedom by judicial punishment and reduced to slavery.[58] Even the children of the slave women did not get over the stigma of slavery.[59]

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[47] *Ibid*, IV, 289.

[48] *Ibid.*, IV, 282.

[49] *Ibid.*, VI, 43, III, 40.

[50] *Vidhurapandita Jataka* mentions four categories of slaves, Vi, 285, (i) those born of slave parents or begotten on slaves women (ii) those purchased with money (iii) those reduced to slavery through coercion by bandits and (iv) those who took to slavery on their own accord. Other *Jatakas*, refer to three additional categories, See *Jataka*, I, 200, IV, 545, 48; *J. B. O. R. S.* Vol. IX, 1923, *Slavery in the Jatakas*, pp. 369–375.

[51] *Jataka*, III, 343,

[52] *Ibid.*, I, 299.

[53] *Ibid.*, VI, 577.

[54] *J.B.O.R.S.* Vol. IX, 1923, p. 390, *Jataka*, No. 477.

[55] *Jataka*, III, 436.

Slavery was not restricted to a particular class or caste. Members of the higher caste might be reduced to slavery,[60] but the nature of their subjection may have been different. In any case the number of such people cannot have been considerable, the mass of the slave labour (men and women) being supplied by the *śūdra varṇa*.[61] Slavery arising out of debt, purchase, free will and fear[62] can be expected more in the case of the people of the lower orders than in that of the members of the higher *varṇas*.[63]

The female slaves made significant contribution in the social life. They performed the duties as *paricārikā*.[64] (attendant) *atthacaarikā itthi*[65] (personal attendant) *geha dasi*[66] (female domestic slave), *kumbha-dasi* etc., connected with the domestic and allied works. They were generally employed in the ordinary duties of a household, for fetching water,[67] pounding rice,[68] ministering to the master when he retired,[69] going on errands,[70] helping the master and the mistress during bath,[71] washing the feet of the master and the family before they retired to bed at night,[72] cleansing the bathing tank, spreading the rice out in the sun,[73] handing the plates and dishes, bringing the spittoon and fetching their fans during meals,[74] for sweeping yards and stables[75] and such other duties.

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[56] *Ibid.*, VI, 494.
[57] *Jataka*, IV, 99,
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Ibid.*, I, 225, 223, IV, 41.
[60] N. C. Bandopadhyapa, *op. cit.*, p. 270; Lallanji Gopal On Slavery in Aneient India, *Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, Vol. XXVII (1961–62) p.17.
[61] A. N. Bose, *op. cit.*, p. 423.
[62] *Jatāka*, VI, 285.
[63] R. S. Sharma, *Śūdras*, p. 104.
[64] *Jataka*, VI, 262.
[65] *Ibid.*, VI, 385.
[66] *Ibid.*, VI. 117.
[67] *Jataka*, V, 282, III, 356.
[68] *Ibid.*, III, 218.
[69] *Ibid.*, I, 276.
[70] *Ibid.*, I, 198.
[71] *Ibid.*, I, 225.

The *Jātakas* indicate that in north eastern India slaves and hired labourers were employed in cultivation, especially in large size fields ranging from 500 to 1000 karisas.[76]

We can maintain that women labourers and slave women were partly employed in the field of agriculture. The *Urga Jātaka* refers to a slave woman carrying food for her master and watching the field.[77] In the *Kāka Jātaka* there is a reference to a slave girl who spread the rice in the sun at granary door and sat there to watch over it.[78] Some references are available in the Jātakas about the wages of women labourers.[79] It indicates that women labourers and slave women were partly engaged in the agricultural operations.

As regards the treatment of working class it depended on the temperament of the master that a worker (male and female) received good or bad treatment. Generally, they were dependent on the whims of their masters.[80] They were treated like cattles in so far as the proprietary rights of their masters were concerned.[81] A female slave is said to have been thrown down on the floor and badly beaten by her master and mistress with rope ends, because, she did not bring her wages home.[82] Female slaves were subjected to the lust of their masters.[83] For the master they were an additional burden, whom he is bound to support just as he has to support the members of his family and other dependents.[84] A slave woman like a Roman slave girl was the property of her master who had every control over her. She was generally ill–treated.[85] Even the children of the slave woman did not get over the stigma of slavery.[86] A cruel master tied the hands of a boy and a girl with a creeper, and holding it tight, beat them and drove them on. Where he struck them, the skin opened and the blood trickled down. When struck, they staggered against each other, back to back.[87] In fact, they were treated well obviously so long as they acted according to the wishes of their masters. In the *Jataka* we do not find any legal provision for the protection of working class against the ill–treatment by their masters. The only safe way for such people was to be absolutely conscientious in their work, which repeating every day became domestic druggery.

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[72] *Ibtd.*, III, 67, 101; also see Richord Fick, *The Social Organisation in North–East India in Buddha Time*, Calcutta, 1920, p. 311.

[73] *Jataka*, I, 300.

[74] *Ibid.*, I, 276.

[75] *Ibid.*, VI, 73.

[76] *Ibid.*, V, 413, III, 293, IV, 276; E. J. Ropson (ed.). *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, Indian Reprint (Delhi, 1955), p. 207; Sharma *Śūdras* pp. 104–105. D.N.Jha, "A Marxist View of Ancient Indian History," *Das Kapital, Centenary Volume*, p. 167; also see, D.N.Jha, *Studies in Early Indian Economic History*, Anupama, Delhi, 1980, p. 40.

[77] *Jātaka*, I, 163.

[78] *Ibid*, I, 484.

[79] *Ibid*, III, 446, Pran Nath. *A Study in the Economic Condition of Ancient India*, London, 1929, p. 143.

[80] P.C.Jain, *op. cit.*, p.158,

[81] Atreyi Biswas, *Political Social and Cultural History of Ancient India*, New Delhi, 1982, p.137.

[82] *Jātaka*, I, 402.

Mention is made in a number of *Jātakas* of servants working for wages, but the nature of the wages is not referred to. We find that the wages given to a water–carrier were half a silver *māsaka* or say, half a copper *paṇa* a day. The same wages were paid to a female labourer.[88] The *Visahya Jataka*, by way of describing the virtue of charity, says that the earning of a grass-cutter was one silver *māsaka* a day.[89] In the *Suvannahama Jātaka*, the wife and two daughters of Bodhisattva, after the latter's death, are described as having lived in a very miserable condition, though all of them were working for wages.[90] The only consolation for them was that they were not servants for twenty four hours like slaves. They worked during the day and returned home in the evening.[91] It appears that the minimum wages of day–labourers ranged from half a *paṇa* to one and a half *paṇa* a day. It appears from these references in the *Jātakas* that labour was very cheap and that the wages of workers were very low.

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[83] *Ibid.*, IV, 145, 298. See also A. N. Bose, *op. cit.*, pp. 414–421.

[84] Dev Raj Chanana, "The Ideological Aspect of Slavery in Ancient India," *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Vol. VIII, 1958–59, pp. 389–298.

[85] B. C. Law, "Slavery as known to Early Buddhist", *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. VI, Part I, 1948–49, pp. 1–9.

[86] *Jātaka*, I, 225, III, 223. IV, 41.

[87] *Ibid.* VI, 548, 573.

[88] *Jātaka*, III, 446, Pran Nath, *op*, *cit*.. p. 143.

[89] *Ibid.*, III, 146.

[90] *Ibid.*, I, 475.

[91] *Ibid.*, III, 445–46.

Hakim Sana'i and Historical Milieu: Two Dimensional Study

BY

V. C. SRIVASTAVA

Hakīm Sanā'ī of Ghazna was a great literary figure of the Ghaznavid epoch (11th–12th century A.D.) who has left his permanent mark on the socio-economic and religio-cultural milieu of his times.[1] He was a mystic, moralist and ascetic philosopher of the Ghaznavid period who reacted to the social, economic, religious and political order of the times and gave expressions of dissidence in unjust issues which found reflection in his works.[2] Much work has been done on his personality and works from the point of view of literature[3] but it is a historical tragedy that very little attention has been paid to his works as sources of history.[4]

To a historian, Abū'l-Majd Majdūd b.Ādam Sanā'ī of Ghazna appears to be something more than a Persian poet and mystic. He represents a great historic transition, not only in the Persian literary tradition[5] but in the historical development of the Islamic civilization as a whole. As a powerful innovator, he seems to be a progressive symbol of the historical transformations[6] that were going on within the body-politic of the Islamic society consequent upon the fall of the Abbāsids and the rise of the Seljuks, and emergence of regional powers like Sāmānids, Tāharids, Buyids, Ghaznavids, Ghūrids etc., during the 11th and 12th century, A.D. particularly in its eastern wing. A historian may discern in his personality all the tumult, turmoil, anxiety, tension, anguish, insecurity and helplessness of the social order of this transitional period which has rightly been regarded by scholars as 'a turning point in the history of Islamic culture.'

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[1] Bertel's Jr., E., *Istorija persidsko-tadzikskoj literatury*, Moscow, 1960.

[2] Arberry, A. J., *Aspects of Islamic Civilization* (as depicted in the Original Texts), London, 1964.

[3] The works of H. Ethe, E. G. Browne, J. Rypka, A. Kryskij, E, Berthels, Ahmed Ates, M. T. Mudarris Radavi, Nazir Ahmad, Khalilluh Khalili, Bo Utas, Pendelbury are specially worth mentioning.

[4] A few works of this type are; Koprulu, M. F., Kay kabilesi hakkinda yeni notlar, *Bulletin*, VIII, 1944, pp. 421–452 and E. Bertel, *op. cit.*, pp. 402–455.

[5] Browne, E. G., *A Literary History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 317; Arberry, A. J., *ap. cit.*, p. 311.

[6] For these historical changes see Shaban, M. A., *Islamic History: A New Interpretation* (A.D. 760–1055), Cambridge, 1976.

'*Une transformation de la Civilization musalmane*'.[7]

The movement of historical and cultural change that overpowered the Islamic Society in the 11th–12th century A.D. had its impact on the thought–processes of great poets, scholars and saints of the time and Sanā'ī[8] could not remain aloof from it. From this point of view Sanā'ī being a realist of far vision, responds and reflects what is known in history as the logic of situation.'[9] But idealism and mysticism in him prevented him from becoming a silent spectator of the historical milieu. He had the vision to see the realities of life in his own times and had the saintly courage to pinpoint the weak spots of the social order with a didactic and mystic tone. Thus his life and works are open books for reading the processes and contents of historical formations and changes in the social and economic structures, administrative set up and ideologies and institutions. There appears to have been an inter–action between the historical milieu of Sanā'ī and his individual genius. He may, therefore, be ranked among those great individuals who, though conditioned by the historical circumstances, determine the course of historical development of their times.

Thus there may be two dimensional approach to the historical study of Sanā'ī's life and times as follows: (1) to investigate into the socio–economic, political, and religious environment which went to make collectively the historical milieu of Sanā'ī's times; and (2) to gauge the depth of contributions made by Sanā'ī towards the total development of the Islamic history and culture. In other words, it may be said that both the historical approaches[10] — the collective social forces in the onward march of history and the individual in the historical development — should be applied to him for a balanced picture of his personality and the historical milieu. Hence historical materialists as well as historical ideologists may discover ample material for study in the case of Hakīm Sanā'ī which may prove the concept of literature as history.

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[7] Richards, D. H., (ed.), *Islamic Civilization*, (950–1150) — Papers on Islamic History III), Oxford, 1973, p. VII.

[8] Rypka, J., and others, *Iranische literaturgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1959.

[9] Popper, K. R., *The Open Societies and its Enemies*, Vol. II.

[10] Gardiner, Patric, *The Nature of Historical Explanation*, Oxford, 1961, p. 103 ff.

Hakīm Sanāī represents the transition from the tradition of the court–poetry to that of didactic, moralistic and mystic poetry. He changed the direction of the Persian poetry from mundane things to spheres more elevated and intellectually more ambitious.[11] He departed from the rosy path of wine, women, cheeks, lilies and locks to the thorny road of asceticism, mysticism, spiritualism, and of God.[12] Even a casual reader of his works like *Hadīquatu'l hakīqut, Sayrul–ibād, Dīvān, Ṭarīq-ut-Tahqīq* etc., will be impressed by this change of trend. The metamorphosis in his character from a writer of panygyric to that of ethical and spiritual themes and mysticism[13] is generally attributed to a shock due to the statement of a drunken madman who accused him of rankest heresy for his eulogy of kings unmindful of people's welfare.[14] It should be viewed as something more than mere psychological upheaval of an individual. To a serious researcher it may be symptomatic of transformations and changes in the contemporary society as a whole. Historical materialists may find material factors operating in Sanā'ī's society which may be held responsible for this symbolic upheaval in Sanā'ī's personality while ideologist historians may be able to trace motives, intentions and thought – processes at the back of this psychological revolution.

The historical milieu of Sanā'ī's times (11–12th century A. D.) contained many explosive material and non–material forces which may have reacted upon the mind of this poet. The period witnessed political disintegration, and rise of small power groups fighting with each other. The centralised authority of the Abbāsids had gone leaving behind it various social and economic problems which have made life insecure and uncertain. Conflict became the keynote of the age. Conflicts in all aspects of life became the prevailing feature of the Islamic society in the east at this time. There was political conflict between the central authority and the provincial powers, between regional power-groups of one area to the other, between the military powers and the civil authorities. There was lack of economic integration. There was a conflict between the economic interest of the rapidly expanding urban centres with those of rural communities. There was a conflict between the feudal and non–feudal classes. Inequitable distribution of tax-burden between the agriculturists and feudal powers[15] had made life of general masses a bed of thorn. Marxian historians may see in this state of affairs a case of class-struggle. Society was torn between the progressives and conservatives. There was a conflict between the old and the new, represented respectively by such sources like Hanifīs, Mutzzilīs, Karmis on one side and Ash'arīs, Sūfīs and Shiates on the other.[16] There is evidence of economic motive[17] behind this social conflict which has a political face also. The lack of political, social and economic security combined with immorality and depression of the age[18] created an apathy and indifference to worldly affairs. Historians may be able to find what is termed in philosophy of history as causal connections[19] between the historical milieu and Sanā'īs thought. The ascetic and mystic attitude in Sanāī may be explained on the grounds of historical forces of the time. To say that his genius was adopted to the receptivities of the moment is correct.[20] The pessimism and asceticism in Sana'ī was due to this crude realities of historical situation in which the poet had lost social prestige, had no permanent patrons to bank upon, and had to sell his conscience to earn his bread.[21] The universal sense of social insecurity and constant threat of invasion had made the matter worse. The growth in the power of town–guilds and bazzars with an increasing antagonism to feudal overlords on the part of their tenants made panegyric an anachronism[22]. There are references to outspoken attacks on poetry written for mercenary purposes. In several of his poems as well as in some letters there are direct or indirect allusions to the pitiable condition of the poet. This realist visionary has expressed his dissatisfactions in unmistakable terms with the currupt and tyrannical system of administration, dishonest social behaviour and economic maladjustments.[23]

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[11] Boyale, J. A., *The Cambridge Historv of Iran,* Vol. V. The Seljuk and Mongol Periods, Cambridge, 1968, p. 559.

[12] His works provide amnle evidence of these trends. For example *Hadīqatul–Haqiqat* is a moral and ethical poem. *Sāryul–ibad* is full of spiritual themes so that scholars have compared him with Dante. See Browne, *op.cit.,* Vol. II, pp.318–322; Boyale, *op. cit.*, p. 557.

[13] It is a debatable point whether Sanā'ī was a mystic or not. Tradition asserts that he was a disciple of Shaikh Yasuf Hamdani and Oriental and European scholars generally accept his *tassawuf*, but Bertel, *op. cit.*, pp. 402–455 and Bo Utas, *The Literary Expression of Persian Mysticism*, Stockholm, 1970, pp. 206–209 challenge it.

[14] Ouseley, *Lives of Persian Poets*, pp. 184–187. It is referred to by Daularshah (pp. 95-97) See Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

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[15] See Shaban, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–88, for economic changes, pp. 89–114; Richards, *op. cit.*, particularly papers by Bosworth, pp. 1–16; Bulliet, pp. 71–91; Cahen, pp. 93 ff, and Lambton, pp. 155–168.

[16] Bulliet, R. W., the Political–Religious History of Nishapur in the Eleventh Century in Richards, *Islamic Civilization*, pp. 71–91.

[17] al Magdisi, *Ahsan al taquesimofi*, Leiden, 1906, p. 336.

[18] *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. V, p. 553.

[19] Collingwood, R. G., *Metaphysics*, ch. on Cause in History; and *Idea of History*, p. 212, for causal connection, Gardiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 65–112.

[20] James, William, Great Men aad Environment, *Atlantic Monthly*, Oct. 1880.

[21] *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. V, p. 551.

Thus it is true that Hakīm Sanāī was a product of the historical forces of his time but this great genius played important role in transmitting some of his dissident ideas to the future through cryptic references to institutions and systems of his time in his works. It is a trite–truism to remind that the history of this period has many gaps and dark corners. It has rightly been pointed out that 'the Seljuks still await the comprehensive historian whom their role in Muslim history would seem to deserve.[24] Poetical works which recreate the social atmosphere of their times have generally been neglected for historical study, particularly in the case of later Ghaznavids.[25] Sanā'ī's works may serve as a valuable source of history of later Ghaznavids along with other sources because Sanā'ī has the courage to project the correct picture of society and economic structure. The court poets have generally depicted the seamy side of socio–economic life of the Latter Ghaznavids which is concerned with feudal lords, aristocrats and princes. This is only the minority-picture of the social order. The masses, peasants, labourers, artisans remain in the oblivion in the court-poetry. Thus Sanā'ī may be utilised for knowing the other side of the story which comprises the major portion of the social epic of the Islamic society.

A few typical illustrations will reveal to us the importance of Sanā'ī as a source of history. The Turkish aspect of the Ghaznavid life has generally been ignored or neglected[26] but a study of Sanā'ī may throw valuable light on the ethnic origins of the Ghaznavid Turkish troops as it has been indicated by Koprulu.[27] The socalled *Ghulāms* played a significant role in the history of the Turks and formed indispensable unit[28] in their army. Sanā'ī refers to this aspect of Ghaznavid life when he mentions that the Ghaznavid forces still included men from the Qay, Yagham, Tatar, and Kirghiz tribes and mercenaries came from Kāshghar, Khotan, and Khītā.[29] He refers to 20,000 *ghulāms*[30] in the army of Bahrāmshāh (1118-1152 A. D.). This figure may or may not be correct but it shows the importance of *ghulām* element in the army of the Ghaznavids till the end of their glorious epoch.[31] He refers to the game of polo which may be valuable for reconstructing the picture of games and sports of the times.[32]

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 552.

[23] The ninth book of *Hadiquatul–haquiqat* is concerned with poet's own conditions and circumstances; see *Kār Nāma–i–Balkh*, *Tauqhq Taniqui* (XXXV, Part II) and his letters— Nazir Ahmad, *Makatib–i–Sana'i*, 1962 specially Appendix I.

[24] Lewis, B., and Holt, *Historians of the Middla East*, London, 1962, p. 58.

[25] Boseworth, 'C. E., *The Ghaznavids*, Beirut, sec. ed., 1973, p. 23.

Iqtā system was an important ingredient of the taxation policy of the Seljuk Turks[33] but was generally absent among the Ghaznavids.[34] It is important to find that there was an extension of this system during the long reign of Bahrāmshāh.[35] It is a moot question. This may have a great relevance on the question of the causes for the decline of the Ghaznavids. Sanāī has some lines in which he complains that the Turks have taken peoples' lands unlawfully possibly implying that the state had been forced to adopt this confiscatory policy in order to find the land to grant out *Iqtās*.[36] However, it is a very debatable point which needs thorough examination for its acceptance or rejection.

There are references to individuals and historical personages in his poems as well as in his letters which may throw interesting light on the historical milieu of his times. Besides, these specific references, the epilogues, myths, and legends found in his writings offer valuable materials for the study of the psychology and sociology of the peoples.[37] Similarly, his concept of tyranny and justice[38] may shed light on the nature of government and administration, and may have origins in historical milieu of his times. He has many lines in praise of the Sun in his *Ṭarīq ut–Taḥqīq*[39] which may throw valuable light on the nature and contents of Sun–worship in this age.[40] There may be a reference to some historical personage by name Shamsuddīn—a royol patron.[41] It would be profitable to enquire whether it refers to the celestial body of the Sun or to a historical personage or both; and in the latter case as to who this historical figure was ? It is important to note that his works may not be connected with any specific religious order but the Sūfī environment pervades his works. From the point of view of historical study of the Sūfī order his works have immense value.[42]

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[26] *Ibid.*, Introduction.

[27] Kuprulu, *op.cit.*, p. 421–452.

[28] Bosworth, *op.cit.*, pp. 98–106.

[29] See Koprulu, *op. cit.*, pp. 422–27, 430–32, 446–449.

[30] Sanā'i, *Divān*, (ed.) Mundarris, Tehran, 1320/1941, p. 568.

[31] Bosworth, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

[32] Browne, *op.cit.*, p. 321.

[33] See Lamoton, A. K. S., *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, London, 1953.

[34] Bosworth, *op.cit.*. pp. 66 and 125.

[35] Bosworth, Barbarian Incursions: The Coming of the Turks into the Islamic World, in Richards, *Islamic Civilization*, p. 15.

[36] Koprulu, *op. cit.*, pp. 449–452.

The above review of the historical milieu of Sanā'ī and his importance as a source of history leaves no room for doubt that Hakīm Sanā'ī was not only a great literary figure of the Islamic world but was a symbol of historical transformations of the 11th–12th centuries in the Islamic world of the east, who combined in himself the virtues of a selfless poet, a realist, and an idealist, a visionary of the future and a philosopher of the glories of the God.

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[37] Arberry, *op.cit.*, p. 308.

[38] *Tariq–ut–Tahqiq*, (ed.) Bo Utas, Lund, 1973, XXXVI, 879, 882. 883 etc. The authorshsp is doubtful. p.115.

[39] *Ibid.*, XXXV–XXXVI — It is quite probable that Sanā'ī may have been influenced by the Zoroastrian or the Hindu concept of the Sun–cult in Afghanistan in the 9th 10th centuries A.D.

[40] Lawrence B.B. *Śāharastanī on Indian Religions*, Paris, 1976.

[41] Bo Utas, *op. cit.*, p.188.

[42] *Ibid.*

Mare Clausum the Dutch and Regional Trade in the Indian Ocean 1650–1740

BY

S. ARASARATNAM

An influential and perceptive observer of Dutch trade and policy in mid–seventeenth century noted that the Dutch aimed at *mare liberum* in the northern European seas and *mare clausum* in the eastern waters.[1] He was referring to the vigorous pursuit of the freedom of the seas by the Dutch in the waters surrounding the British Isles while at the same time taking measures in the east to carve out sections of the sea and the traffic therein for themselves to the exclusion of other European and Asian traders. This ambivalence, the appeal to conflicting principles in the pursuit of commercial policy, was evident in the course of the drive to pursue eastern trade in the 17th century. In the first phase, the Dutch vigorously assaulted Portuguese monopoly of eastern trade, both as a concept, on the foundation of natural right to freedom of trade and navigation, and in its application, by armed attacks on the claimed areas of Portuguese monopoly and possession. Having made that first assault and disposed of Portuguese claims, they set about to enunciate other principles on which restrictions of various sorts were put on this natural right of freedom of the seas.[2]

The justification for these claims were a series of treaties with Asian rulers by which these rulers were made to give up the right to freedom of traffic in their dominions and freedom of trade in staple commodities. They would grant to the Dutch exclusive rights of purchase of these commodities, sometimes at stipulated prices, and the exclusive rights of trade in those ports against other European and sometimes Asian competitors.

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[1] Sir George Downing who was English envoy at the Hague at the outbreak of the second Anglo–Dutch war. Cited in C. R. Boxer, *Dutch Seaborn Empire* (London, 1965), p. 92.

[2] This debate on the right of freedom of the seas is discussed in C.H. Alexandrowicz, *An Introduction to the History of the Law af Nations in the East Indies* (Oxford, 1967), pp.57–60.

Armed with these treaties, the Dutch faced the trading world, creating disruption in trade and often conflict far worse than any perpetrated by the Portuguese during their century of naval dominance over the Indian Ocean. The Dutch attempted these legally and militarily erected structures to exclusive trade only in certain of the trading regions of Asia. The classic example of such a structure, and the earliest to be established, being successfully concluded by mid–17th century, was in the Moluccas. This was extended later by the end of the century, in modified form, to the islands of Java and South Celebes. In the south Asian area, with its open and extensive coastline and its trade routes spreading out westwards to west Asia and eastwards to southeast Asia, this was more difficult to achieve. Yet the Dutch did attempt to erect such a structure in parts of that region. These attempts, though not as successful as those in the archipelago region, did nonetheless have an impact on the trade of the Indian Ocean and create difficulties in relationships with indigenous powers and with European and Asian competitors. It is the purpose of this paper to examine these attempts assess their success and evaluate their effects on coastal and oceanic trade,

These aims revealed themselves early in Dutch dealings with the rulers of the area. In the treaty with the Zamorin of Calicut, entered into in January 1626, it was contracted that all pepper and gambier found in his dominion was to be sold to the Dutch at agreed prices. No pepper or gambier was to be sold to the Portuguese, English, Danes, French, Gujaratis, Persians or other nations.[3] In 1638, a treaty was negotiated between the Dutch and the king of the interior Ceylon kingdom of Kandy. In this treaty also, the Dutch were granted perscriptive rights over cinnamon, the chief produce of the island, and some other products, to the exclusion of other traders. The king also promised not to have any dealings with other European powers named in the treaty, the English, French, Danes, Germans and Portuguese.[4] In the 1640's the Dutch entered into treaties with other Malabar rulers such as the King of Kayan Kulam (Calicoilan) and the King of Purakadu (Porcad) similar to that with the Zamorin of Calicut.[5] It was clear that it was in this region of south Asia — the Malabar coast and the island of Ceylon — that Dutch aims towards closed seas were to be prosecuted. These territories were susceptible to the achievement of such aims. Each of the areas specialised in the export of a mono-culture of great commercial value; they were divided into small political units ruled by relatively weak rulers with hardly any sea power.

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[3] *Corpus Diplomaticm Neerlando–Indicum*, ed. J. E. Heeras en F. W. Stapel ('s Gravenhage, 1907–1955), Vol. I, pp.206–8.

[4] *Corpus Diplomaticnm Neerlando Indicum*, I, pp.308–16.

[5] *Corpns Diplomaticum Neerlando–Indicum*, I, pp.392–4, 405–7.

It should be noted that these aims were being formulated at a time when Dutch naval power had not fully established itself in the western Indian Ocean. It was clear that, if the above treaty rights were to be imposed with any degree of acceptance in these waters, they had to be backed by a considerable amount of force at sea, if not also on land. Serious attention was given to this from 1638 when the first successful assault was made on a Portuguese fort on the east coast of Ceylon and Batticaloa was taken. This was the beginning of a determind commitment to build up power bases in this part of the Indian Ocean. One by one Portuguese strongholds on the island's coast were attacked and seized — Galle (1641), Negombo (1642), Colombo (1656), Jaffna (1658). It was the intention to lodge power not just on the island but on the broad Indo–Ceylon seaboard and the capture of maritime Ceylon was followed by attacks on Portuguese strongholds on the south coast of India. Tuticorin was taken in 1659, Nagpatnam in the same year, Coilan in 1658 (lost to the Malabaris and retaken in 1661), Cochin in 1662, Cranganore and Cannanore in the same year. By 1662, power was lodged solidly in Ceylon, Malabar and in the South Tamil coast. Existing treaties were renegotiated with Malabar rulers and new treaties entered into with others, the effect of all of which was to concede a pepper monopoly to the Dutch.[6]

The course of policy and action was now directed to achieving in practical terms the aims implicit in their military and naval successes. In doing this the Dutch exerted an influence on the trade of the area far more potent than that of the Portuguese. Their actions had an effect on the competitive positions of European powers for trade in this part of the Indian Ocean. They also had an effect on the relationships between the rulers and traders of the region.

When the major ports of Ceylon's trade were taken and fortified by the Dutch, a more effective form of control of the staple of the island's trade was asserted than under the Portuguese, though cinnamon was a crown monopoly,large amounts of it were sold in Asia.[7] Indian and even Arab traders with Portuguese *cartazes* came to Ceylonese ports and were able to purchase cinnamon. Now the monopoly of cinnamon was rigorously administered. It could only be bought from the Dutch, in quantities and at prices carefully regulated to maintain its sales in the various Asian markets. It was a strict injunction of the Directors that no cinnamon was to be sold to traders who called in the ports of Ceylon. The cinnamon was to be transported in Dutch vessels to Asian factories where the Dutch had their establishments, in quantities and at prices fixed by Batavia. Besides controlling supply, it had the added advantage of reducing corruption in trade in Ceylon.[8]

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[6] *Carpus Diplomaticum Neerlando Indicum*, II, pp.139, 199, 202, 204, 246, 263.

It was one thing to declare certain seas closed as preserves of Dutch trade, it was quite another to have it widely recognised and followed, and to live with the consequences of this action. In Ceylon it was possible to blockade the main ports but there was the problem of the sovereignty of the independent interior kingdoms. There was also the problem of the link of Ceylon in the regional trade of south Asia and the role it played in obtaining vital imports in consumer goods such as food grains and textiles in exchange for her exports.

In relation to other European powers, the closed seas policy had to be firmly based on sound legal claims. Though Ceylon was in many respects a most secure possession, there was a snag in Dutch legal claims and this led to the possibilities of challange by competitors. It was possible to claim the old Portuguese ports, e.g. Colombo, Galle, on the basis of right of conquest. This right all European competitors respected. But there were ports still in the hands of the local ruler, the King of Kandy. Given the bad relations between the Dutch and this ruler after the fall of Colombo (1656), and his anxiety to widen his contacts with European powers, it can be seen that Dutch attempts to impose a closed seas policy around Ceylon did not meet with universal acceptance.

The English East India Company was well established in Madras by this time and its trade was flourishing. English country traders were beginning to sail in these parts, visiting places where the Company was not trading. The Dutch were well established on the west coast of

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[7] C. R. De Silva, *The Portuguese in Ceylon*, 1617–1638 (Colombo, 1972) pp. 143–201.

[8] S. Arasaratnam, *Dutch power in Ceylon*, 1658–1687 (Amsterdam, 1957) pp. 187–9.

Ceylon but not on the east and they had not yet imposed a blockade round the island. English private shipping began to be seen on the east coast and contacts with the King of Kandy were established after the wreck of an English country ship *Anne* in the Trincomalee bay and the capture of the crew by the King in 1659. The contacts were made through the agency of *chetty* merchants who traded from Coromandel to Ceylon ports. The Dutch soon got wind of this through their intelligence network and received reports in 1660–64 in an exaggerated form that an agreement was about to be signed providing the English with a residence in the Kandyan kingdom. This place was rumoured to be excellent sheltered port of Kottiyar in the Trincomalee bay. An Indian vessel with letters from the English agent at Madras, Edward Winter, to the King was intercepted by a Dutch yacht off the north coast of Jaffna in 1664.[9]

This made the Dutch more vigilant in blockading the coast and intercepting messages, though on flimsy legal grounds. When a suitable opportunity offered itself they occupied two forts on the east coast, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. from where they were able to cruise these waters better and close the King's ports. Thus by 1665 an assertion of sovereignty over the entire coast was made, an assertion that was very shakily founded but which the English did not have the strength or the inclination to challenge.

With the assertion of sovereignty over the entire coastline and all approaches to and exits from the island, rules were laid down for the reception of any European vessel that arrived. Normally no vessel was to be admitted to any of the ports except under conditions of emergency and acute distress. Even under such circumstances, the ships were to be directed to the major ports, Colombo or Galle, where they could be kept under sonstant surveillance. A minimum amount of assistance was to be given to them in the form of water, refreshments, urgent repairs and they were to be put on their way as quickly as possible. Under no circumstances was any trading to be done with them and particular care was to be taken that they did not get any contraband goods.[10]

The English did not challenge the Dutch claims in Ceylon for about

[9] R. Knox, *An Historical Relation of Ceylon,* With an Introduction by S.D. Sarparamadu (Colombo, 1958) pp. xxi–xxii. Hustaardt to Directors, 10 June 1664 Kolonial Archief, the Hague (K. A.) 1136 fo. 323,

[10] Directors to Governor General and Council, 26 April 1668, K.A.457.

a century. The next European challenge came from the French as part of their effort to break into Asian trade. When the French fleet arrived in south Asia in 1671, it was rumoured that the French had intentions of settling in Ceylon and had established connections with the King of Kandy. This constituted a serious challenge to the Dutch and it was fortunate for them that it came after they had established themselves on the east coast. The French fleet under de la Haye sailed into the Kottiyar Bay in April 1672 and showed every sign of establishing itself permanently on the southwestern corner of this bay furthest away from the guns of the Dutch fort at Trincomalee. The French and the Dutch were at peace with each other and the Dutch could not attack and expel the French. So they appealed to them to leave on grounds of an agreement with the King of Kandy who it was claimed had gifted to them the bay. On learning that the King himself had invited the French and allowed them to erect a factory there, they changed their tack and claimed rights by conquest from the Portuguese. They finally decided to use force and the French difficulties of supply prevented them from putting up a fight and the French fleet sailed away.[11]

After this, neither the English nor the French, the two powers rapidly expanding their trade in the Indian Ocean, sought to challenge Dutch claims to exclusive rights in the Ceylon waters. Yet the fear for these powers did not disappear on the part of the Dutch and strict regulations were issued as to how they were to be treated if they sailed into these ports. From the early 18th century, shipping of these powers in the Indian Ocean, both Company and free merchants, increased. There is evidence of a desire to share in the trade of Ceylon. Shipping records of Ceylon show a greater movement of English, French, Danish and Portuguese vessels in these waters and attempts to enter the ports of Ceylon on whatever pretext. There is an increase in the number of ships around the east and southern coasts with genuine distress wanting to come in. The rules, permitting the admission of these vessels in an emergency, provided a loophole to officials, some of whom would have profited by doing business with these vessels. Once a vessel was admitted into port, on the pretext of it being in distress, it was possible to trade with it and plead in justification that, for example, it carried rice of which there was a shortage, or that it wanted to buy arecanut of which there was a glut. The officials had to give a detailed report of all European ships that called in port, the circumstances surrounding their arrival and all business it transacted. The regularity with which these ships seem to have called, the repeated censure of the Directors and the frequent flouting of clearly laid out regulations lead one to presume that a good deal of private trade was carried on between these vessels and Company officials.[12]

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[11] The whole episode is described from the French point of view by a contemporary participant, *Memoires de Francois, Martin,* (ed.) A. Martineau (Paris, 1931) I, pp. 328–349. Dutch evidence is in contemporary letters in K. A. 1175 passim.

This loophole in the regulations relating to the admission of European vessels into Ceylon ports was stretched so far as to make a regular pattern in trade by a Portuguese ship on the Goa/Macao route in the 1720's. This ship was seen to make regular calls at Galle on its way back from Macao with China goods which the Dutch bought.[13] These goods could easily be disposed of to Bengal and Canara traders who came to Galle. So important did this trade link become that Van Imhoff, Governor of Ceylon (1736–1740), suggested to Batavia the sending of a regular voyage from Colombo to China via Batavia so that Chinese goods for the Bengal and Coromandel trade could be supplied through Ceylon. The proposal was turned down by the Batavian Government.[14]

Besides ships of European competitors, there was the problem of Asian ships provided with French, English, Portuguese and Danish passes that sought to enter the ports of Ceylon. Whether to honour these passes or not was a dilemma that faced the Dutch in their shipping policies. The Directors took the view that these passes should not be recognised in the places where Dutch had sovereignty.[15] These other European powers were, of course, much freer in the issue of passes to Asian vessels than were the Dutch.

Passes were issued by the Dutch to the ports where they had sovereignty as a part of the policy of controlling the trade of that area. These passes may be considered a successor to the Portuguese *cartazes* which had been used to derive tribute in the exercise of a declared domination of the sealanes of the Indian Ocean. In the way the system came to be operated, little or no effort was made to use it as a mechanism for the control of volume and price of commodities and thus to manipulate the market in them.[16] The Dutch made far more efficient use of passes, not in the sense of trying to control oceanic trade and the trade routes, but in a more regionalised form of control of the traffic to particular areas and of particular commodities. It was used effectively in Ceylon in 1670 when a blockade was imposed round the island. Instructions were issued to all comptoirs in ports from which vessels left for Ceylon on the issue of passes. A number of commodities were on the list of those controlled through passes. Cinnamon, arecanuts, chanks, pearls, elephants, elephant tusks, pepper, cardamom, palmyrah timber were articles that could only be exported with passes. Textiles could only be imported with passes. The controlled articles could only be negotiated through the Company's storehouses or through licenced brokers of the Company.[17] The passes enabled the control of export commodities and ensured Company's profit on them as well as cutting out competition in the import trade in textiles.

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[12] Directors to Governor General and Council, 23 June 1700, K. A. 462. Governor General and Council to Governor and Council of Ceylon, 23 October 1700, K.A. 838 pp. 1124–9, Governor General and Council to Directors, 30 November 1702, K. A., 1543 ff. 194–8,

[13] Governor General and Council to Governor of Ceylon, 20 September 1737, K. A. 893 pp. 593–5.

[14] Governor General and Council to Governor of Ceylon, 20 September 1737, K. A. 893 p. 594.

[15] Directors to Governor General and Council, 15 July 1717, K. A. 463.

Certain forms of regional trade were affected more drastically than others by this policy. The trade from Coromandel and Madura to Ceylon was vigorously controlled by the passes policy. While earlier it had been a trade, highly diverse in nature, taking in a wide assortment of goods and moving in and out of ports large and small on both ends, it was now regulated as to articles of trade, quantities and places to which it could sail. The trade from Bengal, Orissa and Golconda was also regulated by passes, but less restrictively. The purpose was not to restrict the number of vessels. On the contrary, these vessels were encouraged as the trade was vital to Ceylon's consumption. The intention was more to regulate the commodities traded in, to manipulate prices, to guide it to particular ports, and to emerge as sole agent with prescriptive rights to deal with these merchants. The Bengal trade was a voluminous one by wealthy merchants in large ships that either undertook direct voyages to Ceylon or called on Ceylon ports on the way to Surat or the Canarese and Malabar ports. The limitations imposed on this trade by the manopoly of certain commodities caused it to decline in the 1680's with adverse consequences on the supply of essential foodstuffs that the traders had imported. Hence some of these restrictions had to be eased and more export goods sold to these merchants to entice them to the island.[18]

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[16] See discussion of Portuguese *cartazes* in M.N. Pearson, *Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat* (California, 1976) pp.48–56.

[17] R. Van Goens to Directors, 30 November 1670, K. A. 1164 fo. 70.

There were other related problems in the issue of passes. Passes had to be freely given to merchants from states in which the Dutch enjoyed trading privileges and indeed to rulers when required to maintain friendly relations. This was a problem in the south Coromandel and Malabar states where rulers were actively concerned with trade. The Dutch were trying to restrict the activities of traders from that region to reduce competition. Denying passes to them would antagonise rulers. The Nayak of Tanjore and the Thevar of Ramnad were in frequent conflict with the Dutch over passes. Vessels of Malabar, Coromandel and Bengal increasingly took to carrying English passes and later French passes also came to be used.[19] If the Dutch did not recognise these passes, these powers would not give them reciprocal recognition and vessels carrying Dutch passes would be at a disadvantage. The whole attempt to regulate trade with passes was full of contradictions and inconsistencies in a sprawling trading area with several sovereign powers.

Another problem in the control of trade was that of deciding whether it was more profitable to sell controlled commodities in the island or to transport them in Dutch ships for sale in ports overseas. In order to attract trade to Ceylon, some of these commodities had to be made available there. In the early phase of control, the Directors were keen that they should be frighted to other factories for sale. In this way it was thought the market in them could be better controlled and profits maximised. Traders who came with import goods had little to spend their money on for the return journey and were forced to take back specie. This meant a drain of specie from the country. It also resulted in a decline in the number of vessels that sailed in and consequently a dearth in food grains which they usually brought. The Dutch had to balance the advantages and disadvantages of restricting trade and take remedial action.[20]

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[18] *Memoir of Hendrick Zwaadecroon* (Colombo, 1911), p. 15.

[19] Governor General and Council to Governor and Council of Ceylon 6 November 1684, K. A. 814 fos 526–7. Governor General and Council to Directors 30 November 1684, K. A. 1283 fo. 124.

The exercise of control meant the diverting of trade to the large ports of the island. The smaller ports could not be properly policed and the vessels subject to proper inspection. All trade was driven out from the east coast ports and from the small ports of the west by a flotilla of fast cruising vessels.[21] It had important implications for the small boat traffic from southern India. This traffic generally frequented the small ports. This disruption of the small scale trade in turn caused a decline of the regional trading centres. There was a centralization of trade which led to price increases in imports and exports. There was a decline in the total volume of trade flowing out of Ceylon, a decline that was to the immediate advantage of the Dutch in reducing competition in internal market for imports and in external markets for Ceylon products.

This trade was largely in the hands of the chulia Muslims of south India and its destruction was a particular aim of Dutch policy. The chulia Muslims were domiciled along the Madura and Tanjore coasts but they also had semi-permanent settlements in the Ceylon ports of Colombo, Galle, Mannar, Kalpitiya, Jaffna and Batticaloa. The Dutch attacked them forcefully with discriminatory laws against their owning property in towns, their movement into the interior and the length of their stay in the island.[22] The laws did not have the effect of rooting them out but did contribute to making their operations difficult and reducing their presence and influence in the island. They forced them out of the small country ports and contributed to the impoverishment of these ports and the hinterland.

Malabar

In the first flush of victory against the Portuguese in Malabar, it looked as if similar aims could be pursued there as well. In almost all the treaties with rulers of the area, all pepper was to be delivered to the

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[20] Resolution of Governor General and Council, 20 October 1704, K. A. 619 pp. 491–3.

[21] Memoir of Commander Graauw to Blommert, 8 April 1676, Hooge Regeering 548.

[22] Resolutions of Council of Ceylon, 10 June 1659. Memoir from Van Goens to Hurstaardt, 26 December 1683 (Colombo, 1932), pp.51–2.

Dutch. In Cochin, the Dutch had the right to regulate the entire overseas trade. There were, however, a number of flaws in this arrangement in Malabar that made the situation not comparable. In the case of Ceylon, European competitors had accepted Dutch claims and did not challenge them till the second half of the 18th century. In Malabar there was a long coastline with an extensive hinterland which made possible alternate forms of transport by land. Dutch power was located only on the coastal forts from Cranganore southwards and Dutch seapower effectively controlled only the entry to these places. The English were not prepared to accept the primacy of Dutch interests in Malabar and dared them to do the worst when in 1662 they established a factory at Pura–kadu (Porkad), a few miles south of Cochin. The Dutch had to await the outbreak of an Anglo–Dutch war to seize this factory. The Zamorin of Calicut, who from the outset was in conflict with Dutch interests, enticed the English to his port where they settled a factory in 1665. Thus from the first the Dutch had to put up with challenges to their position, even though. throughout, the 1660's, Dutch supremacy in these waters did not enable the English to take full advantage of their presence.

The very English presence was an incentive to local merchants and suppliers to break monopoly contracts the rulers had signed. No sooner was the ink dry on the contracts, than Malabar officials of the Dutch began to complain of the violation of their terms, the widespread smuggling and even the impossibility of securing a full load for their needs leave alone getting all the pepper produced in the country.[23] The local brokers, in leagae with Indian merchants who in turn were tied to the English and Portuguese were smuggling pepper by the simple expedient of transporting it by land northwards to another port and shipping it there. This raised an interesting legal problem. Could the Dutch cruising vessels apprehend ships on the high seas, on the strength of the contracts with the rulers and confiscate them for carrying pepper smuggled out of Malabar? The issue was referred to higher authorities at Batavia who ruled that they had no right to do so.[24] The contractual agreement to sell all pepper to the Dutch was with the rulers and the Dutch could only take it up with the rulers. The rulers, however, were not very keen to cooperate in preventing this smuggling as they were getting better prices and better revenues. Even if they were prepared to cooperate, they did not have the power to enforce their orders. Unlesss a massive naval and even land power was located in Malabar, the hope of a pepper monopoly would be thwarted.

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[23] Hurstaart to Direetors, 2 February 1664, K. A. 1132 fos. 1077–8.

[24] Governor General and Council to Directors, 21 December 1663, K. A. 1131 pp. 168–9.

There were other issues of conflict. An inferior kind of wild cinnamon grew in some Malabar areas and its circulation in the market affected the Dutch monopoly of the good Ceylon·cinnamon. When the Dutch secured full control of the Ceylon cinnamon and regulated its sale in Asian markets, the demand for this wild cinnamon from Malabar grew. In the treaties made by the Dutch with rulers in whose territories this cinnamon grew there was a provision requiring them not to peel and export wild cinnamon or to deliver all of it to the Dutch. Like the pepper monopoly, this was a provision difficult to enforce, especially in the light of increased prices resulting from the increased demand. The producers were easily able to get higher prices from Indian, English and other merchants.

Another issue was the transport of Malabar arecanuts southwards down the coast and on to the east. After the Dutch secured a monopoly of Ceylon arecanuts in 1670, they wanted to push sales all over Coromandel and Madura where it was in great demand. They pushed up the sale price but, when they did this, they found that sales of the Ceylon nuts were affected by the increasing imports of Malabar nuts. The Malabar nuts were of a different type and were thought inferior to the Ceylon variety. But the scarcity of the latter created a demand for the former. Merchants now brought these in increasing quantities in small boats through the Palk Straits from the Malabar ports. Dutch officials of Ceylon and Madura put pressure on Batavia and on the Malabar administration to do something. It was decided to combat it with the first weapon in hand, the use of force.[25]

In 1675, agreements were entered into with Malabar rulers by which they were made to promise not to permit the export of arecanuts southwards from their ports. Armed with these agreements, Malabar vessels that came south with arecanuts were seized and confiscated. The trade of the two southern kingdoms of Kayankulam and Attingal were seriously impeded. Producers and traders from these kingdoms where the nuts were produced in large quantities profited from this trade. To the rulers. this blanket prohibition of trade to areas well beyond Dutch jurisdiction appeared highhanded. Officials in the Dutch factories of Madura seized Malabar vessels south of Manapadu and carrying pepper and arecanuts. A vessel belonging to the King of Kayankulam and another belonging to the Queen of Attingal were seized. Both the rulers resisted this and took measures against Dutch trade. The ruler of Kayankulam surrounded the Dutch residence and blockaded all trade. The Dutch feared for the safety of their residence at the port of Kottatte in the Kingdom of Attingal. There were reports that the Queen was making overtures to the English.[26]

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[25] Van Goens and Council to Directors, 24 November 1674, K. A. 1187 fos. 32-35.

Dutch officials of Malabar reported that these prohibitions against trade could not be operated. The monopoly on pepper delivery existed only on paper. Through the northern ports a great deal of pepper was being transported northwards and from the southern ports southwards. Nothing could be done, of course, about inland transport across the Palghat Gap. The same was true of the transport of wild cinnamon and of arecanuts. The attempt to prohibit the latter was leading to frequent conflicts. The policy of restricting trade in Cochin and other Dutch–held ports by passes had only the effect of driving trade to free ports. The English and later the French were coming into these ports and carrying on a thriving trade. It was impossible to police the regulations. The officials argued that it was better to have good relations with the rulers whose goodwill was the only way to secure the V. O. C's aims.[27] These representations caused a change in policy from the 1690's and though the aims were not altered they were not pursued vigorously but more realistically. What this meant in effect was that the Malabar pepper monopoly became a dead letter. The arecanut problem was solved by purchasing surplus nuts and by compensating the boats that were seized.

The weakening of Dutch hold over Malabar was reflected in the gradual penetration of other Europeans into the area. The Zamorin of

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[26] Governor General and Council to Governor and Council of Ceylon, 4 November 1675, K. A. 802 f. 476. Memoir of Adrian van Rheede to his successor, 14 March 1667. *De Nederlanders in Kerala* 1663–1701 ed. H.K. Jacob ('s Gravenhage 1976), pp. 158–60.

[27] Memoir of Hendrick Zwaardecroon to his successor 31 May 1698, Memoir of Magnus Wichelman to his successor 10 January 1701, *De Nederlanders in Kerala*, pp. 291–2, 307–9, 380–81.

Calicut (1664) and the Rajah of Cannanore (1669) admitted the English into the area. The English were well entrenched in the northern part of the west coast and wanted to participate in the pepper trade of Malabar. Dutch naval supremacy in these waters prevented them from taking full advantage of their settled factories. To enforce the Dutch blockade was expensive and it put up the price of pepper. The rulers were not prepared to openly defy the Dutch, so soon after the effective display of Dutch power against the Portuguese. As Malabar rulers became disillusioned with the Dutch, they were more prone to deal with the English. The English, for their part, were more inclind to challenge Dutch claims in Malabar than they were in Ceylon. Seeing that the south Malabar rulers were most dissatisfied with the Dutch, the English made attempts to contact them. In 1682 they succeeded in establishing a factory at Tellicherry in the kingdom of Kolathiri.[28] Contacts with the Queen of Attingal resulted in the obtaining of a residence at Anjengo in 1694 with permission to fortify it, in addition to the earlier obtained factory at Rutera. The French came to Malabar, some years after establishing themselves in Pondicherry, and founded a factory at Mahe in 1721.

It is seen thus that there was less forthrightness in asserting a closed sea policy in Malabar than there was in Ceylon. The difficulties were far greater. They had to deal with a large number of local rulers. Both Indian merchants and European competitors were prepared to challenge their claims frontally and in this challenge they had the cooperation of indigenous elements. The decision to relax the claims of monopoly was not easily taken. There were ideas put forward of pressing ahead with declaring exclusive commercial interests over the entire area of the Indian coast from north Malabar to Point Calimere and the island of Ceylon into one large zone of Dutch monopoly.[29] It was pressed on the Directors soon after the conquest of Cochin (1663) by Rijcklof van Goens, Governor of Ceylon. He was supported later by the Commander of Malabar, Marten Huysman (1678–1684). It was an attractive conception, embracing an area of inter–locking commerce, including places producing and exporting spices, rice, textiles and a variety of other goods. But the very richness and variety of trade stood

[28] C. Fawcett, *The English Factories in India*, (New Series), Oxford 1936-53, III, p. 395.

[29] Van Goens and Council to Directors, 12 February 1674, K. A. 1182, fos. 2-10.

against its central control and direction. The success achieved in Ceylon could not be repeated in a wider area. The administrators who tried to manage it testified to the difficulties. By the beginning of the 18th century the trade of Malabar had become quite free.

Madura

The third coastal region where a closed sea policy was attempted, with partial success, was the long coastline of the far south from Cape Comorin to Point Calimere. The Dutch were first drawn to this coast because of the close commercial nexus it had with Ceylon. Later their interests expanded to a control of the whole Bay of Madura and the Palk Straits and monitoring the shipping between India and Ceylon and the east coast and west coast of India. The region produced many exports for the country trade. Madura and Tanjore produced cheap textiles readily marketable in many parts. The seas produced a kind of shell (*Chank*) that sold well in Bengal and Orissa. Both on the Indian side and on the Ceylon side there were pearl banks. The Dutch had undisputed control over the Ceylon banks and ambitions over the more extensive banks on the Madura coast. Control over the ports of Madura and Tanjore would give control over those markets for Ceylon exports. Any power that dominated the straits was in a position to control the coastal trade that passed between the east coast and west coast of India.

The problems of control here involved not so much European competitors as the complex pattern of the country trade of the region and the interest in it of the regional rulers. The omnipresent English did make efforts to settle in the Bay of Madura. They had been invited there by some merchants who interceded with the Nayak of Madura to allow them to settle a factory. The English did this in 1659 when they established a factory at Old Kayl, the year that the Dutch had taken the Portuguese forts of Tuticorin and Nagapatnam on the two ends of the Bay. The Dutch tried without success to persuade the Nayak to expel the English. They had to wait till the outbreak of the Third Anglo–Dutch war to seize the factory in 1665.[30] Thereafter the Dutch were not worried by European competition for a decade, though they had no legal right to keep them out of the area, as was recognised by the Directors. They worked continuously to secure a legal basis for the claimed exclusive rights in those waters by negotiations and by strong arm tactics against the rulers. In the late 1670's there was renewed English interest in the trade of the area, this time encouraged by one of the rulers, the Thevar of Ramnad. Nothing eventuated from this, however. French interest in the region followed from their establishment in Pondicherry. They tried to participate in the trade of Tanjore and of the Thevar's domains.

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[30] Governor General and Council to Directors, 30 January 1666, K.A. 1142 fo. 263.

Efforts throughout the 1660s to impose on the rulers of the coast treaties that would give them the right to keep European competitors out of the bay were unsuccessful. Also unsuccesssful were efforts to fortify Tuticorin and lodge some effective military power there. The Nayaks of Madura and Tanjore and the Thevar wanted to retain their freedom to open their ports to all traders. But their increasing weakness and internecine quarrels played into the hands of the Dutch who steadily inched their way towards dominance of the coast. First they took advantage of the preoccupations of Madura to fortify and surround their buildings in Tuticorin. Then in return for loans and sale of arms to the Nayak they were able to secure long term lease of four ports on the coast to which were later added three more ports.[31] On the strength of this lease, the Dutch flag was raised in these places and the claim to keep Europeans out of these waters was based on this. In 1690, in the face of intense pressure from his enemies in the north, the Nayak was forced to make the concession he had been withholding so long, and promise not to permit any other European power to settle or trade in his dominions.[32]

In respect of imposing controls on Indian trade, the Dutch were not scrupulous about legal rights. After the fortification of Tuticorin and the acquisition of seven other ports on the coast, it was possible to patrol the coast better with cruisers, even though hinterland powers did not cooperate in this and were even antagonistic. Since much of the trade flowed from these ports to Ceylon, it was possible to control it with passes, particularly with stricter inspection on the Ceylon end. As the control system was streamlined, trade to other parts of India was also monitored through passes. Passes had to be secured by local traders sailing to Bengal and to Malabar, just as traders from Malabar needed passes to sail into the Bay of Madura. This was seen as a means to prevent the transport of pepper, wild cinnamon and arecanuts from Malabar eastward. To make this prohibition effective it was seen that greater control of the Straits at the narrowest point was necessary.

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[31] Governor of Ceylon to Governor General and Council, 10 July 1676, K.A. 1205 fos. 118–9.

[32] *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum*, III, pp. 528–30.

This aspect of policy brought the Dutch into close relations with the Thevar who ruled the territories on both sides of the Palk Straits. This ruler had vital interests in the trade of the area. He encouraged the settlement of a Muslim community largely devoted to trade and pearl diving. He himself owned boats that traded to neighbouring regions. The Thevar had been hostile to Portuguese penetration of Ceylon and south India and had assisted the Dutch in their wars against the Portuguese with supplies and intelligence. Later he and the traders of the coast were growing alarmed when Dutch control was growing more tight than ever the Portuguese imposed. The Chulia Muslim traders of the coastal ports were adversely affected by Dutch claims to precedence in the trade of Ceylon and the Bay of Madura. But there was nothing they could do except encourage their master to resist further Dutch encroachments and run the Dutch blockade.

There were frequent differences and sometimes conflict between the two parties arising from this conflict of commercial interests. The treaty of 1660 between the Dutch and the Thevar had provided for free traffic, for each other's subjects through the Palk Straits belonging to the Thevar and the Straits of Mannar belonging to the Dutch.[33] The assertion of greater Dutch power and interests in the area was reflected in the treaty of 1674.[34] The Thevar's subjects could not dive for pearls and chanks in the fishery without Dutch permission and these were to be sold only to the Dutch. The Thevar was made to promise not to allow vessels from Malabar to pass through the Straits with goods declared contraband by the Dutch. Thus the Dutch had secured a recognition of their supremacy over the pearlbanks and over the traffic of the Bay and the Straits.

As in Malabar, treaty rights were one thing, their observance was another. Frequent quarrels arose between the Dutch and the Thevar's administration over a variety of matters relating to the trade of the area. The Thevar wanted to sell the chanks and pearls in the open market and sought to attract English and French traders to his ports. There was conflict over the right to fish chanks from his shores, conflict over passes given to his subjects and to his vessels to sail to Ceylon and conflict over the sailing of Malabar vessels through the straights. In a number of incidents Malabar vessels were given sanctuary in Thevar's ports, thus rendering ineffective the control by passes. The decision was taken to seize territory on the island of Ramesvaram, at the norrowest point of the Straits, and locate a fortified station there.[35] Early in 1690 a naval expedition attacked the Pamban fort and the Thevar's forces were driven out of there. In the treaty that resulted, the Dutch secured the right to have a residence on the island to watch the traffic through the channel.[36] This put them in a better position to administer their machinery of control of trade of the area.

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[33] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 113–14.
[34] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 518–22.

The aim of the policy of closed seas was eventually aehieved in these waters after about 40 years of effort. The forces that opposed them were a good deal less strong and the challenge of European competition was not present to any great degree. Because of the closed in character of the seas, naval control could be established with a minimum of power. The control was pretty effective in relation to local trade which was subordinated to Dutch interests. It had the effect of stifling trade and of weakening states which previously benefited from this trade.

The Dutch carried into the Indian Ocean the ideas and aims that they successfully achieved in the Indonesian waters. They attempted these aims in selected areas of this vast Ocean. The far south of India where the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal met seemed an appropriate area to implement this policy. Politically fragmented, as yet not a major scene of European competition, the area lent itself to Dutch manipulation. But the gains were modest. Insofar as the trade of the area was linked up with regions outside it, control was not possible. The necessities of a wider exchange of commodities made the closed seas policy unattainable.

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[35] Minutes of the Political Council of Ceylon, 18 January 1685. Ceylon Government Archives. Dutch Records 29. It is interesting to note that almost a century later, in 1771, the English, who now had achieved a mastery of these waters and a domination in trade similar to that aimed at by the Dutch, wanted the Nawab of Carnatie, who now had jurisdiction over the Palk Straits, to close it to certain types of traffic from Malabar to Coromandel. The Nawab, despite his great dependence on the English, refused to do so. Madras Public Consultations, 1771, India Office Records 240/31. 25 January 1771.

[36] *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando–Indicum* III, pp. 531–5.

The imposition of a closed seas policy was generally recognised as detrimental to trade. It kept other Europeans out who might otherwise have increased the volume of traffic in the region. They generally avoided situations of potential conflict. If Europeans could not challenge Dutch claims, much less could Asian traders, except with the assistance and connivance of the rulers. In places where the rulers actively desired to break Dutch control, they were generally successful in doing so with the help of Asian merchants, provided of course they had access to a part of the coastline. The reduction of the political independence of the coastal kingdoms was necessary to the achievement of hegemony over trade, as was demonstrated in the archipelago. That they did not go ahead and do so systematically in south Asia, despite the urging on of some officials in the region, was mainly because of the over-extended nature of their commitments in the last quarter of the 17th century. They did attempt and achieve a degree of control over some indigenous rulers and some sea routes of the region.

The Jahandarnamah of Nur-ud-din

BY

S. B. P. NIGAM

The eighteenth century India witnessed a chain of political events. It saw the downfall of the Mughal empire, the rise of the Maratha, Sikh and Jat powers and the establishment of British rule in India. Necessarily, therefore, the sources for the history of this important epoch in Indian History are spread over many languages. But most of these sources, mainly contemporary and eye witness accounts, remain unpublished. The *Jahandarnamah* is one of them.

Although not detailed, the Jahandarnama unravels the short reign of Jahandar Shah, which marked the beginning of the downfall of the Mughal empire. Its author, Nur–ud–din, belonged to a family of professional soldiers who had served the Mughal empire since the days of Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur and settled in Multan. Due to the anarchy and terror let loose by the Sikhs under Banda Bahadur, the author migrated to Delhi and settled near the mausoleum of Shaikh Nizam–ud–din Auliya. In Delhi he saw Niamat Khan Ali[1] writing the *Jangnamah* in the reign of Bahadur Shah and later on when Farrukhsiyar ascended the throne and appointed Yusuf Khan[2] as the official historian of the court, the author was inspired by him to record the events to which he was an eye witness. Since Nur–ud–din was not a professional historian it appears that Yusuf Khan guided him in writing this history.

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[1] Niamat Khan Ali entitled Danishmand Khan wrote the Jangnamah during the reign of Bahadur Shah (1707–1712 A. D.) which contained a detailed account of the struggle that followed the death of Aurangzeb. C.A. Storey, *Persian Literature* Vol. I, Part--I (London, 1970), p. 592.

[2] He can probably be identified with Yusuf Muhammad Khan the author of the *Tarikh–i–Muhammad Shahi*. This work is often styled the *Tarikh–i–Chaghtai* or *Tarikh–Nadir–uz–Zamani*. The author of the *Mossir–ul–Umara* drew heavily upon this work for the material on biography of Mughal nobility contained in it. *Elliot and Dowson*, Vol. VIII, p. 103.

After the usual doxology and praise of the prophet Muhammad, the author laments the anarchy let loose by the circumstances of the time and as the events witnessed by him were full of lessons for the contemporary as well as later generations he thought of recording them for the benefit of posterity. He then proceeds on to give a brief account of his ancestors. His great grandfather, whom he does not name, came to India in the army of Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur under the leadership of Baba Qashqa Mughal,[3] a noted soldier in the Mughal army and took part in the battles of Panipat and Khanua. After the victoty at Khanua in 1528, Babur decided to stay in India but Baba Qashqa Mughal did not want to stay and left the royal camp without permission. The great-grand-father of the author also accompanied him and reaching Multan he took a Mewati woman as his wife and leaving the company of his master settled there. Meanwhile his legally wedded wife who was in search of him for twenty-five years found him out and came to Multan from Balkh. At the age of sixty seven he had a son from her who was the grand-father of the author. The great-grand-father of the author lived upto the age of 103 years and died in the reign of Jahangir. He was buried at Multan, his native palace. Often, during his visit to Kashmir, Jahangir would call him and listen attentively to the tales of Umar Shaikh Mirza and Babur from him. Once the emperor asked him to accompany him to Kashmir but due to his old age he declined to go.[4] It is, however, not possible to check this information from the memoirs of Jahangir as there is no mention of any such person.

After thus narrating the above story about his ancestors the author comes down to the last days of Aurangazeb and does not say even a word about his grand father. After the conquest of Golkunda in 1686 A. D. the emperor Aurangazeb conferred the Subah of Kabul along with the governorship of Multan and the Punjab on his eldest son, prince Muhammad Mauzzam. Prince Muizz-ud-din, his eldest son (Jahandar Shah) was appointed governor of Multan as his deputy. After the death of the emperor his third son, Muhammad Azam ascended the throne at Ahmadnagar.[5] Since the news of the fatal illness of the emperor was known to Prince Muhammad Muazzam at Kabul, specially through the letter of Muhammad Muizz-ud-din, he left Kabul and arriving at Lahore ascended the throne in the year 1119 A. H./1707 A. D.[6] and ordered his forces to be ready for the eventual contest. Calling his eldest son Muhammad Muizz-ud-din along with his army from Multan he placed him in charge of all matters. A similar order was sent to his second son, Azim-ush Shan to proceed to Agra from Bengal. While Prince Muizz-ud-din was busy collecting all the army from the neighbourhood of Multan Shaikh Burhan-u-din Faruqi, the father of the author, also joined him alongwith his close associates and came to Lahore. The author was also with him. After collecting the army and the machinery of war, Bahadur Shah proceeded towards Agra and from the other side Price Azam Shah also proceeded from Ahmadnagar with a large army under the command of trusted and experienced Generals. From there he proceeded towards Agra with a small army and in the battle that ensued he was killed along with his sons and Bahadur Shah was victorious.[7]

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[3] Baba Qashqa Mughal is mentioned by Babur in his memoirs in connection with the events of July 22, 1519 (See Beveridge, *Baburnama*, Vol. I, pp. 404–5). He was appointed at Dipalpur on January 22, 1524 (*Ibid.*, pp. 441–42),. Abul Fazl says that he continued in the service of Humayun but was murdered by Muhammad Zaman Baiqara. His sons Hali Muhammad and Khan Kuki were also in the service of Humayun but were put to death in 1551 for treachery.

[4] *Folois*, 3b and 4a.

The details of the fateful battle and the events of the reign of Bahadur Sdah are by-passed by the author as they were mentioned in great detail in the *Jangnamah* of Niamat Khan Ali.[8]

After ruling for five years when Bahadur Shah died in February 1712, once again anarchy and disorder prevailed in the country and all the four sons of Bahadur Śhah except Muizz-ud-din met their end in the war of succession. Muhammad Muizz-ud-din ascended the throne with the title of Jahandar Shah. He had hardly ruled for two months when Farrukhsiyar (1712-1719 A. D.), the son of the diseased Azim-us-Shan and the nephew of Jahandar Shah raised the standard of revolt in Bihar and Bengal with the help of Hussain Ali Khan *alias* Abdullah. Khan and after a terrible war in 1124 A. H./1712 A. D. ascended the throne and ruled for seven years. He was not destined to enjoy the fruits of victory for long as the Saiyed brothers reduced him to the status of a figure head keeping all real authority in their own hands. Ultimately he died leaving a world full of sorrows and regrets. At the time of writing this short history peace was no where in sight.[9]

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[5] *Ibid.*, 4a.
[6] *Ibid.*, 4b.
[7] *Ibid.*, 4b.
[8] *Ibid.*, 5a.
[9] *Ibid.*, 5 (b).

After thus briefly surveying the events of the reigns of Jahandar Shah and Farrukhsiyar the author proceeds on to discuss the circumstances which led him to write a history of Jahandar Shah. He says that when during the reign of Bahadur Shah, Niamat Khan Ali was recording the events of his reign in the *Jangnamah* he frequently used to visit the famous historian. When the book was ready, he obtained a copy of it and went through it diligently. It was since then that he developed a taste for writing history. Later on during the reign of Farrukhsiyar when Yusuf Khan was appointed the official historian, the author frequently used to visit him and went through the drafts of his history. His interest became deeper and deeper but the historian warned him that historiography was hell of a job and that the resultant reward was disappointment. But since the author and his father Burhan ud-din had passed their days in the service of Jahandar Shah, the author decided to record the events of his reign so that he might also be remembered by posterity.[10]

Before proceeding on to begin his history, the author gives a brief account of his father and himself. He says that after the fall of Jahandar Shah Shaikh Burhan-ud-din, the author's father served Abdul Samad Khan[11] for sometime but when Husain Ali Khan led an expedition against Raja Ajit Singh of Jaipur, he left Delhi alongwith the royal army and went to Ajmer to offer prayers at the sacred tomb of Khwajah Muin-du-din Chishti. After the submission of Ajit Singh when the royal forces left for Delhi, Burhan-ud-din left the army and went to Multan, his native place. The author who had also accompanied his father to Ajmer chose to settle down at Burhanpur where a colony of Faruquis was living since the days of Akbar.[12] However, the author had to leave for Multan soon after with the army of Abdul Samad Khan which was sent by Abdullah Khan to punish Banda Bahadur. Reaching Multan he found his father confined to bed and looked after him for about a month but it was too late. Burhan-ud-din died on 20 Rabi-us-Sani 1127 A, H. (25 April, 1715). Due to the anarchy and terror let loose by the Sikhs, the author left Multan soon after and came to Delhi. It was in the end of Zulqadah 1127 A. H. that he was able to finish the work. However, it appears that he could give final shape to his work several years after because on folio 5 (b) the death of Farrukh-siyar is mentioned which took place on a jamadi-ul-akhir, 1131 A. H. (28 April, 1719 A. D.)[13] As the history treats mainly the career of Jahander Shah, as also the fact that the author and his father flourished under his patronage, the author named it *Jahandarnamah.*[14]

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[10] *Ibid.*, 6a.

[11] For a short biography of this noble, see *Asrar-i-Samadi*, (ed.) M.Shihab-ud-din (Lahore, 1965), pp. b-d.

[12] *Folios*, 61b-62a.

The book is a continuous narrative written in strict chronological order. It is divided into several sections under convenient headings. It will therefore, be proper to discuss the contents as presented by the author.

Section I: Account of the princehood days of Muhammad Muizz-ud-din, son of Bahadur Shah *Khuld Manzil*

Since the work is devoted mainly to the history of Jahandar Shah it is expected of the author that he will closely trace the early life of the prince but he does nothing of the kind. After giving his date of birth as 20 Muharram 1070 A. H. (7 October, 1659) at Agra he tells us that the prince received his early education under the affectionate care of his grand-father emperor Aurangzeb.[15] By the age of fourteen he had learnt all the arts necessary for a prince and received special rewards from his grand-father. During the Deccan campaigns of Aurangzeb he gave proof of courage and volour, on many occasions, against the Marathas. When his father Muhammad Muazzam, who was governor of Kabul, was called by the emperor to the Deccan [16] he proceeded towards Lahore alongwith his two sons Muizz-ud-din and Azim-ush-Shan. On the way near Qandahar, the Afghans attacked them. Inspite of the fact that Muizz-ud-din had only 500 soldiers, he took the initiative to ward off the attack and successfully drove of the enemy.[17] When he reached Deccan, he was appointed along with his father to chastise prince Akbar. In this task also Muizz-ud-din showed utmost courage and alertness of mind and forced Akbar to leave for Iran.[18] In the twenty-fifth regnal year again he was deputed with his father to attack the Adilshahi Kingdom and captured many forts. After the conquest of Bijapur he was deputed to reduee Abdul Hasan Tanashah, the ruler of Golkonda and pressed the siege so vigorously that the Bijapuri forces were forced to take refuge in the fort of Golkonda. Once he was allowed by Tana Shah to enter the fort just in order to have a look at the buildings. This was reported to the emperor who confined the prince and his father Muazzam.[19] During the long incarceration he once decided to escape away from the imperial guard and join the opponents of the emperor but his father stopped him. Later on when the emperor was informed about the innocence of the prince, both father and son were setfree and restored to their original status.[20] In the twenty eighth regnal year when Tana Shah submitted to the emperor, prince Muazzam was conferred the government of Kabul and Muizz-ud-din also accompanied his father. He was given the charge of the territory of Multan. He continued to hold this charge till the war of succession between Azim-ush-Shan and Bahadur Shah. In this battle, Muizz-ud-din played a vital role and saved his brother Azim-ush-Shan from being captured by the enemy. Thereafter he was locked up in a bloody battle with prince Badar Bakht, son of Azam Shah and succeeded in killing his equally valiant foe.[21]

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[13] Irvine, W., *The Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 392.
[14] *Folio.*, 7a.
[15] *Ibid.*, 7b.
[16] *Ibid.*, 8a.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Ibid.*

After the victory over Azam Shah, Muizz-ud-din was much more near his father, Bahadur Shah, than his brothers and carried on the administration of the empire in close association with his father.[22]

[19] They were arrested on March 4, 1687. See *Maasir-i-Alamoiri*, English translation by Jadunath Sarkar, p. 179.

[20] *Folio*, 8b-9a.

[21] Though the author and his father took active part in the decisive battle against Azam Shah yet it is to be regretted that the account given by him is very brief. In his anxiety to enhance the prestige of prince Muizz-ud-din, he gives all the credit of the victory to him. Fortunately, we have other contemporary and eye-witness accounts of the battle which prove that Azam Shah committed two strategic mistakes while fighting for the throne. After the death of his father Aurangzeb, he did not immediately proceed to occupy the capital like his more prudent brother Muazzam. Heedless of the advice of his Counsellors he left a section of his army to look after the treasurers and the harem at Gwalior. In the crucial battle taking the main army of his opponent to be the advance guard he engaged himself with all his might and lost the battle. See the Ibratnama of Muhammad Qasim Lahori, edited by Zahur-ud-din Ahmad (Lahore, 1977), pp. 117-125; *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan* (ed.) Ghulam Rasul Mehr (Lahore, 1971), pp.53-57,

[22] *Folio*, 10 (a).

Section II: *Account of the contest between the four princes after the death of Bahadur Shah*

When in the year 1124 A. H. (1712 A. D.)[23] Bahadur Shah died at Lahore all the four sons of the late emperor were present in the camp. All of them immediately started preparations for a contest for the throne.

Nawab Asad Khan Asaf–ud–daulah,[24] the vizir, tried a settlement of the matter by negotiation but due to the stiff opposition of Afzal Khan, Jani Khan and Kokaltash Khan his efforts could not succeed. Asad Khan was pleading the cause of the eldest son Muizz–ud–din but since Azim–ush–Shan was much nearer to his father during his life time and held the Subahs of Bihar and Bengal besides the vast treasures of the late king, he presumed his succession as certain and refused to come to any amicable settlement with his brothers. Seeing no possibility of avoiding the war of succession, Rao Gujarmal tried to win over Jahan Shah on the side of Muizz–ud–din with the express consent of Asad Khan and his son Zulfiqar Khan. Having received promises of promotion and rewards he alongwith Jahan Shah joined the army of Muizz-ud–din. The alliance was soon reported to Azim–ush–Shan. In order to strengthen his own position he immediately sent confidential emissaries to Rafi–ush-Shan, the fourth contender to the throne. The hectic activity of the emissaries on both the sides could not remain a secret and spies of Muizz-ud–din sensing the danger of an imminent alliance reported the matter to him. Without loosing any time he proceeded to the camp of Zulfiqar Khan at dead of night and informed him of what was going on in the rival camp. Zulfiqar Khan first tried to wean out Rafi–ush-Shan from the proposed alliance but finally the confidants and principal advisers of the prince persuaded him to join the cause of Muizz–ud–din.[25]

Finding himself isolated Azim–ush–Shan who had all the treasures, elephants and guns of the late emperor postponed an immediate engagement. He despatched swift messengers to Husain Ali Khan who was then the governor of Bihar and also held the eastern provinces of Bengal and Assam as a deputy of the prince to come to his aid. This was a fatal mistake for events were moving very fast and there was hardly any time for Husain Ali Khan to come to the aid of his patron at such a short notice.[26]

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[23] He died on the night of 27 February, 1712. See Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol.I, p. 135. *Irakhi–i–Kradat–Khan*, pp. 105–106 gives the date 21 Muharam, 1124 A. H. Our author says on Folio 12 (a) that he died on 20 Muharram, 1124 A. H.

[24] For a short biography of Asad Khan see *Massir–ul–Umara*, Urdu translation by Muhammad Ayub Qadiri (Lahore, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 304–14; also *The Prime Ministers of Aurangzeb* by Laiq Ahmad (Allahabad, 1976) pp. 100–143. He died in 1715.

[25] *Folios*, 10 (b)–11 (a).

Having entered into an alliance with each other the three brothers ordered their *Bakhshis* to collect the armies for the final trial of strength but in the camp of the allies there was great apprehension of an attack by Azim–ush-Shah for he was still strong enough to cause great damage to the three brothers for as described above he had the majority of the forces with him alongwith the elephants and guns. In monetary aspect also he was more sound than the three brothers combined, having in possession the entire treasure of the late emperor. In order to gain more time and strengthen his position Muizz–ud–din sent Raja Gujar Mal to Mahabat Khan and Khan–i–Zaman, sons of the late prime minister Munim Khan who had not joined any side and were encamping by the side of the river Ravi with the message to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the contenders. The two brothers knew that there were very bleak prospects of an amicable settlement and refused to interfere.[27]

All this happened on the night of Bahadur Shah's death. The nobles in the camp from fear of being looted by the unruly soldiers left for their places of safety. A large number of servants and labourers who had hardly any protection entered the city of Lahore where they were robbed off their meagre belongings including their wearing apparel. So many people had entered the city that there was hardly any space left in the lanes and roads to move about freely. In the royal camp itself the soldiers raised a hue and cry for their pay using abusive language and shouting unworthy slogans against the authorities. Lawlessness and confusion prevailed allround so much so that hardly any discipline was left in the army. Darkness helped the soldiers in looting whatever commodity they could lay their hands on. The author rightly remarks that the night presented the scene of the Day of Judgement.[28]

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[26] *Ibid.*, 11 (a).

[27] *Ibid.*, 11 (b).

[28] *Ibid.*, 12 (a).

Section III: *The War of Succession Begins*

When the night of 20 Muharram passed away and the great Doom's Day dawned, the scouts of the army brought the news to Zulfiqar Khan that prince Muhammad Kareem, the eldest son of Azim-ush–Shan had come out of his tent with seven thousand cavalry and other machines of war and was proceeding towards the royal army (i.e., the army of Muizz–ud–din) and his father was following him with a large park of artillery. Since it was rumoured in the army that all the nobles were secretly aligned to Azim–ush–Shan, the common soldiers were about to run away leaving everything behind but at this juncture Zulfiqar Khan, a seasoned general of many engagements boldly encouraged the soldiers. He alongwith a few trusted soldiers rode to the encampment of Jahan Shah, situated near the tomb of Shah Mir Durvesh and apprised him of the impending danger. The prince at once ordered his troops to get ready for the battle and proceeded post haste to the scene of the battle.[29]

Zulfiqar Khan now went to Rafi-ush–Shan who was encamped on the banks of the river Ravi and found him ready with five thousand well armed cavalry ready to give fight to the enemy. Seeing that Rafi–ush Shan had a small army, he advised him to be in the rear guard and join the action only after receiving a signal from him. The prince who was conscious of his weakness readily agreed to the proposal.

Having thus arranged the disposition of the two armies Zulfiqar Khan proceeded to his own army and urged Muizz–ud–din to come out with the troops and artillery to engage Muhammad Kareem. However, instead of attacking the army of the rival prince Muhammad Kareem went upto the camp of Mahabat Khan and after staying there for some-time returned to his own camp without shooting a single arrow. It was later on learnt that the purpose of this display of the army of Muhammad Kareem was only to persuade Mahabat Khan and his brother to join Azim–ush–Shan but having failed in his attempt he went back. It was now clear that Azim–ush–Shan was only biding his time till the arrival of the reinforcements from Bihar and Bengal and that he was in no mood to fight seeing that the three brothers had aligned themselves to strangulate his claim to sovereignty. Zulfiqar Khan was not as yet ready to risk an engagement and was glad to see the crucial hour postponed by the enemy himself. He once again renewed the pledge of friendship with Jahan Shah and Rafi-ush-Shan given to them earlier and confirming the condition of division of the empire into three equal parts he immediately started collecting materials of war and reorganised his forces.[30]

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[29] *Ibid.*, 13 (a).

The news of this alliance and the hectic activity that followed in its wake caused great panic in the opposite camp led by Azim-ush-Shan. Although Mirza Shah Nawaz Khan Safavi, a veteran of many battles and a statesman of no mean stature advised him to attack the enemy without delay as they were not yet ready to take up arms, he refused to listen and ordered a deep moat to be dug to protect his camp.[31]

Such suspense and indecision could not continue for long for as soon as Zulfiqar Khan and Abdus Samad Khan were ready for battle they took the initiative of opening the attack. On 6 Safar 1124 A. H. (14 March, 1712 A. D.)[32] the combined armies of the three princes proceeded towards the camp of Azim-ush-Shan and the advance guard of both sides came to occasional blows. For two days Abdul Samad Khan was busy arranging his guns and tried to set fire to the gun powder magazines of Azim-ush-Shan but Sulaiman Khan Panni who was his chief gunner foiled all attempts of sabotage. On 8 Safar (16 March, 1712) the battle started with charging of the guns by Sulaiman Khan Panni and his attack was so fierce that Kokaltash Khan and Jani Khan who were stationed in the south and west of the fortified camp respectively retreated from their positions and took refuge behind the fort walls. Finding the western and the southern side abandonded, Shah Nawaz Khan came out of the camp with two thousand cavalry and rushed upon Muizz-ud-din with a lightning attack but was opposed by Abdul Samad Khan and Jani Khan. A tough hand to hand fight followed. Shah Nawaz Khan had nearly carried the day when Jahan Shah came to the rescue of his elder brother and ultimately Shah Nawaz Khan retired with heavy losses. His misfortune was that Azim-ush-Shan did not send any supporting army behind him probably because Shah Nawaz Khan had started hostilities without his permission. Jahan Shah would have entered the camp of Azim-ush-Shan but the constant gun fire prevented him to proceed further. By sun set both sides retired to their own fortified camps leaving heavy casualties behind them. Jahan Shah was badly wounded.[33]

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[30] *Ibid.*, 14 (a) and (b).

[31] *Ibid.*, 14 (b)

[32] *Folio*, 15 (b).

In this battle Rafii–ush–Shan had remained completely inactive. but finding the enemy weak he ensured Jahandar Shah of active assistance. Next day he came out with five thousand cavalry and again a fierce battle ensued from both sides. The combined forces of Rafi–ush-Shan and Muizz-ud-din were about to break the wooden cordon round the camp of Azim–ush-Shan when Sulaiman Khan Panni with five hundred tried Afghans came out and caused hovoc in the enemy forces. But they could hardly make any headway against the freshly arrived forces of Zulfiqar Khan, Kokaltash Khan and Jani Khan. The Afghan retired again leaving behind heavy casualties. Again the day closed without any decision in favour of either party.[34]

During the night Zulfiqar Khan once again contacted Jahan Shah and Rafi-ush-Shan and persuaded both the princes for a concerted attack in a final assault on the fortified camp of Azim–ush–Shan. Next day again a battle took place but Azim–ush–Shan refused to come out. Sulaiman Khan Panni with five hundred Afghan soldiers came out but ultimately retreated leaving behind a large number of Afghans dead on the battle field.[35] The day closed without any decisive victory to either side. During the night Shah Nawaz Khan Safavi who was supporting the cause of Azim–ush-Shan made an abortive attempt to kill Muizz-ud-din. Raiman, a lady in the harem of Muizz–ud-din woke up in time and foiled the attempt of the assassins.[36]

On the third day, the combined armies of the three princes again came out of their camps and tried to break through the fortifications but artillery was the main strength of Azim–ush–Shan which forced the invading army to retire. Azim–ush-Shan lost many soldiers on his side and his advisers urged him to try his luck once for all the next day instead of passing time in the hope of fresh arrivals from the east. They tried to convince him in vain that a camp besieged was a camp lost Over-cautious, he was not prepared to leave his fate to mere chance.[37]

[33] *Ibid.*, 16 (a) and (b).
[34] *Ibid.*, 17 (a) and (b).
[35] *Ibid.*, 18 (a) and (b).
[36] *Ibid.*, 19 (a) and (b).
[37] *Ibid.*, 20 (a) and (b).

Section IV *Account of the battle between Jahandar Shah and Azim–ush–Shan and his end in the whirlpool of Non-existence*

On 9 Safar 1124 A. H. (17 March 1712 A.D.) Zulfiqar Khan took the initiative for a final assault. This time he succeeded in breaking into the camp of Azim-ush-Shan. Many great pillars in the camp of Azim–ush–Shan like Sulaiman Khan Panni, Shah Nawaz Khan Safavi and Daya Ram Nagar fell fighting for the cause of their master. With these high ranking officers gone, the soldiers fled for their lives. Many were drowned in the river. Azim-ush-Shan himself lost his life while crossing the river. By dusk the camp of Azim-ush-Shan vanished away leaving hardly any trace of its existence. The corpse of Azim-ush-Shan was brought out from the river and was given a simple burial outside the camp of Jahandar Shah. A large body fell into the hands of Zulfiqar Khan.[38]

Section V: *The fall of Jahan Shah*

Treachery and trickery were so deeply ingrained in the character of Zulfiqar Khan that he could descend to any extent to promote his personal interests. Having annihilated Azim-ush–Shan who was the main contender for the throne, Zulfiqar Khan now set himself to the task of bringing the downfall of Jahan Shah and Rafi-ush–Shan who had staked all to support their elder brother in the hope that the solemn promise made by the latter would be honoured in letter and spirit. The representatives of the two brothers now approached Zulfiqar Khan to demand the partition of the empire and equal share in the war booty. But swollen by the unique victory and the heavy treasure which Zulfiqar Khan had captured and kept for himself he gave an evasive answer to the emissaries of the two princes. He knew that devoid of money they will not be able to keep their soldiers under their command for long. Sick of the promises of Zulfiqar Khan to divide the empire at once the two princes now insisted that at least the treasure captured by Zulfiqar Khan should be divided equally so that the soldiers could be paid their salaries.[39] But Zulfiqar Khan was unmoved by the entreaties of the two princes and continued to gain time, simply to provoke the princes to initiate hostilities.

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[38] *Ibid.*, 31 a–25 (b).

[39] *Ibid.*, 25 b–26 (a).

Jahan Shah soon awoke from the slumber and realised his mistake but now it was too late. Financially he was more sound than his more unfortunate brother Rafi–ush–Shah who was simply biding his time in the hope that promise would be fulfilled. He ordered the *Bakhshis* of his army to enroll as many soldiers as they could. They collected about four thousand soldiers of the vanquished Azim-ush-Shan who were hiding in the city of Lahore and the suburbs and were hard pressed for want of money and provisions. They simply pounced upon the opportunity and gladly rallied round Jahan Shah.[40]

On 18 Safar 1124 A. H. (26 March, 1712) Jahan Shah moved out of his camp in full battle formation and on the other side Jahandar Shah also proceeded to meet his brother alongwith Kokaltash Khan and Abdul Samad Khan Mir–i–Atish in the vanguard. From the very outset the battle began with booming of the guns from both sides. Rustam Dil–Khan, the *Mir-i-Atish* of Jahan Shah created havoc in the ranks of Jahandar Shah by incessant fire. The battle raged till dusk but without any decisive victory to either side. When the armies retired to their own camps a few thousand soldiers on the side of Jahandar Shah left the camp under cover of darkness causing great commotion in the camp.[41]

The artillery of Jahan Shah had caused so much damage to the rank and file of Jahandar Shah that he decided not to give battle till his forces were reorganised. Moreover, large scale desertions in the army during the previous night had further degraded the morale of his troops. Considering this as a sign of weakness Jahan Shah came out of his camp to besiege Jahandar Shah. He sent Afzal Khan, his gunner, with two thousand soldiers to attack his rival and himself followed him with the bulk of his troops. Zulfiqar Khan too worried with the conditions in his camp hit upon a novel plan. He sent about two hundred trusted servants to the camp of Jahan Shah to congratulate him for the victory. Without enquiring into the actual state of affairs in the rival camp Jahan Shah delayed proceeding further. Meanwhile, Jahandar Shah sent his son Izz–ud–din alongwith Lal Kunwar, his courtesan, and other ladies of the harem for taking refuge in the city. He succeeded in sending the ladies in safety inside the fort but was himself captured by the soldiers of Afzal Khan. In the camp itself thers was confusion worst confounded.[42] News of what was happening in the camp of Jahandar Shah was brought constantly to him and thinking victory round the corner he decided to send Rustam Dil Khan to wind up the contest but committed the suicidal blunder of sending the entire artillery with him. Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash Khan were locked up in a bloody fight with Afzal Khan. With all the forces at their command they attacked Afzal Khan and held him under check for some time. Hearing about the difficult position of Afzal Khan, Rustam Dil Khan instead of proceeding to the camp of Jahandar Shah moved to help Afzal Khan. The battle raged furious. Jahan Shah who was leisurely and cautiously coming to the battle scene, sent his chosen troops to help Rustam Dil Khan and Afzal Khan so that very few soldiers were left with him. Abdul Samad Khan immediately swung into action and attacked Jahan Shah with his light artillery. Within seconds hundreds of body guards surrounding Jahan Shah were killed and a well directed fire finished Jahan Shah and his son Farkhanda Akhtar. The news of his death spread like wild fire and Rustam Dil Khan and Afzal Khan ran away from the battle field in the thick of battle. Zulfiqar Khan lost no opportunity in ransacking the whole camp of Jahan Shah. Thus a great and unexpected victory was achieved mainly due to the indiscretion of Jahan Shah at the crucial hour. A huge booty and considerable treasure fell into the hands of the victors.[43]

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[40] *Ibid.*, 26 b–37 (a).
[41] *Ibid.*, 27 (b).

Section VI: *Victory of Jahandar Shah over Rafi–ush–Shan*

After the defeat and death of Azim–ush–Shan, when relations between Jahandar Shah and Jahan Shah started deteriorating day by day so that an armed conflict was imminent, Zulfiqar Khan went to the camp of Rafi-ush–Shan a day before the fateful battle and re-assuring him of the patronage of Jahandar Shah handed over to him a written agreement signed by Jahandar Shah himself with solemn oaths which contained an offer of the Subahdari of Bengal in case the prince kept aloof from the ensuing battle. This was done just to ensure the neutrality of Rafi–ush–Shan. The prince was satisfied and although Jahan Shah tried to persuade him to join hands and reply the treachery of Jahandar Shah with the barrel of guns he refused to accept the sane advice.[44] Next day when the fall of Jahan Shah was known at midnight Rafi-ush-Shan who was encamping five miles away from the scene of the battle, sent a trusted eunuch to Jahandar Shah congratulating for the victory and reminding him of the written assurances. The emissary was told that Jahandar Shah was sleeping. He was dismissed instantly leaving no doubt in his mind that all was not well. He then went to Zulfiqar Khan but there too he received a cold reception. At last he went to Kokaltash Khan who was as yet awake and was attending to the job of re-organising the camp. When the message of Rafi-ush-Shan was communicated to him he burst out in no uncertain terms and said that sword alone could decide the issue. Any further entreaties or negotiations with the victors were useless. Rafi-ush-Shan was so much disgusted with the reply that he immediately ordered preparations to fight his treacherous brother. In fact the only choice now left with him was to sacrifice his life in the battle field fighting like a brave warrior or pass on a life of ignominy and death in a solitary cell of Gwalior fort. As a man of honour and courage he chose the former.[45]

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[42] *Ibid.*, 24 (a).

[43] *Ibid.*, 28 (b) and 30 (a).

Without loosing a moment he mounted his elephant and ordered Jahangir Quli Khan *Mir-i-Atish* to take out the guns and fix them within striking distance of the enemy camp. Muin Khan was ordered to lead the vanguard. Fath-Ullah Khan was given the charge of the right wing and Afzal Khan that of the left wing. Mirza Muhammad Khan, with newly recruited troops was ordered to remain at the rear guard. The prince remained in the centre with the harem and children and trusted court servants.[46]

On Tuesday, 30 Safar 1124 A.H. (28 March, 1712 A.D.) as the sun rose Rafi-ush-Shan charged an assault on the camp of Jahandar Shan and the battle started by firing of the guns. Zulfiqar Khan who woke up by the sound of guns, hurriedly collected his troops and sent them to bar the advance of the rival army. At this crucial stage Fath-Ullah Khan Mughal who was leading the right wing of the army of Rafi-ush-Shah left his master and went over to Jahandar Shah. His treachery at the beginning of the battle sealed the fate of his master. Still he fought bravely directing the battle himself. Soon the left wing under Afzal Khan was annihilated and he received grievous injuries. The right wing which was given over to Shamsher Khan had a hot contest but on the death of its leader that too vanished. Watching these developments, the newly recruited troops under Mirza Muhammad Taqi who were in the rear fled away. Rafi-ush-Shan was now locked up in a desperate fight alone. Soon the combined forces of Zulfiqar Khan and Koklatash Khan finished whatever remained with the prince who fell down dead leaving heavy casualties alround. As soon as the news of the victory was announced to Jahandar Shah he ordered the drums of victory to be beaten and retired to his camp puffed up with the success over his last rival but quite unmindful of the tragic fate had in store for him just a few months later.[47]

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[44] *Folios*, 30 (a) and (b).
[45] *Ibid.*, 31 (a) – 32 (b).
[46] *Ibid.*, 32 (b).

Section VII: *Account of the Reign of Muizz-ud-din Jahandar Shah*

Having annihilated all the contenders for the throne, Muizz–ud-din heaved a sigh of relief and on the next day i.e.,20 Safar, 1184(29 March, 1712 A.D.) he ascended the throne of the great Mughals at the age of fifty two. Assuming the title of Jahandar Shah he satisfied all the nobles and officers who had supported him in the struggle by promotions and liberal gifts commensurate with the services rendered by each. Ir this war of succession Zulfiqar Khan had played a leading role and, therefore, he was rewarded with all he could hope for and desired. His father Asad Khan was appointed *Vakil-i-Mutlaq* of the empire.[48] Zulfiqar Khan was appointed vizir of the empire with a mansab of 8000 *Zat*. Kokaltash Khan was appointed the *Mir Bakhshi* and was conferred the title of *Khan-i-Jahan*. He was the most active general on the side of Jahandar Shah and expected the post of vizir which was denied to him. Consequently the seed of discord and enmity was sowed between him and Zulfiqar Khan from the day of accession of the new monarch. Other officers got suitable assignments in the court on the recommendation of Zulfiqar Khan.[49] The author, however, laments that although since the beginning of Bahadur Shah's reign he had exerted himself in the two wars of succession and Zulfiqar Khad had himself witnessed his efforts yet as no body pleaded his cause he got nothing except a nominal *inam*.[50] Nobles who had fought on the side of his opponents were either put to death or imprisoned. Those who were of doubtful integrity were imprisoned and their properties confiscated.[51]

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[47] *Ibid.*, 31 (a) and 34 (b).
[48] *Ibid.*, 34 (b).
[49] *Ibid.*, 35 (a)–25 (b).
[50] *Ibid.*, 36 (b).
[51] *Ibid.*, 36 (b).

Having thus disposed off the state matters in accordance with the wishes of Zulfiqar Khan, Jahandar Shah started for the capital and arrived on the banks of the Satluj in the beginning of Rafi-ul-awwal where he honoured Lal Kunwar, his concubine, with the title of Imtiaz Mahal. Valuable presents amounting to about fifteen crores of rupees were given to her. Her brothers and relatives were given titles and *mansabs*. One of her brothers was given the title of Niamat Khan and appointed governor of the suba of Multan. However, the order was withdrawn due to the stiff opposition of Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash Khan.[52] When the emperor reached Delhi he gave himself up entirely to merry making and rivalry. All law and order was thrown to the winds.[53]

Section VIII: *Account of Farrukhsiyar leaving Bihar and submission of Abdullah Khan the governor of Allahabad to fight for his cause*

At the time all the four brothers were locked up in the struggle for the throne at Lahore, Farrukhsiyar the son of Azim–ush–Shan left Bengal and came to Azimabad (Patna) where he stayed for a few days as one of his wives was expecting. When the letters of Azim-ush-Shan reached him asking him to send Husain Ali Khan and others he started preparations to go to Lahore to help his father. Husain Ali Khan had gone to Rajgir to settle certain matters with the local zamindars. Thus the movement of Farrukhsiyar was delayed for a few days. Meanwhile, Khwaja Muizz-ud-din and Mir Ishaq along with three or four thousand soldiers reached Patna and communicated the details of the great tragedy to Farrukhsiyar. His advisers decided that he should immediately ascend the throne. Nobles and supporters who had returned from Lahore were promoted and given suitable mansabs and promises for further consideration in future. Husain Ali Khan, the Subadar of Bihar hesitated for a time to support Farrukhsiyar but since no command was received from Jahandar Shah confirming him to his post he and his brother Abdullah Khan, the Subadar of Allahabad agreed to fight for Farrukhsiyar.[54]

Jahandar Shah's complacency and disorder that was let loose due to the corruption in administration led to further strengthening of the position of Farrukhsiyar. Many dissatisfied nobles and soldiers hastened to join him as soon as they heard of his coronation. Among the influential nobles of Jahandar Shah Ahmad Beg and Khwaja Asim who were distressed at the rude behaviour of Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash Khan secretly opened negotiations with Abdullah Khan and promised to extend all support to him in the ensuing struggle. All at once a great army was collected under the banner of Farrukhsiyar who now proceeded towards Agra.[55]

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[52] *Ibid.*, 29 (a)–40 (b).
[53] *Ibid.*, 39 (a)–40 (a).
[54] *Folios*, 40 (a)–42 (a).

Section IX: *Account of the battle between Saiyid Abdul Ghaffar and Abdullah Khan and the defeat of the army of Jahandar Shah*

The news of the movement of Farrukhsiyar along with Abdullah Khan and Hussain Ali Khan reached the capital but due to mutual jealousies of Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash Khan immediate action against the rebels was delayed and ultimately Zulfiqar Khan, considering the threat to be too negligible and insignificant to be handled by him personally decided to send Raji Muhammad Khan with 12,000 cavalry under the nominal command of prince Izz–ud–din. Raji Muhammad Khan was appointed Subadar of Allahabad in place of Abdullah Khan and Saiyid Abdul Ghaffar was ordered to proceed with the advance guard with 12,000 troops to arrest the progress of the enemy. Prince Izz-ud-din commanding the main army of 40,000 forces followed him alongwith Khwajah Hussain with 15,000 cavalry and Raja Gopal Singh Bhadauria with 8,000 cavalry. When the news of the arrival of Farrukhsiyar near Allahabad reached Raji Muhammad Khan he feared that if the forces of Farrukhsiyar and Abdullah Khan combined it would be difficult to face the enemy.

He, therefore, immediately despatched Saiyid Abdul Ghaffar with 8,000 cavalry towards Allahabad and himself prepared to move forward behind him. When Saiyid Abdul Ghaffar reached Manikpur, Nurul Husain Khan, the Bakshi of Abdullah Khan confronted him with a strong band of Saiyids of Barha. Although Nurul Hasan Khan was supported only by a much smaller force he decided to fight. Soon the two forces were locked up in a deadly fight. At this juncture Najim–u–din Ali Khan and Raja Ratan Chand, the Diwan of Abdullah Khan arrived with two hundred cavalry and forced Saiyid Abdul Ghaffar Khan to retire. When the news of his defeat reached Zulfiqar Khan he sent a farman conferring the rank of 4,000 with an increase of 2,000 to Saiyid Abdullah Khan and confirmed the Subadari of Allahabad on him but it was all useless as the events were fast taking a turn for the worse.[56]

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[55] *Ibid.*, 44 (a), 44 (b).

Section X: *Account of the battle between Prince Izz-ud-din and Farrukhsiyar and the defeat of the former*

At the capital there was confusion worst confounded. Prince Izz-ud-din who had left for Allahabad and reached Kol (Aligharh) was directed to come back to Agra lest it be occupied by the advancing troops of Farrukhsiyar. Raji Muhammad Khan who had been assigned the Suba of Allahabad and was proceeding in that direction was recalled and given the over all charge of the artillery. It was now learnt that Farrukhsiyar had entered Allahabad and accompanied by Abdullah Khan was proceeding towards Agra. Izz–ud–din who had been asked to return to Agra reached Etawah and ordered all the *faujdars* of the territory to present themselves with their respective forces. Chhabila Ram Nagar, the *faujdar* of Kora came to the prince to reassure support. Prince Izz–ud–din, however, apprehended danger from him as his elder brother Daya Ram had died at Lahore fighting for the cause of Azim–ush–Shah. Under the pretext of rendering accounts of his territory he was arrested and handed over to Khwaja Husain Khan. But Chhabila Ram managed to escape during the night by bribing Khwaja Husain Khan and immediately despatched his entire artillery and 5,000 cavalry towards Allahabad himself joining Farrukhsiyar soon after. Strengthened by the arrival of Raja Cahhabila Ram Nagar, Farrukhsiyar now moved forward and reached Etawah.[57]

Having sent his advance guard under Sarbuland Khan, Abdullah Khan encamped near the village of Babharkhi which was a few miles away from the camp of Izz-ud-din who was stationed at Kora. The prince left Kora with five thousand cavalry and reached Khajua. Finding the enemy nearby he ordered a deep moat to be dug around his camp and waited for the arrival of Farrukhsiyar, Learning that the additional forces under Chin Qilich Khan were yet to arrive at Khajua, Abdullah Khan immediately attacked the prince and laid a siege to his camp on 26 Jamadi–ul–awwal, 1124 A. H. A great battle took place in which a large number of soldiers lost their lives on both sides. But the camp of the princes could not be overrun due to the deep ditch around. In the night the prince fled for his life with Khwaja Husain Khan leaving the entire camp baggage and artillery behind.[58] In the morning Abdullah Khan learnt about the escape and ordered a general assault on the camp which was taken without much effort. He opened the doors of the treasury and liberally distributed the riches and captured booty among the officers and soldiers so that all those who were groaning under the weight of poverty became rich overnight. This was a great victory for Farrukhsiyar as the Zamindars and mansabdars of the territory were attracted to join Farrukhsiyar in the hope of rewards and promotions. The Jats and Afghans of the neighbouring areas who were always intent upon dacoity and looting joined in large numbers to swell the ranks of the Saiyid brothers. By now they had collected 40,090 cavalry besides numerous infantry beyond computation.[59]

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[56] *Ibid.*, 44 (a) and 44 (b)
[57] *Ibid.*, 44 (b)–46 (b)

Section XI: *Account of the battle between Jahandar Shah and Farrukhsiyar*

When the news of the defeat of Prince Izz–ud–din was conveyed to Jahandar Shah and his courtiers they were so much struck with terror and nervousness that whatever riches they had collected from the camps of the three vanquished princes was ordered to be lavishly spent for collecting the army and other necessaries of war. Asad Khan alongwith Abdullah Khan Mughal was placed in charge of the capital and other departments. After hurriedly collecting whatever forces he could Jahandar Shah came out of the capital when a quarter of the night had passed[60] with the great pomp and show and proceeded towards Agra. Zulfiqar Khan, Kokaltash Khan and Jani Khan were appointed to lead the vanguard with 40,000 cavalry and heavy artillery. Raji Muhammad Khan the *Mir-i-Atish* was appointed to guard the royal camp with one hundred large and small pieces of field artillery. In the centre, Islam Khan, Murtaza Khan and Azam Khan were posted with a special park of artillery. Muhammad Amin Khan and Abdus Samad Khan Turani led the right wing of the army. The author and his father along with six hundred trusted cavalry were in the left wing which was led by Jan

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[58] *Ibid.*, 47 (a) – 47 (b).

[59] *Ibid.*, 48 (a) and 49 (b).

[60] Jahandar Shah left the capital on the night of 11 Zulqadah, 1124 A.H. (9 December, 1712). Khafikhan, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, Vol. II, p. 700.

Nisar Khan and Mukhtar Khan. Saad-ullah Khan, Hafiz-ullah-Khan, Bahramand Khan were posted with the choicest soldiers to guard the emperor. Behind the elephant of the emperor, Lal Kunwar and other maid servants of the palace were guarded by 5,000 cavalry led by Fateh ullah Khan Mughal.

With these elaborate arrangements being complete the royal army proceeded through the Delhi gate. From the very beginning bad omens portending the great tragedy awaiting the emperor and his nobles occurred. Firstly, the ropes of the great royal drum were broken while passing through the Delhi gate and it fell down to the ground in pieces. Secondly, the royal canopy somehow entangled with a tree and the pearls trappings attached to it fell down on the ground causing the pearls to scatter around. But the greatest evil was that a great hail storm accompanied with heavy rains created havoc from the day the emperor started towards Agra. Owing to incessant rains and cold wave, the army was hard pressed. Inspite of biting cold and considerable rain when the emperor came out of the city and encamped at the garden of Khizrabad the main tent of the emperor caught fire and was totally gutted. It was with great difficulty that the royal army some how reached Agra.[61]

News was brought by the scouts that Bahadur Khan Rohella and Muhammad Khan Bangash who were leaders of the advance guard of Farrukhsiyar's army had arrived on the banks of the Yamuna with seven or eight thousand troops and small guns with the intention of crossing the river. Raji Muhammad Khan, the chief of the artillery was ordered to prevent him from crossing the river. He crossed the river and the enemy fled without fighting.[62] This was a dupe to isolate a powerful column of the royal artillery from coming into action because the main army of Farrukhsiyar under the command of Abdullah Khan was already busy crossing the river elsewhere south of Sikandara. Again, it rained so heavily that two officers were unable to fix their guns in position and all the pieces were stuck on the banks of the river. Both the officers returned leaving the guns behind. For two days it rained so heavily that the river was flooded and it was not possible for either party to cross it. All of a sudden, however, it was reported that the advance guard of the enemy led by Khwaja Asim, Bahadur Khan

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[61] *Ibid.*, 51 (a).
[52] *Ibid.*, 51 (b).

Rohella, Muhammad Khan Bangash and Mir Ashraf Khan had crossed the river alongwith the army followed by Abdullah Khan and fortified themselves in the vast field near the banks of the river at Bahishtabad adjacent to the tomb of Akbar. Soon after Husain Ali Khan with his trusted generals also crossed the river and both the brothers arranged the army in battle array. Jahandar Shah and his generals who had considered it an impossibility hurriedly put their armour and proceeded to face the enemy.[63]

The battle began on 13 Zulhijja, 1124 A. H. (10 January, 1713) with the firing of guns from both sides. In the beginning Raza Quli Khan, the *Mir–i–Atish* seemed to carry advantage by incessant but reckless firing and Zulfiqar Khan brought the advance guard with full might against the army. The left wing under Kokaltash Khan attacked Abdullah Khan and the right wing under Jani Khan came to grips with Husain Ali Khan. Meanwhile Zulfiqar Khan sent Raji Muhammad Khan with seven elephants to bring the heavy guns which were stuck on the banks of the Yamuna who succeeded in pulling out forty guns with great difficulty and brought them to the field of battle but these could not be put effectively into action as the battle was raging all along the front.[64]

We have already pointed out the rivalry between Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash Khan since the day of the coronation of Jahandar Shah. In the crucial battle of Sikandara this was the deciding factor. Kokaltash Khan was already in collusion with the enemy. Throwing the orders of Zulfiqar Khan to the winds he proceeded directly towards the centre of the enemy where Farrukhsiyar was seated on his elephant well protected by a large body of elephants and cavalry. This gave a clear advantage to Abdullah Khan who, finding no body to oppose him swept away the right wing of the royal army. Kokaltash Khan did not attack the enemy at once. He was waiting for the heavy guns to arrive. This inaction led Husain Ali Khan to attack him. Soon, both the generals were locked up in a bloody battle. For several hours the action continued all along the front with neither side in a position to overwhelm the other or retire in safety. At dusk Churaman Jat and his cavalry finding the rear guard of the royal army unprotected, attacked it and made havoc. The elephant on which Jahandar Shah was riding was struck with a ball and ran amuck. Lal Kunwar who was riding on another elephant came to his rescue and he was brought down with difficulty. Hardly knowing the consequences of the King leaving the battle field she ran away with Jahandar Shah leaving his generals to their fate. His absence became known to the royal army. Although the battle was as yet undecided, the soldiers began to flee for their lives. Zulfiqar Khan who was still locked up with Abdullah Khan saw soldiers running away from the battle field and tried to find out Jahandar Shah or his son Izz–ud–din but none could be traced. He was as yet undecided as to the course of action he should follow when Abdullah Khan made a last desperate attempt to win or lose and was rewarded with victory.[65]

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[63] *Folios*, 51 (b) and 52 (a).
[64] *Folios*, 52 (b) and 53 (a).

Section XII: *End of the reign of Jahandar Shah and murder of Zulfiqar Khan with the connivance of Mir Jumla*

Totally ruined and exhausted Jahandar Shah reached Agra on the elephant of Lal Kunwar who was so terrified that she urged Jahandar Shah to proceed to Delhi immediately. At first Jahandar Shah wavered between indecision and firmness considering the consequences of escape but ultimately leaving everything to fate he decided to move to Delhi and threw himself at the mercy of Asad Khan hoping that as a faithful servant he would not only give him protection but would also work for saving the throne for him. But Asad Khan was never faithful to his salt. Like an old jackal he was only faithful to his own interest. He allowed the doomed emperor to enter the fort and immediately threw guards alround the royal palaces. Jahandar Shah was now only a prisoner waiting for execution. A farman full of threats and promises from Farrukhsiyar was received soon after addressed to Asad Khan commanding him to arrest Jahandar Shah if he reached the capital. On the arrival of Farrukhsiyar in Delhi, he was put to death by Lachin Beg Qalmag.[66]

Zulfiqar Khan had also retired to Agra and met Jahandar Shah. At first he decided to go to the Deccan and after collecting troops fight in the cause of Jahandar Shah but the idea was dropped as a final decision could be taken only after consultations with his father. He followed

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[65] *Folio*, 60 (a).
[66] *Ibid.*

Jahandar Shah and arrived at the capital on the next day. Farrukhsiyar reached Barapula near Tughlaqabad and was enthroned there with all pomp and show. Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan submitted to him in the hope of getting favours by the new king. Asad Khan was dismissed after the usual ceremony but Zulfiqar Khan was detained on the pretext of consultations. He was disarmed and put to death by the soldiers of Mir Jumla.[67]

The book ends with a short account of Buhran–u–din, the author's father and his final settlement in the mausoleum of Shaikh Nizam–ud–din Auliya.[68]

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[67] *Folios*, 60 (b) – 61 (b).

[68] *Folios*, 61 (b) – 62 (b).

A Study on the Matak Coins

BY

S. DUTTA

The Mataks* who formed a distinct community by themselves within the Assamese nationality, are one of the aboriginal peoples of Assam. They belonged to different castes, tribes and professional groups. They were the disciples of the Mayamaria *Satras* and hence they were also called as Mayamarias or Moamarias. Under their own Vaishnava preceptors, headed by Aniruddhadeva, one of the successors of Sankardeva and Mahavdeva, the great Vaishnava saints of Assam in the 16th century, they developed certain cultural traits and patterns of social behaviour, which made them a distinct community within the Assamese fold. They successfully challenged the Ahom monarchy in 1769 A. D., which exercised sovereign power for over five hundred years. Theirs was a popular rebellion and hence they were considered as the architects of the first "socio-political movement in the history of Assam, made for the people and by the people."[1]

After deposing the reigning Ahom monarch Lakshmi Singha in October, 1769,[2] the Mataks occupied the Ahom capital at Rangpur (near the present Sibsagar town) and placed their nominee, Ramakanta, a commoner, on the throne.[3] The new king, soon after his installation, struck novagonal coins on 11 February 1770 on the advice of one Madan Kakoty Chaliha, in imitation of the octagonal coins of the Ahoms.[4] But, as no coin of Ramakanta could be traced out till today, nothing definite regarding their weight, metal, shape, legend, etc., is known to us. However, a chronicle belonging to Lakshmi Singha's reign informs us that the one rupee coins of Ramakanta weighed one and a half *tolas* (17.49 grams).**

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*The population of the Matak community at present is more than twelve lakhs, most of whom live in the Dibrugarh district of Assam, which once formed the major part of their kingdom. The rest live scattered throughout the Brahmaputra valley, mainly in the districts of Sibsagar, Lakshmipur, Darrang and Nowgong.

[1] D. Neog, *New Light in the History of Asamiya Literature*, Gauhati, 1962, pp. 282.

[2] Srinath Duara Barbarua, *Tungkhungia Buranji* (ed.), S. K. Bhuyan, Gauhati, 1932, 2nd edition, Gauhatl, 1964, pp. 64 f; *Asamar Padya Buranji* (ed.), S. K. Bhuyan, Directorate of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Gauhati, 1933, pp.93 f, 221; Kasinath Tamuli Phukan, *Assam Buranji* (ed.), S. K. Bhuyan, 1st published 1922, 2nd edition with the title *Assam Buranji Sar* (ed.), P. C. Chaudhury, Reprint DHAS Gauhati, 1964, p. 58; Maniram Dewan – Buranji Bibek Ratna (MS) available at DHAS, Gauhati.

The success of the Mataks, however, was short-lived and the Ahom king soon recovered his throne. In 1786 the Mataks again rose in rebellion, occupied the capital at Rangpur and compelled the reigning king Gaurinath Singha (1780–1795) to take his flight to Gauhati (January 19, 1788).[5] They then placed Bharat Singha, a relative of their *Guru* (Preceptor) Pitambardeva, on the Ahom throne at Rangpur. Soon after they took possession of the major part of the eastern Ahom kingdom and established three other principalities in different parts of the region. Thus a weaver named Harihar Tati of the north bank[6] (of the Brahmaputra river), who was one of the leading figures of the rebellion, was recognised as their Chief in an extensive tract from the foot of the Dafala hills to the Brahmaputra, which covers a major part of the present Lakshmipur district of Assam. Harihar Tati had his capital at Tatibahar near the Banderdewa hills, a place near which the temporary capital of Arunachal Pradesh is situated at present. In a like way, Howha, also a commoner, was allowed to rule in Majuli, which even now is considered as the biggest river island of the world, in the Brahmaputra river. Another Matak principality, which was destined to last longer to be ultimately named as the "Matak Rajya" or the Matak kingdom, was founded in the present Dibrugarh district of Assam with its headquarters at Bengmara (present Tinsukia town). It was placed under Sarabanda Singha, who assumed the Ahom royal title 'Swargadeo'. Nothing detail is known about the principalities at Tatibahar and Majuli.

**The MS of this chronicle is available in the library of the Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Assam, Gauhati.

[3] *Ahom Buranji* (tr. and ed.) Golap Ch. Barua, Calcutta, 1930, p. 30; *Satsari Asam Buranji* (ed.), S. K. Bhuyan, Gauhati Universtty, 1960, p. 153.

[4] *Asamar Padya Buranji op.cit.*, p. 93; S.K. Bhuyan; *Anglo Assamese Relations*, Gauhati, 1949, 2nd edition, Gauhati, 1974, p. 210.

[5] *Tungkhungia Buranji*, p. 102.

The success of Mataks brought forth all the discontented dorman elements of the Ahom kingdom into action. The situation ultimately became so critical that the Ahom ruler was compelled to appeal to the Company Government of Bengal for help. The latter, long interested in the affairs of Assam, immediately took advantage of the situation and sent Capt. Welsh to Assam with six companies of sixty sepoys each. Capt. Welsh recovered the capital at Rangpur from the possession of the Mataks in 1794. Bharat Singha, being defeated, fled away. But Capt. Welsh was called back from Assam by Sir John Shore, the Governor General, because of his total implementation of the policy of non–intervention in the affairs of the Indian states.[6] Soon after his return, the Mataks again recovered the Ahom throne for Bharat Singha. But with his newly formed well-equipped army, trained on British model, Purnananda Buragohain, the able Ahom premier of the time, defeated and killed Bharat Singha in a combat.[7] At this, the Matak kingdom at Bengmara ruled by Sarbananda Singha, started exploring possibilities of getting Burmese help to challenge the restored Ahom regime. The Burmese, who too, had covetous eyes on Assam, responded to the call of Sarbananda Singha favourably by sending an army; but on its arrival, the army was won over by Purnananda Buragohain with diplomatic overtures.[8] Considering the difficult political and economic situation of the country, and with a view to evading another crisis, Purnananda Buragohain decided to adopt a policy of conciliation towards Sarbananda. But before the negotiation could be completed, Sarbananda Singha died in the later part of the year 1805. It was, therefore, his son Matibar Barsenapati who made the agreement. According to it, the Ahom Government recognised the autonomy of the Matak kingdom and the title 'Barsenapati' (Great General) on its ruler. Matibar Barsenäpati, in turn, agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Ahom Government in kind, consisting of articles like elephants' tusk and silk.[9] This autonomy of the Mataks was also recognised by the British, when they took possession of Assam in 1826. But the annexationist policy of the British deluged this kingdom of the Mataks in 1839.

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[6] P.E. Roberts, *History of British India*, London. 1921, 3rd edition, 1952 (Reprint, 1958) p. 222; Bhuyan, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

[7] *Tungkhungia Buranji*, pp. 144 f ; *Satsari Asam Buranji*, p. 176.

[8] H.O. Hannay, 'A Short Account of the Moamorah Sect and the Country occupied by the Bur Senaputte' *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal*, No.80, Aug. 1838, Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 673 ff.

[9] Hannay, *loc.cit.*, pp.673 ff; William Robinson, *A Descriptive Account of Assam*, First published 1841, Reprint, Delhi. 1975; p.328: John M'Cosh, *Topography of Assam*, 1st published 1837, Reprint Delhi. 1975, pp. 154 f; A. J. Moffatt Mills, *Reports on the Province of Assam*, Calcutta, 1854, pp.2 f; John Bryan Neufville, 'On the Geography and Population of Assam', *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XVI, p. 334.

Of all the Matak rulers, mentioned above, only two, namely, Bharat Singha of Rangpur and Swargadeo Sarbananda Singha of Bengmara have, till date, the credit of issuing coins. In this connection, Robert Montgomery Martin states that "The low followers of the Mahamari* (mostly fishermen) drove him (Gaurinath Singha) from his throne, and the spiritual guide (Pitambardeva) of these Ruffians, appointed Bharat Singha, his nephew, to be king. This person, in a coin dated 1715 (A. D. 1792) claims a descent from Bhogodotto, which, had he been successful, would have been considered as an indisputable fact."[10] (See plate No. 2, coin No. 5). Bharat Singha continued to issue coins till 1794 A. D., when he was ousted from Rangpur by Capt. Welsh.

After she return of Capt. Welsh, as has been mentioned above, and the resultant wirhdrawal of Gaurinath Singha and his premier Purnananda Buragohain from Rangpur to Dichoi (now Jorhat town of Assam), Bharat Singha reoccupied the Ahom capital and continued to issue, both silver and gold coins till 1799 A. D., when he was defeated and killed by Purnananda Buragohain. One such one rupee gold coin of Bharat Singha issued in the year 1718 *Saka* (1796 A. D.) could be traced by me, which is in possession of the present *Satradhikar* or *Mahanta* (head of a *Satra*) of the Dinjoy Mayamara *Satra*, one of the main *Satras* of the Mataks, situated in Chabua of the Dibrugarh district of Assam. The weight of the coin is slightly more than a *tola* (11.66 gms.) and is octagonal in shape. The legend of this coin in archaic Assamese runs as follows: (See plate No. 1.)

Obverse:	*Reverse*:
Sri Bhagadatta Kuludbhava Sri Bharatha Sinha nripasva Saka 1718	*Sri Sri Krishna Charanava vindamakaranda pramatta madhukarasva.*

(English translation: *Obverse*: Born in the family of Sri Bhagadatta, King Sri Bharat Sinha, *Saka* 1718; *Reverse* : of the bee intoxicated with the honey of the feet of Sri Krishna).

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*The Mataks or the Moamarias.

[10] Montgomery Martin, *The History, Antiquities, Topography and Statistics of Eastern India*, Calcutta, 1836, Reprint, Delhi, 1976, Vol. V, (Rangpur and Assam), p. 606.


Plate No. 1.
Obverse
Reverse


Plate No. 2.
Reverse
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
Plate No. 2.
Obverse
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Plate No. 3.



Obverse Reverse

Plate No. 4.



Obverse Reverse


Plate No. 5.Reverse

Please read coin No.1 as obverse


Plate No. 5. Obveres

Please read coin No.1 as reverse.

An one rupee silver coin of Bharat Singha issued in the same year (1718 saka) is available in the State Museum, Assam, Gauhati. It contains the same legend and is also octagonal in shape (coin no. 1, plate No. 2). Three other one rupee silver coins of this ruler issued in the year 1719 *saka*, which are also preserved in the State Museum, Gauhati, contain similar texts and are similar in shape (coins nos 2, 3 & 4, plate No. 2). The weight of the coins of this ruler, although of similar denomination differ, even though they were issued in the same year. For example, the weight of the one rupee silver coins varies from 11.15 gms to 11.36 gms.)

Besides, there are half rupee silver coins belonging to Bharat Singha. Three such coins are available in the State Museum, Gauhati. They have the same shape as that of the gold and silver one rupee coins, and contain similar texts in archaic Assamese, which run as follows: (See coins nos. 6, 7, & 8, plate no. 2).

Obverse:	*Reverse:*
Sri Sri Bharatha Sinha naredrasya.	*Sri Sri Krishnapada parayanasya.*

(English translation : of king Sri Bharat Singha; adhering to the feet of Sri Krishna).

Another half rupee coin, preserved in the same place, which is similar in shape, contains a slightly different text, which runs as follows: (See plate no. 2, coin no. 9).

Obverse:	*Reverse:*
Sri Sri Bharatha Sinhanripasya.	*Sri Sri Krishnapada parashya.*

(English translation : of king Bharat Singha; adhering to the feet of Sri Krishna)

The weight of these four coins varies from 3.36 gms to 3.71 gms.

As regards the claiming of ancestry from Bhagadatta by Bharat Singha, the fact may be explained thus: Aniruddhadeva, the founder of the Mayamara *Satra*, as well as his predecessors, claimed their origin from Sasavindu and Bhagadatta of the Yaduvamsa.[11] So Bharat Singha, as a relative of the then Mayamara Mahanta, Pitambardeva, also claimed his origin from Bhagadatta. Bharat Singha, being a Vaishnava, the name of his invoking deity Krishna finds in his coins.

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[11] Chidananda Goswami, *Sri Sri Aniruddhadevar charitra aru Mayamara Satrar Gosain Sakalar Vamsavali* (a metricat chronicle of Aniruddhadeva and other *Mahantas* of the Mayamara *Satra*), Tinaukia, 1933, pp. 6f.

Coins of Swargadeo Sarbananda Singha

Swargadeo Sarbananda Singha, the founder of the Matak Kingdom at Bengmara, struck coins both in gold and silver. However, his silver coins are only extant. These coins are of the denominations of one rupee, half rupee and *admahiva* (one-eighth of a rupee). We had an opportunity of studying two one rupee, octagonal silver coins, in the Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Assam, Gauhati,[12] and five half-rupee coins and one admahiya coin of this ruler in the State Museum, Gauhati, Assam.

The texts of the one rupee coins in archaic Assamese, issued in the years *Saka* 1716 and 1717 run as follows: (See plate No. 3)

(1)	*Ubverse:* *Sri Sri Swargadevo, Sri Sarvananda Sinha Nripasva Saka 1716.*	*Reverse:* *Sri Sri Krishna Charana Kamalamakrananda madhukarasava.*

(English translation: Swargadeo Sarvananda Singha, *Saka* 1716; of the bee–intoxicated with the honey of the lotus feet of Sri Krishna).

(2)	*Obverse:* *Sri Sri Swargadeva sarbananda Sinha narendrasya Saka 1717.*	*Reverse:* *Sri Sri Krishnapada Padmananda markaranda brinda madhukarasva.*

(English translation ; King Sarbananda Singha, *Saka* 1717; of the bee intoxicated with the honey of the lotus-string feet of Sri Krishna). Plate No. 4.

The legend in the five half rupee coins, which are also octagonal in shape is not exactly similar. In two of the coins, the legend runs as follows: (See coin Nos. 1 & 5, plate No. 5).

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[12] Catalogue of the Provincial Cabinet of Coins (Eastern Bengal and Assam), Shillong, 1911, (Preserved in the Department of Historical and Antiquarin Studies, Assam, Gauhati).

Obverse;	*Reverse*;
Sri Sri Sarbananda Sinha narendrasya	*Sri Sri Krishna Pada Parayanasya.*

(English translation: Of King Sri Sarbananda Singha; adhering to the feet of Sri Krishna).

In the other three half-rupee coins, the legend runs as follows (See coins nos, 2, 3 & 4, plate no. 5).

Obverse:	*Reverse*:
Sri Sri Sarbananda Sinha nripasya	*Sri Sri Krishna Charana madhukarasya.*

(English transalation : Of King Sri Sarbananda Singha; bee at the feet of Sri Krishna.)

Only one *admahiya* coin of this ruler is now available, which is also preserved in the State Museum, Gauhati. Its shape is also octagonal and contains a legend in archaic Assamese as follows: (See Coin No. 6, plate No. 5).

Obverse:	*Reverse*:
Sri Sri Sarbananda.	*Sinha nripasya.*

(English translation: Of King Sri Sarbananda Singha).

The weight of the half-rupee coins varies one another. The weight of that of the *admahiya* is 0.71 gms. Sarbananda Singha, being a Vaishnava, his invoking deity was also Sri Krishna.

According to some scholars,[13] Purnananda Buragohain conferred the title 'Barsenapati' on Sarbananda Singha. This conclusion was drawn on the basis of a report of the British Officers submitted to the Government in 1881 A. D., where Sarbananda Singha was referred to as 'Barsenapati'.[14] But the report submitted at such a later period cannot be conclusive proof in this respect. Sarbananda Singha issued coins in his name, as cited above, wherein he assumed the title 'Swargadeo'. The *Buranjis* (Assamese chronicles) do not give us any information that Sarbananda Singha paid any kind of tribute to the Ahom Government.

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[13] Sarbananda Rajkumar, *Chutia, Bhuyan aru Matak Rajya*, Gauhati, 1965, p. 84.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

But the case was different with Matibar, the son and successor of Sarbananda Singha, who does not have any coins to his credit. Further the British sources also inform us that Matibar paid a tribute in kind to the Ahom Government, and that during the period of Burmese invasion of Assam, he established himself in his father's position,[15] which indicates that he began to behave as an independent ruler like his father. Again the observation that the title 'Barsenapati' was conferred on the Matak Chief by the Ahom premier is not acceptable, because Matibar was already the Barsenapati or the Great General of the Matak kingdom during the reign of his father. The Ahom Government simply recognised this title on the understanding that henceforth he would cease to use the title 'Swargadeo' and mint coins like an independent ruler. Hence after Sarbananda Singha no coins are available to the credit of the Matak rulers.

A comparison of the Matak coins with the Ahom ones

Since the Matak coins were similar to the Ahom coins,* a brief reference to the latter would help us in appreciating the characteristics of the former.

The main Characteristics of the Ahom coins

1 The Ahom one–rupee coins generally weighed 1 tola (11.66gms.) Unlike the round–coins issued by the rulers of the other parts of India, Ahom coins were octagonal. Of course, some Ahom rulers, such as, Queen Phuleswari Devi alias Queen Prametheswari (1722–31 A. D.), wife of Siva Singha (1714–44 A. D.), and king Rajeswar Singha (1751–69 A.D.) issued square coins also. The sides of the octagonal coins were generally unequal.

2 Coins, even of the same denomination, are not equal in weight.

3 The value of the coins is not indicated in the coins. The same is to be understood from their sizes.

4 While one side of the one–rupee and the half–rupee coins contains the name of the ruler concerned, the other side contains the name of his invoking deity. Coins of smaller denominations contain the name of the related king only.

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[15] Hannay, *loc. cit.*, p. 328.

5 Generally, the picture of a dragon or a winged lion was imprinted just below the legend. The coins of Suklenmung contained the picture of a rising sun; some coins of Gadadhar Singha contained the pictures of a winged lion on the obverse and that of a reversed–peacock on the reverse, whereas some coins of Rudra Singha contained the picture of a deer pursued by a lion.

6 As stated, the Matak rulers issued coins in imitation of those of the Ahom kings; so most of the characteristics were common. The Matak one-rupee coins, of course, weighed more than a *tola*. Unlike those of the Ahom rulers, no square-shaped Matak coins could be traced. The Matak coins, like their Ahom counterparts, even of the same denominations, varied in shape, size and weight. The Matak coins also do not mention the value, which is to be understood from their shape or size, and like their Ahom counterparts, the Matak rulers also used to change the legends of the coins from time to time. Only one-rupee coins of the Mataks contain the year of issue. Again, like those of the Ahoms, coins of greater denominations of the Mataks, contained on one side the name of the ruler, and the name of his invoking deity, on the other. Whereas coins of smaller denominations contained only the names of the rulers on both the sides. The Matak coins, so far extant, contain only the picture of a dragon or a winged–lion and in none of them the image of the rulers appears.

Till today only one gold coin issued by the Matak ruler Bharat Singha from Rangpur could be traced.* Other coins of different denominations, under review, are made of silver.

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*Sarbananda Rajkumar's contention, that the Mayamaria (Matak) rulers did not issue gold coins (S. Rajkumar, *op cit.*, p. 196) is not tenable.

The English Acquisition of Chicacole Circar

BY

M. S. R. ANJANEYULU

Chicacole was 'the most northerly and largest' of the Northern Circars.[1] It was divided into three divisions, i.e., Ichapur, Chicacole and Kasimkota. Being an important port on the Coromandel Coast and the chief centre of trade in the Chicacole Circar, Vizagapatam played a prominent role in the history of the Circar.

The English East India Company established a factory at Vizagapatam in 1682. They had no political interests in the Circar upto 1752 and limited their activities to promote their trade and commerce. They did not entangle themselves in the local disturbances and followed a policy of neutrality and always applied themselves to obtain trade concessions.

The year 1753 marked a turning point in the history of Northern Circars. The French obtained the Chicacole, Rajahmundry, Ellore and Mustafanagar Circars by the treaty of Aurangabad on 23 November, 1753. The possession of this extensive coastal tract provided them increased opportunities for trade and enormous prestige. This significant event caused a change of attitude in the policy of Fort St. George authorities by obliging them to counteract.

The Aurangabad treaty disappointed Saunders, the Governor of Fort St. George, who coveted the Circars.[2] He cautioned the Council at Vizagapatam: "We are more concerned than surprised at this event when we consider what influence they have at Aurangabad by means of their troops. The possesson of these countries will put it in their power greatly to hurt the Company's investment and we imagine they will lose no opportunity of doing it."[3] But the English had to bide their time.

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[1] They were the Circars of Chicacole, Rajahmundry, Ellore, Guntur or Moortizanagar and Condapalli or Mustafanagar.

[2] Saunders to Richard Bouchier, Governor of Bombry. Records of Fort St. George (RFSG): Diary and Consultation, 24 September 1752, pp. 43–46.

The French acquisition of the Northern Circars displeased the local chiefs also. Prominent among them were Jaffar Ali, the Faujdar of Rajahmundry and Vijayarama Raju, the raja of Vizianagaram. The latter was ambitious to become the master of the Circars with the English help. But the French military supremacy obliged him to put up with the French regime and manage the Chicacole Circar on favourable terms biding his time.[4]

Jaffar Ali and Vijayarama Raju sought the English assistance in vain. The English Governor wrote to Vizagapatam, "The Nawab and the Rajah have both applied to us for assistance, it is not prudent to refuse them though we can gratify neither and yet we would willingly appear a friend to both without making any direct promise."[5] These subtle English machinations and recalcitrance of the Zamindars threw the Circars into turmoil.

The most remarkable feature was steadfast friendship of Vijayarama Raju towards the English against all odds. Eventhough the English confined themselves to affectionate advices and promises, he assured them of his loyal friendship.[6] His nephew and successor Ananda Gajapati Raju followed suit. Further, as Bussy rebuked his decesed uncle Ananda Raju was alienated.[7] Determined to dislodge the French, he urged the English strongly to co-operate. But he received only evasive replies. Vizagapatam itself surrendered to Bussy on 27 June 1757.

Dissatisfied with the negative attitude of Fort St. George, he directly corresponded with Clive in Bengal. Bussy was suspicious of him since the battle of Bobbili and apprehending his correspondence with the English, he punished him by enhancing the peshkash. Exasperated, Ananda Raju wrote frantically to Fort St. George: "In short, I meet with ruin in your friendship."[8] When Bussy proceeded to Pondicherry to lead an attack on Madras[9] Ananda

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[3] RFSG, Letter from Fort St.George (FSG), 12 January 1754, p. 3.
[4] RFSG, Diary, 7 January 1754, pp. 7–8.
[5] RFSG, Letters from FSG, 12 January 1754, p. 3.
[6] RFSG, Country Correspondence (CC), 1757, p. 28.
[7] J.D.B. Gribble, *A History of the Deccan*, (London, 1924), Vol. II, p. 48.
[8] RFSG, CC, 1758, pp. 40–41.
[9] G. B. Malleson, *History of the French in India* (Edinburgh, 1909), p. 505. See also H. Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive*, (London, 1923), p. 100.

Raju seized Vizagapatam and hoisted the English flag on the factory on 2 September 1758.[10]

Ananda Raju's initiative was highly potential. With his characteristic vision, Clive utilised this. Moreover, Nizam Ali Khan, the younger brother of Salabat Jang, asked for his help. He despatched Col. Forde to the Circars to help the Raja and wrote to Madras: "If this expedition only threw the country into such confusion as to prevent our enemies from collecting any revenues, it will answer in a great measure the design and the expense."[11] The Madras Government deputed John Andrews, the Chief of Masulipatam, to co-operate with Forde.

Andrews first drew up an agreement with Ananda Raju on 21 November 1758. It stipulated "that all plunder should be equally divided; that all the countries which might be conquered should be delivered to the Rajah who was to collect the revenue; but that the sea ports and towns at the mouths of the rivers should belong to the Company with the revenues of the districts annexed thereto; that no treaty for the disposal or restitution, whether of the Rajah or of the English possessions should be made without the consent of both parties; that the Rajah should supply fifty thousand rupees a month for the expenses of the army and six thousand to commence from their arrival at Vizagapatam for the particular expenses of the officers."[12] It laid the responsibility for the acquisition and administration of the Circars on Ananda Raju. On this point, the Bengal Government, which was responsible for the expedition, commented that "by the tenor of Andrews' letter it appears as if he entertained thoughts of taking possession of large territories in the Company's interests on many accounts."[13] This shows even Clive did not now prefer territorial aggrandizement. They considered themselves only auxiliaries to Ananda Raju and thus would promote their trade.

On 7 December 1758 the allies defeated the French commander

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[10] RFSG, CC, 1758, pp. 47-48.

[11] Bengal to Madras, 14 September 1758, Select Committee Consultations, 18 October 1758, Vol, 52, pp. 416–17 quoted in Lanka Sundaram, "The Revenue Administration of the Northern Sarkars", *Journal of Andhra Historical Research Society* (JAHRS), Vol. VI, p. 90.

[12] RFSG, Letters to FSG, 14 December 1758, pp.127–39. See also L. Forde, *Lord Clive's Right Hand Man*, (London, 1910), pp. 190–91.

[13] G. W. Forrest, *Bengal and Madras Papers*, Vol. III, (Calcutta, 1928), (1757–95), 15 January 1759, p. 6.

Conflans at Chandurti. The Raja was not conscious of its significance. He was more anxious to acquire influence over the local Zamindars[14] and his reluctance to adhere to the treaty led to a fresh agreement.[15] Accordingly, the Company agreed "that whatsoever sums the Raja might furnish should be considered as a loan and that the revenues of all the countries that might be reduced on either side of the Godavari, excepting such as belonged to the French either by establishment or grant in property should be equally divided between him and the English."[16]

Thus by this new treaty the English were entitled to half of the territories south of the Godavari under the French influence. They became the Raja's equal partners. Soon after this agreement the Raja and Forde marched against Masulipatam and captured it on 8 April 1759. On 14 May 1759 Salabat Jang agreed to the 'requests' of Col. Forde and made over to the English "a territory extending eighty miles along the sea and twenty miles in land which, besides including Masulipatam, Nizampatam, and other important stations produced an annual revenue of forty lakhs of rupees."[17] The French were to vacate it in a fortnight and they were debarred from the Northern Circars. He agreed not to question Ananda Raju's collusion with the English, not to demand the money collected by him during his march from Chicacole to Masulipatam and not to enhance the tribute. The English promised not to protect and assist the Nawab's enemies. They recognised the Nizam's authority over the Northern Circars. Ananda Raju could only expel the French without any advantage. He only facilitated the English supremacy. Thus during this period the Company acquired the country round Masulipatam as a first step to acquire the whole of the Circars. The treaty of 1759 recognized Salabat Jang as the master of the Circars. For seven years anarchy prevailed in the Northern Circars. In 1762, Salabat Jang was deposed by his brother Nizam Ali, who was not friendly to the English. So the circumstances were not in favour of the Company which had to bide its time.

The uncertain situation in the Circars was complicated by the sudden and premature death of Ananda Raju at Rajahmundry about

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[14] Samalkot Kaifiyat, Mackenzie MSS. O.M. Library, Madras.

[15] RFSG, Letters to FSG, 14 December 1758, p. 11.

[16] L. Forde, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–72.

[17] J.D.B. Gribble, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 59.

23 February 1760. The eventual succession dispute caused utter confusion. While the struggle was bitter,[18] Nazim Ali marched into the Circars and demanded the arrears for the Chicacole and Rajahmundry Circars. This obliged the Vizianagaram family to arrive at a compromise. Vijayarama Raju's succession was acknowledged and Sitarama Raju became Diwan. Nizam Ali made Vijayarama Raju responsible for the rent of the Chicacole Circar. Hussain Ali Khan was appointed the Faujdar of Rajahmundry, Ellore and Mustaphanagar.

At the request of Masulipatam, the English tried in vain to procure Nizam Ali's confirmation of Salabat Jang's grant.[19] But in 1762 the Nizam needed the English assistance against the Marathas and deputed Hussain Ali Khan to Madras with the offer of five Circars. But the Madras Government was unwilling for military alliance.

. Anarchy persisted in the Circars because of the pre–occupation and weakness of the Nizam and Vizianagaram respectively and the English reluctance to acquire power. The disputes between Vijayarama Raju and Sitarama unsettled the Chicacole Circar. Further, the Marathas invaded the Circar. More complications arose when Nizam Ali appointed Fatch–ud Din Mahomed Khan to the Circar superseding Sitaram Raju, supposed to be responsible for the management of the Circar on behalf of his brother.[20] Meanwhile Sitarama Raju subjugated Kimidi in 1761. He became the defacto ruler of the Circar. He resented the appointment of Fateh–ud Din and marched to Rajahmundry against him; and the Faujdar fled to Masulipatam.[21] Then he threatened to capture Mugalaturru Zamindar, a friend of the English, in 1763.[22] A clash with the Company was imminent. Nizam Ali himself, unable to deal with him, asked for English assistance. Fortunately for the Company, clash was averted as Sitarama Raju did not disturb the Raja because of combined opposition to his unjust action. But he protested to the Company for sheltering the Raja and "openly paraded his hopes of coercing Nizam Ali into granting him the Circars as his nominal deputy."[24]

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[18] Vizagapatam to Madras, 18 August 1760, Military Consultations (MC) (44: 691–92).

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] The title of Faujdar ceased in Chicacole Circar when Ananda Raju defeated Anwar Ali Khan, the Faujdar, on 11 April 1759.

[21] 2 August 1763, MC (49 : 107).

[22] The Raja of Mogalaturru rented from the English the farms of Tonduru and Bondada for an annual rent of a lakh of rupees.

[23] Sitarama Raju to Madras, 23 April 1764, MC (50:295).

Meanwhile, the Madras and Bombay Governments, in view of the fluid conditions in the Circars and possible advantages argued for the acquisition of the Circars.[25] The Court of Directors agreed but advised caution.[25] After deliberation Palks Government decided to 'rent' the Circars for a period. Kandregula Jogi Pantulu, the dubash, was appointed to negotiate with Nizam Ali on November 1764.

The instructions [26] to Jogi Pantulu reveal that the English wanted to be the *de facto* rulers. Finding Hussain Ali obstructive [27] the Madras Government entered into an agreement with him, in 1765, promising military aid to control the Circars. He offered to defray the expenses. Thus the Company would have a footing in the Circars in case of protracted negotiations with Nizam Ali. [28] Jogi Pantulu obtained the ratification of the agreement with Hussain Ali.

Hussain Ali regained Ellore and Mustaphanagar Circars. Then he tried to subjugate Sitarama Raju. The Company was reluctant to alienate Sitarama Raju. However, the English disliked the garrisoning of Rajahmundry by Sitarama Raju and Madras Government directed Masulipatam "to dislodge him peaceably therefrom". [29] This was accomplished. Sitarama Raju reluctantly evacuated it, observing the growing power of the English and his own insecurity at Vizianagaram because of the recalcitrance of the hill Zamindars.

Observing the English strength, Sitarama Raju entered into agreement with the Company towards the close of October 1765. [30] But, dissatisfaction of Hussain Ali and the threat of Nizam Ali to march into the Circars[31] forced the English to nullify it. They began to assist[32] Hussain Ali to negotiate terms with Sitarama Raju. When he pressed for military assistance to reduce Sitarama Raju,the Government observing a policy of 'caution' desired 'explore every peaceful avenue' to reconcile Sitarama Raju and Hussian Ali, since the Company's ,obligations to the Vizianagaram family were substantial'.[33] Sitaram Raju was obdurate and the Company's troops marched to Rajahmundry. The news of Shah Alam's *farman* and the fact that an envoy of Nizam Ail was on his way to Masulipatam to settle the Circars, stopped the hostilities.

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[24] Peter Auber, *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, Vol.I, (London, 1837). p. 153.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 153–154.

[26] R. Subba Rao, "Correspondence Between the East India Company and the Kandregula Family in the Eighteenth Century", JAHRS, Vols. III, IV, IX, pp. 208-222, 61–71, 194–208.

[27] 15 January, 1765, MC (52 : 33–35).

[28] 13 February, 1765, MC (52 : 118–19).

[29] Masulipatam to Madras, 20 May 1765, MC (52 : 435–38).

[30] By this agreement the English instead of acting as "auxiliaries" assumed the part of the "principals" in Hussain Ali's affairs. Masulipatam to Madras, 27 May 1765, MC (52 : 486–89, 492–93).

At this juncture, on 12 August 1765, Clive obtained the grant[34] of Northern Circars from the Mughal Emperor. The English apprehending the Nizam's hostility to it awaited opportunity and published the Sanads from Masulipatam on 3 March 1766 while the Nizam was engaged with the Bhonslay. They dismissed Hussain Ali conferring a Jagir on him latar on. On hearing of the publication of the Sanads the Nizam hastened to Hyderabad to oppose the English. He even thought of warring with the English but financial stringency prevented him. Ultimately he was inclined for an agreement. The Madras Government deputed General Caillaud with "full powers for consulting the treaty." A treaty was concluded on 12 November 1766.

According to this treaty the five Circars of Rajahmundry, Ellore, Mustaphanagar and Murtizanagar and Chicacole were given as 'free gift' to the Company. The Company agreed to pay "for the three Circars of Rajahmundry, Ellore and Mustaphanagar, five lakhs of ruppes and for those of Chicacole and Murtezanuggur, as soon as they are in their hand and the settling the same is well effected, to lakhs each, in all nine lakhs of rupees per annum, in whatever year the assistance of their troops shall not be required . . . as a consideration for the free gift of the above mentioned five Circars". The English should manage the Chicacole Circar. This signifies that the Nizam practically abandoned it. The English agreed to acquire Murtezanuggur after the demise of Basalat Jang.

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[31] The object was to collect three years' arrears due from Hussain Ali and Sitarama Raju.

[32] The English entered into an agreement at the request of Hussain Ali. By this he agreed to pay two lakhs of rupees a year to the English for the expenses of the Company's settlements in the Circars exclusive of the expenses of the military detachment placed under his command. 13 August 1765, MC (53 : 752–54).

[33] Masulipatam to Madras, 26 August 1765, MC (53 : 781–85).

[34] Masulipatam to Madrass, 12 October 1765, MC (53 : 897–98). Also C. U. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. IX, (Calcutta, 1909), pp. 20–21.

The Nizam, disliking the treaty of 1766, tried to invalidate it. But he was defeated by the English before Trinomalee and at Vaniembady when he allied with Hyder Ali. So, he was cowed down. On 23 February 1768 he agreed to a new treaty by which the tribute was reduced and the Circars were surrendered.[35] Thus the Circars were finally secured by the English. Later they connected their Southern and Northern settlements. This was their first acquisition in South India.

Nizam Ali agreed to direct Narayana Deo of Kimidi who declared independence on the basis of an alleged sanad granted by the Nizam and other Rajas to obey the Company. The new acquisitions were at first governed from Masulipatam, but in 1769 Andrews, the then Chief, was sent to Vizagapatam and made the first Chief-in-Council of the region. It is ironical that the Vizianagaram Zemindari which helped the English to acquire the Circars had to accept the English as its overlord. The English established their authority over the Pusapatis in 1767 when they forced Sitarama Raju to comply; and he selfishly surrendered the Pusapati family. But Vizianagaram tried to preserve its independence until 1794. The English defeated it at Padmanabham in 1794, occupied the Chicacole Circar and tamed the Vizianagaram family. In 1767 the Pusapatis paid their first tribute of three lakhs to the Chief of Masulipatam for the Circar, having lost the Rajahmundry Circar.[36]

Thus the Company, which established a factory at Vizagapatam in 1682, carried a precarious trade upto 1753. It changed its attitude under the pressure of the disturbed political conditions of the time and the French activities. It improved its position by acquiring the "Masulipatam Farms" during 1753-59 and established its authority in the Chicacole Circar in 1768 with the help of the Pusapati family.

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[35] "26 February 1768 is generally reckoned as that of the actual cession of these territories, and was so recognized by Law. Vide Section 2 Madras Regulation No. XXXI of 1802, because the sunnud of the Moghul Emperor dated 12 August 1767, assigning this territory to the English Company and the treaty with the Nizam of 12 November 1766, by which he ceded the same provinces, had no substantial operation.

"The five circars of ... came under the English for an annual payment of nine lakhs and military help whenever found necessary. They finally came into British possession in 1823 by the paymet to the Nizam's Government of Rs. 11,66,666 in lieu of an annual tribute". (A Hand-book to the Records of the Government of India in the Imperial Record Department, 1748–1859).

[36] *Manual of the Administration*, Vol, I, f. n. 2, p. 54.

The Evaluation of Safdar Jang's Campaign of Jaunpur in 1738 by Dr. A. L. Srivastava Re-examined

By

HAMID AFAQ QURESHI

During the reign of Emperor Muhammad Shah (1719–1748), Mir Murtuza Hussain, a noble of Delhi, got the sarkars of Benares, Jaunpur, Ghazipur and Chunar as jagir and entrusted those to his relative, Rustam Ali Khan, with the stipulation that he would pay him 5 lakhs of rupees annually. At the same time, Mutrunjun Singh lived at Ootataria, a village 6 miles away from Benares, and carried his livelihood by agriculture. His eldest son, Mansaram, joined the services of Rustam Ali as his personal attendant. By his tact and wisdom, he speedily became the *de facto* ruler of the four sarkars and through Murtuza Khan, obtained the title of 'Raja' for his son, Balwant Singh. When Muhammad Shah appointed Burhan-ul-mulk as Subehdar of Awadh in 1722, Mir Murtuza Khan leased out his jagir to him at seven lakhs of rupees. Burhan-ul-mulk reappointed Rustam Ali to the government for an additional sum of one lakh. Many complaints used to be made to Burhan-ul-mulk of the neglect and carelessness of Rustam Ali, to which, being friendly towards him, he did not listen. However, in 1150 H (1737–38), being summoned by the Emperor to Delhi, he went there, leaving his son-in-law, Nawab Abu-ul-Mansoor Khan (later Safdar Jang), as his deputy. The enemies of Rustam Ali, finding this a golden opportunity, poured out their complaints and accusations against him into the ears of Abu-ul-Mansoor Khan, asserting that Rustam Ali paid no attention to the business of the State, but spent all his time in pursuits of pleasure; that he entertained enmity towards the servants of the State and meditated encroachments on the prerogatives of Mir Murtuza Khan. It made Abu-ul-Mansoor Khan to mistrust him and he forthwith started from Faizabad to chastise him.[1]

In place of discussing the subsequent actions of Abu-ul-Mansoor Khan in some details to justify his evaluation of the entire situation,

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[1] Fakhir Khairuddin, *Bulwantnamah*, (tr.) (Allahabad, 1875), pp. 1–3 & 8.

Dr. A. L. Srivastava has just put in a curt statement, saying, "Early in 1738, Abulmansur Khan undertook an expedition to Jaunpur to deprive Rustam Ali Khan of the four districts of Jaunpur, Mirzapur, Ghazipur and Banaras. Though no fighting was done, he was able to achieve his object by diplomacy, backed by force, and Rustam Ali Khan had to seek refuge by flight." [2] For it, his sole authority is *Bulwuntnamah*, which gives the following details of the entire affair[3]:

"When he (Abu-ul-Mansoor Khan) had reached Jounpore, the well wishers of Roostum Alee, who always had a spite against Munsaram, insinuated that he was the originator of all this ill-feeling, that openly he professed friendship, but in his heart was contriving schemes to injure, and that he it was who had excited Sufdur Jung against him. Roostum Alee was thunder struck at hearing all these stories, and asked Rajah Munsaram what they all meant. Munsaram a clever and open minded man, assured Roostum Alee that it was impossible for him whom he had raised from nothing to be guilty of such treachery, and that it was merely the invention of enemies who were envious of Roostum, and also wished to injure him (Munsaram). To this Roostum replied that if such was really the case, some steps must be taken to induce Sufdur Jung to return at once from Jounpore to Fyzabad. Munsaram answered, that any direct application to that effect would not do; but if Roostum would permit, he himself would proceed to the Nawab, and by making things smooth with the Nawab's ministers, and presenting gifts, so remove his suspicions; but he added that he felt doubtful about Roostum's feelings towards him while absent; that it was likely his enemies would take this chance of misrepresenting all his actions, and thus cause a coldness to arise between them, in which case his efforts would be fruitless. Roostum Alee approved of Munsaram's plan and assuring him of the continuance of his friendship, sent him with costly presents to the Nawab. Rajah Munsaram, on his arrival at Jounpore and obtaining an audience, laid these presents from Roostum Alee before the Nawab, and by his address and knowledge of affairs completely cleared the mind of the Nawab from the doubts he had regarding Roostum Alee, and brought him to look again with favour upon the latter. During the discussions about these affairs, Munsaram had offered an increase of four lakhs of rupees in revenue if the four surkars were continued to Roostum Alee, when a letter came from Boorhan-ool-mulk to Sufdur Jung, to the effect that the Ghazepoor province was to be given to Sheikh Abdoollah. Many of the Nawab's courtiers were friends of Abdoollah, and remined him in private how long a time Abdoollah had been at court, and that on this journey he was always in attendance; further, that there were the orders of the Nawab Boorhan-ool-mulk, and that the best thing to do would be to give Abdoollah Ghazepoor, and the other three provinces to Roostum. The Nawab also approved of this course. Munsaram, on hearing of this project, without consulting Roostum Alee, strongly objected, and the argument between the Nawab's ministers and Munsaram waxed hot on the point, when suddenly Sheikh Abdoollah appeared on the scene, and bid eight lakhs additional for the four surkars. Munsaram's enemies about Roostum Alee represented to him that all these proceedings—the consent to pay more revenue, and the separation of Ghazepoor from the four surkars—were merely dodges of Munsaram, and succeeded in causing Roostum to suspect him. An angry correspondence then began. Roostum showed his displeasure openly to Bulwunt Sing who was at his court, and permitted the enemies of Munsaram to attend and take part in his councils. By their advice he sent another envoy to the Nawab, who was directed to carry on the negotiations without consulting Munsaram, through some of the Nawab's ministers, and by no means to allow Munsaram to interfere. These things were soon known to Munsaram, and grieved him greatly: he consulted those of his friends who were in the Nawab's court, and was advised by them that, since his principal had thrown him over, his best plan was to act for himself in the business, to spend money, and court the favour of the Nawab. Accordingly, as he fully perceived that his power in the country and influence with Roostum Alee would go with his loss of favour and not liking to fall back into a position of inferiority, he made overtures to the Nawab's ministers, and obtained their consent to getting the three surkars by paying thirteen lakhs of rupees revenue. The Nawab approved and granted a sunnud of the three surkars in the name of Rajah Bulwunt Singh—the fourth Ghazepoor, being given for three lakhs of rupees to Sheikh Abdoollah. The Kotwalee of Benares, the governorship of the fort at Jounpoor, and the mint at Benares, were not included in Rajah Bulwunt Singh's sunnud but were bestowed on other dependents of the Nawab, and troops were sent to instal the new rulers in their places. Roostum Alee, overcame with grief and anger at these occurrences, was unable to take any steps to recover his position, and departed for Allahabad by way of Mirzapoor."

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[2] A. L. Srivastava, *The First Two Nawab's of Awadh*, (Agra, 1954), p. 88.
[3] *Bulwuntnamah*, pp. 8–10.

From the foregoing details, it is crystal clear that Abu-ul-Mansoor Khan might have had an intention of depriving Rustam Ali of his districts when he left Faizabad; but he was totally reconciled to him after his first meeting with Mansaram. The subsequent ouster of Rustam Ali was solely due to the sudden fluctuations of the circumstances and the entire episode, in place of depicting the 'diplomacy' of Abu-ul-Mansoor Khan, rather portrays him to be a mere tool in the hands of his courtiers, who could turn the balance of his mind in any way they liked.

Idankai and Valankai dispute in Tamilnadu — A Case Study

BY

B. SOBHANAN

The early Tamils who were accustomed to the occupational division of the society were not familiar with the traditional fourfold classification of society or *catur varna* system, expounded by the Aryans. On the other hand geography had its decisive impact upon the Tamil society. Based on the fertility of the soil and its geographical location the land was divided into five natural divisions, viz., *Kurinchi* (hilly region), *Palai*, (barren region) *Marutham* (cultivable land), *Mullai* (pastoral lands) and *Neythal* (coastal area). The people who inhabited in these regions were *Vettuvar* (hunters), *Maravar* (warriors), *Ulavar* (peasants), Ayar (cowherds), *Paradavar* (fishermen) respectively.[1]

Within these settlements there were corporate companionships or brotherhoods of elementary families comprising the members of the clans or gens who regarded one another as relative of the common lineage and the kins within the elementary family who were known as *okkal*, *kelir*, *urror* or *tamar* in the sense that they were affinal relatives.[2] Free social movement existed among the different groups. The ancient Dravidians are regarded as the direct ancestors of the Tamils, Telugu, Malayalam, Canarese and other tribes that occupied the greater part of South India.[3] The earliest Dravidians were not primitive tribals, but settled people who tilled the ground and raised crops of various kinds. They were agriculturists by nature.[4]

The Aryans who were familiar with the conventional system of

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[1] V. Kanaka Sabhai, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, Madras, 1966, pp. 113–114.

[2] S. Singaravelu, *Social Life of the Tamils*, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, p. 171.

[3] T. K. Krishna Menon, *The Dravidian Culture and its Diffusion*, Ernakulam, 1937, p. 11.

[4] T. R. Sesha Iyengar, *The Ancient Dravidians*, Madras, 1925, p. 57.

Varnashrama dharma in North India found an entirely different social set up during their migration to South India. Upto their migration the people of Tamilagam appeared contented with their respective professions. They never thought of their superior or inferior status. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar wrote: "The Brahmins did not succeed in arranging the people of Southern India as members of the four varnas as they did in Northern India. It only led to the confusion of caste and the prevalence of social jealousies that have characterised the life of South India for a thousand five hundred years."[5] The Aryans injected the distinctions based on upper and lower status into the body politic of the Tamil society. It might have naturally developed a doubt in the minds of all the professional groups which led to regular confrontations. The Brahmins who formed the microscopic minority emerged as the greatest arbitrators and peace makers and extended their counsel to the reigning kings too. By virtue of their spiritual authority, they commanded considerable influence in the society.[6]

The Brahmin writers on law propounded a model of the caste system which placed them at the top and gave them the privilege of declaring the duties of other castes, including the kings.[7] In order to proclaim their spiritual superiority and temporal welfare, they gerrymandered customs and conventions, administrative and socio-economic systems and brought the entire society under the provisions of their *sastras*. The essential principles of caste system traditionally observed in Hindu society are unchangeable inequality based on birth, the gradation and inequality of vocational professions and restrictions on marriage outside one's own group. In essence one's birth into a particular caste decided all sphere of his activity. Whether this system is a theoretical division of society, a sociological fiction or a Platonic myth, it has worked definitely to the advantage of the Aryan immigrants.[8] Further the position afforded to the Brahmins by the Tamil kings and the increasing use of Sanskritic forms provided the base for the introduction of the hierarchical organisation of caste into Tamil society.[9]

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[5] P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, *Pre-Aryan Tamil Culture*, Madras, 1914, p. 20. But historians like Oldenburg, Gilbert Slater and Hutton believe that the caste system was popular among the early Tamils.

[6] K. Rajayyan, *Administration and Society in Carnatic* 1701-1801, Tirupati 1966, p. 127.

[7] M. N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, Berkeley, 1966, p. 5.

[8] K. M. Panikkar, *Hindn Society at Cross Roads*, Bombay, 1955, pp. 10-11.

[9] Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., *The Dravidian Movement*, Bombay, 1955, p. 10.

Following the large scale migration of the Aryans to the Tamil country, the Tamil society was divided into Brahmins, non-Brahmins and untouchables. The Aryan theory that mankind is divided into four varnas or castes — Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra — was wholly foreign to the southerners.[10] There were no genuine Kshatriyas or Vaisyas in the peninsular India and the use of these categories in this are referred only to local castes which had successfully claimed Vaisya or Kshatriya status.[11] The introduction of the inferior and superior status led to a competition among the different communities to receive the sacramental recognition of the Brahmins for their claims.

The non–Brahmins, including the untouchables, during the medieval period were broadly divided into *Valankai* or Right hand and *Idankai* or Left hand castes. The exact origin of these two groups has been examined by several scholars, but no definite answer has been given to this interesting question. Some of the inscriptions state that each group consisted of ninety eight sub–sects. Though one gets the names of some sects in each group the names of all the ninety eight sects are not known. But side by side with these, there is reference to groups of eighteen professional castes.[12] Prof. K. K. Pillay writes: "Perhaps a large measure of laxity existed in the Sangam Age, but there is no doubt that the stiffening of the hereditary basis increased with the lapse of time."[13] The ninety eight sects under each of the two divisions were generally of the industrial and agricultural classes.[14] The Brahmins and a few other communities who claimed the highest predominance were kept aloof from these two groups. These superior castes acted as the creators of troubles between the right and the left hand factions.[15]

The division of the society led to regular confrontations among the different sects of the two groups. As Abbe Dubois has rightly pointed out: "This division into right hand and left hand factions whoever invented it has turned out to be the most direful disturber of the public peace. It has proved a perpetual source of riots and the cause of endless animosity among the natives."[16] Most of the skirmishes are centred on certain privileges like the right to wear slippers or to ride through the streets in a palanquin, or on horseback during marriage festivals. Sometimes it is the privilege of being escorted on certain occasions by armed retainers, sometimes that of having a trumpet sounded infront of a procession or of being accompanied by a native musician at public ceremonies. Further it is simply in the use of a particular kind of musical instrument suitable for such occasions the right of carrying flags of certain colours or certain devices during these ceremonies.

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[10] V. A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, London, 1958, p. 42.

[11] M. N. Srinivas, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

[12] T. V. Mahalingam, *Administration and Social Life Under Vijayanagar*, Part II, Madras, 1975, p. 236.

[13] K. K. Pillay, *Social History of the Tamils*, Madras, 1975, p. 236.

[14] K. R. Hanumanthan, *Untouchability – A Historical Review*, Madurai, 1979, p. 175.

[15] Chidambaram Pillai, *Right of Temple Entry*, Nagercoil, 1933, p. 247.

It is recorded in the Proceedings of the Home Department, Fort William, Bengal that the custom of accompanying religious processions with music gave rise to frequent breaches of the peace and became the subject of complaint by persons of other sects.[17] As per the *Mackenzie Manuscript* the right hand caste people who were designated as the Valankai caste used *savarkkali* and white umbrella. They were permitted to ride on white horses and possess five sembus. The Vellalar, Agambadaiyar, Idaiyar, Kavaraikomutti, Kaikolar, Ceder, Ceniyar (oil monger) were included in the Valankai group. The Vannar, Ambattar and Pariahs also used white cloths. Those who were having carts were also having five sembus. None among Idankai caste was allowed the use of Savarkkali and white horse.[18]

The Kammalas or the artificers including the goldsmiths and carpenters who held a high place in the pre-Aryan days were reduced to the status of Idankai caste people. But they were permitted to wear sacred thread and assume the title of Achari but they were not allowed to perform *upanayana* ceremony. Further they exercised the privilege to to have double conches, drums beaten on auspicious occasions, put on shoes while going on a journey and whitewash their houses.[19] In due course influenced by the Aryan immigrants, the reigning princes began to ban such privileges. The Kammalas sought the support of other Idankai caste people like the Pallas, another fallen community who formed the agricultural serfs in the Tamil society, to restore their lost privileges. The Valankai caste people assuming themselves as superior to the Idankai people prevented them from bearing a white or green umbrella, banner with the emblem of swan, monkey, cuckoo, plough, white horse, travelling in palanquins, wearing white petticoat erecting grand gateways or *thoranom* etc. They built the marriage pandal only inside the courtyard of their houses. They were not allowed to decorate the pandal with a white saree. During the *pattana pravesam,* the procession of the bridegroom in the street, they were prevented from using white horses and umbrellas and were compelled to use red or black horses and umbrellas.[20] They were not permitted to use the conveyance called *tair* or chariot to carry the corpse to the burning ground. Further they were prohibited from fixing the five tambauls or brass chembus and white cloths in the *tair*. They could use only chaindy or gaykundy.

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[16] Abbe J.A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*, Oxford, 1897, pp. 16–17.

[17] Home Department, Judicial Proceedings, National Archives, 19 August 1882, No. 1032, p. 7.

[18] T. V. Mahalingam, (ed.) *Mackenzie Manuscript*, Vol. I, Madras, 1972, p. 147.

[19] *South Indian Inscriptions*, Vol. V, Nos. 238, 283.

The concerted attempts of the Kammalas and the Pallas to avail the banned privileges resulted in regular confrontations between the two hostile factions. It became a common feature in the districts of Madurai and Ramnad where the artificers and cultivators commanded much influence due to their numerical strength.[21]

The dispute fanned into flames in May 1796 when the artificers took the initiative in carrying the corpse of an old Palla woman in a tair fixed at the top of it with brass chembus; the Gentoos who formed the Right hand caste arrested them from performing the funeral ceremonies. Subramany, a goldsmith and Muthu Karupah, a carpenter, the principal men among the artificers took the leadership.[22] They instigated the Palla cultivators to abandon their fields at the critical period of harvest and to stay back until they secured the right to carry the dead bodies in tairs with other decorations. The principal Gentoos issued orders to the washermen and barbers not to wash and shave the artificers and cultivators.[23]

George Powney, the English Collector stationed at Ramnad immediately authorised the senior Brahmin arbitrators to settle the problem amicably. But the Pallas who left the fields supported by the artificers without waiting to hear the verdict of the arbitration removed the corpse to the burning ground in the tair with *chembus* on it.[24] For this defiance the artificers were sentenced to pay a fine of five hundred chuckrums and directed to abide by the ancient customs.

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[20] Prof. A. P. Ibrahim Kunju Felicitation Volume, *India in the Eighteenth Century*, Trivandrum, 1981, pp. 78–79.

[21] Proceedings of the Board of Revenue, Vol. 161, pp. 7030. Letter from the Collector of Ramnad to Edward Saunders, President of the Board.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 7034.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 7055, Declaration given by Subramany and Muthn Karupah.

On way back, after the arbitration committee meeting, the Gentoos of the Valankai caste were received by dancing girls with other musical instruments. But the artificers as mentioued by Subramany "had nothing but the Pullers Tom–Toms which they beat before us and with which we were contented in order to conform ourselves to the tenor of our muchilaka."[25]

When the Gentoos continued to harass and obstruct the movement of the Idankai people, Subramany sent *olas* to the Pallas in every village ordering them neither to be engaged in the concerns of cultivation nor in cutting the crops and measuring the grain but to repair immediately to Paramagudi with their respective arms and necessary provisions.[26] They were threatened with explusion in case of refusal to obey the orders.[27]

Accordingly the Pallas assembled at Shalagramom with swords, picks, match locks, crooked irons and club sticks to the number of about 1,500 men. They surrounded the cutcherry of Shalagramom and forcibly released the artificers; they caught hold of the Amildar and *Sibbendy* sepoys whose turbans and jackets were taken off and carried them to a distant place and beat them with the butt end of the match locks for their open support to the Gentoos.[28] But the timely arrival of a company of sepoys from Ramnad prevented any untoward incident. Subramany and Muthu Karupah, the principal instigators surrendered before the sepoys. Later they were sentenced to banishment from their native village throughout life. But when the matter came before the Board of Revenue, the President and the Council members found fault with the left hand caste people and reduced the permanent banishment of Subramany and Muthu Karupah into 500 pagodas each as a security for their good behaviour.[29]

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[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 7035–36, An account of the disturbances occasioned by the people of the left hand caste.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 7053, Declaration of Subramany and Muthu Karupah.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 7057.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 7050, Translation of a declaration from Petchen Kudumban.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 7946, Account of the disturbance occasioned by the people of the Left hand caste.

Thus the English government, instead of making an impartial settlement of the disputes based on just and fair laws, authorised the local pundits to settle the controversy by remaining within the fold of Hindu Sastras and Samhitas. The local arbitrators further aggravated the situation by trying to uphold the fossilized customs.

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[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 7061–62, Minute of the President in Council.

Lord Lytton and the Northern Frontier of India

BY

RAMESH CHANDRA SHARMA

Although the long and sprawling northern frontier of India presents "the finest natural combination of boundary and barrier that exists in the world,"[1] the vulnerability of its western sector has made it a problem of prime concern in her external relations from the earliest times. This meeting place of some of the world's greatest mountain ranges,[2] rivers,[3] and religious faiths[4] from times immemorial came to have special significance as the probable junction of three huge territorial empires[5] in the mid-nineteenth century. As such, during this period, it came to be intimately connected not only with the defence of India, but with Britain's imperial policy as well. Its value from this point of view was fully realised for the first time by Lord Lytton, who was also the first to lay down for India under the crown a coherent policy to meet the situation, which was followed by his successors at least in outline.[6]

Before we take up a study of the frontier policy of Lord Lytton, it will be in the fitness of things to discuss the nature of the problem posed by India's frontier in the north and the north-west at the time.

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[1] T. Holdich, *Palitical Frontier and Boundary Making*, (Calcutta, 1916) p. 280.

[2] The Himalaya, the Safed Koh, the Sulaiman, the Kuenlun, the Karakoram, the Mustagh and the Hindu Kush, which formed the real frontier between India and Central Asia.

[3] The Indus, the Kabul, the Oxus, the Yarkand, the Tarim, for example.

[4] Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam.

[5] The British in India, the Russian and the Chinese.

[6] In this connection it may be pointed out that Lord Ripon, who aecording to his implicit instructions started withdrawing from the points of vantage acquired by Lytton, had, in the end, not only to give up but also to undertake expansion of the line to Chaman. Lord Elgin and Lord Landsdown adopted an increasingly forward policy.

The northern frontier of British India was, no doubt, a primary settlement frontier.[7] As such, it naturally was "not a chosen line accepted after careful study and with farseeing provision, but adopted because it represented, approximately, the points to which the Sikhs had at that time (under Ranjith Singh) pushed."[8] However, this legacy of the annexation of Sindh and the conquest of Punjab was "not represented by any particular boundary line; it was a zone or belt of mountainous country of varying width,"[9] providing vast stretches of "no–man's land separating organised states from each other."[10] It was in this situation that the real interest of the frontier in its physical and human aspects lay.

From the physical (geographical) point of view, the Indian frontier was a land of hills and deserts with cultivable valleys here and there. It comprised "that great range of mountains, which under various names, extends from Herat in the west, past Cabul, to the extreme northern boundary of Cashmere; and forms a watershed dividing the waters running south towards the Persian Gulf and the Indian seas and deserts."[11] This irregular belt of independent or semi-independent territory extending from the Himalayas and Tibet[12] to Baluchistan provided an almost impenetrable barrier to any invading foe except for the passes in its western sector like the Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal and Bolan, which had acted as gates of India from times immemorial, presenting "the easiest roads and those best adopted for military operations."[13] Numerous other passes that exist in this region "can be placed outside the pale of strategical considerations."[14] Nevertheless, geo-physically it remained a region of strategic importance, being contiguous to Central Asia, an area which could threaten India's security, especially in view of the Russian expansion there. Hence the complete control of the frontier became incumbent on the British Government of India.

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[7] Such a frontier represents an historical feature and makes the *de facto* limit of a state's political authority. *Cf.* J.R.V.Prescott, *The Geography of Frontires and Boundaries*, (London, 1967), p. 35.

[8] Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *Foreign Secret Supplementary*, Dec. 1878, No. 43.

[9] C.C. Davies, *The Problem of the North–West Frontier*, (Cambridge, 1932) p. 185.

[10] C.C.Davies, *The Evolution of Indias Northern Borders*, (Bombay, 1971) p. 3.

[11] Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For. Sec. Supp.*, Dec.. 1878, No.43.

[12] Lytton to Cranbrook, Aug. 3, 1878 *Lytton Papers*, (Microfilm at the National Archives of India).

[13] Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For. Sec. Supp.*, Dec. 1875, No.43.

[14] Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

Added to the difficulties inherent in the geographical situation of this region, were the problems posed by the human aspect of the frontier, which presented "an ethnological jigsaw of frightening complexity."[15] It was peopled by a large number of pastoral, wild hill tribes,[16] mainly Pathans, with other considerable groups. such as the Ghilzais, the Turkomans, the Mongols, the Tajiks, the Afridis, the Baluchis, who held the passes and the contiguous terrain in their hands.[17] These virile sons of the wilderness derived much of their national character from the environment of their country, which produced among them the most expert guerilla fighters in the world, and hardy mountaineers, possessed of great powers of endurance, a hatred of control and a patriotic spirit approximating to religion.[18] Naturally, they abhorred any government but that of their own chiefs. The Amir of Kabul claimed suzerainty over them, which was, nevertheless, ineffective. The poverty of the tribes was enough to make them invade British territories and to plunder caravans attempting the passes. However, political propaganda, particularly of the Afghans from Kabul or by local officials, from time to time, incited the tribes to rebel against the British Raj.[19] Then there was the possibility of their falling under foreign influences. These reasons caused the British to attempt at controlling the frontier tribesmen to serve their purpose.

However, the British Government did not adopt a consistent or stereotyped policy towards these tribesmen. Not only did it vary from time to time, but owing to geographical, ethnological and political reasons a policy which was completely successful in one part of the frontier, was entirely unsuited to the other. It was, therefore, in the fitness of things that the administrators of these regions adopted different policies. Had they adopted a universal system of frontier policy, operating from the territories of the Mehtar of Chitral to the coast of Makran, it would have been a complete failure and the problem would have become more complicated and confused than before.

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[15] A. Swinson, *North-West Frontier*, (London, 1967), p. 21.

[16] For an account of the frontier tribes see Davies,pp. 37–70 and Apps.C and D.

[17] Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For. Sec. Supp.*, Dec. 1878, No. 43.

[18] Davies, *op.cit.*, p.179.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

Since Punjab and Sindh were the two parts of the British dominions, adjacent to the frontier, its administration prior to the formation of the North-Western Frontier Province, was entrusted to the authorities of these provinces. They adopted totally different frontier policies which resulted in the growth of two distinct schools of frontier administration, namely, the Punjab School and the Sindh School. The Punjab system depended "to a very large extent upon an efficient political management of the tribes,"[20] which, however, could not come fully in operation before the late eighteen seventies.[21] The Punjab authorities aimed at protecting their subjects from the attacks of marauding bands, keeping the trade routes open, and, as far as possible, keeping peace on the border.[22] For this purpose, they first, resorted to reprisals to give the Pathans an impression of their strength.[23] Next, they attempted at conciliation to show the tribesmen how they would benefit by becoming friendly neighbours.[24] However, the Punjab authorities had adopted three methods of coercion to force the tribesmen to terms, namely, fines, blockades and expeditions.[25] The Sindh system, on the other hand, started with "an uncompromising repression of outrages by military force."[26] Charles Napier began by building forts, posting troops at certain points and leading occasional expeditions against the tribes, but could not create much effect. Then John Jacob adopted the methods of vigilant patrolling of the frontier.[27] Robert Sandemann, however, tried to introduce a policy of conciliation in Sindh. He introduced the system of granting allowances to tribesmen for maintaining peace, guarding trade routes, and passes, and meting out justice according to the tribal *jirga* (assembly), which worked very successfully among the Baluch tribes.[28] Thus it is clear that "British policy was one of conciliation backed by force".[29]

Besides this administrative side of the frontier policy, there was another problem connected with the imperial aspect of the frontier. From this point of view also there arose two distinct policies in the two administrative sectors of the frontier during the British period. The policy of the Punjab Government was known as the 'Close Border Policy'. In the beginning, it advocated leaving the tribes alone and giving their land to the Amir of Afghanistan. It desired the British Government to remain satisfied with the lands upto the right bank of the Indus.[30] This idea of 'Back to the Indus', vigorously emphasised by the Panjab authorities, was not accepted by the Government of India,[31] which wanted to keep close to the frontier it had received from the Sikhs.[32]

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 23.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–28.
[26] *Ibid.*, p.18.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp.19–21.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

The Sindh administration, on the other hand, advocated the occupation of the tribal land in order to bring it under their direct control.[33] This policy, ultimately, came to the fore as the Forward Policy, which was necessitated by Russia being within the striking distance and in proximity and immediate contact with Afghanistan.[34] It would suffice here to say that this policy was meant to bring the frontier tribes under control, so that they might not be helpful to the Russians, and to secure against absorption by Russia certain points necessary to the safety of India.[35]

Lord Lawrence was a great advocate of the 'Back to the Indus' policy and adhered to the 'Close Border' system. He did not allow the Sindh authorities to proceed further.[36] His two immediate successors, Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook, followed this policy with slight changes and modifications as did five Secretaries of State for India between 1859 and 1874. Lord Lytton, on assumption of office, gave vent to his utter dissatisfaction with the policy of his predecessors, declaring it to be one of "costly impotence",[37] and noted with satisfaction that "it is encouraging to find that the do-nothing and know-nothing policy in regard to Afghanistan is not so popular on the frontier as it would seem to be at Calcutta".[38] Thus, as on foreign policy, so on frontier policy Lytton had definite ideas and was determined to pursue them steadily.[39]

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[30] *For. Political*, Jan. 1868, No. 154.

[31] J.L. Morison, *From Alexander Burns to Frederick Roberts*, (London, 1936), p. 13,

[32] *For. Pol.* Jan. 1868, No. 154.

[33] Minute by Canning, Feb. 5, 1857, *Parliamentary Papers*, LVI, 1879 (2472).

[34] Lord Roberts' speech in the House of Lords in 1890 – *Ibid.*, LXIII, 1897-98 (8713),

[35] Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For. Sec. Supp.*, Dec. 1878, No. 43.

[36] Government of India to Bombay Government, Jan. 17, 1867 – *Parlt. Papers*, 1879 (73).

[37] Lytton to Salisbury, April 1, 1876– *Lytton Papers.*

[38] *Ibid.*

For Lytton the question of the frontier was an integral part of his foreign policy, which revolved round the great Central Asian problem of containing Russian ambitions there. Thus to him there was "no longer such a thing as a Khelat question, or an Afghan question; these are only departments of the great Russian question, and should be treated accordingly".[40] It was this idea of "treating all frontier questions as parts of a whole question, and not as separate questions having no relation to each other,"[41] which led him to telegraph and to write to Northbrook, on his way to Calcutta, "urging him to suspend the mission of Major Sandemann, who had not then entered Khelat territory".[42] This emphatic unitarian approach to the frontier question was the result of Lytton's conviction that the end to be attained was "the military defence of our frontier".[43] Therefore, he adopted the policy "to cultivate our north-western borders as a strong bulwark, by aiding Afghanistan to become a powerful and prosperous State".[44] It was because of this vital link between the frontier and the defence of the country that Lytton wanted to place "purely political management of the whole frontier, from Peshawar to Kurrachee, in the hands of a single officer, invested with adequate rank and importance, and acting directly under the orders to the Viceroy".[45]

These principles Lytton derived from a thorough consideration of the various problems connected with the frontier in his time. This is clear from his letter to Cranbrook, August 3, 1878,[46] and the Minute of September 4, 1878,[47] in which he gave vent to his thoughts on the problem in view of the changed situation in his time, in the wake of the Russian moves in Central Asia and the changed attitude of the Amir of Kabul.[48] He did not find the frontier bounded by the hills, as inherited from the Sikhs, advantageous either as a boundary[49] or a strategic line, for "the value of an obstacle such as a great river, or a mountain range, depends upon the command on both sides of the obstacle".[50] Therefore, due to its weak frontier in India, England was "urged forward by considerations of military and political expediency, and by the instinct of self-preservation, towards the Hindu-Kush, the great natural boundary between India and Central Asia".[51] From this followed the natural conclusion that "the wild country between the present Indian and Russian frontiers contains the key to both India and Turkistan."[52] This was followed by a thorough examination of the position of this region in its eastern, central and western sectors[53] leading to the conclusion that "as a purely military line, the strongest frontier we could take up would be along the Hindu-Kush from the Pamir to Bamian, holding the northern debouches of the principal passes; and thence southwards by the Helmund, Girishke, and Candahar to the Arabian Sea. Though political considerations of the moment may compel and justify an expansion of our line to the northern frontier of Afghanistan, this would weaken rather than strengthen, our general position. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so great that, though it lies beyond our natural frontier, it cannot be excluded from our line of defence. This line, therefore, should ultimately run from the Hindu-Kush along the Paropamisus to Herat, and thence down the western frontier of Afghanistan and Beloochistan to the Arabian Sea."[54] In view of this the frontier problem at the time was that "there are certain points necessary to the safety of India, which we must secure against absorption by Russia, in view of Russia and England steadily drawing nearer to one another in the East, and to do that with least danger, disturbance, responsibilities and expense."[55]

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[39] Lytton to Temple, May 25, 1876; Lytlon to Cranbrook, Aug. 3, 1878– *Ibid.*

[40] Lytton to Rawlinson, Aug. 5, 1876, *Ibid.*

[41] B. Balfour, *History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, 1876–1880 (London, 1899), p. 97.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

[43] Lytton to Frere, March 26, 1876– *Lytton Papers.*

[44] Lytton to Salisbury, Feb. 26, 1876; Lytton to Girdlestone, Aug. 27, 1876– *Ibid.*

[45] Lytton to Salisbury, April 1, 1876– *Ibid.* Lytton, in fact, had a whole scheme for the reorganisation of the entire frontier administration, which shall be discussed later.

[46] *Lytton Papers.*

[47] *For. Sec.Supp.* Dec. 1878, No. 43.

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[48] "A rapid change is taking place in Indian public opinion on the subject." *Ibid.*

[49] "It was not a strong line, except in the sense that a prison wall is strong to the prisoner, and it was not a favourable line, as it left our boundary peculiarly exposed to inroads and insult, while limiting our power of external influenee or chastisement" - *Ibid.*; also Lytton to Ctanbrook, Aug. 3, 1878, *Lytton Papers.*

[50] *Ibid., For. Sec., Supp.* Dec. 1878, No. 43.

[51] *Ibid.*, Lytton to Cranbrook, Aug. 3, 1878-*Lytton Papers.*

[52] *Fnr., Sec. Supp.* Dec. 1878, No. 43.

[53] *Ibid.*, Lytton to Cranbrook, Aug. 3, 1878 – *Lytton Papers,*

[54] *For., Sec. Supp.* Dec. 1875, No. 43.

[55] *Ibid.*

This self–exposition of his ideas on the frontier problem may well smack of the influence of the 'Forward School' on Lytton. The security of the Indian empire, however, dominated Lytton's thinking and policy. He had "no desire to extend beyond India" and his was "essentially a defensive policy, confined to the defence of India; but theory and experience alike prove that a strategy purely defensive almost certainly ends in a disaster. Therefore, India must be defended by a vigorous offensive."[56] This provides the key to the policy of Lytton, which we may term as one of offensive defence, in which "while war must always be kept in view as a possible ultimate measure, it is one to be resorted to only when all others have failed."[57]

Of this offensive defence oriented policies, extension of the British influence and control to Afghanistan by all means, in order to prevent Russia from getting a foothold there, was the chief prop. Therefore, Lytton wanted to manage the frontier in such a way as to enable the predominance of Britain in Afghanistan either by itself or by compelling the Amir to accept it to ensure the security of India. Thus his Afghan and frontier policies were interdependent. It becomes obvious when we look at the basic principles of his frontier policy. Complete knowledge of the region by its thorough investigation and survey[58] was the first principle that Lytton adopted to replace the 'know–nothing' policy of his predecessors. Efficient administration of the frontier and its proper political management and military control was another thing dear to him as was the control and befriending of the frontier tribes to wean them away from Kabul. Occupation of places of strategic importance was another essential requirement of his frontier policy, as we have pointed out earlier. All these were intended to secure the frontier as a supreme means of Indian defence, which would act not only as a powerful deterrent to Russia but as a solid base of offensive in case of need as well.

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[56] *Ibid.*

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] Lytton's own successful efforts to know about the frontier and the external relations of India, and encouragement to his political agents and officers to survey the region* may be stated as proofs of this principle. This is the point that Lytton emphasised in his Minute on Frontier Administration dated April 22, 1877– *Cf. Parlt. Papers*, 1878, LVIII (1898) and Balfour, pp. 167–168.

*After the successful conclusion of the Jowaki expedition, for example, Lytton wrote to Grand Duff: "When I came to India I found that our officials on the Punjab frontier were profoundly ignorant of the country five miles beyond their border. No map of it existed. Within our border, raids were constantly perpetrated with perfect impunity by the same tribes. The raiders, though a mere handful of men, invariably found our frontier authorities unprepared for their visitations and invariably escaped unharmed, after cutting, the throats, and plundering the property of the Queen's subjects . Now, at least, the whole Jowaki country has been accurately surveyed and mapped from end to end, practicable roads have been made through in all directions..."– Lytton to Grant Duff, Feb. 24, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*

Now let us turn to the execution of his frontier policy by Lytton. It can be studied in two parts, the first concerning administration and the second related to the problems of defence and strategy.

Efficient administration of the frontier had been the aim of the British administrators. For this purpose proposals had been put forward for the creation of a new administrative unit, which, it was hoped, would usher in a new era of peace and order on the bloodstained frontier and would eradicate many of the evils to which it was subjected. In the days of Dalhousie, proposed changes were not sanctioned by the Court of Directors,[59] while his idea of separating the trans-Indus regions, because of the ethnical difference of their inhabitants, was abandoned due to the assassination of Col. Makeson, to whom he desired to entrust the new province, at Peshawar.[60] But from 1877 the idea of forming a separate frontier province had steadily gained ground under the inspiration of Lord Lytton, who in that year commented upon the 'overwhelming concurrence of opinion' on the need of adjustment of the frontier administration.[61] This adjustment was to be, in the first place, the separation of the government of Sindh from that of Bombay.[62] Secondly, "the line of demarcation between the Sindh or lower frontier and the Punjab or upper frontier should be readjusted according to the distribution of the races on the border; so that the Belooch tribes (might) all come within one district and administration, and the Pathan tribes within the other."[63]

In his Minute of April 22, 1877,[64] Lytton "sketched in an outline of a scheme which embodied his own views as to the best policy to be pursued."[65] He sought to solve this problem by the creation of a new trans–Indus frontier province,[66] separate from Sind and Punjab, under a Chief Commissioner or Governor–General's Agent, having "the management directly under the Government of India of all frontier business and trans–frontier relations."[67] Under him were to be two separate Commissioners for the Pathan and Baluch tribes respectively. "The Viceroy would, by means of this arrangement, command the services of his own specially selected agent, in whose hands the threads of all our border politics and tribal relations would be concentrated. The time of such an agent could be devoted almost entirely to purely frontier duties; and he would be better able than any Lieutenant–Governor of the Punjab can possibly be to visit ... all parts of the frontier."[68] This would place the political and administrative control of the frontier in the same hands and make it pass through the same channels eliminating all division of responsibility and all antagonism of schools and systems.[69] The Punjab Frontier Force and the Sindh Frontier Force were to be merged into one 'Frontier Force' and placed under the orders of the Commander–in–Chief.[70] Regarding the tribes, he emphasised the need 'to cultivate more direct and frequent intercourse than at present.' For this purpose he proposed the appointment of a "Chief Commissioner at Peshawar, invested with exceptionally high powers, who can represent to the native mind more directly and personally than either the Lieutenant–Governor at Lahore, or the still more distant Viceroy at Calcutta, the embodied power and dignity of the British Government."[71] The administrative staff of the divisions and districts was also to be increased.[72] He criticised some practices of the local administration, specially the system of punitive expeditions 'because it perpetuates a system of semi–barbarous reprisal.'[73] "In dealing with barbarous tribes, our object should be either to support and enforce tribal responsibility to the utmost wherever it already exists. or to reduce tribal cohesion to a minimum where no recognised authority can be found and used."[74] He also advocated the gradual disarmament of the population along the frontier and concluded this Minute by remarking that the proposed reorganisation of the frontier administration was "absolutely and urgently requisite for the efficient execution of the policy of the Government of India... now or hereafter."[75]

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[59] *Parlt. Papers*, 1878, LVIII (1898).
[60] L. Fraser, *India Under Cutzon and Afterwards*, (London, 1911), p.58.
[61] Balfour, p. 166.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 167.
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Parlt. Papers*, 1878, LVIII (1898).
[65] Balfour, p. 167.

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[66] This was to consist of six frontier districts of Panjab, viz., Hazara Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (except the Cis–Indus tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same exception), Dera Ghazi Khan, and trans–Indus Sindh (with the exception of Karachi).

[67] Lytton's Minute, April 22, 1877 – *Parli. Papers*, 1878, LVIII (1898).

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] *Ibid*, This remark was roundly attacked by F.C. Bayley, a member of the Viceroy's Council, which was adequately replied by Lytton. *Cf.* Swinson, p. 150.

Lytton's scheme of the new frontier province was objected to on three grounds; first, that some of these districts formed integral parts of Punjab; secondly, that their internal administration would suffer by separation, and thirdly, that frontier relations were best conducted by the Punjab Government.[76] Lytton's reply was that these districts were separated from Punjab geographically, historically and racially. He also pointed out that "all unnecessary links in an administrative chain admittedly weaken the strength of it."[77] But due to objections to certain other proposals of Lytton,[78] the Secretary of State could not accept the scheme as such and the compromise proposed by him was opposed by the then Foreign Secretary of the Government of India and the Lieutenant–Governor of Panjab, although Lytton did try to give effect to the proposal.[79] However, due to the second Afghan War (1878–1880) Lytton's policy could not be effected. Thus his scheme for the reorganisation of the frontier administration could not be implemented. Nevertheless, it shows the thoroughness with which Lytton was trying to conduct his foreign policy and he deserves credit for establishing political agencies in the frontier region.[80]

The second aspect of Lytton's frontier policy in action was related to India's defence and matters concerning its strategy. He tried to tackle these problems in the two sectors of the frontier, which appeared to him vulnerable, in two different ways. So far as the western sector of the frontier was concerned, he tackled the problem directly. But in the northern sector he attempted to tackle indirectly through the agency of the Maharaja of Kashmir.

In the western sector Lytton had to face a twofold problem. In the first place, he had to tackle the frontier tribes so as to make them instruments of India's defence. Secondly, he had to secure the frontier strategically by the occupation of points of advantage along the frontier so as to assure safety against a possible aggressor and to secure sound bases for forward action, when needed, beyond the frontier.

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[74] Lytton's Minute, April 22, 1877, – *Parlt. Papers*, 1878, LVIII (1898).

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] Balfour, p. 168.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[78] Davies, p. 106.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

Lytton emphasised on having direct contacts with the frontier tribes. For this purpose he suggested a number of administrative changes and criticised and insisted on abolishing certain measures like the appointment of the middle men and the punitive expeditions of the Punjab system.[81] He later favoured direct negotiations with the tribes in order to befriend them so as to secure them as allies.[82] This he wanted to do with two objeetives in view. First, he wanted to prevent the possibility of these tribesmen becoming allies of an aggressor, obviously Russia. Secondly, he desired to wean them away from the Amir of Kabul, thus weakening him thereby, and also to secure an appropriate basis for military action in Afghanistan[83] if and when necessary, for these tribes held the passes, safe conduct through which would be most important requirement of any military action in the trans-frontier region. In this Lytton obviously appears to have taken a wise lesson from the disasters of the First Afghan War.

Lytton discussed with Cavagnari the advisability of openly befriending some of the more important of the tribes, whose territories lay between Afghanistan and the north-west frontier of India. Cavagnari, while pointing to the significance of realising the independence of these tribes, warned the Viceroy against any active steps "to secure their independence while there was still any chance of patching up differences with Sher Ali."[84] The Viceroy, however, pointed out that a complete change of policy with regard to these tribes had become necessary, as the old policy (of regarding the tribes as "the political property of the Amir of Kabul, with a view to making him responsible for the control of them")[85] had failed beyond repair. The Amir had never been "able to exercise authority over these intervening tribes in the sense contemplated by those who laid down the lines of the old policy." The influence he exercised over them "is distinctly prejudicial and permanently inconvenient" to the British cause and had resulted in the predominance of the Russian influence in Kabul, while the British could get at him with great difficulty "across a hedge of thorns." Thus the British relations with the Amir of Kabul had become the "cause of incessant anxiety." Therefore, "it is not, and cannot be, in our interests to promote the consolidation of a border power whose friendship we have no means of securing, and whose enmity we cannot punish save by a war in which success would not be free from embarrassment."[86] Gavagnari raised the objection that the British Government's direct settlement with the chiefs would render impossible a reconciliation with the Amir.[87] Lytton replied that "Sher Ali has irrevocably slipped out of our hands; and it is therefore inadvisable to neglect any opportunity of strengthening or improving our position by means independent of his goodwill for fear that by so doing we should provoke his resentment."[88] To Cavang–nari's objection that an understanding with the tribal chiefs on the part of the British Government would be equally resented by the Amir's successors, the Viceroy's reply was that so long as the British Government aimed at the disintegration of Afghanistan it did not matter.[89] The reason for this was that the help rendered to the rulers of Afghanistan would never satisfy them because many of their "natural objects are not compatible with our own interests. But they will always be more or less influenced by our practical power of hurting them; and it is this which we should now endeavour to develop and confirm."[90]

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[81] Lytton's Minute, April 22, 1877 – *Parlt. Papers*, 1877, LVIII (1898).

[82] Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For. Sec. Supp.*, Dec. 1878, No. 43.

[83] B. Prasad. *The Foundations of Indias Foreign Policy*, Vol, I, (Bombay, 1955) p. 184.

[84] Balfour, pp. 164–165; *For. Sec.*, Oct. 1877, Nos. 30–160.

[85] Lytton to Cavagnari, June 9, 1877, *Ibid.*

Thus it was in order to bring the Amir to book that Lytton had to resort to befriending the frontier tribes. But he did not overrule Cavagnari's objections altogether, as is clear from his instruction that "direct negotiations with the various semi-independent tribes along the border, with a view to detaching them from the Amir's cause" should be opened "on the failure of our mission"[91] in 1878. The appointment of Cavagnari (as Assistant Commissioner of Peshawar) to wean the frontier tribes from the Amir's influence, securing them under British control, opening the routes into Afghanistan and effecting Khanates in the vicinity of the British frontier under chiefs whose welfare depended largely on the recognition and support they could receive from the British Government[92] also proves this. These measures aimed at gaining the allegiance of Swat, Bajaur and Dir, over which the Amir had influence and with whom he had intimate relations.[93] The Afridis and the Mohmands were approached with a measure of success and their loyalty to the Amir was sufficiently weakened.[94] The Khaibaris were brought into alliance and their full support was acquired and utilised during the Second Afghan War.

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[86] *Ibid.*

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] *Ibid.*

[89] *Ibid.*

[90] *Ibid.*

[91] Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For. Sec. Supp.*, Dec. 1878, No. 43.

Lytton, however, had to sanction a military expedition against the Jowaki tribes, within a few months of writing his famous Minute of 22 April. 1877. They had "perpetrated incessant raids upon the Peshawar border."[95] The original causes for their outbreak were dissatisfaction at the anticipated redistribution of the Kohat Pass allowances, intrigues on the part of the middle men through whom communications were carried on with the tribes and the change of district officers at Kohat, at a time when specially delicate management was required.[96] A blockade having failed,[97] an expedition was sanctioned, which proved "ludicrously ineffective" and did "more harm than good."[98]

The Viceroy had to face great difficulties owing to the multiplicity of authorities with whom he had to deal.[99] Despaired of coming to a satisfactory understanding with the frontier officers, he sent his Military Secretary, Col. Colley, unofficially to Peshawar, where a conference of the frontier officers[100] laid down the three principles of action: "1st. To avoid as far as possible operations necessitating the ultimate retiremeat of the British troops under pursuit and fire of the enemy. 2nd. To hold all positions once taken until the absolute submission of the tribe had been secured. 3rd. To make the loss and suffering fall as heavily as possible on the enemy's fighting men, and as lightly as possible on the non–combatants."[101]

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[92] Cavagnari to Lytton, Oct. 13, *For., Sec.*, Oct. 1877, Nos. 272–277.

[93] Prasad, p. 186.

[94] For., Sec., Oct. 1877– Nos. 34–160.

[95] Balfour, p. 179.

[96] The Panjab Government to Government of India, April 22, 1878 and G. O. I. to Secretary of State for India, July 1, 1878 – *For , Sec.*, July 1878, Nos. 36 and 40 respectively.

[97] *Ibid.*; No. 40.

[98] Lytton to S.O.S.I., Oct. 4, 1877 – *Lytton Papers.*

[99] Balfour, p. 180.

[100] For discussions at this Conference see G.O.I. to S.O.S.I, July 1, 1878 – *For., Sec.*, July 1878, No. 40.

[101] Lytton to S.O.S.I., Nov. 23, 1877 – *Lytton Papers.*

Under the new system advocated by the Viceroy, operations started against the Jowaki tribes under General Keyes.[102] He advanced into their country on November 9, 1877, with a force of about 2000 strong.[103] The recalcitrant tribe was isolated,[104] and by a succession of combined movements the whole Jowaki country was overrun.[105] The Jowakis were thus bewildered and cowed by the new tactics,[106] which the Viceroy at last succeeded in getting the frontier authorities to adopt. The terms suggested, namely, the surrender of arms, and, if possible the ring leaders, and the opening up of the country by roads,[107] were unconditionally accepted early in 1878 and the expedition came to a satisfactory conclusion.[108]

The results of this expedition were very important. It resulted in the control of the Jowakis and a thorough survey of their country.[109] It proved that "the cohesion among several sections and sub-sections of the Afridi tribes is less complete than has hitherto been believed,"[110] for "not another tribe, or section of a tribe, has ventured to stir hand or foot in support of them."[111] It also became established that no Afridi tribe could resist the action of the British troops (with their fractional arms) if these troops were employed according to rational principles. It also established the practicability of properly organised night surprises as preferable to the old system of combrous and protracted military operations. Finaliy, it established throughout the border tribes "such a salutary fear of our power, will and patience that I think I can safely predict that, during my tenure of office at least, the peace of the Punjab frontier will not again be troubled by any more tribal attacks."[112]

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[102] Balfour, p. 180.

[103] *Ibid.*

[104] *Ibid.*

[105] G.O.I. to S.O.S.I., July 1, 1878 – *For. Sec., July* 1878, No.40.

[106] Lytton to Salisbury, Dec. 7, 1878– *Lytton Papers*. The new tactics was expressed thus by the Viceroy in his letter to Salisbury of Nov. 23, 1877: "I have made every effort to keep the present operations (which in some form or other were absolutely unavoidable) within the narrowest possible bounds: first, by confining them to the Jowakis and taking every security for the isolation of the tribe before we attacked it; secondiy, by rejecting every plan of operations which was not so devised as to enable us to employ the minimum of force with the maximum of effect; and thirdly, by steadily resisting the pressure put upon me by the Punjab authorities, both civil and military, as well as by the Commander-in-Chief for permission to employ a force greatly in excess of what is admitted to be necessary for the purposes to which the present expedition is confined." *Lytton Papers*.

[107] Balfour, p. 182.

[108] *Ibid.*

[109] Lytton to Grant Duff., Feb. 24, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*

[110] G.O.I. to S.O.S.I., July 1, 1878 – *For. Sec.*, July 1878, No. 40.

[111] Lytton to Grant Duff, Feb. 24, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*

Along with this management of the tribes in the western sector, Lytton had to settle certain territorial questions before he could secure the frontier there. From this point of view the most important work done during this period was a treaty with the Khan of Kalat, which secured for the Government of India among other advantages the occupation of Quetta, which had been put forward constantly by the adherents of the Forward School.

Kalat was a mountainous state, west of Jacobabad and south of Quetta, ruled over by a Khan, who claimed authority over dominions which "embraced the whole province of Baluchistan."[113] It was one of the buffer states [114] which had entered into definite treaty relations with the British, first in 1842[115] and then in 1854. The second treaty concluded on May 14, 1854 regulated the relations between Kalat and the Government of India. It bound the Khan to conduct his foreign policy with the consent of the Indian Government. He agreed to the stationing of British troops in Kalat or occupation by troops of portions of his territories whenever that step should be thought necessary and to accord protection to merchants passing through his territories. He was to prevent raids into India. In return he received an annual subsidy of rupees 50,000.[116] Thus Kalat came firmly within the British influence. In fact, its position was not unlike that of the Indian princely states under the Subsidiary Alliance. It was, as a matter of fact, even less independent than the (Cis–Sutlej Sikh States of Patiala, Jind and Nabha, because the British Government was its paramountcy and could under engagement at any time, occupy the country.[117]

The authorities in Sindh tried to manage the transborder Baluch tribes through Kalat, because they (the Baluch tribes), though constantly opposing the supremacy of the Khan, nevertheless generally acknowledged it.[118] The Khan was, in reality, little more than head of a loose confederacy of tribal chiefs, who were his quasi-feudal vassals.[119] Therefore, when the Khan, Khudad Khan, attempted about the year 1869 to increase his power at the expense of the Sardars, there were disturbances, from which it was obvious that Kalat would become the scene of internecine struggles, if British support were withdrawn. Captain Sandemann, there at, recommended to the Government of India to intervene and reconcile the contending factions.[120] By the end of 1871, the Sardars were in open revolt against the Khan. By 1873 the climax was reached when Major Harrison, the British Agent was recalled and the subsidy of the Khan withdrawn, for the Khan had failed to observe his treaty obligations. There arose some differences among the frontier officers as to the course of action to be taken in the matter at this juncture.[121] It led to the conference of Col. Phayre, Political Superintendent of Kalat, Capt. Sandemann, Official Representative of the Panjab Government, and Sir William Merewether, Commissioner of Sindh, at Jacobabad to investigate the complaints of the Sardars. To this conference Lytton traced all subsequent difficulties in Kalat.[122] It resulted in the dismissal of Phayre and the recall of Sandemann. Thus Sir Merewether was left to conclude the mediation alone. His decision in spite of being in the main against the Sardars deeply incensed and offended the Khan; for it had admitted his rebellious Sardars to be heard and treated as his equals.[123]

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[112] *Ibid.*

[113] Balfour, p. 94.

[114] Prasad, p. 43.

[115] G.O.I. to S.O.C.I., Sept. 2, 1869 – *For. Sec.*, Oct. 1869, No. 8.

[116] C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol,XI (Calcutta, 1909) pp. 212–214, for the text of the Treaty.

[117] Memorandum by B. Frere, March 22, 1878, Sindh and Panjab Frontier Schemes, by B. Frere & L. Griffin – *Baluchistan Blue Book*, No.1.

Conditions further deteriorated in Kalat. Merewether then recommended an armed intervention there and disposition of the Khan.[124] The Government of India did not approve of it and decided to give a trial to Sandemann's epoch-making suggestion that before resorting to military coercion, an effort should be made to effect an amicable settlement between the Khan and the Sardars through a mission of the Sindh and Punjab officers, with powers to settle disputes and grievances.[125] Accordingly, Sandemann was appointed as the arbitrator and leader of the mission. He crossed the border on November 22,

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[118] *Ibid.*
[119] Davis, p. 32.
[120] *Parlt. Popers*, 1877, LXIV (C. 1807), p. 6.
[121] *For., Pol. A.* May 1871, No. 259.
[122] *For., Pol. A*, March 1877, No. 60.
[123] *Ibid.*, Nos. 219-560, K.W, No. 60.
[124] Balfour, p. 96.
[125] T. H. Thornton, *Life of Sandemann* (London, 1895), p. 63.

1875. In spite of his friendly conferences with the tribal chiefs and the Khan himself[127] he did not succeed in settling disputes among the tribes or between them and the Khan.[128] Yet he could secure a very big advantage for the British Government in so far as the Khan and his chiefs agreed to settle their grievances through the mediation of the British officers.

The situation in Kalat became grave after Sandemann's departure and signs were "not wanting that all parties really desired the intervention of the British Government," while merchants, collected at Shikarpur, clamoured for assistance through the Bolan Pass.[129] Sandemann, however, suggested that "there was no cause whatever to prevent his again visiting Kalat with a good promise of effecting settlement of all disputes."[130] He was supported by Col. Munro, the Commissioner of Derajat, to whom the management of Kalat affairs had been temporarily assigned.[131] Consequently, Northbrook's Government decided, in its resolution of March 14, 1876,[132] to send Sandemann who had become a Major by now, on a second mission, at a time when change of Government in England had already taken place and the new Viceroy was on his way to India.

Major Sandemann started on his second mission on April 4, 1876, three days before Lytton landed in India. This mission entirely upset Lytton's original iutention, approved by the Home Government, of sending a confidential mission first to Kalat and thence after the satisfactory settlement of relations with the Khan, to Kabul via Qandahar.[133] At the same time this mission did not fit in with Lytton's principle "of treating all frontier questions as parts of a whole question and not as separate questions having no relation to each other."[134] Therefore, on being informed of the mission, he telegraphed to Northbrook requesting him to suspend the mission until his assumption of office, so that "he might have an opportunity of reconsidering, and, if necessary, revising,

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[126] S.O.S.I. to G.O.I., Dec. 13, 1877 – *For. Pol. A.* Feb. 1878, No. 288; also *For. Pol. A,* March 1876, No. 38.

[127] *For. Pol. A,* Feb. 1878, No. 288.

[128] *Ibid.*

[129] *Ibid.*

[130] *Ibid.*

[131] *Ibid.*

[132] *For. Pol. A,* March 1876, No. 463.

[133] S.O.S.I. to G.O.I., Feb. 28, 1876 – *Lytton Papers.*

[134] Lytton to Rawlinson, Aug. 5, 1876 – *Ibid.,* Balfour, p. 97,

Major Sandemann's instructions" in connection with his views and plans of the whole frontier policy and of associating his mission, if possible, more directly with the attainment of the object he had in view.[135] This suggestion, however, was not acceptable to Northbrook and therefore Lytton had to recast "the arrangements he had contemplated in a form, he thought, less favourable to their success."[136] Nevertheless, he resolved to aid and support the Agent to the Khan, selected by his predecessor.[137]

The mission of Sandemann soon began to show its fruits in the restoration of peace in Kalat with the cooperation of the Sardars and the Khan.[138] By June 5, he was able to telegraph that "both the Khan and his Sardars look to the British Government as the paramount power to settle all quarrels and difficulties that from time to time may arise between them, and consider themselves entirely subordinate to it,"[139] and were willing to meet Sandemann at Mastung.[140] These efforts won the approbation of the Viceroy. This "support and sympathy lightened his (Sandemann's) task considerably, and all his negotiations progressed smoothly until they culminated in the crowning success of his (Sande–mann's grand settlement at Mastang."[141] This agreement effected on July 13, 1876 formally reconciled the Khan and his Brahui Sardars.[142] "This document embodying the terms of the agreement may be said to be the Magna Carta of the Brahoe chiefs and people."[143]

But the battle was as yet only half won. A definite treaty had to be arrived at to round off the issue. In accomplishing this Lytton himself played an active part in suggesting guidelines, through his Military Secretary and himself offering to proceed to Jacobabad to sign the treaty.[144] The Khan having accepted the invitation of the Viceroy, arrangements for the meeting were set afoot.[145] Finally, on December 8, 1876 the Treaty of Jacobabad was signed between the Khan of Kalat and the Viceroy.[146]

[135] *Ibid.*, pp. 97–98.
[136] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[137] S.O.S.I. to G.O.I., Dec. 13, 1877 – *For. Pol. A*, Feb. 1878, No. 288.
[138] *Ibid.*
[139] *Ibid.*
[140] Balfour, p. 98.
[141] R. I. Bruce, *The Forward Policy*, (London, 1900). p.63.
[142] *Parlt. Papers*, 1877, LXIV (C–1808), pp. 255–257.
[143] Bruce, p. 64.
[144] *Ibid.*, p. 65; Balfour, pp. 98–100.
[145] *Ibid.*, p. 100; Bruce, p. 65.

The Treaty[147] renewed and supplemented that of 1854. It pledged the British Government to assist the Khan against both internal and external foes. It provided for the presence of the British Agents within the Khan's dominions. It bound the Khan and his Sardars to accept the arbitration of the British Government in any serious dispute between them and made them agree to the stationing of a detachment of British troops in Kalat "in such positions as that Government may deem expedient" as its will. The subsidy of the Khan greatly increased, Freedom of trade between the two states was pledged and contributions were promised for the development of telegraph and railway lines throughout Kalat.[148] The treaty, at the moment was kept secret.[149] The Viceroy addressed the Khan and his Sardars in "explanation of their mutual obligations to each other and to us, under the terms of it."[150] "Both the Khan and his Sirdars appeared to understand every clause of the Treaty thoroughly, and to be equally delighted with it."[151] They accepted the Viceroy't invitation to the Delhi Darbar and started for it soon after.[152]

Thus the Second Mission of Sandemann succeeded in accomplishing the work for which it was sent. Naturally, Sandemann won the appreciation of the Viceroy for "the services rendered to my Government, and to India, by enabling to effect a satisfactory reorganisation of our relations with Khelat."[153] Lytton's happiness at the outcome of the whole transaction found expression even before the treaty was signed. He hoped the terms were bound to "make us virtually the masters of Kalat, not by annexing the country, but by reestablishing the Khan's authority on conditions which secure his allegiance,"[154] besides putting an end to civil war in Kalat and providing "adequate guarantees against its recurrence."[155]

This was finally accomplished by the creation of the Baluchistan Agency, with Quetta as its headquarters, according to the Treaty of Jacobabad, by a resolution of the Government of India on February 21,

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[146] *Ibid.*, p. 66; Balfour, p. 102.
[147] *Parlt Papers*, 1877, LXIV (C–1808), pp. 314–316.
[148] S.O.S.I. to G.O.I., Dec. 13, 1877 – *For. Pol. A.*, Feb. 1878, No. 288.
[149] Lytton to Henry Norman, Dec. 12, 1876 – *Lytton Papers.*
[150] *Ibid.*
[151] *Ibid.*
[152] *Ibid.*
[153] Lytton to Sandemann, Dec. 9, 1876 – *Lytton Papers.*
[154] Lytton to the Queen, Nov. 15. 1876 – *Ibid.*
[155] *Ibid.*

1877.[156] Sandemann was, most appropriately, appointed the first Agent to the Governor–General in Kalat.[157] It was a very significant step in the development of the frontier administration.

Thus this long cherished hope of the adherents of the Forward School was realised with the peaceful[158] occupation of Quetta in March 1877. Besides being the headquarters of the British Agency, it was to be the station of the main British army. A forcc comprising a regi–ment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and a mountain battery was stationed there, while supporting troops were located at Kalat, Dadar and Mithri.[159] It was soon to develop, under the fostering care of R. I. Bruce,[160] as "another Peshawar, but with better and lovelier surroundings."[161] In fact, its significance as a strong military position was great for "any adversary trying to enter India from this direction would first be obliged to besiege and capture Quettah, giving us ample time to prepare for his reception, and then to force the long gorges of the Bolan Pass."[162] It was because of this that the Viceroy came to "look upon our frontier from Multan to the sea as now so well guarded that it leaves almost nothing to be desired."[163]

The Government of India justified the occupation of Quetta as a measure desired by the Khan and his Sardars and the people.[164] Lytton regarded it as indispensable to the success of his policy towards Kalat, "for the Khan could not be adequately supported without it."[165] However, political advantages, on which ground Lord Napier justified its occupation,[166] of the hold on Quetta were not lost sight of, as is clear from what Lytton himself wrote to Sandemann: "I anticipate that Quetta will henceforth be the seat of our most important Intelligence Department in regard to trans–frontier politics; and indeed... the main work of your diplomacy in the Khanate will be to extend our influence quietly, peacefully, but if possible, rapidly from Quetta in the direction of Kandahar."[167] In view of this the occupation of Quetta may well be regarded as "a move in the game which Lord Lytton was playing against Sher Ali."[168]

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[156] S.O.S.I. to G.O.I., Dec. 13, 1877 – *Far. Pol. A,* Feb. 1878, No. 288.
[157] *Ibid.*
[158] Bruce, p. 66.
[159] Prasad, p. 185.
[160] Bruce, pp. 70–71.
[161] Swinson, p. 151.
[162] Lytton to Cranbrook, Aug. 3, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*
[163] *Ibid.*
[164] G.O.I. to S.O.S.I., Jan. 25, 1878 – *For., Sec.*. Feb. 1878, No. 183.
[165] Balfour, p. 169.
[166] Memo. by Lord Napier of Magdala on Occupation of Quetta, May 30, 1878 – *Afghanistan Correspondence*, 1878, pp. 225–226.

These measures, naturally, caused dissatisfaction to Amir Sher Ali.[169] But to Lytton "the propriety of a policy which was intended to rescue, and which actually did rescue, Beloochistan from horrible anarchy, and restore it not only to peace but prosperity, was a matter to be conducted on its own merits without reference to the light in which it might be viewed by Sher Ali."[170] This was, in fact, in accordance with Lytton's idea to make 'the security of the frontier independent of Sher Ali,' in case he did not adequately respond to friendly overtures.[171]

Thus the understanding with the Khan of Kalat served a very useful purpose. On the one hand, it secured the Sindh frontier from the disturbances of feudal anarchy. On the other, it enhanced India's powers of resistance and her capability for offensive in the trans-frontier region in case of need by putting the Bolan Pass in her orbit of influence. The value of the Baluchistan Agency and of the British station at Quetta was proved during the trying period of the Second Afghan War (1878-80) when the Sardars of Baluchistan "behaved most loyally and rendered excellent service to the Government."[172]

Let us now turn to the eastern sector of the northern frontier of India, forming the actual northern frontier. Its extreme point guarded by the Himalaya and reaching upto Tibet did not pose any problem from the point of view of defence, being securely guarded by the mountain wall.[173] As such, Lytton's Government instructed its officers in Kashmir "whilst endeavouring to extend our influence over the petty chiefdoms along the southern slopes of this ridge, to avoid most carefully the least appearance of interfereace with the tribes and races beyond it."[174]

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[167] Lytton to Sandemann, Dec. 9, 1876 – *Lytton Papers*.

[168] H. B. Hanna, *The Second Afghan War*, Vol.I (London, 1899).

[169] Summary of conversation with Nawab Atta Muhammad Khan at Simla, Oct. 7, 1876 – *For. Sec.* May 1877, No. 162; R. C. Sharma, Lord Lytton's Foreign Policy – 1876–1880, Ph.d. Thesis, Agra University, 1975 (Unpublished) Ch. 3.

[170] Balfour, p. 105.

[171] Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For., Sec., Supp.*, Dec. 1878, No. 43.

[172] Bruce, p. 82.

[173] Lytton to Cranbrook, Aug. 3, 1878 – *Lytton Papers*, Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For. Sec. Supp.* Dec. 1878, No. 43.

The real worry of Lytton was the central sector of the frontier, "the boundary from Quetta to Chitral,"[175] wherein he wanted to secure the inner line from the military point of view.[176] This inner line ran through the land of Kafristan, which contained "a small loose group of independent chiefdoms, very weak and destined to be absorbed ere long by one or other of their more powerful neighbours."[177] Among these was the Amir of Kabul, who "greatly coveted"[178] the chiefdoms and their absorption by him would "weaken the security of our frontier by strengthening a frontier state which already commands some of the most important passes of it."[179] Another reason why Lytton wanted to secure control of the chiefdoms in the region was that commanded the external debouches of the frontier and without control of these "our mountain frontier is simply a fortress with no glacis — in other words, a military mousetrap."[180] Moreover, "the absorption of the Mirs of Kafristan by any power holding Kashgar would probably make them appendages of the Russian or the Chinese empire (to one of which it seems probable that Kashgar must eventually belong), thus bringing either of these empires into direct contact with our own."[181] Thus the active frontier policy that Lytton adopted in this region also was a defensive move against Russia. However, it was, at the same time, to be used offensively against Afghanistan as well. This change was due to the changed attitude of the Amir, proved by the failure of the Peshawar Conference;[182] for in the beginning Lytton was not opposed to the Amir's influence in this region and was even prepared to allow the Afghan absorption of Chitral.[183]

Among the Chiefdoms in this region, the two northern-most, namely, Chitral and Yasin, were considered to be the most desirable for control. The reason for this was that they possessed two passes, the Baroghil and the Iskoman, and "if either of these passes be practicable for troops, it would enable an invading force, with a fine base at Yarkand, to reach our frontier (at its weakest point) by a route quicker than any other."[184]

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[174] Lytton to Cranbrook, Aug. 3, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*
[175] *Ibid.*
[176] *Ibid.*, Lytton's Minute, Sept. 4, 1878 – *For. Sec. Supp.*, Dec. 1878, No.43.
[177] *Ibid.*
[178] Lytton to Cranbrook, Aug. 3, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*
[179] *Ibid.*
[180] *Ibid.*
[181] *Ibid.*
[182] For details see Sharma, Ch.3.
[183] Lytton to Salisbury, May 2, 1876 – *Lytton Papers.*

Here, however, Lytton did not act directly, but through the Maharaja of Kashmir. But it cannot be said that the Viceroy was acting through a 'proxy champion' regarding the northern frontier as of 'secondary importance,'[185] for as we have explained in the preceding paragraph, to Lytton this region was very important. To the question why the Indian Government did not act directly, Lytton answered that "the British public has vetoed annexation,"[186] "and so long as we can prevent them (the chiefdoms) from being annexed by Kabul or the future Kashgar power, it would certainly not be worth our own while to annex these poor and barren territories."[187] Moreover, his predecessor, Northbrook, had strongly recommended the extension of Kashmir's control over Chitral and Yasin upto the southern side of the passes.[188]

Till May 1876 Lytton believed that the extention of Kashmir's influence over Yasin should be postponed until the result of the Afghan negotiations was known.[189] However, by July he was convinced that it would be needed in any case, because in view of the absorption of Kokand by Russia "it would be suicidal, in our present uncertain and menaced position, to leave to the mercy of chance, in the hands of any weak chief surrounded by powerful and aggressive neighbours, that strip of territory containing the Baroghil and Iskoman passes."[190] Therefore 'he decided to support Kashmir, in case of need, to occupy Chitral and Yasin and secure the passes and in return to obtain a permanent Resident in Kashmir and an Agent at Gilgit.[191] In November 1876, he advised the Maharaja, at Madhopur, to enter into treaty relations with these neighbouring chiefs with a view to obtaining their negotiation of his suzerainty in return for a small subsidy" without the use of force.[192] At the same time "support and assistance"[193] was promised him "in the event of his action over involving him in military operations."[194] The Maharaja eagerly accepted this because "if there be one thing more than another which every Indian Prince is ambitious of, it is extension of territory or rule."[195] But he 'kicked long and strenuously' against the appointment of a British Agent of Gilgit.[196] Probably, he was afraid of the sort of high-handed interference in the domestic matters "like what was done by Dr. Cayley at Ladakh,"[197] and at one stage the negotiations appeared to break-down over this issue. However, Lytton could get his policy through by dropping the plan to keep the British Resident in Kashmir throughout the year, and by assuring in writing that Gilgit Agent would not interfere in domestic affairs of Kashmir.[198]

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[184] Lytton to Cranbrook, April 9, 1878 – *Ibid.*

[185] G.J.Alder, *British India's Northern Frontier* 1865–95 (London,1963) p.315.

[186] Lytton to Cranbrook, April 9, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*

[187] *Ibid.*

[188] Lytton to Egerton, Dec. 2, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*

[189] Lytton to Salisbury, May 29, 1876 – *Ibid.*

[190] Lytton to Salisbury, July 15, 1876, - *Ibid.*

[191] Lytton to Salisbury, July 22, 1876 – *Ibid.*

The accomplishment of this work became easy because Amanul Mulk, the Mehtar of Chitral, being afraid of Sher Ali, had approached the Maharaja of Kashmir with the request that he was prepared to accept the suzerainty of Kashmir, along with his relative, the Chief of Dir, and Raja Pahlwan, the ruler of Yasin and Mastung.[199] In fact, in early 1877, while Sher Ali's representative was negotiating at Peshawar, the Amir had asked the tribal chiefs of the region to come under his influence and all the chiefs, except the Mehtar of Chitral, had agreed.[200] Thus left isolated Amanul Mulk, finding himself unable to resist the pressure of the Kabul Agent, then on his way to Chitral, sought the help of Kashmir.[201]

The Maharaja consulted the Government of India, which on the one hand, warned the Amir to keep clear of Bajaur, Dir, Swat and

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[192] Lytton to Cranbrook, April 9, 1878 – *Ibid.*

[193] *Ibid.*

[194] Note on relations between Kashmir and Chitral – *For. Sec.*, March 1878, Nos. 247–253.

[195] Lytton to Cranbrook, April 9, 1878 – *Lytton Papers.*

[196] Alder, p. 118.

[197] Maharaja to Lytton, Nov. 26, 1876 – *Lytton Papers.*

[198] All this was deliberately hushed up. Balfour, pp. 184–88; *Cf.* Lytton tc tha Queen, Dec. 23, 1876 – B. Balfour, *Personal and Literary Letters of Robert, Firsi Earl of Lytton*, Vol. II (London, 1906) p. 46.

[199] Lytton to S.O.S.I., June ll, 1877 – *Lytton Papers.*

[200] *For. Pol. Proceedings*, March 1877.

[201] Henderson to G.O.I., March 28, 1877 – *Ibid.*

Chitral,[202] and, on the other, hastily organised an intelligence system from Peshawar, through which British secret agents were filtered into this region to report on the situation.[203] The Maharaja, at the same time authorised to instruct the Chief of Chitral to resist the claims of Kabul, and to furnish him with the means of doing so relying, if necessary, on British support.[204] However, Amanul Mulk could not be led to sign a treaty with the Maharaja of Kashmlr before 1878, although representatives of Chitral and Yasmin were taken to the Delhi Darbar to be impressed by the resources of British India and to be acquainted with the British Government's agreement with Kashmir.[205] Eventually, at the end of 1878 a treaty[206] was signed between the Mir of Chitral and the Maharaja of Kashmir and the next year Chitral envoy visited Kashmir to confirm it.[207]

Amanul Mulk, however, could not be contained within the influence of Kashmir and maintained his relations with the Amir of Kabul, as is clear from the reports of the British Agent at Gilgit during the Second Afghan War.[208] Lytton, realising the weakness of Kashmir, had to resort to negotiations with the tribes to bring under his influence Bajaur, Dir and Swat, as pointed out earlier.

A word may now be added about the remaining part of the 1876 agreement between Lytton and Maharaja of Kashmir, that concerning the British Agency at Gilgit. At the end of 1877 its charge was assumed by Biddulph as Officer on Special Duty, to "watch the frontier at that point."[209] But his main work was "to furnish reliable intelligence of the progress of events beyond Kashmir frontier . . . and ... in consultation with the Kashmir authorities, to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes beyond the border in view to bringing them gradually under control and influence of Kashmir."[210] This makes it clear that the purpose of the Gilgit Agency was political. In spite of his efforts, however this Agency could not serve its purpose well as is clear from

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[202] G.O.I. to Pollock, March 30, 1877 – *Ibid*.

[203] Lytton to Egerton, April 10, 1877 – *Lytton Papers*.

[204] Lytton to Henderson, March 29, 1877 – *Ibid*.

[205] Lytton to Beaconsfield, Oct. 3, 1876 – *Ibid*.

[206] For the text see Alder, p. 329.

[207] *Ibid*., p.122.

[208] Biddulph's Memo. on the condition of Affairs in Gilgit and Gilgit Diary, April 3, 1879 – *Ibid*., 123.

[209] Lytton to Cranbrook, April 9, 1878 – *Lytton Papcrs*.

[210] A.N. Wollaston, Memo, on Chitral, Pt. I – Alder, p.119.

Lytton's remark towards the end of his Viceroyalty that he was "not cognizant of any practical advantage yet obtained by Major Biddulph's residence at Gilgit."[211] This should not be surprising in view of Lytton's decision, in Dccember 1879, to give up his policy in this region and to adopt a new drastic one proposing the Maharaja of Kashmir to be relieved to his role in securing that part of the frontier and withdrawl of the Gilgit Agency.[212] Kashmir's double dealing unearthed at Kabul by Roberts,[213] hostility of the Maharaja to Biddulph's appointment, inaccessibility of Gilgit both from the British territory direct and along the route from Kashmir, gross maladministration and strategical weakness[214] had been responsible for that.

Thus Lytton adopted an active frontier policy. It was devised, on the one hand, as a necessary defensive move against Russia. But, at the same time, it was worked out as a base for offensive against Afghanistan. In this way securing the frontier, he prepared himself for the final move of winning over the Amir of Afghanistan through friendship, if possible, or overpowering him through coercion so that he (the Amir) might not fall under the influence of Russia.

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[211] Lytton to Roberts, March 20, 21, 1880 – *Lytton Papers*.
[212] Lytton to Egerton, Dec. 2, 1879 – *Ibid.*
[213] Lytton to Cranbrook, Feb. 7, 1879 – *Ibid*.
[214] Alder, pp. 129–137.

The Problems of the Indian Immigrants to Mauritius, 1834–1878

BY

PRAVINA BHIM SAIN

The migration of Indian labour to Mauritius was the result of various factors. The economic distress prevailing in areas which today constitute the Eastern Districts of U. P., the Western Districts of Bihar and partly Orissa, was one of the important factors which helped the European planters to induce the Indians to go to British Colonies like Mauritius to work as plantation labour to replace the Negro slaves after the abolition of slavery in 1833. The Indians too were tempted to take advantage of this offer as they thought that this would provide them an opportunity for better living and the first Indian migration to Mauritius began in 1834. In this paper an attempt has been made to analyse the socio–economic problems faced by the people of Indian origin in Mauritius between 1834 and 1878.

It may be noted that Indians were induced to go to Mauritius because European planters considered the Indian labourers suitable for their purpose owing to their agricultural background through generations, and their capacity to do hard work. At the same time they were forced to depend on this labour since after the abolition of slavery they were confronted with financial ruin. It is interesting to note that Trinidad and British Guiana (now Guyana) had made attempts to tap other sources of labour such as an intermigration within the islands, importation of Europeans and immigration of Portuguese from Madeira.[1] While the immigration of whites was unsuccessful, inter–island migration was checked by the British Government by an Order-in-Council of July 30, 1839.[2] Then schemes were mooted out for buying slaves from the West Coast of Africa and transporting them to the free life of the West Indies, but the

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[1] *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. II, (Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 508.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 509.

Colonial office turned a deaf ear[3] for fear of a revival of the slave, trade. Hence these attempts having failed to solve the labour probleme of the planters, they had to look towards a more feasible source — the sub-continent of India.

The social and economic conditions prevailing in India were such that made life especially for the rural folk difficult and oppressive for a variety of reasons. The dawn of the Industrial Revolution in the West sounded the death knell of India's cottage industries. Agriculture could provide no relief to those thus rendered unemployed, as it was subject to various limitations like the uncertainty in weather conditions, the oppressive system of landlordism, the wrath of the money lenders, unprogressive methods of agriculture and a defective land tenure system. Besides, various social customs like elaborate marriage celebrations and other festivals, the ignorance and conservatism of the people ruined the already poverty-stricken people. Along with these, a rapidly increasing population created a labour surplus available and ready for export to the colonies to be used as labour for plantation capital and thus be converted into an economic resource.

Under these existing unfavourable circumstances at home many prospective immigrants were attracted towards Mauritius as the terms and conditions offered to them for work spelt promises of social and economic upliftment. They were to work for a period of five years on a sugar plantation and were to be paid Rs. 5/- in addition to liberal rations, clothing and living quarters. Their passage to and from India was also to be paid.[4]

Between 1834 and 1837 nearly 7000 persons left Calcutta for Mauritius. Challenges and problems are incidental to any significant transportation of people from one country to another and it turned out that in spite of rosy promises made to the immigrants before they left India, the manner in which they were transported was most unsatisfactory. In the initial stage very little supervision or control was exercised by the Government over immigration and the planters failed to provide proper facilities on the ships as reported by Woodcock,a member of the Bengal Civil Service in 1836 when he wrote that "the lower decks were stowed with rice and the coolies were disposed off in the waiste between the gangway and the forecastle, unprotected from the weather."[5] On this point immigration was suspended in 1836, although it did not come into effect as between 1836–38; 22,015 men, 716 women, 130 boys and 62 girls were sent from the three Presidencies of India.[6] This alarmed the planters as they foresaw another financial crisis and they readily accepted any legislation passed for the welfare of immigrants. Thus Government Act V of 1837 laid down rules for the food and medical supplies on board immigrant ships, and regular inspection of such amenities and not more than one person for every 1½ tonnage was to be carried.[7]

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[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Cumpston, I. M., *Indians Overseas in British Territories*, 1834–54. Oxford University Press: London, 1953, p. 12.

However the whole problem of immigration was questioned in Parliament in 1837 and denounced by the Anti–slavery Society.[8] Consequently the Calcutta Committee was appointed in 1838 to make enquiries into the treatment of emigrants during their voyage. In 1840 the report of this Committee was given and it spoke of insufficient space on coolie ships and ill–treatment. Again alarmed, the planters accepted strict supervision of ships and ships supplies laid down by Act XV of 1842. It also provided for the appointment of a responsible emigration agent in India and rules for the welfare of immigrants on board.[9] In–spite of these precautions the same problem reappeared in 1856 when there were outbreaks of cholera on the "Hyderee" and "Fateh Mobarik" owing to neglect of cleanliness, quarantine and other amenities.[10] Therefore in 1856 immigration was again suspended[11] throwing the planters for a third time in dilemma. The Government of India only agreed to lift the ban under the assurance that full precautions would in future be taken. Dr. Mant's proposals concerning food and water, extra milk for infants, capable doctors, an improved system of records and larger ships with proper ventilation were accepted and approved by the Government of India, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Emigration Board.[12]

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[5] Parliamentary Papers, 1875, XXXIV. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Conditions of Indians in Mauritius, p. 32.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[7] Parliamentary Peper, 1874, XLVII. Geoghegan Report on Emigration from India, pp. 433–34.

[8] Parliamentary Paper, 1910, XXVII. Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, p. 2.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[10] Colonial Office Record. Mauritius C.O. 167/395, Stevenson to Labauchere 41, 21 Feb. 1857 – Enclosure Clerihew Chief Medical Officer to Colonial Secretary. Report of Cholera Committee, 1856.

[11] Parliamentary Paper, 1859 Vol. XXI. Copy of Despatches from Governor Higginson to Right Honourable H. Higginson Relating to the causes that led to the suspension of Immigration.

Thus by 1857 many problems of transportation had been remedied but on reaching Mauritius the early batches of immigrants were faced with other problems as they were required to settle in political, social and economic conditions different from what they were accustomed to at home. Politically Mauritius was a Crown Colony, i.e., the right of making laws was vested with the Crown and concentration of power was in the hands of the Governor and strict control was exercised over him from a newly established Colonial Department in London. The society of Mauritius comprised of a French Aristocracy, British Planters, descendents of Negro slaves, some Chinese and Indians settled there as shopkeepers and traders prior to 1834. The island's economy depended largely on the production of sugar. It was in this social, economic and political set up that the Indians had not only to adjust themselves but also be accommodated in the best manner. It meant the uprooting of a socio-cultural group from an established surroundings and replanting it in a foreign land with its own predetermined conditions.

At first the labourers were well treated and appeared happy and content as the hours of work were well regulated with hours for meals.[13] But after some time the Planters began to exploit and ill-treat their labourers thus provoking the Anti-slavery Society rightly to point out that it was just another form of slavery.[14] Thus in 1838 the Calcutta Committee, appointed to enquire into the treatment of Indians during their voyage was also assigned to ascertain the treatment of Indians in Mauritius. Its report stated that Indian labourers in Port Louis were "severely punished."[15] Chief Justice Anderson also spoke of the filthy and confined lodgings.[16] Hence the reason for the suspension of immigration in 1836, 1839 and 1856 respectively was not only owing to defective transportation but also the ill-treatment of Indians after they reached

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[12] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report of the Royal Commission, p.76.

[13] Parliamentary Paper, 1874, XLVII. Under Secretary to Government of India Department of Agriculture, Revenue and Commerce - Geoghegan Report on Emigration from India, p. 432.

[14] Parliamentary Paper, 1910. Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, p. 2.

[15] Cumpston, I.M. "Indians Overseas in British Territories, 1834–1854". Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 26.

[16] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of Indian Immigrants in Mauritius, p. 39.

Mauritius. On each occasion the Government of India agreed to re-open immigration only under revised conditions. The outcome was Government Act V of 1837 specified that all immigrants must be given a clear idea about the terms and conditions of contract and that they were not to be transferred as chattels from one employer to another.[17] Act XV of 1842 provided for the appointment of a Protector of Immigrants in Mauritius.[18] These measures had a favourable effect on the social and economic life of the Indians. Reports were given of the generally fair treatment of Indians in Mauritius by Sir Lionel Smith and Lord Fitzgibbon of the India Board.[19] A picture of the socio-economic life was also drawn by Governor Higginson in 1851 when he wrote, "I saw the Indian Immigrants in the fields working steadily and with goodwill and when at rest, cheerful and contented in their camps."[20] On the basis of these reports and the measures adopted to improve the system of immigration, immigration to Mauritius was reopened in 1857. Thus by 1857 immigration of Indian labour to Mauritius was systematized and regulated by means of various ordinances to regulate the traffic, to establish suitable conditions for transporting labourers from India and to secure their social and economic well being in the Colony.

The reopening of immigration caused an increase in the flow of immigrants to Mauritius. Among other factors responsible for this increase were a general enhancement in the prosperity of the planters owing to a great extent to the industry of the Indians, and also to the outbreak of the revolt of 1857 in India, which caused an outpouring of Indians into the Colonies, Mauritius receiving the largest share. Many Indians wishing to escape in one way or another from the general disturbances and also wishing to avoid a compulsory trip to Port Blair in the Andemans where criminals were deported from India, preferred to cross the "Kala Pani" to Mauritius.[21] It is said that the largest number of immigrants that ever sailed from Calcutta was in 1858 immediately after the revolt, numbering 29,949.[22]

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[17] Parliamentary Paper, 1874, XLVII. Geoghegan Report on Emigration from India, pp. 433-34.

[18] Parliamentary Paper, 1910, XXVII. Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, p. 3.

[19] Cumpston, I.M., *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[20] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report of the Royal Commission appointed to Enquire into the Conditions of Indian Immigrants in Mauritius, p. 76.

[21] Parliamentary Paper, 1874, XLVIII. Geoghegan Reporr on Emigration from India, p. 495.

This increase of the Indian population in Mauritius created socio-economic problems having wider dimensions and of a more intense nature; thus affecting at every stage the socio-economic life of the Indians especially as they began gradually to settle there. The rosy promises of good wages, free rations, clothing and adequate housing were not always kept and nor were the various legislations and ordinances always followed. One of the commonest complaints of the labourers was non-payment of wages. This resulted in great hardship and frustration. Many who were desirous to return to India could neither do so nor could they remit any money to their relatives at home. They were compelled so borrow from the Sirdars and thus became indebted to them. Ordinance 16 of 1862 partially remedied this evil.[23] Later on Government Notice No. 166 of 11 Dec. 1868, Article 13 provided that wages were to be paid monthly.[24]

In the social sphere the status of the Indian labourers was one which could be compared to the slaves as physical ill-treatment like beating was prevalent. In the sugar estate owned by Staub, for instance, the labourers were weak and emaciated owing to insufficient rations.[25]

Over work was another feature and failure to perform the allotted task resulted in imprisonment in highly sub-standard prisons or withdrawal of rations. Corveé or forced Sunday labour though forbidden by Ordinance 17 of 1841 was still practised.[26] Although in 1863 Governor Johnston made attempts to put an end to this practice, it still continued because his successor Governor Barkley declared that it was not a very serious problem.[27]

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[22] Parliamentary Paper, 1910, XXVII. Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to ths Crown Colonies and Protectorates, p. 10.

[23] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report of the Royal Dommission of Inquiry into the conditions of Indians in Mauritius, p. 297. Also Colonial Office Record Mauritius C.O. 167/439, Stevenson to New Castle, No.81, May 1, 1862. *Enclosure* Protector of Immigrants to Bedingfield. 5 Jan. 1862. Also Records of Private and Public Life of Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon (Lord Stanmore) 1871-1874, Vol. I. Daly to Gorden, 26 July 1871 p. 170.

[24] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report of the Royal Commission, p, 427.

[25] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report of the Royal Commission, p. 427.

[26] Colonial Office Record. Mauritips C.O. 167/453, Johnston to New Castle, No. 243, 6 Nov. 1863. *Enclosure*. Ordinance 17 of 1841.

Hospitals were in a deplorable state often comprising of "empty neglected buildings."[28] The labourers often complained of refusal of medical care, the planters being careless and desirous of avoiding expenditure. They also found an excuse for not providing a hospital on the ground that very often Indian labourers hesitated in visiting the doctor. The worst was that before an inspection the doctor would fill up the register with fictitious names to "regularize" the books.[29]

Similarly Ordinances 40 and 6 of 1844 and 1845 respectively designed to provide "sufficient and wholesome dwellings" for the labourers were totally ignored. Lodgings were very poor and utterly devoid of ventilation. They consisted of dry, low walls 4–5 ft. in height or of miserable palisade composed of aloe stalks, the roof in either case being of thatch, resembling a lock up rather than a human habitation.[30]

The effect of all this was obvious. The labourers became oppressed, discontented and unhealthy. Many of them would leave their employers and become "vagrants", "deserters" and "absentees"[31] creating a social problem in the island. They even began to indulge in robbing, manufacture of illicit liquor, resorted to sheer idleness and soon lost their identity. What else could be expected when the so-called "Protector of Immigrants" had failed to perform his duties and the Magistrates themselves had planting interests.

Thus we find that the internal condition of the Colony was far from satisfactory. It was unhealthy, because of inadequate sanitary conditions and the presence of malaria and pollution of the water supply. Governor Barkley was much blamed for this state of affairs as he had planting interests.[32] The condition of the Indians was even described as "wretched". Sir Arthur Gordon was the first Governor to reveal to the Colonial Office these miserable conditions of the old and new immigrants,[33] and he sincerely wished to remedy them. He made private investigations and found them to be an oppressed class, subject to injustice in courts with no one to listen to their tales of woe. Punishments were even given at the written requests of the masters. Gordon even found that the inspections and reports of magistrates had been most insufficient. The police were corrupt and ready to serve the planting interest.[34] The Protector and Magistrates had hardly done their duty of Protection and Inspection.

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[27] Colonial Office Record. Mauritius C.O. 167/473 Murdoch to Rogers, India Board, 4 June, 1884.

[28] Records of Public and Private Life of Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon (Lord Stanmore) Vol. I., p. 235. Also Colonial Record, C. O. 167/535 Gordon to Kimberley, No. 138, 21 Sept. 1875.

[29] Records of Public and Private Life of Sir Arthur Hamilton Gorden (Lord Stanmore) Vol. I. Daly to Gordon. 19 Dec. 1871 on Inspection of Estates, p. 361.

[30] Colonial Office Records, C. O. 167/535, Gordon to Kimberley, 138. 21 Sept. 1871. Also Lord Stanmore, Vol I, p. 235.

[31] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report on the Royal Commission, pp. 329–330.

Ordinance 16 of 1862 was passed to extend engagements to five years and to produce steadiness and settled habits in the Indians and diminish vagabondage.[35] However, it proved to be one of the most oppressive legislations passed. For instance Article 17 did not call upon the employers to produce their accounts and records.[36]

Gordon wished to carry out the necessary reforms himself to redress the grievances of the Indians. But this was an uphill task as any such step would surely antagonize the planters who always thought that no one was better than themselves and that all the fault lay with the Indian labourers.[37]

Things however soon came to a head when some old immigrants of the island, tired of the rigidity of Ordinance 31 of 1867 which was described as an ordinance suited to a military administration of a conquered people of an ungovernable character,[38] sent a petition to Gordon.

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[32] Chapman, J. K., *The Career of Sir Arthur Gordon*, (University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 105.

[33] C. O. 171/150. The Mauritius Government Gazette, Tuesday 10 Sept. 1878. Ordinance 18 of 1872.

[34] Stanmore, Vol. I. Records of Private and Public Life of Sir Arthur Hamilton Gorden (Lord Stanmore) 1871–74.

[35] C. O. 167/439 Stevenson to New Castle, 81, 1 May 1862. Encl: Report of Procurer General Dickson on Ord. 16/6862.

[36] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report of Royal Commisstoner p. 186.

[37] Lord Stanmore, Vol. I, Herbert to Gordon, 21 Dec. 1871, p. 398.

[38] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, LIII. Correspondence relating to Royal Commiision of Inquiry into the conditions of Indian Immigrants in Mauritius. Carnarvan to Phayre, 11 March 1875, p. 221. Also Colonial Office Records. Mauritius C. O. 167/536 Gordon to Kimberley, 197, 17 Nov. 1871 – *Enclosure* Petition.

In it they stated the general treatment they had received since the time they were recruited in India till the expiry of their term of contract. The whole system, was denounced as unjust. The oppressiveness of the Police, the Ticket System, the neglect by the Protector of Immigrants of his duties and the injustice of the Magistrates were vigorously condemned, while the Indians were said to have been put almost outside the pale of humanity,[39] virtually devoid of freedom, and used only for the material prosperity of the Planters.

Reform thus became an urgency and could only be accomplished by an unbiased authority. Thus in 1872 a Royal Commission was appointed by the Crown and certain powers were conferred upon the Commissioners by Ordinance 11 of 1872.[40] The Commission made a thorough investigation and left no aspect of the social and economic life of the Indians untouched, the minutest details being recorded. They examined all those responsible in one way or another with immigration, i.e., the Protector, Magistrates, Planters and Managers, the Police force, medical men, a few Indian labourers and even the Governor.[41]

Ordinance 31 of 1867 passed by Governor Barkley was severely criticised for its oppressive clauses.[42] It stated that vagrancy was prevalent not only among Indians but among other classes as well. The ticket and pass system were condemned as causing unnecessary harrassment to Indians, as they were being constantly checked for possessing the ticket and could be arrested as vagrants if found without it.

The Police already criticised were described by the Commission as loafers and untrained, uneducated drunkards. Prisons dwelling, hospitals, and estates were discredited and severely criticised as being in a shocking state. Morally and physically the Indians were described as being better than their counterparts in India but they were by no means robust or well–fed.

[39] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, LIII. Procurer General's (Colin) Report on Ord. 11 of 1872, p. 214.

[40] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, LIII. Correspondence Relating to the Royal Commission of inquiry into the conditions of Indian Immigrants of Mauritius – Procurer General's (Colin) Report on Ordinance 11 of 1872, p. 214.

[41] Parliamentary Paper,1875, LIII. Correspondence Relating to the Royal Commirsion of Inquiry into the Conditions of Indian Immigrants in Mauritius – Procurer General's (Colin) Report on Ordinance 11 of 1872, p. 214.

[42] Parliamentary Paper, 1875, XXXIV. Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Treatment of Indians in Mauritius, p. 135. Also Lord Stanmore, Vol. I, pp. 176–178.

This study shows that the Indian immigrants were allowed to go to Mauritius by the needy European planters who wanted to take advantage of their agricultural background and willingness to go owing to their economic distress. The life of the Indians was of suffering as well as gains. The major problems were the sufferings faced during transportation to Mauritius, insanitary conditions in which they were kept by the greedy planters, poor food and more work extracted by them —all these resulted in social and economic mal-adjustments. However, many of the Indians adjusted to the life to make use of this opportunity for settling in the colony. In due course of time they were able to accumulate wealth and even became small planters. Thus their economic conditions were better than their counterparts in India and it can be said that immigration, to a great extent, fulfilled the purposes for which it was begun.

The Himalayan Frontier during the British rule in India: A Case Study of the Bhutanese Frontier*

BY

KAPILESHWAR LABH

In November 1959 the Historical Division of external Ministry of India published a note on the historical background of the Himalayan frontier. It read:

> India's northern frontier has been lain where it runs for nearly three thousand years. The areas along this frontier which is nearly 2,500 miles along from the Kuenlun mountains in the far north to the junction with Burma in the east, have always been a part of India.[1]

If we trace the history of the northern frontier of India to a remote past, we may find out that the southern slope of the Himalayas was within the geographical limits of India.[2] But the existing frontiers of India are, by and large, a heritage from British rule in India. Today there are, besides India, the sovereign states of Nepal and Bhutan which are situated on the southern side of the Himalayas. This is so because there was a deliberate policy of the British authorities in India to maintain the Himalayan kingdoms as buffers between India and China. Similarly, our frontier dispute with China is to a largo extent attributable to our colonial legacy. If the British rulers in India had reached an explicit understanding with China regarding the Himalaya frontier, possibly our current relations with China would not have been bedevilled over the frontier issue. In this paper an attempt has been made to study British policy towards the Himalaya frontier in general and the Bhutanese frontier in particular.

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* There is a difference between the frontier and the boundary or border. While the Frontier signifies a zone, a boundary usually indicated as a line on a map, represents the edge of the zone. In this paper I have used both the terms since both are related and knowledge of one is necessary to understand the other.

[1] *White Faper No.* 2 (Notes, Memoranda And Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China), 1959, Appendix I, p. 125.

[2] S. C. Bajpai wrote, "Ever sine the dawn of human history in Asia, India, its subcontinent, had a well-known geographical frontier. The land south of the high snow-clad peaks of the Himalayas was within its geographical limits." See S.C. Bajpai, *The Northern Frontier of India: Central and Western Sector*, (Bombay, 1970), p. 143.

Search for buffer-states between India and Tibet

The policy of the East India Company towards the Himalayan frontier did not aim at a reckless expansion. It was based on its commercial and strategic considerations. In the initial phase of relations with the Himalayan kingdoms, it was the Company's concern for trade which primarily influenced its policy. As early as 1772 when the Company fought war against Bhutan as a protector of Cooch Behar, and captured the Bhutanese forts of Daling, Chichacotta and Buxa, Warren Hastings decided to treat the Bhutanese "with much leniency and forbearance" with a view to promoting the Company's trans-Himalayan trade, and he restored the territories which belonged to Bhutan before the commencement of the war with Cooch Behar.[3] Moreover, towards the end of the eighteenth century, China appeared to be in the ascendant in the Himalayan kingdoms. Hence the Company authorities in India were not prepared to be embroiled in any dispute with the Chinese over the frontier question when the Company needed their goodwill for promotion of its trade and was engaged in French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Chinese influence in the Himalayan States had increased in the wake of Sino-Nepalese war of 1789-92. Nepal sufferad defeats and concluded a humiliating agreement with China on September 30, 1792. According to the terms of this agreement, Nepal undertook to submit her disputes with Tibet to the Amban at Lhasa for settlement; she agreed to send a mission to Peking every five years with gifts for the Chinese Emperor. China in return agreed to come to Nepal's assistance in the event of an attack by a foreign power.[4] The Sino-Nepalese war had strong impact not only on the Himalayan kingdoms but also on the Company's policy. The authorities at Fort William realised that China treated Nepal as her vassal state and that any interference from the Company in the affairs of Nepal would have an unfortunate effect on their commercial relations with the Chinese government. This was one of the reasons why Nepal was not absorbed into the British Indian empire. A very favourable opportunity for the Company authorities in India to bring Nepal under their control presented itself in 1800–1801 when Nepal was badly involved in her internal political crisis. Rana Bahadur Shah was forced to retire to Banaras in May 1800 because of his conflict with the Nepalese Durbar. But even so ardent an expansionist as Lord Wellesley did not think it expendient to interfere in Nepalese affairs because of China's possible reactions. He thought that the "transactions" which had passed between China and Nepal in the year 1791–92 "had placed the Dominions of Nepal in a state of partial dependence on the Government of China."[5] He considered it necessary to observe a considerable degree of caution in dealing with Nepal in view of "the interest of the Honourable Company in China." Nepal was considered tributory to China, and Sikkim and Bhutan being tributory to Tibet, were also regarded as subject to Chinese overlordship."[6] Besides, there were other reasons why the Himalayan countries were not incorporated into India. The economic potentiality of these countries minus Nepal's Tarai and Bhutan's Duars was then negligible and the administration of these countries would not have been easy because of lack of communication and difficult terrain. That is why the British authorities in India did not annex the Himalayan kingdoms. They thought that these kingdoms would serve their interest more as buffer states between India and Tibet than as a part of their Indian dominion. However, the security consideration of their Indian empire led the British authorities in India to extend their dominion to the natural frontier of India.

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[3] Clements R. Markham (ed.), *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet and the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa* (London. 1879), edn. 2, p. xviii.

[4] Leo E. Rose, *Nepal: Strategy for Survival*, (Berkeley, 1971), pp.64-65.

Quest for the Natural Frontier

Although Lord Hastings wrote to the Secret Committee, on 2 August 1815, that "the war with the Goorkhas was unavoidable, and forced upon this Government by series of unjust and unprovoked aggressions"[7] he was in fact influenced by strategic and economic considerations in launching hostilities against Nepal. As the northern frontier of the Company's territory was then in exposed situation with no natural barrier, Lord Hastings desired to extend the Company's frontier to the hills by annexing "all the low lands from the Kali eastward to the Teesta, rendering either the foot or the ridge of the lowest range of hills the common boundary throughout the line." Besides, he was actuated by the economic potentialities of Kumaon, Garhwal and Tarai areas. In addition to revenue of these areas, he expected to open up communication with Tibet through Kumaon which provided "the easiest road across the snowy range of mountains into Chinese Tartary" and promised "a most encouraging prospect of improved commercial resources."[8]

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[5] Minute by Lord Wellesley, For. Dept., See Progs., 30 June, 1802, pp.6372–84.

[6] P. R. Rao, *India and Sikkim* 1814–1970 (New Delhi, 1972), pp. 40–41.

[7] Secret Letter from Lord Moira to Secret Committee, Augst 2, 1815. *Nepaul War*, 1824, pp. 762–63.

While the British were engaged in hostilities with Nepal, they adopted conciliatory policy towards other Himalayan countries. Soon after the commencement of the war, they decided to establish contacts with the authorities of Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan in order to explain the causes of war, and to clarify to them that the British did not aim at aggrandizement in that quarter.[9] In a letter dated 3 August, 1816 the British Governor-General explained to the Chinese Amban of Lhasa. He wrote:

> The British Government has no views of aggrandizement and only seeks to remain at peace with other states, and no motives of ambition and interest prompt it to extend its influence and authority beyond those barriers which appear to have been placed by nature between the vast countries of India and China.[10]

Subsequent to the Nepal war the Company authorities in India became preoccupied with the Maratha War, the Pindari War and other problems relating to the consolidation of acquired territories. In due course they, however, took possession of such Bhutanese and Sikkimese territories as they considered valuable economically and strategically.

The annexation of Assam in the first Burmese war of 1825-26 resulted in the extension of common frontier between Bhutan and the Company's territories in India. Since then frequent disputes took place between the Bhutanese and the Company authorities on the issue of the tribute due from the Bhutanese in return for their possession of what were known as the Duars (literally doors) were strips of land through which access was gained to various passes leading into the hills. They were eighteen in number, eleven of them were situated along the northern border of Bengal, between the Tista and Manas, and were called the Bengal Duars. The remaining seven were on the northern border of the districts of Kamrup and Darrang, between the Manas and Dhansiri, and were called Assam Duars.[11]

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[8] *Ibid.*, Letter dated 1 June, 1815, pp. 864-66,

[9] Banarsi Prasad Saksena, (ed), *Historical Papers Relating to Kumaon* 1809-1842. State Record Series Selection no. 3, (Allahabad, 1966), pp. 25-26.

[10] To the Chinese Umbah (Amban) of Lhasa, For. Dept., Sec, Progs. 3 August 1816, pp. 4540-43.

In 1837 the British Government of India sent Capt. Pemberton to Punakha to settle differences with Bhutan, but his mission failed. In 1841 the Company annexed Assam Duars.

In 1835 Sikkim ceded Darjeeling to the Company as a "gift". In 1849 the Company annexed from Sikkim Morung and other fertile areas measuring 640 sq. miles.

In 1864 Sir John Lawrence, known for his "masterly inactivity", launched the offensive against Bhutan to avenge the ill-treatment meted out to Ashley Eden at Punakha. Although he turned down the request of the tea-planters for annexing the whole of Bhutan, he resolved "upon administrative and military considerations" to secure the effectual control of the Bhutanese Duars from Dewangiri in the east to Dalimkote in the west.[12] In annexing the Bhutanese Duars the British authorities in India, however, were influenced by two factors. First, the Duars had valuable and fertile lands. Secondly, the Company took possession of the Duars to ensure the security of its terrirory. To guard the plains with the help of regular troops would have been not only costly but also difficult on account of the extremely bad climate in the area.

Boundary between India and Bhutan

During the war in 1865 the British Government of India invited the opinions of three of its Commissioners, General Tytler, Colonel Bruce and Colonel Agnew. The three had stated on 5 October 1865 in a joint memorandum:

> We would recommend that the boundary line be drawn so as to include within British territory the mountain tract which lies

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[11] *Political Missions to Bhutan* : *The Raport of Ashley Eden* (Calcutta, 1865) pp. 7–8.

[12] For. Dept., Pol. A. December 1764, no. 6 (1–30).

> between the Rivers Teesta and Jhaldaka, and extends northward as far as the frontiers of Sikkim and Tibet. We are of opinion that, besides this, no part of the hill territory of Bhutan should be annexed, except so much as is requisite for the establishment of our military frontier posts.[13]

The British Government of India agreed to this boundary in its letter dated 8 November 1865, with the proviso that sufficient post should be included at Baxa and Dewangiri. Article 2 of the Treaty of 1865 contained the following provision:

> It is hereby agreed that the whole of the tract known as the 18 Dooars bordering on the districts of Rungpur, Cooch Behar and Assam, together with the talook of Ambaree Falacottah and the hill country on the left bank of the Teesta upto such points as may be laid down by the British Commissioner appointed for the purpose, is ceded by the Bhutan Government to the British Government for ever.[14]

The work of surveying the boundary was taken up in 1867–68. The boundary between Bhutan and Jalpaiguri was laid down by J. H. O'Donel of the Revenue Survey Department, under instructions from Colonel Haughton, who was then chief civil and political officer of the Division. In his letter dated 1867 to O'Donel, Colonel Haughton listed the following as the considerations to be kept in view while carrying out this work: (i) A strict adherence to the spirit of Government instruction not to include any territory that could be called a hill tract; (ii) the obtainment of clear and easily recognizable lines (iii) the inclusion of all lands in the plains so far as practicable; (iv) the inclusion of all Mech, the tribal people of Duars, and the exclusion of all Bhutanese cultivators.[15]

The Indo-Bhutanese boundary was, however, not demarcated in its entirety in 1867–68. Although the boundary between Bhutan and Cooch Behar was demarcated, the boundary between Bhutan and Assam was left undemarcated. In 1870 the Dev Raja pressed Colonel Haughton that the boundary between Bhutan and Assam should be clearly laid down. Sir Willsam Grey, Lieut. Governor of Bengal, directed the Commissioner of Assam, to take steps to this end. Colonel Agnew, as Officiating Commissioner of Assam, strongly opposed such demarcation. He stated that the boundary had been settled and explained to the Bhutanese authorities in 1866, and maintained that the demarcation of boundary would be unnecessary and would only cause irritation to the Bhutanese authorities. He was, however, mistaken, for the undemarcated boundary soon gave rise to misunderstanding and friction between the authorities of the two countries. The Bhutanese authorities collected taxes from the wood-cutters who worked in the forests on their border with Kamrup. Colonel Hopkinson, Commissioner of Assam, forbade the local Bhutanese authorities to collect such taxes in view of the British claim to the outer slopes of the hills on which the forests stood. Colonel Haughton, however differed with him. He pointed out that in 1865 the foot of the hills had been prescribed as the limit of British and Bhutanese territories except at Buxa and Dewangiri. There was thus no unanimity of opinion among the local British authorities as to the actual line of boundary. Colonel Hopkinson contended that the Assam Duars had been British territory since 1841. The Government of Bengal agreed with him and maintained a distinction between the Duars of Assam annexed in 1841 and those of Cooch Behar ceded in 1865. To the Bengal Government, the expression, "a direction along the foot of hills," in the correspondence of 1866 seemed to have been loosely used to express the boundary.[16]

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[13] For. Dept. Pol. A., 5uoe 1982, No. 644 (643–44).

[14] C. U. Aitchison (Comp.) *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and the Neighbouring Countries*, Vol. II, (Calcutta, 1909), pp. 303–304.

[15] Kapileshwar Labh, *India and Bhutan*, (New Delhi, 1974), pp. 112–13.

The Government of India, however, stated in its letter dated June 22, 1827 that no distinction had been made between the eighteen Duars at the time of conclusion of the Treaty of 1865. It lent no weight at all to the contention of the Government of Bengal that the Government of India had obtained some of these Duars in 1841. It made it clear to the Government of Bengal that the definition of the Indo-Bhutanese boundary should follow the line explained to the Bhutanese representatives at the time of concluding the Treaty of 1865 and deplored the attempt to adhere to a stringent and one–sided interpretation of it. Although it advised the Government of Bengal to take enough of the lower part of the Bhutanese hills for the security and permanence of the frontier, it was opposed to impoverishing the Bhutanese people by depriving them of all the valuable forests on the southern slopes of the hills. It felt that the pursuance of a hard line policy towards Bhutan would lead to frequent quarrels with the Bhutanese authorities. It, therefore, directed the Government of Bengal to survey and demarcate the boundary as early as possible.[17] In September 1872 Major J M. Graham, Deputy Commissioner of Darrang, was appointed Boundary Commissioner. Graham settled the boundary between Assam and Bhutan during the cold session of 1872–73.[18]

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[16] For. Dept. Pol. A, June 1872, Nos. 633-64.

Himalayan Kingdoms, Tibet and India

During British rule in India the boundary between Bhutan and Tibet had not been delienated by treaty. The boundary was known by tradition and usually followed the crest of the Himalayan range. In 1783 when Samuel Turner was going to the Court of Teshu Lama, he saw on the Bhutan-Tibet border that "a long row of little inscribed flags fixed in rude heaps of stones, were fluttering in the wind. They mark the boundaries of Tibet and Bootan."[19] No major boundary dispute between the two countries (Bhutan and Tibet) is known to have occurred during the period under study. As a matter of fact, the British authorities in India were not much coucerned about the boundaries of the Himalayan States with Tibet for a long time. However, by the 1890s they were determined to "recognize no foreign rights over states lying upon our side of tha Himalayan waterparting."[20] This is obvious from the Lingtu episode which took place in 1886–88. In 1886 the Tibetans who were against the Macaulay mission decided to oppose it by force and sent troops to Lingtu, well within the Sikkimese territory. The presence of the Tibetan force on the territory of Sikkim was likely to prove detrimental to the relations of the British not only with Sikkim but also with Bhutan. In the beginning of 1887 Lord Dufferin referred the issue to the Chinese and requested them to procure the withdrawal of the Tibetans from Lingtu. He gave them ample time to bring their influence to bear on the Tibetan authorities, but the latter turned a deaf ear to their representations. When all peaceful methods failed, a British force commanded by Brigadier Graham drove the Tibetans out of Lingtu. In 1870 the British Government of India signed a convention with China which defined the

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[17] *Ibid.*, No. 664,

[18] Labh, *op. cit.*. p. 115.

[19] Captain Samuel Turner, *An Account of An Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet, containing A Narrative of Journey Through Bootan, and part of Tibet*, (London, 1800), p. 197.

[20] Memorandum by H. M. Durand on the course of negotiation with Amban, For. Dept., Sec. E. 1889, No. 382 (259–391).

Sikkim-Tibet frontier as the watershed between the Tista river system in Sikkim and the Tibetan Mochu and the rivers flowing northwards into Tibet.[21] There was no dispute between the British authorities in India and the Tibetans or the Chinese with regard to Bhutan. However, China initiated an active policy towards the Himalayan States in the wake of the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa and attempted to establish its suzerainty over Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. The British position in regard to the exclusion of Chinese influence from Sikkim and Nepal was entirely satisfactory. By 1890 the Government of India had acquired direct and exclusive control over the affairs of Sikkim. Although Nepal was not a protectorate of British India, the office of British Residency in Kathmandu was a powerful means to counteract Chinese influence in Nepal. Bhutan alone remained vulnerable to Chinese forward policy. The British forestalled the Chinese move by concluding a treaty with Bhutan on 8 January 1910. According to this treaty Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations.[22]

The British Government at that time made no attempt to bring Tibet under its protection. Some scholars hold that "Tibet had traditionally been a buffer between India and China. It was mainly because of this that there had been no military confrontation between India and China in the past."[23] But Tibet was not a buffer during the greater period of British rule in India. Throughout the 19th century Tibet remained closed to the British authorities in India and the latter (the British) accepted China's claim to suzerainty over Tibet. The British were very circumspect in dealing with China because of their commercial interest in that country. They were not prepared to jeopardise their trade in China on account of their actions on the northern frontier of India. In a letter dated 14 September 1816, to Edward Gardner, Resident at Kathmandu, the Government at Fort William wrote:

> The maintenance of peace and amity with the Emperor of China is an object of such vast consequence to the commercial interest of the company, and indeed of the United kingdom

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[21] C. U. Aitchison, (Comp.), *A Collection of Treaties Engagement and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Vol. II, (Calcutta, 1909), p. 331.

[22] Labh, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–75.

[23] See S. P. Varma, *Struggle for the Himalayas : A Study in Sino–Indian Relations*, (Delhi, 1971), p. 10.

> that no efforts ought to be spared on the part of this Government to prevent the present state of things from taking a turn which might occasion any suspension of those relations.[24]

In the first half of the 19th century the British authorities in India considered Tibet virtually a part of Chine and were disinclined to antagonise China on account of Tibet. They became concerned when the Dogras under Raja Gulab Singh invaded Western Tibet in 1841. They expressed "strong objection" to the endeavours of the Jammu Raja to acquire territories in "Chinese Tibet" and advised him to give up "the erroneous ambition of possessing territories beyoud the Himalaya."[25] Although Chinese power had declined in the second half of the 19th century and Tibet was virtually free in its affairs, the British authorities in India still acknowledged China as the suzerain of Tibet. In the 1860s they (the British) revived their attempts to open up Tibet for trade. But they failed to communicate with the Tibetan authorities. The latter used China's claim to suzerainty as a cloak to keep the British at a distance. To the British the main threat to their dominion in India arose from Russian expansion in Asia. In the 1880s and 1890s their imperial rivalry with Russia increased particularly in Central Asia. China had become a very weak power during this period. She did not pose any danger to the British Indian empire. On the contrary, she seemed to the British as a potential bulwark against Russian aggrandizement in Asia. That is why they encouraged her to assert her claim to certain tracts in or near the Pamir in 1891. Moreover, they were not inclined to antagonise her on the issue of Tibet. Lord Curzon, however, attempted to reorient British policy towards Tibet. He endeavoured to put an end to the 'fiction' of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet by emphasising direct dealings with the Tibetans. To him the use of the Chinese Amban as an intermediary was "an admitted farce." He attempted to bring Tibet under the influence of British India. The Younghusband Expedition which was despatched by the Government of India into Tibet in 1903–1904 was an attempt to bring that country under British influence. The Government of India wanted, among other things, the placing of a Resident at Lhasa or failing that, an agent at Gyantse with the right to proceed to Lhasa, and 'a formal recognition of our exclusive political influence in Tibet.' But the Home

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[24] From John Adam, Secretary to Government, to Edward Gardner', Resident at Kathmandu, dated Fort William 14 September 1816. For. Dept., Sec. Progs. 14 September, 1816, pp. 5073–5121.

[25] For. Dept. Sec. Cons. 1 June, 1842, No. 25.

Government which was influenced more by its imperial interests than by the interests of India, did not endorse the proposal of the Government of India for placing a Resident in Lhasa or even Gyantse.[26] In a letter dated 14 July 1904 to Ampthill, Acting Viceroy, John Broderick, Secretary of State for India, wrote that His Majesty's Government "look upon the whole matter as a question between us and Russia and would not make a larger annual sacrifice in keeping an Agent with a proper escort in Tibet in order to force the Tibetans to trade which they do not desire."[27] However, the Lhasa Convention which was signed between the representatives of British India and Tibet in September 1904, secured to the British a dominant position in Tibet. According to it, the Tibetan Government had agreed that no portion of Tibetan territory would be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation to any foreign power, and that no representatives or Agents of any foreign power would be admitted into Tibet, without the previous consent of the British Government.[28]

The Lhasa Convention was, however, directed at Russia rather than China. The net gain, in the words of Sir Edward Grey was that "an effective buffer had been built to a Russian advance, there was freedom from an anxiety that had often preoccupied earlier administration, an end had been put to a frequent source of friction and a possible cause of war."[29] The Home Government which did not realise the need for creating a buffer between India and China, surrendered to the latter (China) in the process of placating her the advantageous position in Tibet that had been acquired as a result of the Lhasa Convention. In 1906 as the price for China's acceptance of the Lhasa Convention the British Government reaffirmed China's special status in Tibet and that the clauses in the Lhasa Convention which excluded "Foreign Powers" from exercising influence in Tibet applied to Great Britain and not to China.[30] Again by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 China was declared as Tibet's suzerain and the British bound themselves to communicate with Tibet through China. Having secured the explicit recognition of their suzerainty over Tibet the Chinese went on to give effect to that suzerainty. In 1908 Chinese troops under Chao Erh-feng took possession of Chamdo and other parts of Eastern Tibet, and in 1910 they occupied Lhasa. But for the Chinese revolution of 1911, Tibet would have most probably been annexed to the Chinese empire. After the revolution of 1911 Tibet was practically independent. Nevertheless the British Government of India endorsed the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet at the Simla Conference in 1913-14. It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.[31]

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[26] Bisheshwar Prasad, *Foundations of India's Foreign Policy: Imperial Era 1882-1914* (Calcutta, 1979), p. 512.

[27] Quoted in Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 512.

[28] C.U. Aitchitson, *A Collection of Treaties Engagements and Sanads* (Calcutta, 1929), Vol. XIV, pp. 24-25.

[29] Cited in Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 520.

[30] Alastair Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa 1767 to 1905*, (London, 1960), p. 311.

Thus the British Government of India made a distinction between trans-Himalayan and cis-Himalayan States. While they refrained from interfering in trans-Himalayan region, they were not prepared to brook foreign influences in cis-Himalayan States. In 1909-1910 when the Chinese invaded Tibet, the British Government of India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama, but it took no measure to restore Tibetan autonomy. But in October 1910 when China asserted its claim to the suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan, the British Government made it clear to China "that they will be bound to resist any attempt on the part of the Chinese Government to impose their authority or in any way to intervene in either of these two states."[32]

The British did not attach strategic importance to Tibet because China was then weak politically. But by the mid-20th century Red China emerged as a vigorous and resurgent power. The Government of independent India should have taken this change into consideration while formulating its policy towards Tibet during 1950-54.

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[31] Cited in Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries* (London, 1969), p. 182.

[32] From British Minister at Peking to Prince Ch'ing, 10 May, 1911, For. Dept. Sec. E.. July, 1911, No. 279 (248-80).

Landholders and Land tenure in Panchmahal* District during the Nineteenth Century A.D.

BY

B. SURYAVANSHI

I

Panchmahal had been a troublesome district for the rulers of Gujarat in the 18th and 19th centuries. The desertion of Champaner began with the conquest of Gujarat by Akbar, the Great Mughal. After the death of Sultan Bahadur Shah, his nephew Muhmud II ascended the throne of Gujarat. He established his new capital at Mahamadabad. Thereafter Champaner lost its glory and with its conquest by Akbar in 1573, it turned into a small city with few Jains and weavers left there. In March 1618 A.D., when Jahangir visited Champaner, it was a deserted city turned into a forest and a grazing ground for wild elephants. After the death ef Aurangazeb in 1707, Krishnaji, the General of Bajirao I captured it and made Pavagarh his headquarters. Meanwhile Trimbakrao Dabhade, the General of Shahu established his power in Baroda, who did not like the entry of Peshwa into Gujarat; hence a conflict developed between Peshwa and Pilaji Gaekwad. In 1730 Chimnaji, the Peshwa's younger brother captured Pavagarh and Sarbuland Khan, the Mughal Governor of Gujarat, was forced to cede the right of collecting Sardeshmukhi to the Peshwa, who kept 2500 horses in Gujarat to help the Mughal Governor. To face this danger, Dabhade and Gaekwad entered into a treaty with Nizam Asaf Jah against the Peshwa who made an alliance with Maharaja Abhaysingh of Marwad. The encounter took place near Dabhoi in April, 1731 where Dabhade was defeated and slain, while Pilaji Gaekwad escaped wounded. As a result of the death and defeat of Dabhade, Pilaji became powerful and established his rule in Baroda. After sometime the Peshwa and the Gaekwads entered into a treaty according to which Panchmahals went to the Peshwa who collected Chauth and Sardeshmukhi and managed it upto 1761 when it was made over to Sindhia.

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* This paper is based on the field work done by the author in the course of a project work in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. The data of this paper is the result of the survey.

In 1803 Colonel Woodington forced Sindhia to sign the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon by which he was obliged to give up his possession of Broach district but allowed to retain Pavagarh. In 1819, Daulatrao Sindhia made it over to Appa Saheb, his son–in–law and its management was carried on by his father Mansingh Patankar as Governor, who could not manage it and a reign of terror prevailed in Panchmahals. After the death of Daulatrao Sindhia, Jayajirao Sindhia also could not control it. In the frequent clashes with the Britishers, Sindhia got defeated and he had to handover its management to the British. During this period the princely States of Panchmahals were managed by the Political Agent of Rewa–Kantha agency. The trouble was mainly due to the rebellious attitude of the Mewasis and Bhils. The Sindhia Maharaja entered into an agreement to transfer the management and superintendence of Panchmahals to the Britishers for ten years from 1843. It was agreed to re–transfer its management to Sindhia again after the expiry of the period if desired. Owing to this set–up, the amount collected by way of revenue increased but the expenses got reduced. Sindhia's establishment in Panchmahals was placed under the Britishers who drew a code of conduct according to the pattern obtaining in British territories but the business of the district was conducted exclusively in the name of the Maharaja of Gwalior. By 1855 the *paṭṭābandhī* of the district had been concluded. From mid–nineteenth century onward five separate "districts" viz., Halol, Kalol, Godhra, Jhalod and Champaner became one administrative unit.[1]

Panchmahals have always been a crucial district and the history of its contentious state was not new in the 18th or 19th centuries. The Dohad inscription of Jayasimha – Siddharaja dated 1140 A. D. refers to the appointment of Rana Sankarasinh on Godrahaka (modern Godhra) under the command of *Vāhinīpati* Senapati Kesava who was commissioned by the Chaulukyas of Gujarat to guard the highway connecting Gujarat and Malwa. The hostile relations between the Chalukyas and the Paramaras of Malwa are evident from *Prabandhachintamaṇi* and other Jain works. The Chaulukya rulers, Jaisimha Siddharaja, Kumarapala and Bhima I etc., subjugated Malwa repeatedly. This district was also a gateway for Northern India as a whole and in the ancient period there was a highway which used to connect it with Udaipur, Dhara, Ujjain aud Mandu. Thus this district had some of the important checkposts.

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[1] Cf. Diary No. 171, National Archives, New Delhi.

Gujarat with her unrestrained prosperity and fertile land attracted the people of neighbouring regions of all castes and creed which allured them to this province. This phenomenon can be traced at least from the early centuries of the Christian era. A study of this trend reveals that the large number of Brahmanas, Rajputs, Banias, Patels and even aboriginals are immigrants to this province. After getting settled, they adopted the culture of the province. Being a forested region contiguous with Rajasthan and Malwa, Panchmahals became the homeland of many aboriginals like the Barias, Bhils, Naiks, Rathwas, etc. Some of them proved very turbulent and became a headache to the rulers particularly in the 18th and 19th centuries when there was no central authority to control the affairs of India. When the Marathas became the overlords of this region, they tried to solve the problem of controlling the turbulent aboriginals by appointing their officers to realise revenue from this district.

The Barias, Naiks and others were freebooters and used to carry out their activities on the highway connecting Malwa. The Maharajas of Gwalior settled this problem by the creation of Mewasdars who were given the responsibility of realizing revenue and to suppress criminal tribes. The Sisodia Rajputs were engaged to protect the royal share and escort it to the treasury of the Sindhias with 50 horsemen. When the Sindhias gave this district to the British Government, the Rajput were free from this responsibility. Maharaja Sindhia also appointed Doongardas Patel to collect revenue in this district who came from Charotara in Kaira district and got settled at Pavagarh. It is said that, Doongardas helped the army of the Sindhias to defeat the Muslims. The Sindhia government gave four villages viz., Malav, Sonawati, Deopura and Saliya to Doongardas Patel as *inām*. The Sindhias constructed a fortress at Malav for Doongardas. He was allowed to wear arms and to fight with the outlander Mewasis. From inscriptions on the *Pāḍiās* (memorable stones) of the Patels, it is evident that, they fought with the Mewasis who used to invade the village. Doongardas constructed a moat around Malav village which has gone out now.

The *pāḍiās* of Malav are seven in number and contain inscriptions in Devnagari. In them men are depicted putting on long *aṅgarkhā* and turban with drawn swords. Mayadas the grandson of Doongardas changed the name of the village to Malav.

Panchmahals were also troubled by the Gaekwads of Baroda as is evident from the treaty between the Gaekwads and the British government dated 3rd April 1820. According to it the Maharaja "shall not send his troops into the districts belonging to the zamindars of Mahi–kantha and Rewakantha agencies without the consent of the company."[2] The responsibility of the collection of tribute on behalf of the Gaekwads was taken up by the Britishers; similar agreement was made for the Mewasis of Panchmahals.[3] This measure was found necessary to promote "peace and safety" in the country. This also covers the payment of *Khirājāt* and settlements of 1800, 1807, 1819, 1864, 1871 whereby it was agreed that, every zamindar was given the responsibility of paying the sum regularly, in default of his payment he was asked to incur considerable expense. Accordingly the Gaekwads entered into an agree–ment and all the zamindars were forced to give an undertaking to pay regular tax to the Baroda Government. In the agreement dated 8 April 1826 signed by the zamindars Chauhan Dajibawa Khushalbawa of village Dhamsiya and others, certain terms and conditions were agreed upon between them and the Gaekward's government. They agreed to pay revenue (*dān*) on *uparwāria* land and *salāmī* on *wāṇṭā*. They agreed to reside as ryots and carry on their agriculture without disturbing peace and surrendered their rights like *haq*, *girās*, *wāntā*, *dān*, *rukhopā* and debt to the Baroda government. They agreed not to encroah on the land of the zamindar or the taluqdar or on the *muhals* of Gaekwad government or any other village. They gave an undertaking not to associate with any outlaw. It was agreed that, if any Grasia settles down in their territory, the government will be informed immediately. Rajput Grasias were allowed to remain in service but they were ordered not to create disturbance. The zamindars were ordered to discharge all the Sindhis, Arabs, Makrani and Pardesis from their services. They were asked not to give shelter to any foreigner in future. They assured to give full co–operation to the Mehtas of Gaekwads in realizing revenue from their villages.

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[2] Aitchison, C. U., *A Collection of Treaties Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Vol. VI, Government Press: Calcutta, 1932, p. 361.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

According to the Diary No. 151, dated 21st December 1803 in the National Archives, the port of Broach was taken by assault under the command of Lt. Col. Hoduyton on 29 August, 1803. The Britishers after this, reduced the Sindhias' stronghold of Pavagarh. Major–General Wellesley, the Resident of Baroda wrote a letter to the Governor–General in which he has mentioned the appointment of Ambajee Ingle to manage the possessions of Sindhia. He also kept a detachment of 250 soldiers to maintain peace and to collect the revenue from Dohad, Godhra, Pavagarh and Khusalgad. Arrangements were made for the clearance of the dues with the local officers in charge of Daulatrao, particularly with the Rajas of Santrampur and Lunawada.[4]

Ultimately the district of Panchmahal was taken by the British Government in 1865 with the intention of maintaining the statusquo. After sometime the first conference was held at Pavagarh.

The Maharaja of Gwalior transferred the whole district of Pavagarh in full sovereignty on the following condition. It was agreed that, the British government 'shall give in exchange land of equal value to the Gwalior Maharaja calculated on both the sides on the payment of both gross revenue'. This treaty was concluded between Maharaja Ali Jah Jyajirao Sindhia and British Government represented by Col. Sir Richard Campbell Shakespear, Agent to the Governor–General in Central India on January 1844. It was agreed to pay to the Maharaja from the British treasury of Gwalior an equivalent in company's rupees calculated at the average rate of *batta* which was prevailing during the last six months. Each government agreed to respect the existing lease condition until the expiry and agreed to give lease to its new subjects on the same terms and condition as those which they enjoyed. Each government agreed to give to its new subjects *sinads* in perpetuity for the rent free lands as the jagirs, the perquisites and hereditary claims (*Huks* and *Wuttuns*) which they enjoyed under their former government. This deed was signed at Banares on December, A.D. 1860 and ratified by the Viceroy and Governor–General of India on the same day.[5] Later on for administrative purposes Panchmahals were attached to the district of Kaira. During this time Babashahi silver coins were current but in 1900 A.D., British currency was declared to be the legal tender of the Agency and Babashahi was discontinued.

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[4] Cf. Diary No. 462, dt., 3rd March, 1819, National Archives, p. 1385.

[5] Aitchinson, C. U., *op. cit.*. Vol. IV.

Being a forest region, dotted with numerous hills and hillocks, situated on the border of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, Panchmahals had a number of landholders of various classes who always remained faithful to their rulers except in few cases. Besides a few ruling princes varying from class I to class VI, there were *Talukdars*, *Mewasdars*, *Inamdars*, *Bhagidars*, *Narwadars*, *Jagirdars*, *Girasdars*, *Ankadedars* and *Khotidars*. These feudal lords belonged to martial races viz., Rajputs, Barias, Musalmans and Kolis.

In Rewakantha Agency the ruling princes were the Maharajas and Rajas of Rajpippla, Chhotaudepur, Deogarh–Baria, Santrampur(Sunth), Lunawada, Jambughoda (Narukot), Balasinor, Kadana and Sanjeli. These princes were Rajputs except the Nawab of Balasinor. Next in the series come the Taluqdars; they were mostly Rajputs viz., the Thakur Sahebs of Golana, Metral, Laliba, Mehlol, Kanjari, Bhanwaria, Eral and Shivrajpur.

Amongst the ruling princes administered under the Panchmahal district were H.H. the Maharaval of Chhota-udepur, Maharaja of Devgad–Baria, Santrampur, Maharaja of Sanjeli, Maharaja of Lunawada, Maharana of Jambughoda and the Thakur Saheb of Kadana.

The families of Chhota-udepur and Devgad–Baria are the descendants of the Chauhans of Sapadalaksha who migrated from Rajasthan into Gujarat after the defeat of Prithviraj III, the Chauhan ruler of Sapadalaksha. According to Bardic sources, fourth in descent from Prithviraja III was Verisinh who established himself as ruler of garh Mahmud in 1251 V.S. (A.D. 1194-95).[6] In V.S.1280 (1233 A.D.) Suratsinh, the great grandson of Verisinh ruled over garh Gangraun. Sixth in descent from Suratsinh was Palanji who ruled Pavagarh in V.S. 1392 (A.D. 1335). In this line 7th in descent was Raval Jayasinhji (alias Patai Raval) who died fighting in the battle of Pavagarh. Two elder sons of Patai Raval died fighting, but the younger son Raisinh was saved by a maid Karmabai who escaped with him and took shelter in the Solasara hillock. The prince after attaining maturity killed the Bhil Kalya and laid the foundation of his kingdom at Jhund. Raisinh had two sons, elder Prithviraj and younger Doongarsinh, who conquered 1200 villages from the Mewasis. Prithviraj with 700 villages established himself as ruler at Hanf in V. S. 1580 and the younger brother with 500 villages laid the foundation of the kingdom of Devgarh–Baria.

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[6] This is apparently a mistake in the records of the bard Kaluji Modhji of the Maharaja of Chhotaudepur as Prithviraja III was defeated in 1192 A. D.

The descendants of Prithviraj later on ruled over Mohan. Some generations after one Raisinhji changed his capital to Udepur (Chhota–Udepur) in V.S.1840 (A.D. 1783). The site of Chhota–Udepur was on the trade routes but it was not so safe as the former. In the nineteenth century, however, it came under the paramountcy of the Gaekwads. In 1822 A.D. the Gaekwads gave its control to the East India Company with an agreement to pay Rs. 10,500/– to the Gaekwads. In 1871 this tribute was reduced to Rs. 10,147, out of which Rs.8769–13–4 was paid to the British government. It was a second class State.

The descendants of Doongarsinh continued to rule over Deogarh–Baria lill 1948 when the State got merged with the Indian Union. The present Maharaval Jaideepsinhji is his descendant.

Like Baria and Chhota–Udepur, the Maharaja of Santrampur is also a Rajput belonging to Pawar (Paramara) dynasty. This family migrated from Ujjain. At first they got settled at Jhalod and finally in the 14th century they got settled at Santrampur. The founder of this family was Sant. In 1800 a treaty was concluded with this State, but it got dissolved by the policy of Lord Cornwallis. The Raja of Sunth agreed to pay Rs. 7000–00, out of which Rs. 5384–00 was granted to the Sindhia government on condition of non–interference in the internal affairs of State. In 1860 it came under the direct control of the British government. It was also a second class State.

The ruler of the third class State of Kadana was a scion of the house of Santrampur. Thakur Saheb Kadana was not on good terms with Santrampur who claimed sovereignty over it. The British government in 1871 declared it an independent State, free of the control of Santrampur.

The ruler of the State of Lunawada claim descent from the Solankis of Gujarat. This family first got settled at Virpur. In 1434 A.D. they founded Lunawada. In 1803 they came into contact with the Britishers who gave a guarantee of protection. Later on, an amount of Rs. 12000/– as Babashahi was granted to the Sindhia government on condition of non–interference in the affairs of the State. This tribute was paid to the "British government in 1860 when they took control of Panchmahal district." This was a second class State.

The State of Sanjeli was a fifth class State in the nineteenth century and belonged to Songadha Chauhan of the Rajputs. The founder of this State was Chhatrasalji who migrated from Mewar. In an engagement with Baria State, Thakur Bahadursinhji was slain and his successor Jagatsinh sought intervention and help of the British government. Accordingly the Baria ruler was asked to recognize the independence of Sanjeli with 12 villages.

The petty State of Narukot (Jambughoda) was classed as fifth class State in the 19th century A.D. and used to pay a revenue of Rs,100,000/-. The ruler of this State claims to be a descendant of Bhoja Parmara of Dharanagari. In 1826 A.D. the State came under the control of the Political Agent of Rewakantha and the officers of the Gaekwad were allowed to collect small annual tribute. Owing to the quarrel with Gaekwads, the Chief sought protection from the British government and offered half of his tribute to the Britishers which was spent on the administration of the State till 1917.

One of the most important problems of 19th century Panchmahals is the rise of the Naiks. Since 1825 A.D. the peace of this district got disturbed thrice, i.e., in 1838, 1857 and 1868. In 1838 the Naiks of Deogarh–Baria, Chhota–Udepur, Jambughoda and Godhra rebelled. Major Forbes took action in February, 1838. Naik Kewal of Baria district and his brothers Jalam, Rupa and his manager Onkarsingh helped by Makranis and other miscreants from Chhota- Udepur and Jambughoda carried off the cattle and other properties of the villagers. Vikram Naik, Mahadev Naik and Amar Naik laid waste the whole district of Baria. In 1868 Rapsingh Naik of Danddiapur attacked Baria with the help of the Makranis; they sacked Jambughoda and Halol. Joria Bhagat and other Naiks attacked Chhota–Udepur. In the end, British troops under Captain Richard Burner suppressed them and their leaders were punished.

In 1858 A.D. the Naiks of Narukot joined the troops of Tantia Tope and plundered the Thana of Narukot. The revolt was put down in 1859, and the State was treated as subordinate to the Collectorate of Panchmahals. After 80 years the administration of the State was given to Chief Gambhirsinhji Dipsinhji on 16 June, 1917.

To the second category in the series of landholders belong the Taluqdars of Panchmahals who are mostly Rajputs. These Taluqdars were the Thakur Sahebs of Golana, Metral, Laliba, Mehlol, Kanjari, Bhanwaria and Eral. Each Taluqdar was the owner of his estate consisting of one or two or more villages. Sometimes, in one estate there were more than one owner. Many families in Gujarat which once held estates were subjugated by the Muslims, but were allowed to hold some portion of their estate as Wantas which was either rent-free or subject to the payment of salami or tribute-rent. These were relics of former Rajput organization. In some cases the Taluqdari right were taken by the Rajputs from the Britishers. The Taluqdars of Eral came into prominence during the reign of the Sindhias; after purchasing lands, they obtained Taluqdari rights from the British. It is said that, the Taluqdars of Eral were the Jagirdars of Devgarh-Baria.

In Gujarat some villages are held on Mewasi tenure. Mewasi is a caste name. The Mewasis call themselves Rajputs but local Rajputs do not recognize their claim. Being free-booters, their habitations are generally in the forest or in the ravines and mounds. They were very proud and turbulent and the British could not control them. Therefore they appointed Desais to control them and realize revenue from them with the arrangement of *solavānṭā*. The Mewasis had no widow marriage system and regarded themselves as higher than the Baria. They followed all the systems of the Rajputs and were also addicted to opium. In their dealings they imitated the traditions of the Taluqdars. Some of the villages of the Mewasis were very notorious like Khempur of Lunawada taluqa, which never paid revenue to anybody. On the border of Godhra taluqa there is one more Mewasdar of Karauli. This village is densely surrounded by forest and is cut off from all sides during the rainy season.

In Kalol taluqa, there are 22 villages, viz., Vyasda, Bedia, Pigli, Madroli, Karoli, Muli, Phadli, etc. In this taluqa there are two ethnic divisions viz., Jadhav and Parmar. The Parmars and Jadhavs intermarry. The Jadhavs marry their daughters with the Parmars and the Parmars give their daughters to the Thakur Sahebs of Bakrol and Karauli. Local traditions reveal that, the Mewasis got settled here after the downfall of the Pavagarh Chauhans. In course of time they occupied some villages and started realizing revenue from the villagers. It is said that, the Mewasis are the descendants of the Rajputs and Kolis; however, their exact origin is uncertain. In Kalol taluqa, Bedia Mewasdars were very strong and considered to be criminal-minded. They inhabit twelve villages, which are collectively called Bedia. These are situated 5 miles from Kalol on the Godhra highway. The Bedia Mewasis called themselves

Khichi Chauhans. The Desais of Kalol reveal that, these Bedias were given land by the Sindhia government with Mewasi right to safeguard the highway which connects Madhya Pradesh via Godhra and Dhar. Thus on the four sides of Kalol taluqa there were turbulent Mewasis, and the Desais were given the authority to maintain law and order and to realize revenue from them.

The Rathor Mewasis are immigrants from Idar and were summoned to protect Mahlol. They settled later on at Champaner, Palla, Ramnath and Delol. According to local tradition they attacked Delol village and captured it. Later on they were given Mewasdari by the Sindhia government. It is divided into four parts. The first part was given to Jabaısingh Parvatsingh, second to Mahasingh Rupsingh, third to Bahadur Singh Madhav Slngh and the fourth to Bhaktibhai Jhumabhai. From the records of the archives it is evident that, in the month of October 1802 Babaji Diwan had to undertake Mulukgiri expedition against the Mewasis and Kolis.[7] Babaji arrived at Pithapur to get payment, but the Kolis and Mewasis refused to obey the orders of the Diwan, went out of the camp, indulged in looting and carried away the cattle of the villagers. They always tried to defy the orders and utilized every opportunity to shake off the authority of the Gaekwads, but every time they were subjugated. The Diwan pressed for the allotment of two or three thousand troops to suppress them. On 13 February 1819 Captain S. R. Carnac, the Resident of Baroda, requested for a contingent and the second regiment of Native infantry was sent to suppress them. Thus during 1839 to 1843 disturbances broke out in Pandu–Mewas which forced the British government to take measures against them. On 13 February, 1827 Colonel Stanhope led an expedition, which finally solved the Mewasi problem.[8]

At the time when the Panchmahal district was exchanged with certain territories in Madhya Pradesh by the Sindhia, the Mewasdars officially did not possess either land or any other skill excepting habitual contumacy. Till the survey settlement was introduced in the Kalol taluqa in 1867 they exercised unquestionable rights over the villages by virtue of custom. In 1873 the British government recognized the tenure approximately equal to taluqdari at least in Ahmedabad district with proprietary rights on the lands of the villages. The Mewasdars at first refused to sign and the British government made the villages *Khalsa*. In 1887 the orders were reversed and the management of the villages was handed over to the Mewadars on the payment of *jama* calculated on the assessment of the land held by them. The assessed waste land was leased out to them and they were to let it out for cultivation without the obligation of increased *jamā*. Tne government, however, retained the management of the forest but granted to the Mewasdars a reduction of *jamā* varying from 30% to 68% as compensation for the loss according to the area of the land taken up for the forest. Thus the proportion of the *jamā* varied in each village according to thc proportion borne by the forested area. These orders clinched the issue and decided that, the Mewasdars had no property rights in the villages and forests. This was executed in 1888. Thus the Mewasis contract was formed on two lines viz., compensation for the loss of the Mewasdar's forest rights and remuneration for the recovery of revenue on behalf of the government. In Mewasdars' contract, the land was divided into five categories viz., (i) land occupied by the Mewasdars, (ii) land occupied by other Khatedars holding directly from the government, (iii) *inām* lands, (iv) assessed waste land and (v) unassessed waste land. There were two concepts which were considered in the contract: (1) *Ankaḍā* (lump sum), (2) Mewasi profit.

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[7] Cf. Report No. 128 (4) N. A. I., Diary No. 140.
[8] Diary No. 462, p.1792.

The lump sum payment called *ankaḍā* was fixed for each village at certain percentages of the survey assessment of class I and II land and judi on class III, but assessed waste land was left entirely at the disposal of the Mewasdars, who were entirely at library to make free use of and to retain profits subject to the condition that the tenants were not to pay more than one assessment. As regards the unassessed waste land, the Mewasdars enjoyed the same rights as for assessed waste land, however, the lands in the category were included in lease (*paṭṭā*) executed in 1887–88 and called *paṭṭābāha*s (outside the leased land). The Mewasdars were entitled to get free timber under permit from forest and unassessed waste land for agriculture and domestic purposee.

This Mewasi tenure was, in two territories. called Pandu–Mewas and Sankheda–Mewas. Pandu–Mewas subdivision was conglomeration of petty estates of Kolis, Barias, Mohemadans and Rajputs stretching along the bank of the river Mahi.

Next in the series of landholders are Khotidars. Khoti tenure was merely a lease holder paying some revenue to government but he does not claim to be the actual proprietor of the land. He used to pay a fixed rent liable only to be increased at a general revision of the settlement. Other cultivators paid a grain share to the Khotidars but they were protected in their holdings and were not entitled to transfer it. In some cases it was owned by several joint owners or co-sharers; in this case they were jointly liable to the government for revenue and for this purpose they engaged the services of a managing Khot (lambardar of north–Indian villages). The Khots pay a whole lump sum (*jamā*) of the village instead of an assessment on each field. Consequently, he has to keep control over the waste numbers.

The Jagirdar or Jagirland holdings were given conditionally in return for military services or as reward for the political services. In their service tenure they were called Jagirdars. Few hundred years ago in Rajasthan, the Jagirs were confiscated by the ruler after the death of the Jagirdars and later on the Jagir became hereditary. In the Panchmahal district Thakur Saheb of Parauli was a Jagirdar of the Maharaja of Devgarh–Baria. He was a low class Rajput but was a *tāzīmī-jāgirdār* and entitled to sit with the Baria ruler in his darbar. This was evidently an old Jagir in the district. In the time of Patai Raval, the ancestors of Parauli ruled over Palla which was a State of 500 villages. The descendants of Patai Raval remained with the Solankis of Palla; later on when the Chauhans re-established themselves at Devgarh–Baria, Kesarba, one of the queens, possibly of the Chauhans, proclaimed that, the right of performing ceremonial *tilak* on the occasion of the enthronement of the Mevgarh–Baria ruler would always remain with the decendants of Palla and this rite has always been performed by the Solankis of Parauli village. The chief of Parauli ruled over Eral also. In Vikram Samvat 1407 the village of Eral was kept and served as security for Rs. 40–00 (*babashali*). The Maharaja of Devgarh-Baria confirmed the right of first *tilak* by blood at the time of the enthronement ceremony of the ruler.

There is a seizeable population of the Barias and few of them are landholders also. They inhabit the villages Bhanpura, Karaha, Undvana Jotwad and Nathpur in Jambuhoda taluqa. Ethnically they are divided into two: (1) Kshatriyas and (2) Kolis. The Baria–Kshatriyas have their Barots. They are mostly cultivators and used to pay regular taxes to inamdars. It is said that, Bhathiji Maharaj of Phagvela aud Ladvela was a Baria–Kshatriya.

Next in the series of landholders come the inamdars who were given gift of some villages in lieu of their services. The Desais of Kalol are Porward Banias. It is said that, during the time of the Solankis they were invited to take charge of the administration. Amongst their few names like Munjal Mehta. Uda Mehta and Vimal Mehta are well known. They were all Jains. In Kalol town there are 1000 families of the Banias divided into Lad, Porwad, Modh and Khadayats. There were sixteen villages in their charge in which the Desais of Kalol had *wāntā* land having 100 acres in each village. This right was given to the Porwads by the Sindhia government. They are also originally Raja–sthanis and migrated from their original home at Pragvat near Shrimal. They first got settled at Dholka, got associated with the Nagars and then they got *Pasaitā* land.

Other Inami villages were Kandach, Sureli, Alali and Barola. One of the most important inami villages is Malav given to the Patels by the Sindhia Government. The head of these inamdars was Doongardas who rendered services to the army of the Sindhia when the latter was fighting against the Muslim rulers of Gujarat. When the Sindhia got victory, he gave the villages Malav, Sonawati, Devpura and Salian to Patel Doongardas who hailed originally from Charotar. The inamdari tenure given by the Sindhias was of two categories: (i) *jñāti inām* where complete rights were given and (ii) *Watanināṃ* which was not to be given to girls. The Malav ināmdārs are Leuva Pāṭīdārs. The pāṭīdārs remember the tradition that Siddharaja Jayasimha invited the Pāṭīdārs from Gujarat district in Pakistan.

The Charan or Bards are also a landholding class and are called ankadedars. They migrated from Saurashtra from Junagarh, Chotila and Jamnagar due to famine. They were called ankadedars by the Sindhias. In the dense forest they were allowed to graze their cattle in lieu of that they used to pay Rs. 25-00 as *aṅkaḍā* to the Sindhia government. In district Panchmahal there are 24 villages of the Charans.

The Girasia system is mostly found in Kathiawad and at few places in the Panchmahals. These Girasias originally came with the ruler who established his sway over the land. They were given girasdari subject to their military services to the ruler and used to pay him tribute. It was hereditary, but the eldest son was given the largest share of the girasdari, others who received lesser share were called *bhāyāts*. They used to claim the same share in their estates as the eldest head of the family. In this way the district of Panchmahals had its own problems and was the most difficult part of Gujarat. The Sindhias were responsible for the creation of many feudal lords of different classes as already observed.

II

After discussing these important points about the landholding classes, we pass on to the land tenure in Panchmahals during the 19th century A.D. Amongst the feudal chiefs, the first in the series are the Rajas of petty States. As referred to earlier, Khīchī Chauhans laid the foundation of Baria (Devgarh–Baria) State. According to the treaty of Sarji Anjnngaon concluded between the Sindhia darbar and the Britishers, the management and superintendence was handed over by the Maharaja to the Britishers as the Gwalior darbar was not in a position to maintain Panchmahals from such a distance. Hence under the above treaty, when the East India Company began to take care of the district, the petty States, Taluqdars, Mewasdars, Gieasias, etc., came into contact with the Britishers directly. The Baria ruler, Yashwantsinh, had to accede to the terms and conditions of the treaty. Yashwantsinh was succeeded by his son Gangadas in whose time the country was laid waste by Marathas. His power was usurped by the Brahman Minister who also devastated the neighbouring regions till 1819 A.D., the British somehow established law and order. The State of Baria remained in debt during the period of Bhimsinh, the next successor, and its management fell to the lot of the British. But when Prithviraja became major, the British management was withdrawn.

Raja Prithviraja entered into a treaty with the British in 1824 A.D., according to which he agreed to pay Rs. 6000/– yearly or Rs.600/– per month for the maintenance of British cavalry and infantry for the protection of the State. On the part of British government, Captain Alexander Macdonald was appointed to help Raja Prithviraja of Baria. The State was in debt; therefore Rs. 12000/– as Salimshahi was accepted by the Raja to pay off his debt for six years. But after the expiry of this period the amount of tribute was increased. It was confirmed by the Governor–General–in–Council.[9] On the part of the Raja, Raval Jeejeebhai signed the treaty. The State of Baria thus regularly came under the protection of the East India Company.

On November 21, 1882, the Raja of Chhota–Udepur also entered into a treaty with the East India Company, according to which the Maharaja subscribed to the yearly payment of *ghāsḍānā* to the Gaekwad government. It was agreed that, Bhils and Kolis would be kept under control to prevent them from committing violence. The Raja was made to agree that, the Mewasis and other rival elements would not be allowed to find shelter in Chhota-Udepur and no assistance would be provided to them. It was the duty of the Raja to protect the roads for the travellers and particularly to the traders. Smuggling of opium was not permitted by the Raja and he agreed to pay Rs. 10,500/– to the Gaekward for *ghāsdānā* and Rs. 12,000/- *salimshali* to the East India Company.

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[9] *Ibid.*, p.183.

The East India Company entered into an agreement with the other states also. It agreed to protect the State of Lunawada. This agreement was signed during the reign of Rana Fatehsinh, according to which the Rana was asked to maintain a military force of the Company and to consider the British as his benefactors. He was entitled to tax the merchandise sold in his territory and was also asked to pay *ghāsdānā* (a *mulakgiri* tax) and *Khirājāts* to Baroda amounting to Rs. 7001/– every year. It was signed on 10 August and 14 November, A.D. 1803. He was obliged to expel all the Pathans recruited by him for his protection.

Considering the friendly relation with the Gwalior Darbar on 10 August 1819 A.D., the British government settled the problem of the tributary claims with the petty States like Lunawada, Santrampur (Sunth) and Rampura. According to this, the East India Company guaranteed the Sindhia Maharaja Daulatrao the annual tributes of Santrampur and Lunawada which amounted to Rs. 19,000/– (Rupees 7000/– Babashahi of Santrampur and Rs. 12000/– Babashahi of Lunawada), This payment was made in two instalments, first instalment in December and the other in April. Mansinh Patonkar was asked by this agreement to withdraw his troops as well as his Karkun and officers from these States and was ordered to refrain from any interference in the matters of these States. He relinquished his office in favour of the aforesaid Maharajas.[10]

Jagatsinh the chief of Narukot came into conflict with the Gaekwads of Baroda. The problem began with the revolt of the Naikdas and the Thana of Gaekwads was placed in his territory, even then the Naiks did not remain peaceful and the palace of Jagatsinh was plundered. The Raja filed a petition to Malet, the first Assistant Political Commissioner in Gujarat and in–charge of Rewakantha Agency. When the Thana left, the Naiks troubled again. The Rani of Narukot represented the

[10] *Ibid.*, pp.172–73.

matter to the Manager at Sankhera but it was of no use. Moreover, she and Jagatsinh were imprisoned. Jagat got himself released on submission on half of his pargana. The State was plundered and the villages got deserted. In 1826 A. D. Jambughoda came under the protection of the British. In 1878 A.D. Abkari settlement was made in the state, management of which was performed by the officers of the British government. The ownership of the palm and toddy producing trees remained with the chief but control was exercised by the British government. It was, however, agreed that, no extra tax would be imposed on the people without the consent of the Raja. This agreement was made on 28 October 1891.

After the States in Panchmahals, next in seniority were the Taluqdars. It was the most important tenure where the proprietary rights were given to Taluqdars—Broach, Kaira, Panchmahals, Amreli, Ahmedabad, Sabarkantha and Mehsena are instances. Those in Saurashtra could retain political power, but those in Bombay were classed as non-judicial Thakurs. Practically the taluqdarī tenure of Gujarat can be compared with the zamindari tenure in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. There in U.P. and Bihar also the former zamīndars had proprietary rights and many of them had even judicial powers. They were second class magistrates also and were paying some percentage of their revenue directly to the British government. The so-called taluqdars of U.P. viz., the Maharajas of Balrampur, Kalakankar, Jahangirabad, Isanagar, Oiel, and Kemhra and many others were entirely different in status and were classed separately than those in Gujarat. Many Taluqdars in Gujarat purchased villages in course of time but those in U.P. were given these villages by the Mughals and were continuing till 1848. Many of them had their own force also. After 1857 their armies were liquidated and came under the British protection. The Taluqdars of Gujarat had their own characteristics, viz., they were neither alienated nor unalienated. They enjoyed proprietary rights in their estates including mines, minerals, trees and forests. Many of them were settled by the Mughals also as actual proprietors of their estates with simple liability of paying tribute to government. Maratha domination made no change in their tenurial status. The British continued to levy the amount of tributes but in 1821 A.D. the amount increased to 50%. Their rights and responsibilities were settled by the Gujarat Taluqdari Act in 1888. The taluqdari estates in Panchmahals and Ahmedabad were subject to *jamā* which was liable to revision. The *jamā* was an aggregate of the assessment of lands in the village but limited upto 60% of the assessment on the cultivated land and 35% on the waste lands. In special cases maximum 70% of the aggregate was allowed. The Taluqdars were allowed to retain 30% of the total assessment of his village to meet the cost of police establishment of the village. In these estates large areas of lands were alienated to the cadets and widows of the families and relatives of the Thakurs for maintenance. Holders of these lands paid no revenue either to the Taluqdars or to the British government. They were equal to the type of lands called *māfīs* of U. P. and Bihar. The *Chākariat* (service–*inām*) lands were resumable at will, but in case of alienation the taluqdars had a revisionary right in the event of the failure of male heirs. The alienations were called *lāl–liti* lands because they were recorded in red ink in the old *patrakas*.

In the taluqdari estates there were *wāntā* lands which were the traces of Mughal settlement. It was a sort of taluqdari tenure within the taluqdari estates. These landholders were called ex–taluqdars. In settlement records they were entered as *jāl-litī* lands. These *wāntā* holders had generally no documentary evidence to prove their title during the period prior to the enactment of the Act VII of 1863 because such lands were not assigned but retained after surrendering ¾th of the area of the village to the Muslim rulers. In Surat, Broach, Kaira and Panchmahals these *wāntās* were considered to be the private property of the *wāntādārs*.

For settling the claim of the either *wântā* or *giras* in the territory under the direct rule of the Gaekwads a British Officer was appointed in 1878 A.D. in subordination to the Agent to the Governor–General to settle the rights and interest guaranteed and unguaranteed by the government of India. This measure was taken because in 1862 Maharaja Khanderao Gaekwad attached all such *tora giras* and *wanta* rights in large majority enjoyed by the Zamindars in Rewakantha Agency. This was done by the Maharaja of Baroda in accordance with the settlements in 1820 among the Gaekwads, the Chief and the Zamindars. It was completed in 1884 by which 6765 cases (4113 Giras and 2652 Wantas) were decided. In 1892 a special department was constituted to hear the Giras and Wanta disputes by the Gaekwads with a right of appeal to the Resident. The Government of India ruled that, the Girasias should be exempted from paying court fees in the Baroda Court in revenue cases brought by them in connection with their *giras haq*. In 1895 further exemption was granted by the Government of India to the Girasias to recover their revenue from the Baroda treasury. In 1897 the Government of India approved certain rules and regulations for revenue management to the girasias and thakurs. In 1907 a conference was held at Baroda Residency in which various points of disputes between Baroda darbar and the girasias were settled. Discussion on additional liabilities of these holdings was also held.

The next most important tenure in the 19th century was Mewasi. This problem came to light with the Mulakgiri expeditions of the Gaekwad of Baroda. In 1753 A.D. the Gaekwads started Mulakgiri expeditions in the Panchmahal district to collect their *ghasdana* tax from the Mewasis but from 1773 when the East India Company defeated the Marathas, their interference began and the Company started mediating between the two parties. Hence many settlements were made among the Mewasis, the Gaekwad and the Sindhia in the beginning and later with the Britishers. On 29 April 1821 an agreement was made with the Chiefs of Dhudalia, Bakrol and Ranasar with Captain William Miles. It was agreed to discontinue plundering raids and stop their associations with the outlaws. The recruitment of Arabs, Sindhis or Makranis was also stopped. They were given the responsibility to protect the traders and travellers and were forbidden to allow opium trade through their territories.

Agreement was reached between the Gaekwads and the Mewasis through the British Officer J.P.Willonghby on 18 March 1825 A. D. They were asked to behave properly and bear the punishment inflicted upon them for their misconduct, and to inhabit the villages again. They were ordered to remain peaceful and restrain from any quarrel with any one or to commit any depredation with the ryots of the Gaekwad government or with any other States. They agreed to pay revenue regularly according to the custom of the district besides salami. They were asked to submit their dues to the government. They were ordered to restore lands to the proper parties which were taken by them forcibly and were ordered not to mortgage any land in future without the permission of the government. For the satisfaction of the government an officer was ordered to reside at Baroda. It was further agreed that, if the robber of the zamindar concerned robbed anybody, the zamindar would compensate the loss. They were allowed to receive as *giras*, whatever was fixed, without creating any disturbance to the ryots of the mahal. The *giras* or *ranwatia*, *vechan* and *pasaita* enjoyed by the girasias of the Muhals residing in the villages of the zamindars were continued. Any inquiry or highhandedness done by the Mewasis, was liable to make them bear compensation with penalty. They were ordered not to quarrel with each other. However, in each case they had to take care of the ryots and no disturbance was permitted. If the robbers of the Mewasis were killed in conflict with the government, the

Mewasis were not to be permitted any claim. The Zamindars were allowed to keep their servants but they were not permitted to create any disturbance and they were ordered to take precautions in future.

Mention may be made about the agreement reached between Maharaja Daulatrao Sindhia and Thakur Kesrisingh Abhayasingh of Kanjhari on 18 February 1826 through J.P. Willonghby, Political Agent of Rewakantha Agency. It was settled that, the Thakur should behave like a peace loving ryot and pay *jamabandi*, *babatis*, *ghasdana* and taxes regularly without any objection. He gave his guarantee to remain peaceful and not to quarrel with his neighbours. They were asked to submit their accounts of ancient rights and duties regarding *giras*, *wanta*, *dan*, *rakhopa* dues. They gave an undertaking not to keep any association with the criminals, rebels and outlaws (*barbatias*). The Thakur was ordered not to molest and injure the traders or passengers frequenting his region and maintain the safety of highway. He was asked to discharge all the Sindhis, Makranis and Arabs from his service and not allow the export or import of opium without permit. Besides this, some important points with regard to the Mewasi settlement are also noteworthy. The Kamavisdar was allowed to realise half of the amount payable to the Sarkar for management. It was decided to assess the amount on the basis of ten years account including *Kharājāt* and *babtis* excluding the years of *asmanī–sultanī* (acts of God and King). In case the Mewasis wanted to exclude *asmānī–sultānī*, no deduction could be allowed in future. If zamindar was completely impoverished, he was allowed to pay his dues to the government within the next five years. During this period, management of the estate was to be done by the *adhikāri*. The Mewasdars were asked to pay accordingly. Even in case of villages with *talpad* and *wāntā* lands and the management to be done by the zamindar, he was asked to pay fixed amount to the government but village belonged to the government. Any village leased out by Kamavisdar to Zamindar who was not regular in his payment, belonged to Sarkar. If a Mewasi Zamindar had been managing a village inherited by him from his ancestors, he could continue to pay the same amount as revenue that was paid by ancestors. The management and enjoyment of zamindar *wāntās* that may be in Sarkar muhals was ordered to continue as it was, no change in property right was allowed with regard to the *talpad* land, no encroachment was allowed on the *wāntās*, but tax was levied on the land under cultivation, he was to pay *Sarkar salami* also. The Zamindars were authorized to exercise authority on the population of their villages but they were not permitted to oppress the Sewakars, Brahmanas and other persons. If Sarkar sawari proceeded for the purposes of bathing in the river Rewa, the Zamindar was obliged to pay *nazarānā*. No Zamindar was permitted to acquire new land in Sarkar muhals without proper permission. The mulakgiri was to be paid through the British government. If a Mewasdar had no issue, adoption was allowed with the permission of Sarkar after paying *nazarānā*. Even the legitimate sons were asked to seek cognizance of the Sarkar.

Another tenure is Khoti tenure which is merely a lease with the holder paying certain amount of revenue to the government, but the landholder had no right to claim the property of the land. He used to pay a fixed rent, liable to increase on the occasional general revision of the settlement. He was allowed to protect his holding but was not entitled to transfer it. In cases where the land was owned by more than one person, they were held jointly responsible to the government for paying revenue. For that purpose they appointed a Khot (lambardar of North Indian village). The Khot used to pay the lump sum instead of an assessment of each field, therefore he had control over the waste land of the village.

The Bhagidari and Narvadari tenures were in the district of Broach, Kaira, Surat and Panchmahals covering 119 entire villages and scattered lands in 7 villages with 168,498 acres assessed at Rs. 7,71024/-. They were remnants of post-Mughal and Maratha administration. It was only a method of collecting land revenue from the villages. They were held on *hunda* or lump payment of the land revenue payable to the government. The responsibility for the payment was joint for mox-bhagidar and peta-bhagidar. In 1802 the Bhagidari and Narwadari Act was passed to regulate the revenue collection.

As a class by itself this system presents all essential features of a North Indian village. Though both are similar in many ways they differ in certain aspects. It is difficult to trace the origin of this system. Its origin may be attributed to a tribal settlement or it may have resulted from the dismemberment of a petty kingdom by the members of former rulers' families. At first all the taxes were common but later on different groups of tax payers were separated, major division came to be called as *gambhag* and the sub-division was called *petabhagi*. All the shareholders (*patidars*) were called Patels but the head of each *paṭṭi* had a sort of representative character for the rest, he was called as *Mukh-bhagidar*. He was entitled to sign on behalf of others. The shareholders inventad a plan in which each *patti* was jointly responsible for the share of Narwa and all *pattis* were jointly responsible for the whole.

In the Bhagidari village, field to field assessment was levied and harers bore the burden not according to the law but according to their ancestoral shares. The Collector used to take assessed revenue from the share-holder according to the actual field in possession.

List of the tenure prevalent in the 19th century in Gujarat:

	Name of the tenure	*District where found*
1	Bhagidari and Narwadari	Broach, Kaira, Surat and Panchmahals
2	Mewasi	Panchmahals (mostly in Kalol taluqa.)
3	Maliki	Kaira, (Thasara taluqa.)
4	Taluqdari	Broach, Kaira, Panchmahals, Ahmedabad, Amreli, Mehsena, and Sabarkanta.
5	Wantas	Ahmedabad, Kaira, Panchmahals, Broach, Surat, Amreli and Sabarkantha.
6	Personal inams	All districts of Gujarat.
7	Mulgirasias	Amreli.

The above study of the problems of landholders and land tenure in Panchmahal district draws the clear picture of process of British occupation in India. One can hardly justify the Mulakgiri expeditions and Ghasdana tax of the Gaekwads imposed so strongly on Panchmahals. Sindhias kept up their interest to realised revenue from this district but hardly took any interest in the administration or establishing law and order. Not only that, Peshwas also never hesitated to occupy it and realise revenue from this district. Therefore it is clear that the Gaekwads, Sindhias and Peshwas were exploiting the poor residents of this district. This state of affair coupled with the turbulent aborginals like the Barias, Naikras, Bhils etc., in the association of the Mewasis, made the life hell during the 19th century A. D. To this arena, the Britishers joined and promulgated law and order.

One of the great weaknesses of the Marathas was lack of administrative capability and discipline. This tendency coupled with their greed and lust for money reduced them to the status of free bootters and plunderers rather than kings and nobles. Owing to these qualities, they lacked the grace of rulers in general. The Britishers got India not from the Mughals, but from the Marathas. This lust for money at the cost of administration in a way was a repercussion of the third battle of Panipat (1761) and the Marathas lost it due to their ignorance. It proved to be an eye-opener to the Britishers who realised the weakness of the Maratha generals and inspired them to enter into the political arena of India. They took full advantage of the chaotic situation of Panchmahals and usurped every opportunity to establish themselves n Gujarat.

The author is obliged to the Maharaval Jaideepsinghji of Devgad Baria. the Maharana of Jambughoda, Thakur Sahib Mahendrasinhji of Eral and Shri Vittalbhai, advocate for their co-operation in the field work.

Gandhiji's Leadership of the Indian National Congress: A Study in Political Management

BY

P. K. JOSE

In a newly emergent nation, leadership plays an extremely important role. More so in India where diversity and pluralism had kept the people, divided for over five millenia. It required a colossus to straddle the diversity of the Indian people and present the semblance of a united nation. What Mahatma Gandhi achieved during India's national movement, therefore, made his contribution far exceed the totality of his acts. The unity that was achieved under Gandhian leadership, owes as much to the personal charisma and religious character as to the political management of the Indian National Congress by the Mahatma.

A National Group in India should necessarily represent the tremendous diversity of the country. The Indian National Congress, which led the nation's struggle for freedom could be no exception. Absence of unanimity inevitably became one of the hallmarks of the Congress movement. It could hardly have been otherwise because the Indian National Congress, in due course, came to be viewed as "a national organisation providing a platform for all parties to appeal to the Nation with a view to moulding its policy."[1] Even a deliberate attempt was made "to make the Congress retain its no-party national character.[2]

Unanimity was possible in the Indian National Congress only in the early years, when the organisation represented a homogenous group consisting of English-educated Indians, drawn from a very narrow social base. The chances of internal dissensions and intra party rivalries brightened as the Congress membership went beyond the classes and reached the masses. The ranks of the organisation swelled considerably with the entry of new recruits representing the diverse and often antagonistic communities of India. They formed themselves into the numerous interest groups within the Congress organisation, often retaining their separate identities. With an ideology shaped by its own environment and a political programme moulded by its own peculiar interests, each of them sought to convert the national organisation to its own view-point. Small wonder, group or party rivalry often assumed a dominent note in Congress activities and dissipated much of the national movement's energies.

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[1] *Young India*, 28 April 1920.

[2] *Ibid.*, "The Congress." observed Gandhiji, "is not a party organisation. It ought to provide a platform for all shades of opinion. ." — Speech at the Calcutta Congress in September 1920, *Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (G. A. Natesan and Co. Madras, Fourth edition) p. 536.

What, however, eclipsed the heterogeneity of the national organisation was the personality of Mahatma Gandhi. Since Gandhiji's moral ascendency over the Congress, its history tended to become a one man show. This, however, proved to be a preponderating good. It enabled the amorphous mass of Indian political consciousness which gradually emerged to organise itself into an efficient machine of national service and national effort round a nucleus of such moral and spiritual potency as the personality of Mahatma Gandhi. It would in all probability have remained a more or less chaotic mass, and to that extent an inefficient and ineffective machinery, if such a powerful centre of inspiration and lead, co-ordination and control, had not existed. Moreover, it served to arrest the process of premature disruption in which centrifugal forces prevailed over those that tended to keep to the centre, in which men and groups moved towards war rather than alliance.

Despite the regional differences, the delegates of the early Congress sessions formed a homogeneous group, drawn as they were from the new English educated elite whice was predominently Hindu, upper caste and professional.[3] Hence the difference among the two schools—Moderate and Extremist—into which nationalist opinion had been divided, was one of degree rather than kind. The first World War and its aftermath, however, gave an unprecedented fillip to the nationalist movement. The advent of Mahatma Gandhi on the Indian political scene, first to challenge the Rowlatt Bills and then to champion the Khilafat cause, generated a mass awakening as the struggle for

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[3] Stanley A. Kochanek, *The Congress Party of India* (Princeton, 1968) p.324; P. G. Ghosh, *The Development of Indian National Congress* (Calcutta, 1960) pp. 23–4.

Swaraj assumed the character of a moral and religious movement. The new enthusiasm created on the one side by the prospect of a revolutionary change, broadened the social base of the national organisation. The heterogeneity resulting from the broader social base was, no doubt, a source of strength to the Indian National Congress. At the same time it created the majar problem of aggregating the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests that were drawn into the organisation.

It was before the All India Khilafat Committee that Mahatma Gandhi presented his novel scheme of non-violent non-co-operation. Muslim sentiment in India had been brought to the point of explosion by the publication of the Turkish Peace Terms in early 1920. Contrary to the assurances given by the British Premier, Lloyd George Turkey was deprived of her homelands, and the Sultan was placed under the guidance of a High Commission appointed by the Allies.[4] The Muslim community were in a rage against what was termed a breach of trust, and they decided to organise an agitation for the redress of the Khilafat wrongs. The publication of the Turkish Treaty was followed by that of the Hunter Inquiry Committee Report on the Punjab tragedy (The Jallianwallah Bagh firing). The Report, which virtually exonerated the officers who were involved in it, produced great indignation among educated Indians. Economic distress and political discontent had already created widespread discontent in the country, and India in 1920 appeared to have been ripe for a radical political programme.[5]

The idea of non–co-operation as developed by Gandhiji meant that Indians had only to take their hands off the government machine to stop its working. It was understood to consist of two aspects—non-co-operation with the government, through boycott of all governmental institutions and jobs, and attainment of self–reliance through Swadeshi. The one thing absolutely essential for the success of non–co-operation, according to him, was that people should "scrupulously shun all violence in word, deed or thought."[6]

The Gandhian programme was unanimously adopted by the Khilafat

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[4] *The Tribune*, 9 June 1920.

[5] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London, 1936, 1942 reprint) p. 40.

[6] *Young Indian*, 23 February 1921.

Conference on 4 June 1920.[7] The Indian National Congress however, refused to join the movement, as the Gandhian programme of non-co-operation threatened to divert the national movement from the path it had been following in the past. Moreover, at the Amritsar Congress in December 1919, it had been decided to work the new reforms and arrangements were being made by Congressmen to contest the forthcoming elections. Hence one item of the Gandhian programme which was of immediate relevance was the boycott of elections and the legislative councils. And this could not but cause a great commotion in Indian politics for a long time to come.

The controversy over the boycott of elections and councils in 1920 revealed that this item in the Gandhian programme was disapproved by larger sections of nationalists than has been usually made to understand. If the opinions of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of Calcutta, the *Independent* of Allahabad and the *Tribune* of Lahore could be treated as representative of the attitude of the elites of these provinces, one is forced to doubt whether the boycott of councils had the support of any large body outside those who were enraged by the Turkish Peace Treaty and the Punjab Tragedy.[8] Lokamanya Tilak, who towered over all contemporary nationalist leaders, and his Maharashtrian party, stood firmly by their policy of "responsive co-operation" which implied the capture of legislatures and offices of power conceded by the new Reforms Act. In pursuing the policy of contesting elections and entering the councils, Tilak had before him the example of the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland. "Everyone will admit," wrote the *Kesari*, "that the Sinn Feiners deserve to be *gurus* in questions of non-co-operation with government and defiance of government."[9] Even while accepting the policy of non-co-operation, the Sinn Feiners in Ireland "captured as many seats as possible in the last election and then kept them vacant."[10] To Tilak and followers the legislatures were "the battleground in the struggle for Swarajya and military posts from which to bombard government..."[11]

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[7] *The Tribune*, 9 June 1920,

[8] *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 5 April, 1920, Report on Native Newspapers and Periodicals, hereinafter as RNNP (Bengal) 1920. p. 273, Nationai Archives of India, herein after NAI; *The Tribune*, 6 July 1920, and 18 August 1920.

[9] *Kesari*, 6 July 1920, RNNP (Bombay) July–December 1920, No. 28, p. 14.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Kesari*, 27 July 1920, *Ibid.*, No. 31, p. 10.

A surprisingly large section of the national leaders too were not in favour of the boycott of legislatures. Even among Muslim leaders there were many who preferred 'responsive co-operation' to non-co-operation. Mohamad Ali, for instance, "expressed his regret at the method of boycott adopted, he would have preferred the Sinn Fein way."[12] C. R. Das vehemently opposed the boycott of councils as he wanted "to work out the principle of non-co-operation from within the councils.[13] Pandit Motilal Nehru also favoured entry into the legislatures. As Jawaharlal Nehru wrote, "his acceptance of the Council boycott in 1920 was partly a subordination of his own view-point to Gandhiji's."[14] Vithalbhai Patel made no secret of his preference for the capture of legislative machinery.[15] Significantly, the minds of many of the younger people were full of the potentialities of the council-entry tactics. "I remember pressing Gandhiji in the summer of 1920 to adopt this variant of the boycott," wrote Jawaharlal Nehru, "but in such matters he was adamant."[16]

Besides its insistence on truth and non-violence, Gandian ideology represented an instinctive hatred for Western civilisation and Western institutions, with its for-reaching implications. Gandhiji's condemnation of the values and institutions of Western civilisation, as expressed in his book, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule,* presented him as an uncompromising enemy of Western education, law courts, professions and even machines.[17] And if Gandhiji was to be true to his convictions as represented in the book, then he could not honestly adopt any other political programme except that of complete non-co-operation consisting of boycott of all Western institutions like legislatures, educational institutions and law courts. Hence he stressed that political life of the country would become thoroughly corrupt "if we import western tactics and methods".[18] Moreover, his wholesale condemnation of western institutions prevented Gandhiji from having any contact with the government, which naturally implied that he had to vehemently oppose the association of Indians with the bureaucracy in legislative councils or offices of power.

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[12] Nehru, n. 5, p. 99.
[13] Hemendra Das Gupta, *Desabandhu Chittaranjan Das* (Delhi, 1960) p. 48.
[14] Nehru, n. 5. p. 99.
[15] *The Tribune*, 1 September 1920.
[16] Nehru, n. 5, p. 99.
[17] Mahatma Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule* (Madras, 1934 edn.), pp. 20–1, 30–3, 41–7 and 77–87.
[18] *Young India*, 14 January 1920.

It was Lala Lajpat Rai's proposal for the boycott of elections which helped Gandhiji to give an inflated significance to the issue of entry into the legislative councils.[19] Lajpat Rai's proposal was the product of the series of political events in the Punjab which had ranged the important Punjab officials and the educated classes into two irreconcilable camps. Even those who did not endorse the Gandhian programme considered it most offending that the "important delinquents of the Punjab tragedy are still the important pillars of the administration."[20] They also shared the belief that, having been placed in an unassailable position, these Martial Law officers were "determined to defeat the reforms."[21] It was not surprising, therefore, that Lala Lajpat Rai asked the Punjabis to have nothing to do with the councils. The issue was given national importance by Gandhiji, who accepted the suggestion to boycott the councils, and made it an important plank in the non-co-operation programme. That was not all. He selected legislative councils for his special condemnation, treated them as "mud" and "small pills of opium to keep us in a state of somnolence." [22] The councils were thus made targets of public anger and condemnation.

With the large array of nationalist leaders not in favour of his programme, Gandhiji failed in persuading the Indian National Congress to join his movement for the redress of Khilafat wrongs. However, in view of the general situation in India and popular sentiment in the country, the All India Congress Committee which met at Benares on 7th June 1920 resolved to convene a special session of the Congress at Calcutta as early as possible and not later than 15 September 1920 to consider the adoption of a policy of non-co-operation or any other suitable course of action.[23]

The Special Congress which met at Calcutta on 1 September 1920 was to mark the ascendency of Mahatma Gandhi over national politics. The sudden demise of Lokamanya Tilak on 1 August 1920 removed from the Indian political scene the only leader of national stature who could challenge Gandhiji with any hope of success. Yet, at Calcutta, the Gandhian scheme was opposed by most of the Congress leaders.[24] The general feeling among the leaders was that the country needed some time to understand the spirit of non-co-operation, and that the details of the programme should be decided after further deliberations. This view was conveyed by an amendment proposed by Bepin Chandra Pal and supported by leaders from Bengal and Maharashtra, as well as leaders like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, M. A. Jinnah and S. Satyamurti. As Gandhiji himself admitted "never perhaps has the Congress witnessed such determined opposition as was offered to the non-co-operation resolution."[25]

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[19] *Hitavada*, 3 July 1920, RNNP (C.P.) 1920, No. 28, p. 7.

[20] *Lokmat*, 2 July 1920, *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Navjivan*, 18 July 1920, RNNP (Bombay) July–December 1920, No. 29. p. 17.

[23] *The Tribune* 10 June 1920.

All opposition, however, failed to leave any impression on Gandhiji. He stood firm by his resolution for the immediate implementation of his programme, unmoved by friendly appeals or hostile attacks.[26] He baffled the opponents of the non-co-operation programme by his statement at the subjects committee of 5 September 1920 that he was not bound by the majority of the Congress and retained the right of acting against the wishes of the majority.[27] A split in the Congress was feared.[28] It should, however, be conceded that Gandhiji could not let go the most propitious occasion which offered itself. In the prevailing atmosphere of unrest and discontent, the general consensus among people was in favour of an expresion of the real national sentiment.[29] There was a general feeling that with the disappearance of Tilak from the political scene, there was no leader who was Gandhi's equal in eminence, sacrifice, service and popularity and who could oppose his programme. "The feeling though unexpressed," wrote Jayakar, "operated on the minds of many who ultimately gave their adherence to

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[24] *Khaparde Papers*, File No. 6, Item No. 699. dated 1 Sept. 1920, NAI; also Diary entries in M. R. Jayakar, *The Story of My Life* (Bombay, 1958.) I, p. 390.

[25] *Young India*, 15 September 1920.

[26] Jayakar, n. 24, p. 391.

[27] *Khaparde Papers*, File No. 6, Item No. 700, NAI.

[28] *Ibid.* That this fear was not without base could be established by the fact that but for the timely intervention of Aswini Kumar Dutt, Chittaranjan Das, Followed by his Bengal friends, would have seceded from the Indian National Congress on its acceptance of the Non-co-operation resolutions at Calcutta. – P. C. Roy. *Life and Times of C. R. Das*, (Bombay, 1927), p. 159.

[29] *Prajapaksha*, 22 August 1920, RNNP (C.P.) 1920, No. 35, p. 4.

Gandhiji's resolution, though in most cases, out of sheer compulsion and not without great hesitation and doubt."[30] Tilak's party was in dissarray and confusion and his followers were yet to recover from the shock of his sudden demise. Some like Motilal Nehru were converted to the Gandhian view during the session. And finally Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, himself helped Gandhiji indirectly by the speech he made in opening the autumn session of his legislative council, which even a moderate paper like the *Servant of India* criticised as disappointing.[31] The Viceroy's tirade agaist the Gandhian movement served to create a reaction in favour of the non-co-operation programme. Even the *Kesari* was provoked to retort that the mere curses of the Viceroy "will not kill the Khilafat and non-co-operation movements.[32] As a result, Gandhiji's resolution which was approved by the subjects committee by a narrow majority of 12 votes, was carried in the plenary session of the Congress by 1,826 votes against 884 for Pal's amendment.[33]

The acceptance of non-co-operation by the Congress generated wide-spread enthusiasm. It initiated the involvement of the masses on an unprecedented scale and released a tremendous wave of national indignation against the British. All differences among Congressmen vanished as the new gospel made rapid conquests in the different regions of the country. Even those who were skeptical agreed to give a trial to the Gandhian programme which promised Swaraj in one year.

At Calcutta, the Congress had been led by circumstances to accept Gandhiji's leadership. At Nagpur, in December 1920, his leadership was constitutionally accepted and confirmed. From that time onwards the organisation did not escape his hold. One group after another was forced to dissolve its separate identity. In a short span of a few months, therefore, Gandhiji established a movement in which there was only one leader and one doctrine. His programme exercised complete control over the whole field of public life. To that extent he succeeded in unifying Indians. He could count on a wider support than any national leader before him. Although at times psychological pressure, even culminating in the victimisation of the non-conformists, had been used to achieve this state, it was widely felt to have been a necessity to accelerate the movement towards swaraj.[34] There was undoubtedly a great determination alive in the country to work out the new doctrine. And even those who suffered in their political prominence and many who dreaded the consequences of the movement were reluctantly impressed by the universal feeling that a new dawn was breaking.

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[30] Jayakar, n. 24, p. 403.

[31] *Servant of India*, 26 August 1920, RNNP (Bombay) July–December, 1920, No. 35, p. 1.

[32] *Kesari*, 24 August 1920, *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[33] *Indian Social Reformer*, 12 September 1920, RNNP (Bombay) July–December, 1920, No. 37, p.1.

If the unification of the different forces which Gandhiji achieved marked the beginning of a new era in the history of India's freedom movement, it soon became clear that history did not end with the era of achievement. Apart from the emotional unity of the various elements of the country, it was not easy to forecast what form the movement would take. Whatever the intention of Gandhiji and those who shared his views might have been with regard to the end and the means of India's political progress, it could not be overlooked that the conditions created by his action were little short of ideal for a civil war in India. It was in this sense that the radical elements in Indian politics approved of the whole scheme. According to them, "struggle and conflict with the bureaucracy with the ultimate object of paralysing the present administration was the main characteristic of the present struggle," and "the whole movement as conceived by the Calcutta Congress was directed to that goal."[35] The nation, they held, was given to understand that as a nation "it was at war with the present bureaucracy and for the matter of that even with England," and therefore, it was absolutely necessary to withdraw all co-operation with the opponents. The giving up of titles and the triple boycott of schools, law courts and councils, in their opinion, were but "a warning in the form of beginning, leading upto, and ending in civil rebellion."[36] With the supporters of the movement holding similar views, it was inevitable that the atmosphere be surcharged with sentiments of violence, although most of them remained unexpressed as a result of Gandhiji's uncompromising stand on the question of non-violence.

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[34] *Bharatwasi*, 24 and 30 November 1920, RNNP (Bombay) July–December 1920. No. 51, p. 7; *Young India*, 8 December 1920 *Ibid.*, No. 50, p. 12,

[35] *Mahratta*, 6 August 1922, RNNP (Bombay), July-December 1922, p,743.

[36] *Ibid.*

The inevitable happened when violence broke out in connection with the boycott of the Prince of Wales in 1921, and later when a mob attacked a police station in Chauri Chaura in February 1922, and burnt to death the constables who took refuge in it.[37] These events convinced Gandhiji of his "Himalayan blunder", made him declare that the Swaraj he saw stank in his nostrils, and pray for a "disastrous defeat" of his own movement.[38] Gandhiji could not have been ignorant of the danger implied in his movement, that violence was potentially present in all mass political movements. Despite Gandhiji's insistence on Ahimsa or non-violence, his movement could be no exception, especially as the massess lacked in strong ideological motivations. The consternation created among the leaders by the suspension of the non-co-operation movement proved that even they treated non-violence as a matter of policy. Motilal Nehru, Lajpat Rai and others sent from prison angry letters to Gandhiji, protesting against his decision to suspend the movement.[39] When the issue came before the A.I.C.C. at Delhi on 24 February 1922, the whole proceeding "reduced itself to attack from Maharashtra and Bengal."[40]

The suspension of civil resistance by Gandhiji was "certainly not due to Chauri Chaura alone, although most people imagined so."[41] That was only the last straw. Even before Chauri Chaura, it was evident that "our movement, in spite of its apparent power and the widespread enthusiasm, was going to pieces."[42] J. Nehru describes the situation thus:

> "All organisation and discipline was disappearing; almost all our good men were in prison, and the masses had so far received little training to carry on by themselves. Any unknown man who wanted to do so could take charge of a congress committee and as a matter of fact, large numbers of

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[37] Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, (New Delhi, 1935, 1969 reprint) I, pp. 235–6. The outbreak of violence in connection with the non–co–operation was not confined to these two events. A long list of riots or disturbances which broke out in connection with it has been given in Sankaran Nair, *Gandhi and Anarchy* (Madras, 1923) pp. 218–51.

[38] *Young India*, 16 February 1922, and 2 March 1922.

[39] Nehru n. 5, p. 82; Subhas Chandra Bose, *The Indian Struggle*, 1920–1942. (Calcutta, 1964, 1967 reprint) pp. 73–4; Sitaramayya, n. 37, p. 237.

[40] Jayakar, n. 24, p. 580.

[41] Nehru. n. 5, p. 85.

[42] *Ibid.*

> undesirable men, including *agents provocateurs*, came to the front and even controlled some local Congress and Khilafat Organisations. There was no way of checking them.[43]

The only means of preventing the whole movement from becoming mischievous, nay, positively harmful, was by suspending it.

On Gandhiji's recommendations, the Congress Working Committee which met at Bardoli decided to suspend the whole movement, and placed before the country a 'constructive programme consisting of nation-building activities like the removal of untouchability and drinking, propagation of Charka and Khaddar, and cultivation of Hindu-Muslim unity. The Bardoli resolutions were endorsed by the A.I.C.C. at Delhi. Gandhiji's bold decision to suspend his movement, though unpopular, represented the conclusion that no commander, however fearless and resourceful he be, could afford to go beyond the strength and readiness of the army under his command.

The arrest and incarceration of Gandhiji cast a gloom over the country. With the suspension of non-co-operation, all that was left for the Congress and the nation was the constructive programme "which in effect was a programme of social reform", and "was not likely to satisfy those who believed in political action."[44] A large section of Congressmen, Pandit Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das, Vithalbhai Patel and leaders from Maharashtra and Bengal including, felt that the constructive programme digressed attention from the real work before the Congress. They were also concerned about the possible creeping-in of lethergy and disorganisation among the nationalists. The only way to keep the flame of struggle burning was to present to the nation an alternative to direct action. Hence a change was suggested in the Congress programme to include council-entry.

The 'pro-changers' had to contend with the spirit of non-co-operation which surcharged the atmosphere even in Gandhiji's absence. Besides his personal appeal over the masses, Gandhiji had succeeded in rallying round him a band of dedicated and loyal followers within the Congress Organisation. Their ranks included stalwarts like C. Rajagopalachari, Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad. It was the historic role of the orthodox Gandhians led by these leaders to play the part

[43] *Ibid.*
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

of "no-changers" and defenders of the Gandhian programme. Under their leadership the A.I.C.C. reiterated its faith in civil disobedience as the "right and duty of the people to be exercised and performed whenever the state opposes the declared will of the people."[45] They not only battered the pro-changers heavily, but prevented the latter from capturing the machinery of the Congress and change its programme.[46] The bitterness which was imported into the controversy, over the question of a modification of the Congress programme no doubt, pointed to the development of a new cult around the Mahatma and his principles, which in certain respects was to be "as intolerant and tyrannical as the civilisation born of the sandy deserts of Arabia."[47]

The uncompromising attitude of the no-changers made a split in the Congress ranks inevitable. At the Gaya session of the Indian National Congress, in December 1922, the pro-changers made a bid for council-entry, but the majority in the Congress stood firmly by Gandhiji's programme. The pro-changers, therefore, organised themselves into a separate party, the Swaraj Party, with the definite aim of contesting elections and entering the legislatures. Even while preparations were being made by the Swarajists to contest the elections of 1923, Rajagopalachari issued a manifesto exhorting the no-changers to continue the boycott of the elections and to decide upon civil disobedience.[48] The internecine conflict seemed to be heading towards a crisis. The tussle gained in intensity as the elections approached. Meeting after meeting of the Working Committee and the A.I.C.C. — at Calcutta, Bombay, Nagpur, and Vizagpatam— convened to resolve the deadlock proved to be of no help.[49] The breach between the two groups were finally made up at the special Congress held at Delhi in September 1923 where it was resolved that "Such Congressmen as have no religious or other conscientious objections against entering the legislatures are at liberty to stand as candidates and to exercise their right of voting at the forthcoming elections."[50] And it was declared that "this Congress, therefore, suspends all propaganda against entering the Council."[51] The compromise resolution was subsequently ratified by the annual session of the Congress at Cocanada in December 1923.

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[45] Jayakar, n. 24, p. 580.

[46] *Report of the Thirty-Seventh Indian National Congress,* pp.1–3.

[47] Rabindranath Tagore as quoted in Jayakar, n. 24, p. 373.

[48] *The Indian Annual Register* 1923 (Calcutta) II, pp. 655–58.

[49] *The Indian National Congress,* 1920–23 (A. I. C. C., Allahabad, 1924) pp. 245–47.

[50] A.I.C.C. File No. 5/1923 NMML.

[51] *Ibid.*

Gandhian influence over nationalist politics could be seen reflected in the activities of the Swarajists themselves. While their ultimate goal was declared to be "the attainment of Swarajya," the Swarajists had accepted the attainment of Dominion Status as their immediate practical objective.[52] They were, however, quick to realise that Gandhian thought represented a glorification of Indian past, her traditions and institutions, as well as a corresponding hatred of Western political systems. Hence they hastened to add that the Dominion status they envisaged did not necessarily imply the adoption of the parliamentary system after the British pattern.[53]

Of equal importance as their objective was the method contemplated by the Swarajists. Their contention was that council-entry was compatible with non-co-operation, and their programme carried non-co-operation to the very citadels of British bureaucracy.[54] It was made to appear that council-entry was only one of the means for realising the objective of non-co-operation. This prominence given to non-co-operation in their programme alone enabled the Swarajists to command a hearing within the Congress and face the electorate. Phrases like "Non-co-operation inside the councils," and "wrecking the legislatures" were freely used by them to enlist support for the party. The reliance on Gandhian terms was a clear admission that the memory of the Mahatma remained as a tender sentiment in popular mind. It acted as a bond of unity even in the absence of Gandhiji in jail.

The success of the Swaraj Party in the general elections, and the great enthusiasm they imparted among the nationalists were recognised by Mahatma Gandhi on his release from jail. Even the release of Gandhiji was "generally regarded as a victory for the Swarajist party rather than an act of grace on the part of the Government."[55] However much he disapproved of the Swarajist programme, as a realist Gandhiji recognised that council-entry was a "settled fact" and tried to come to a compromise which could enable the Congress to function as a homogeneous organisation.[56] In the course of a series of secret conversations held in Poona between Gandhiji, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai, Gandhiji agreed to commit himself to a policy of tacit support to the Swaraj party. Gandhiji also seemed to have said plainly that the number of voters that flocked to the polling booths to vote for the Swarajists distinctly showed that the country was not in favour of non-co-operation. He had, he said, therefore to bend before public opinion, although it might be against his own opinions.[57]

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[52] A. I. C. C. File No. 13/1923, NMML.

[53] Motilal Nehru, *The Voice of Freedom* (Selected Speeches edited by K.M. Panikkar and A. Pershad) (Bombay, 1961) p. 149; *The Indian Annual Register 1923* (Calcutta) II, pp. 217–21. A.I.C.C. File No. 13/1923, NMML.

[54] Speech of C. R. Das, *Congress Presidential Addresses* (Madras, 1934) Second Series, pp. 587–98.

[55] *Fortnightly Reports*, Home (Political) File No. 25, February 1924) p. 1, NAI.

During the conversations which followed between Gandhiji and the Swarajist leaders, it was the obstructive tactics of the party which invited the most severe criticism from Gandhi, as he held the obstructive tactics of the Swaraj Party to be inconsistent with the practice of non-violence, and it was reported that he had therefore urged the adoption of "responsive co-operation."[58] Mention should be made of the appeals which Gandhiji was reported to have received that "the reckless action of the Swarajist Party in refusing the salaries of the Muhammadan Ministers and a number of educational officers has inflamed communal feelings."[59] The result of these talks was that obstruction pure and simple give way to responsivism as was evident from the statement of the Swarajist leaders after the Juhu talks. "Our position" it stated, "is really not so much of obstruction in the Parliamentary sense as that of resistance to obstruction placed in our path to Swaraj by the bureaucratic Government. It is this resistance which we meant to imply when we used the word obstruction,"[60] The restated policy and programme of the Swaraj party, which was approved by the All-India Swaraj Party Conference in August 1924, showed a tendency to utilise the opportunities available in legislatures "to create an atmosphere of resistance making government by bureaucracy impossible."[61] On his part, Gandhiji promised the Swarajists not to oppose council-entry at Belgaum Congress in December 1924.[62]

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[56] *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, XXIV, 1924 (The Publications Division, 1967) Preface, v–vi.

[57] *Fortnightly Reports*, n, 55, pp.29–30.

[58] *Fortnightly Reports*, Home (Political) File No. 25, (April, 1924.) p. 3.

[59] *Ibid.*, (May 1924) p.3.

[60] Motilal Nehru, n. 53, p, 520.

[61] *The Indian Quarterly Register*, 1924 (Calcutta) II, p. 140.

[62] *Fortnightly Reports*, Home (Political) File No. 25 (September, 1924) p. 2: *Ibid.* (December, 1924) p. 32: Sitaramayya, n. 37, p. 276; Hemendranath Das Gupta, n. 113, pp. 113–14.

Gandhiji, at the same time, forced the Swarajists to swallow the bitter pill of a spinning franchise. Despite their serious objection to the yarn franchise, the Swarajists accepted it in order to secure their immediate political goal, namely, the right to carry on their policy while remaining within the Congress.[63]

The compromise reached between Mahatma Gandhi and the Swarajists was endorsed by the Belgaum Congress in December 1924. Gandhiji permitted the Swarajists to pursue their council programme, while he exhorted the no-changers to devote themselves to the constructive programme.[64] The Swarajists scored a further victory when in September 1925, the All-India Congress Committee in its Patna meeting, voiced their strongest objections to the existing method of yarn franchise and sanctioned Pandit Motilal Nehru's alternative of the money subscription by 93 votes to 7.[65] This undid the revolutionary change introduced at the Belgaum Congress in the matter of the Congress franchise. The Patna A.I.C.C. completed the work which was begun at Belgaum, namely that of uniting the two wings within the Congress by resolving that the Congress should "take up and carry on all such political work as may be necessary in the interest of the country" without confining its activities to the constructive programme.[66] At Cawnpore, in December 1925, the Swarajists, while retaining their identity as a party, gained the sanction to take up the political work of the immediate future by employing the machinery and funds of the Congress.[67]

These developments, which promised a concentration of the national effort in struggle for swaraj, were deprived of any enduring result by a major split within the Swaraj Party. Many of the Swarajists in Maharashtra, Central Provinces and Berar, who belonged to the Tilak school of politics, had been clamouring for a further change in the Swarajist programme to include the acceptance of offices as well. The controversy, however, began with the acceptance of Executive Councillorship in the Central Provinces by S. B. Tambe, the Swarajist President of the C.P. Council. The resentful commotion created by the Tambe incident and the irritating correspondence which appeared in the press provoked Pandit Motilal Nehru, President of the All-India Swaraj Party, "to forget his usual dignity and restraint", and publicly condemn the Swarajists in C. P. and their friends in Maharashtra.[68] The Maharashtra leaders who had already become restive under Motilal Nehru's authoritarian reign after the death of C.R. Das, rose in revolt and eventually formed themselves into the Responsive Co-operation Party in 1926. Yet, the membership of the Congress was made a condition of membership of the party, although an exception was made for Bombay city to accommodate Jayakar, the President of the Party.[69] That the differences between the Responsivists and the Swarajists was insignificant was admitted by Motilal Nehru himself.[70] With all his personal animosity towards the Maharashtra leaders, Motilal Nehru appreciated the strength of the movement in Maharashtra and the Central Provinces. That explains the enthusiasm with which he joined to convene a meeting of the Responsivist and the Swarajist leaders at Sabarmati. He even wrote to Rangaswami Iyengar who was in Bombay, asking him to meet the Responsivists and speak to them regarding the differences between them and the Swarajists with a view to arriving at an agreement.[71]

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[63] *Fortnightly Reports*, Home (Political) File No. 25 (December, 1924) p. 32, Motilal Nehru characterised Gandhiji's attempt to limit Congress membership as autocratic and ultra vires. D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, II (Delhi, 1961) p. 138. Speaking at a Swaraj Party meeting at Poona on 2 January 1925, D. V. Gokhale said that Swarajists agreed to the new franchise only as a compromise, and that as soon as Gandhiji was convinced of its impracticability he would "take it back." *Fortnightly Reports*, Home (Political) File No. 112 (January, 1925), p. 2.

[64] As he himself admitted "there is nothing today on the Indian horizon to warrant the hope of early mass civil disobedience." — *Young India*, 23 April 1925.

[65] *Report of the Indian National Congress, Cawnpore*, 1925, (Madras, 1926) p. 53, *Resolutions passed by the All India Congress Committee at Patna* (Allahabad) 29 September, 1925.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] See Resolution VII, *Report of the I.N.C., Cawnpore*, 1925, (Madras, 1926) p. 106.

The conference, convened at Sabarmati on 20 and 21 April 1926, was attended by Mahatma Gandhi, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu (the Congress President), Pandit Motilal Nehru, Lala Lajpat Rai, N. C. Kelkar, M.S. Aney, Dr. B.S. Moonje, M.R. Jayakar, D.V. Gokhale and Oagle. The discussions centred on the conditions under which Swarajists could

[68] Jayakar, *The Story of My Life* (Bombay, 1959) II, p.643.

[69] N. C. Kelkar to M. R. Jayakar, 28 July 1926, Jayakar Papers, File No. 600, N. A. I.

[70] In his speech at Lahore in April 1926: The difference between them and ourselves are very few. You know that till recently we have been working shoulder to shoulder without the least friction, and if I may take the opportunity, as the Leader of the Swarajya Party to say it, I should say that I got the fullest loyalty from this groups of members. *The Hindu*, 10 April 1926.

[71] *The Indian Quarterly Register*, 1926 (Calcutta) I, p. 40.

accept offices. The main issue was presented by Mahatma Gandhi who held that there was no question of taking offices unless there was a satisfactory response on the part of the government.[72] Yet, the conference evolved a formula acceptable to both the groups, which was submitted for the ratification of the A.I.C.C. at Ahmedabad in May 1926. But before the A.I.C.C. met, Motilal Nehru sent to the Responsivist leaders a copy of resolution which he proposed to place before the A.I.C.C. instead of the original Sabarmati Pact.[73] It was rejected by the latter on the ground that it was "a travesty of the pact and a complete repudiation of the same."[74] They, therefore, refused even to attend the A.I.C.C. session.

Although Gandhiji kept himself out of the controversy at Ahmedabad, it was evident that he was upset by Motilal Nehru's compromise at Sabarmati. "I was simply taken aback about the Sabarmati Agreement", he wrote to Birla. "Even now I have not been able to understand all this."[75] It was significant that neither Jayakar, who was on intimate terms with Gandhiji, nor the other Responsivist leaders met Mahatma Gandhi or sought his intervention at Ahmedabad. Referring to the criticisms raised, Jayakar confessed to Gandhiji that "my seeing you personally could not have counted much or made any difference with you."[76] Pointing to the possible response towards them Jayakar added: "I do certainly feel that, not having the political following of Das or Motilal, I do not count with you in that sense, notwithstanding the personalte nderness which has always existed between us."[77]

The failure of the Sabarmati Pact implied the prospect of the two Congress sections competing at the polls in the ensuing elections. The internecine war removed a major obstacle in the way of the Maharashtra party identifying itself with communal, as against national, interests. At the same time, the Swaraj Party lost the predominant position it had both inside the Congress and outside. It was not accidental that the left-wing within the Indian National Congress, which had remained dormant till then, was able to make its influence felt in 1927.

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[72] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] Mahatma Gandhi to G. D. Birla, 23 May 1926, in G. D. Birla, *In the Shadow of the Mahatma* (Bombay, 1968, 1972 edn.) p. 16.

[76] Jayakar, to Gandhi, 27 July 1926, Jayakar Papers, File No. 499, NAI.

[77] *Ibid.*

The non-co-operation movement launched by the Indian National Congress had drawn into it a large number of young men who found in the Gandhian struggle an alternative to violent agitation or armed revolt. Many of them shared the view that the movement should not have been withdrawn simply because an infuriated mob at Chauri Chaura had committed an act of violence. This did not mean that they were advocates of violence. Apart from some youth organisations which advocated violent methods, most of them had accepted non-violence, although they accepted it as a policy and not as a religion, or an unchallengeable creed or dogma.[78] Violence was ruled out as an impracticable proposition under conditions which existed in India, although the undercurrent of sympathy with violent methods often dominated their writings and speeches. They treated the non-co-operation movement of 1920–22 as being predominantly peaceful and non-violent. Stray incidents of violence were, in their view, no justification for its withdrawal.[79] Another issue which agitated those of leftist banings was the vague concept of Swaraj, which, according to them imparted weakness to the movement. At the Nagpur Congress, in 1920, the goal of the Congress was definitely stated as the attainment of Swaraj. But this concept was never clearly defined by the Congress or by Mahatma Gandhi. "What were our principles and objectives in 1921 and 1922?", Nehru recalled, "a vague Swaraj with no clear ideology behind it . . .[80]

The period following the suspension of non-co-operation and the arrest of Gandhiji in 1922 found the leftist groups confused. They had before them instead of civil resistance, the constructive programme consisting of the cultivation of Hindu–Muslim unity, temperance, eradication of social evils like untouchability and drinking, the uplift of Harijans, the propagation of Khaddar and Charka etc. Most of the left-wing Congressmen approved of these nation-building activities, but many of them were not prepared to treat them as an alternative to India's struggle for freedom. Hence, they were inclined towards the council-entry programme of the Swaraj Party. None of them, it should be conceded, believed that the councils would win Swaraj for them, but obstruction and resistance within the legislatures alone provided an avenue for political action. While leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru showed willingness to give a trial to the Swarajist programme, most of the left-wing leaders like Subhas Chandra Bose, Srinivas Iyengar, S. Satyamurti, N.F. Nariman and Jamnadas Mehta were in the vanguard of Swarajist activities during 1922-26. The lack of response to Swarajist overtures from the government, and the split in Swarajist ranks over the issue of acceptance of ministerships which left the party weak and ineffective, served to discredit Swarajist policies. The disintegration of the Swaraj Party in 1926 helped the emergence of the left–wingers as a distinct group within the Indian National Congress.

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[78] Nehru, n. 5, p. 84.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

[80] *Ibid.* p. 86.

It was in the year 1927 that the ideas of the left-wing Congressmen began to take a more concrete as well as a more organised shape. And it was in the direction of complete independence and socialism that they moved. Jawaharlal Nehru became the intellectual leader of the group, and speeches and writings represented and echoed the main tendencies of the group. The left-wingers made their first organised effort at the Madras session of the Congress in 1927, when they successfully moved a resolution pledging the Congress to a policy of complete independence.[81] Yet, it was evident that they too had to reckon with Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhiji made no secret of his disapproval of the new development. To Jawaharlal Nehru he wrote:

> Your plunging into the 'republican army' was a hasty step. But I do not mind these acts of yours as much as I mind your encouraging mischief-makers and hooligans. I do not know whether you still believe in unadulterated non–violence. But even if you have altered your views you could not think that unlicensed and unbridled violence is going to deliver the country.[82]

The sobering effect it had was reflected in the activities of the left-wingers during the All-Parties Conference in 1928.

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[81] *Report of the I.N.C,, Madras*, 1927 (Madras) p. 15; Pattabhi n. 37, p. 319.

[82] Gandhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, 4 January 1928, *A Bunch of Old Letters* (Bombay, 1958) p. 56, Motilal Nehru had warned his son: "I do not think there is one man among the old or the new set of Congressmen who will not go into a fainting fit on hearing the words complete independence for India" — Motilal Nehru to Jawaharlal Nehru, 14 April 1927, Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Part I, Volume XIX, Nehru Memorial Museum Library, New Delhi, hereinafter as NMML

The events following the arrival of the Statutory (Simon) Commission left Congress politics in a melting pot.[83] A Conference of all the major parties in India met at Bombay and entrusted the work of framing a constitution for the country to a committee headed by Pandit Motilal Nehru. The report of the Nehru Committee, which represented the maximum common measure of agreement among the different parties, recommended Dominion Status for the country. The recommendation regarding a dominion form of Government,which came after thc Madras Congress resolution of complete independence, placed the left-wingers on the horns of a dilemma. At the All-Parties Conference at Lucknow in August 1928 they strongly upheld the banner of Independence and socialism. But they were reluctant to press him their demands to breaking point which "would have given great satisfaction and delight to the enemies of the Congress, would have weakened the forces working for national unity and would have increased the prestige of the Simon Commission instead of destroying it."[84] Even the socio-economic views of the left-wingers came under fire at the All-Parties Conference.[85] Yet, as suggested by Subhas Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru, the left-wing group decided to content themselves by voicing their protest at the Conference and then proceed to organise an Independence League in order to carry on an active propaganda in the country in favour of independence.[86]

The left-wingers met at a conference on 30 August 1928 and decided to form an "Independence for India League," pledged to the achievement of independence for India.[87] The growing strength of the Independence League threatened to bring it into collision with the All-Parties Conference and create a schism within the Congress. The province of Srinivas Iyengar and Satyamurti took the lead in asserting the growing prominence of the League. The Tamil Nadu Congress Working Committee which met on 5 October 1928 to consider the attitude of the congressmen towards the All-Parties Conference, passed resolutions expressing complete adherence to the resolutions of the Madras Congress (declaring the goal of the Indian people to be complete national independence).[88] Defiance to the Nehru Committee recommendations was more pronounced at the A.I.C.C. which met at Delhi in November 1928. The Working Committee even adopted the following resolution to be moved at the A.I.C.C. meeting.

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[83] Sitaramayya, n. 37, p. 320.
[84] Bose, n. 39, p. 153.
[85] *The Times of India*, 3 September 1928, p. 13.
[86] Bose, n. 39, p. 153.
[87] *The Times of India*, 1 September 1928, p. 18.

> "This meeting of the All-India Congress Committee adheres to the decision of the Madras Congress declaring complete Independence to be the goal of the Indian people and is of the opinion that there can be no true freedom till the British connection is severed. . ."[89]

Soon after the session of the A.I.C.C. closed on 4 November 1928, the Independence for India League met under the chairmanship of Srinivas Iyengar. A provincial All–India Council was formed with Srinivas Iyengar as President, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose as joint secretaries, Shiva Prasad Gupta as treasurer and with S. Satyamurti, Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, Jamnadas Mehta, Shankarlal, B. Sambhamurthi and twenty-five others with power to bring the League into existence throughout India.[90]

Despite their strong feelings the Independence Leaguers refused to force a division at the A.I.C.C. in December 1928. At the Congress Subjects Committee, they were persuaded to agree to a compromise resolution moved by Mahatma Gandhi. Jawaharlal Nehru did not attend the meeting, while Subhas Chandra Bose remained neutral. The resolution, as moved by Gandhiji, read as follows:

> "This Congress having considered the constitution recommended by the All-Parties Committee Report, welcomes it as a great contribution towards the solution of India's political and communal problems and congratulates the Committee on the virtual unanimity of its recommendations; and whilst adhering to the resolution relating to complete independence passed at the Madras Congress, approves of the constitution drawn up by the Committee as a great step in a political advance especially as it represents the largest measure of agreement attained among important parties in the country.

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[88] *Ibid.*, 8 October 1928, p. 11.
[89] *Ibid.*, 5 November 1928, p. 11.
[90] *Ibid.*, 7 November 1928, p. 13.

> "Subject to the exigencies of the political situation this Congress will adopt the constitution in its entirety if it is accepted by the British Parliament on or before December 31, 1929, but in the event of its non-acceptance by that date or its earlier rejection, the Congress will organise non-violent non-co-operation by advising the country to refuse taxation and in such other manner as may be decided upon.
>
> "Consistently with the above, nothing in this resolution shall interfere with the carrying on in the name of the Congress of propaganda for complete Independence."[91]

Gandhiji also succeeded in having Jawaharlal Nehru nominated for Presidentship of the Congress in 1929. While it recognised the growing importance of the group inside the Congress, it kept the radicals within the ambit of Congress discipline.

Conditions in 1929 necessitated the active involvement of Gandhiji "to prevent the nationalised movement lapsing into violence and terrorism."[92] Despite the less impressive performance of the Swarajists, the Congress seemed to have appreciated the possible advantages of having Congressmen in the legislatures. The Madras Congress, in pursuance of the boycott of the Simon Commission, had, no doubt, restricted the work inside the legislatures to a minimum.[93] Difficulties were, however, experienced in carrying out this direction, and "it was regretted that it was more honoured in the breach than in the observance."[94] Finally the Congress Working Committee recommended to the A.I.C.C. to give greater freedom to members of the Assembly and the provincial councils, and the A.I.C.C. accepted this recommendation.[95] As a result, the Congress movement during this eventful period had at once "a Council front" as well as "a Simon front."[96] In July 1929, however, Gandhiji made an earnest attempt to make the

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[91] *Ibid.*, 7 November 1928, p. 15.

[92] Horace G. Alexander, Introduction to C. F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas* (London, 1929, 1949 impression) p. 10.

[93] Pattabhi Sitaramayya, 'The Madras Congress," in *The Indian Review*, 1928 (Madras) p. 109.

[94] Pattabhi, n. 37, p. 321.

[95] *Ibid.*

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

Congress Working Committee pass a resolution calling upon Congressmen to resign their seats in the legislatures.[97] The attempt was defeated by the opposition of Motilal Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose and J.N.Sengupta. Gandhiji later won over Motilal Nehru and Sengupta to agree to "his pet theory of Council–boycott", which enabled him to have the boycott of Councils revived at the Lahore Congress in December 1929.[98] Unlike the other socialist leaders, Subhas Bose held the view, shared by the Responsivists and their school, that "it was tactically a great blunder to boycott the Legislatures when the new constitution was under consideration."[99] Hence, according to him, Pandit Motilal Nehru, who was the only man who could influence the Mahatma either way at that time, did a positive disservice to his country by actively supporting the Mahatma in his policy of reviving the boycott of legislatures.[100] But Pandit Motilal had himself become disgusted with "some Council members", and Gandhiji seemed to have had little difficulty in gaining his support.[101] Thus the call of the Congress to the Council members was a foregone conclusion. The logical consequence of such a course was the revival of civil disobedience.

Civil disobedience movement was inaugurated by Gandhiji in 1930 with his famous march to Dandi to break the salt laws, following the declaration of 'Purna Swaraj' as its goal by the Indian National Congress.[102] The internal differences within the Congress disappeared in the face of the intense feelings generated by the movement. Even the Maharashtrian leaders joined the Gandhian movement without any reservations.[103] They even permitted their political party— the Responsive Co-operation Party — to be "scattered to the winds."[104] The civil disobedience movement was, however, withdrawn by Gandhiji in 1931, and he attended the Second Round Table Conference as the sole representative of the Congress. On his return from England without achieving anything, the Congress Working Committee adopted, on

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[97] Bose, n. 39. p. 168.

[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 168–9.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

[101] Pattabhi, n. 37, p. 347.

[102] For the failure of negotiations with the government, the declaration of independence and the starting of civil disobedience, see *Ibid.*, pp. 348–54 and p. 357.

[103] *Fortnighly Reports,* Home (Political) File No. 18/VIII/30 (July 1930) p. 23; Home (Political Deposit) File No. 353/1930 and File No. 253/1930, NAI.

[104] Jayakar to Dr. Moonje, 1 February 1933, Jayakar Papers, Correspondence File No. 236, NAI.

1 January 1932, a resolution for the renewal of civil disobedience and the boycott of British goods.[105] Three days later Mahatma Gandhi was arrested. The Indian National Congress was declared an illegal body by government.[106] And all political activity in the country was brought to a standstill.

Congressmen found themselves placed in a situation almost similar to that of 1922. But they had the Swarajist history to fall back on. Moreover, the advent of the new constitutional reforms, coupled with the changed communal situation, added to the anxiety of a large section of Congressmen. With all his personal hostility to the legislative councils, Mahatma Gandhi appreciated the strength of feeling in Congress circles, which desired a pro-council policy. In a letter to M. S. Aney, he wrote thus:

> "In my opinion it is desirable that those who do not have faith in C. R. (Civil Resistance) or have lost the spirit for it should organise as congressmen such constructive activities as may commend themselves to them and prosecute them vigorously. In these I include even the Council entry programme for those who believe in it. Only they may not follow them as the official congress programme. The present paralysis is demoralizing and is difficult for me to understand."[107]

A similar letter seemed to have been written to K. M. Munshi also.[108] And in his letter to Dr. M. A. Ansari dated 18 March 1934, Gandhiji wrote:

> "My emphatic opinion is that the paralysis of the intelligentsia must be removed. However much therefore I may differ as to the Council-entry programme I would welcome a party of Congressmen prosecuting the programme rather than they should be made sullen, discontented and utterly inactive."[109]

The result was that a conference of Congress leaders was convened on 31st March 1934, by Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy and Dr. M. A. Ansari, at

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[105] Pattabhi, n. 37, pp. 614–7.

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 526.

[107] Mahatma Gandhi to M. S. Aney, 7 March 1934, M.S. Aney Papers, File No. 2 (1928–34 NMML.

[108] *The Indian Annual Register*, 1934 (Calcutta) I, p. 261.

[109] Enclosure in letter from K. F. Nariman to M. S. Aney, 3 April 1934. M. S. Aney, Papers, File No. 2, NMML.

Delhi, to take stock of the political situation in the country and consider a reorientation of Congress policy. It was attended by nearly forty delegates representing all provinces.[110] After two days of discussions, the conference decided to revive the all India Swaraj Party which had been in abeyance, and to contest the forthcoming elections to the Legislative Assembly.[111] Dr. Ansari, Dr. B. C. Roy, and Bhulabhai Desai met Mahatma Gandhi at Patna on 4 April 1934, and obtained his approval of the conclusions arrived at by the Delhi Conference. The following letter addressed by Gandhiji to Dr. Ansari embodied the Mahatma's views:

> "I have no hesitation in welcoming the revival of the Swarajya Party and the decision of the meeting to take part in the forthcoming elections to the Assembly which you tell me is about to be dissolved. My views on the utility of legislatures in the present state are well-known. They remain on the whole what they were in 1920, but I feel that it is not only right but it is the duty of every Congressman who for some reason or other does not want to or cannot take part in the Civil resistance and who has faith in entry into legislatures to seek entry and form combinations in order to prosecute the programme which he or they believe to be in the interests of the country."[112]

In a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru dated 14 April 1934, Gandhiji wrote: "The revival of the Swarajya Party is a right step. There is no doubt that we have in the Congress a body of men who believe in Council-entry and who will do nothing else if they cannot have their programme. Their ambition must be satisfied."[113] Subsequently, on 7 April 1934, Gandhiji issued a lengthy statement suspending civil resistance for Swaraj as distinguished from specific grievances.[114]

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[110] Those who attended the Conference included Dr. Ansari, Dr. B. C. Roy, Dr. Alam, K. R. Sidhwa, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, S. Satyamnrti, Bhaktavathsala Mudaliar, Bhulabhai Desai (Chairman), K. M. Munshi, K.F.Nariman, G. V. Subha Rao, Mohanlal Saxena and Dixit.— *The Indian Annual Register*, 1934 (Calcutta) I, p. 261.

[111] *Ibid.*, p. 262, also Sitaramayya, n. 37, p. 567.

[112] Reproduced in *Ibid.*

[113] Chandra Sekhar Shukla, ed., *Reminiscences of Gandhiji* (Bombay, 1951) p. 207.

[114] Sitaramayya, n. 37, pp. 568–70; Bose, n. 39, p. 299 and p. 331.

Although civil disobedience was suspended by Gandhiji to facilitate Swarajist politics, the way seemed far from clear for a free pursuit of the programme. Gandhiji was firm in his view that "it will be wrong for the Congress to abandon C. D. altogether."[115] According to Nariman, Gandhiji still insisted that civil disobedience should formally and nominally continue to be the official policy of the Congress, but that the duty of executing the official programme rested on him alone as the sole representative of the Congress. Gandhi, it seemed, desired that other Congressmen "wishing to follow another programme should form themselves into groups not actually inside the Congress to pursue their programme and he will 'bless' that move whatever direction it may be."[116] The Swarajists were given a further set back by the U. P. Congress Workers Conference, held in April 1934, which passed a resolution wherein a desire was expressed to entrust the council programme to the A.I.C.C. and not to have a separate party such as the Swarajya Party for that purpose.[117] Dr. Ansari held that behind this resolution lurked the fear whether the Swarajya Party would be dominated by those Congressmen who were opposed to civil disobedience movement or those non–Congressmen who would become Swarajists for electioneering purpose.[118] He also expressed his fear that "this would be reiterated by every province."[119] This turned out to be true. It soon became evident that many of the prominent Congress leaders did not feel the necessity of constituting a separate organisation for the purpose of council work. In a letter to Gandhiji, dated 21 April 1934, C. Rajagopalachari wrote: "The Parliamentary programme should be done in the name of the Congress and through Congress machinery, and not in the name of a separate party affiliated to the Congress. I am glad to find from your letter that your inclination also is towards the All–India Congress Committee adopting the parliamentary programme and placing the Congress machinery at the disposal of such programme."[120]

Nearly a hundred Congressmen representing all provinces met at conference at Ranchi on 2 May 1934, and unanimously passed the constitution of the revived all-India Swaraj Party. The conference, presided over by Dr.Ansari, was attended by leaders like Bhulabhai Desai, C. Rajagopalachari, S. Satyamurti, Asaf Ali, K. M. Munshi, Sherwani, Choudhuri Khaliquzzaman, T. C. Goswami, Mrs. Naidu, K. F. Nariman, K. T. Shah, S. C. Mitra and Dr. B. C. Roy.[121]

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[115] Gandhi to Aney, 30 April 1934, M. S. Aney Papers, File No, 2, NMML.

[116] Nariman to Aney, 17 April, 1934. *Ibid.*

[117] Dr. Ansari to M. S. Aney, 22 April 1934, M. S. Aney, Papers, File No. 2, NMML.

[118] *Ibid.*

[119] *Ibid.*

[120] Quoted in Chandrasekar Shukla, n. 113, p. 207.

The Swarajya Party's separate existence was brought to a sudden end by the conflicting interests within the Congress. Hindu leaders like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and M.S. Aney vehemently opposed the Swarajya Party's attitude to the Communal Award, while the Socialists who welcomed the prospect of a premature death of the party, joined them in attacking it.[122] The result was that the A.I.C.C. which me at Patna on 18 and 19 May 1934 decided to entrust the programme envisaged by the Swarajya Party to a Parliamentary Board of the Congress.[123]

Mahatma Gandhi had prevented a pro–change no–change controversy by himself initiating the alternative programme of council–entry. And yet the Indian National Congress found it impossible to contain the irreconcilable factions within its fold represented mainly by the Muslim and Hindu leaders as well as the Socialists. If the national organisation escaped from a series of major splits threatened by the internecine conflicts, it was in no small measure due to the tactics of compromise the Mahatma adopted at critical moments.

The Communal Award had become a bone of contention between the Muslim and Hindu leaders within the Congress. While the Hindu leaders wished to reject the Award, Muslim leaders like Dr. Ansari chose to defer the consideration of a suitable communal settlement until a constituent assembly was called.[124] The Congress was threatened by a split over the communal question when, on 17 June 1934, the Parliamentary Board accepted the policy declared by Dr.Ansari. Significantly, this was approved by the Congress Working Committee which met on the same day.[125] By it, the Congress chose for itself the path of neutrality by neither accepting nor rejecting the Award. The policy of neutrality, as explained by Rajendra Prasad, was determined by considerations of the actual realities of the situation. Rejection of the Award, he said, would have created a breach in the united front of all communities, especially Hindus and Muslims, which was essential for successfully fighting the White Paper imposition.[126] Acceptance of the Award, on the other hand, would have given a temporary success but, according to Rajendra Prasad, it would have led the country into the morass of communalism from which there was no hope of getting out.[127] The policy of neither accepting nor rejecting the Award was, therefore, an attempt to escape from the horns of this dilemma.

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[121] *The Indian Annual Register*, 1934 (Calcutta,) I, p. 271.

[122] *Ibid.*, pp.278–79.

[123] *Ibid.*, p,290, also Sitaramayya, n. 37, p. 571.

[124] *Ibid.*, pp. 278–79.

[125] Sitaramayya, n. 37, pp. 574–5.

The decision of the Congress on 17 June 1934 prompted Pandit Malaviya and M.S. Aney to come out with strong disapproval of it. Their contention was that as the Indian National Congress stood for national unity and joint electorates, it could not tolerate even for a short period any arrangement like the communal decision which made for separate electorates and national disintegration. They, therefore, resigned their membership of the Congress Parliamentary Board and the Working Committee.[128] "You dare not resign", wrote Mahatma Gandhi to Aney, "and in any case not without a proper fight with me. I would undertake to prove to you that by remaining on both the committees, you will do no violence to your principle."[129] All negotiations, however, failed. The suspicion had gained strength that it was the Muslim Nationalists who at one time outdid the Hindus in condemning the Communal Award, had prevailed upon the Congress to become converted to a policy of non-acceptance and non-rejection of the Award. In its issue dated 24 June 1934, the *Leader* wrote editorially:

> "Is it a fact that at Bombay Mahatma Gandhi was faced with two resignations, (not made known to the public) cabled by Dr. Ansari that if his view was not upheld by the Congress he must resign and the other by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and as stated by the *Hindustan Times* the weak Hindu Community's claim had to be ignored to please the Muslims?"[130]

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[126] Rajendra Prasad, *Autobiography*, (Bombay, 1957) p.392.

[127] *Ibid.*

[128] *Ibid.* pp, 576–77.

[129] M. K. Gandhi to M.S. Aney, 18 June 1934, M. S. Aney Papers, File No.2, NMML.

[130] Quoted in *The Modern Review*, 1934, (Calcutta) II, p. 117.

Consequent on their resignations, Pandit Malaviya and M. S. Aney summoned a conference of Congressmen who were opposed to the Congress attitude to the Communal Award on 18 and 19 August 1934 at Calcutta. The conference decided to constitute a separate party, to be called the Congress Nationalist Party, with the object of carrying on agitation against the Communal Award and the White Paper in the legislatures and outside, and for that purpose to set up candidates for election to the Legislative Assembly.[131]

More than the communal factor, the ascendency of the Socialist group threatened the Indian National Congress with disintegration, as it posed a challenge to Gandhiji's domination and leadership.

When the Socialist movement began in the early 1930s, there was little to distinguish them from the Communists. As admitted by one of the Socialists, "Socialist thinking in this period had almost become synonymous with the orthodox Marxism which was construed even by democratic socialists as the sole scientific school of thought which offered not merely a scientific interpretation of the historical development of society but also a guide to usher in a new social order free from exploitation."[132] The Socialist leaders of this period seemed to have generally subscribed to the materialistic interpretation of history, theories of class struggle, revolution leading to the dictatorship of the proletariat and finally to the development to the stage of a classless society.[133] They also seemed to uphold the dictum that the end justified the means.[134]

With the Socialist leaders aiming to bring about a mass revolution of the Soviet type, they could not honestly approve of the Gandhian programme of action based on truth and non–violence. They entertained serious doubts about the efficacy of Gandhiji's movement, and could at best accept non-violence as a matter of policy.[135] Some of them were inclined to direct scathing attacks on Gandhiji's teachings and even to accuse him of trying to maintain status quo in society and obstruct the pace of social transformation.[136] To many of them "Class war and advocacy of confiscation of property are not inconsistent in any way with the Congress creed."[137]

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[131] Sitaramayya, n. 37, p. 577.

[132] M. R. Dantavate, *Gandhiji's Impact on Socialist Thinking* (A Praja Socialist Party Publication, 1957 p. 1; also J. B. Kripalani, *Gandhian Thought* (Gandhi Smarak Nidhi, 1961) Preface, p. V.

[133] Girija Shankar, 'Gandhiji and the Socialists–A phase in the National Struggle, *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. L, Part III, (December 1972) pp.811–12.

[134] *Ibid.*, p. 812,

The Congress under Gandhian leadership, no doubt, exhibited socialist outlook in its policies and programmes.[138] The resolution adopted by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay in 1929 should be sufficient to establish it:

> "In the opinion of the Committee the great poverty and misery of the Indian people are due not only to the foreign exploitation but also to the economic structure of society which alien rulers support so that their exploitation may continue. Therefore to remove this poverty and misery and to ameliorate the condition of the Indian masses it is essential to make a revolutionary change in the economic and social structure of society and remove the gross inequalities."[139]

Gandhiji could not, however, approve of the Socialist advocacy of a violent struggle, divorce of moral principles from politics and their programme of drastic social and economic reforms. His differences with them appeared to be so fundamental that Gandhiji declared emphatically: "If they (Socialists) gained ascendancy in the Congress, as well they may, I cannot remain in the Congress."[140] The following proposals which Gandhiji made for a reorganisation of the Congress were even viewed by the Socialists as an attempt to drive them out of the Congress:

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[135] *Ibid.*

[136] Jayaprakash Narayan, *Why Socialism?* (Benares, 1936) pp. 80–84 Marxists even condemned him as "an agent of capitalists". — Swami Kumaranand at Patna A.I.C.C., May 1934, *The Indian Annnal Register*, 1934 (Calcutta) I. p. 292.

[137] *The Times of India*, 2 October 1234.

[138] Kripalini, n, 132, pp. 96–97. Many of Gandhiji's admirers maintained that "if practice matters more than theory then Gandhiji is much more truly a communist than most of those who call themselves by the name." — Horace Alexander, 'Political Ideas of Mahatma Gandhi' in *Social and Political Ideas of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi, 1949) p. 9. Even many confirmed Communists came round to agree that "it is silly to aver that Gandhi acted as the conscious and willing tool of the bourgeois." — Hiren Mukherjee, *Gandhiji, A Study* (Calcutta, 1958) p. 86.

[139] Kripalani, n. 132, p, 97,

[140] N. V. Raj Kumar, *Development of Congress Constitution*, (New Delhi, 1949) Appendix I, p. 137.

(1) to change the creed of the Congress from a commitment to "peaceful and legitimate methods" to "truthful and non-violent means";

(2) a requirement that every member of the Congress should spin 2,000 rounds of yarn every month;

(3) that only a Congressman, whose name had been in the Congress Register for at least six continuous months without default, and had been a habitual wearer of Khadi would be allowed to vote for the Congress delegates and that the number of delegates at the annual session of the Congress be reduced from 6,000 to 1,000 with not more than one delegate for every 1,000 voting members.[141]

It was on the eve of the Bombay session of the Congress, in October 1934, that the Socialists organised themselves into the All India Congress Socialist Party. It was decided that "the Party shall consist of members of the Indian National Congress, who are also members of the Provincial Congress Socialist Party affiliated to the Party, provided that they are not members (a) of any communal organisation and (b) of any other political organization whose objects and programmes are in the opinion of the party inconsistent with its own."[142] The object of the party was "the achievement of complete independence and the establishment of a socialist society." Expressing its firm opinion that political freedom should include real economic freedom of the starving millions, the party declared that the future constitution of the Indian States should be based on the following fundamental principles:

(1) The transfer of all power to the producing masses.

(2) Development of the economic life of the country to be planned and controlled by the state.

(3) Socialiation of the key and principal industries, i.e., steel, cotton, jute, railways, shipping, mines, banks, and public utilities.

(4) State monopoly of foreign trade.

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[141] *Ibid.*, pp. 135–40.

[142] *The Times of India*, 23 October 1934.

(5) organisation of co-operative institutions of production, distribution and credit in the un-socialised section of economic life.

(6) Elimination of princes and landlords and all other classses of exploiters without compensation.

(7) Re-distribution of land to peasants.

(8) Liquidation of debts owned by peasants and workers.

(9) The State shall provide work to every able bodied adult and social insurance against unemployment, old age, sickness and accidents, maternity etc.

(10) "To every one according to his needs and from every one according to his capacity" to be the ultimate basis of distribution of ecocomic goods.

(11) There shall be adult franchise which shall be on a functional basis.

(12) The State shall neither support nor discriminate between religions nor recognise any distinction based on caste or community.

(13) The State shall not discriminate between the sexes.[143]

Another feature of Socialist politics of the 1930s was their uncompromising hostility to the scheme of the Federation envisaged by the White Paper which followed the Round Table Conferences. The native rulers, who were to become a powerful force under the new scheme became the target of their virulent attacks. The All-India Socialist Conference, held on 22 October 1934 at Bombay declared that "the abolition of the rule of the Indian Princes alone can assure the complete Independence for the whole of India."[144] The conference also invited the people of the native states "to fight side by side with the people of British India in the struggle for Independence."[145]

The Socialists in general refused to assign much importance to the Communal Award and its consequences, which was a question of life and death to many in nationalist circles. They, in fact, went out of the way to condemn the activities of those concerned with the developments as "a communalist and anti-National move which has started a futile controversy over an issue which is of no importance to the masses and which has distracted attention from the real task of their emancipation from exploitation."[146]

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[143] *Ibid.*

[144] *The Indian Annual Register* 1934 (Calcutta) II, p. 296.

[145] *Ibid.*

One issue which consistently agitated the Socialists was the question of entry into the legislatures and acceptance of offices. They made no secret of their vehement opposition when Gandhiji blessed the revival of the Swaraj Party in 1934 and the Council entry programme. Their meeting at Benares in October 1934 expressed their feeling that such activity constituted "a drift towards sterile constitutionalism, and called on the members of the Congress Socialist Parties

> (1) to decline nomination as Congress or independent candidates for the Assembly election and withdraw their condidature if already nominated and (2) to decline to serve as members on the Parliamentary Board's central or provincial or any committees formed for the electoral campaign.[147]

The Congress Socialist Party definitely showed signs of dominating the Indian political scene at the expense of the Gandhians. Eminent national leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose lent their support to the growing left-wing. Socialist slogans for economic justice to the exploited masses, and for a militant and direct struggle against British imperialism filled Congress meetings. The Faizpur Congress in 1937 marked the high-water-mark of Socialist influence over the Congress, with the elevation of Jawaharlal Nehru as President and Socialist leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan, Narendra Deva and Achyut Patwardhan as members of the Working Committee. Even Gandhiji's suggestion for "omitting a Socialist name and taking a woman" was ignored.[148] Resolutions relating to War, the Faizpur agrarian programme and mass contacts were "readily amended in the manner demanded by the left."[149] Gandhiji's influence seemed to be on the wane.

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[146] *Ibid.*,

[147] *The Times of India*, 2 October 1934, p. 14.

[148] Gandhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, 21 May 1936, *A Bunch of Old Letters* n. 82, p. 177.

[149] Jayaprakash Narayan, *Towards Struggle* (Bombay, 1956) p. 193.

While appraising the Faizpur Congress, Jayaprakash Narayan wrote: "But as his (Gandhi's) words rolled on they fell, as it seemed to me, more and more flatly. When he finished there was no cheering, no waves of acclamation breaking through the cries of Gandhiji-ki-jai."[150]

The growing confidence of the Socialists about their strength in the Congress served to intensify the conflict between them and the Gandhians, who supported the Congress ministries in power in the seven provinces. The conflict became acute in Bihar where the Socialist sponsored Kisan Sabha came into a direct clash with the Congress ministry on the issue of agrarian reforms. The issue of conflict was a Tenancy Bill, passed by the Congress Government in Bihar, which was originally meant to give some relief to the peasants but was alleged to have been considerably watered down in order to meet the wishes of the Zamindars. The Bill, it was pointed out, evaded the issue of banning illegal eviction and sale of homesteads of the peasants by the Zamindars for failure to pay the rent.[151] Demonstrations and processions were held in different parts of Bihar in protest against the Bill. The agitation soon took a different turn when the Socialists began to advocate the use of violence against the offending Zamindars. The Bihar Congress Committee threatened to take disciplinary action against those whose action was bound to create an atmosphere of violence. Gandhiji too was drawn into the controversy which involved the question of violence versus non-violence. He strongly denounced the Socialist advocacy of the use of violence by the kisans even for self defence.[152] He approved the action taken by the Bihar Congress Committee and the Congress Working Committe. Confident of their strength in the Congress the Socialists chose the path of defiance and Jayaprakash Narayan, the General Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party, lashed out at Gandhiji:

> Gandhism has played its part. It cannot carry us further and hence we must march and be guided by the ideology of socialism. We may suffer political persecution at the hands of the Congress and even be driven out of it, but a day will come when the Congress will become ours."[153]

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[150] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[151] Girija Shankar, n. 133, p. 816.

[152] *The Indian Aunual Register*, 1938, (Calcutta) I p. 340.

[153] *Congress Socialist*, 6 February, 1938, quoted in Girija Shankar, n. 133, pp. 816-17.

The ideological differences between the Socialists and the Gandhians reached the climax when the A.I.C.C. met at Delhi in September 1938. The right-wing, with the support of Gandhiji, moved a resolution on "civil liberties," which, at the same time accused the Socialists of being advocates of "murder, arson, looting and class war by violent means," and assured the Congress ministries which undertook measures for the "defence of life and property" of the support of the Congress.[154] The heated debate which followed almost caused a split in the Congress. Sixty members of the left-wing led by Acharya Narendra Deva walked out of the meeting in protest.[155] The defiant attitude of the Socialist group moved Gandhiji to such an extent that he suggested that those who did not subscribe to the Congress creed of truth and non-violence and constructive programme should leave the Congress.[156]

The gradual move of Jawaharlal Nehru from the left to the left of the centre and the rapport that developed between him and the Gandhians proved to be of far reaching consequences. Significantly, the leftist opposition to the centrist leaders had been led by Jawaharlal Nehru himself. The leftists had viewed Nehru as their "only hope," and expected him "to withstand the combined opposition and influence of Gandhism."[157] Nehru's strong advocacy of socialist views, and his "irritability and impatience" of the centrists had prompted the latter to dissociate themselves from him.[158] With all his differences with leaders of the centrist group, however, it was felt that Nehru appeared to be the only person under whose leadership the two groups would pull together. On the one side, his vehement opposition to some of Gandhiji's measures had not in any way reduced Nehru's veneration of the Mahatma. At the same time, it became more and more evident that "though Jawaharlal is extreme in his presentation of his methods, he is sober in action."[159] Gandhiji had the faith that Nehru would not "precipitate a conflict," and would be inclined to "accept the decisions of the majority of his colleagues."[160]

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[154] *Congress Bulletin*, No. 5, 26 September 1938, (Allahabad, 1938) p. 7.

[155] *The Indian Annual Register*, 1938 (Calcutta), II, p. 257.

[156] M. K. Gandhi, 'The Unfortunate Walkout', *Harijan*, 15 October 1938.

[157] Rafi Ahmad Kidwai to Nehru, 20 April 1956, *A Bunch of Old* Letters, n. 82, p. 174.

[158] Rajendra Prasad to Nehru, 19 December 1935, and 1 July 1936, *Ibid.*, p. 166 and p. 185; Gandhi to Nehru, 15 July 1936, *Ibid.*, p. 197.

[159] Mahatma Gandhi to Agatha Harrison, 30 April 1936, *Ibid.*, p. 175.

[160] *Ibid.*, pp. 175–76.

Nehru himself had, in the meanwhile, become disgusted with the turn leftist politics had taken. "I fear," he said, "that many of our so-called Leftists believe more in strong language than in anything else."[161] The final stage in the gradual conversion of Nehru was marked by the stand he took in 1939 when Subhas Chandra Bose fell out with the Gandhian group. Nehru explained the transformation thus:

> "During the past few years I have come into intimate contact with Gandhiji and Vallabhbhaiji and others of his way of thinking. We have had repeated and prolonged discussions and although we have failed to convince each other, we have influenced each other considerably and we have, I believe, understood each other to a large extent."[162]

Public affairs, Nehru held, involved "an understanding of each other and faith in the *bona fides* of colleagues" and of late he had come "to attach more and more importance to this faith and understanding between colleagues."[163] He had also become convinced that "the pushing out, or the attempt to push out, [sic] of Gandhiji and his group would weaken us greatly at a critical moment."[164]

The conversion of Nehru coincided with a general cleavage within the Socialist ranks, which brought one section closer to Gandhiji. They had been disillusioned by their dealings with the Royists and communists from whom they had derived their strength, and had begun to realise the futility of their attempt to unite the discordant left-wing.[165] They also acknowledged the wisdom and necessity of accepting the Gandhian leadership for the attainment of independence, and even for the reconstruction of Indian society. Their frequent exchange of views with the Mahatma tended to reduce their opposition to Gandhi.

The change which the Socialists underwent in their outlook was considerable. They were, till then, of the view that the national movement had to choose between Socialism and Gandhism. They had claimed that the workers, the peasants and the lower middle classes were the real anti-imperialist classes and should be relied upon in the fight against British imperialism. By 1939, they came round to accept the view that the nationalist movement represented all shades of Indian people which consisted of different classes, communities and interests, and that the success of the movement lay in uniting them in a common effort, which was possible only under the Congress banner and Gandhiji's leadership.[166] The deviation from their previous stand was more perceptible in the writings of some of the Socialists who stressed the points of similarity between Gandhism and Socialism. According to them, the Gandhian phase in our national struggle would logically and ultimately "lead to a socialist base."[167] They even tended to accept non-violence, although still as a matter of policy rather than creed. The Gandhian concept of re-organisation of rural life on the basis of self-sufficiency and small-scale production was also endorsed by some of them.[168]

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[161] Nehru to Subhas Chandra Bose, 4 February 1939, *Ibid.*, p. 308.

[162] *Ibid.*. p. 308.

[163] *Ibid.*, pp. 311-12.

[164] Nehru to Subhas Chandra Bose, 3 April 1939, *Ibid.*, p. 341.

[165] Girija Shankar, n. 133, p. 818.

On his part, Gandhiji had begun to recognise some merit in the social and economic proposals of the Socialists. His support to a resolution placed before the Ramgarh Congress in March 1940 established the change the Mahatma underwent during the period. The resolution, which was meant to be a re-statement of the Congress goal, advocated the abolition of land-lordism and Princely States, recognition of the principle that land belonged to the actual cultivators, nationalisation of large-scale industries, etc.[169] The resolution, which the majority in the Congress Working Committee seemed to approve, was not discussed by the Ramgarh Congress because it was decided to confine the discussion to only one resolution relating to the war crisis. Significantly, Gandhiji published the draft resolution in the *Harijan*, and admitted that he had no difficulty in generally endorsing the proposals except the abolition of the Princely States.[170] What deserves special mention is Gandhiji's acceptance of the Socialist concept of land reform and nationalisation which he had previously opposed. This has been viewed as a significant ideological agreement between Gandhiji and the Socialists which helped to promote a new relationship between them in the struggle for freedom ahead.[171]

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[166] *Ibid.*

[167] M. R. Masani, "C. S. P. must save the Congress," *Congress Socialist*, 5 March 1939, quoted in *Ibid.*

[168] *Ibid.*,

[169] Jayaprakash Narayan, *Socialism, Sarvodaya and Democracy* (New York, 1964) pp. 37–39.

[170] *Harijan*, 20 April 1940.

The rapprochment between Gandhiji and the Socialists was preceded by an open challenge to his leadership by Subhas Chandra Bose. Gandhiji and Bose had little love lost between them. Bose never believed in non-violence and openly sympathised with the Bengal terrorists and probably had links with them. Likewise, he did not believe in the 'constructive programme' and the Gandhian philosophy of village life and hand-spinning.[172] Moreover, he did not share the steadfast loyalty to Gandhi which characterised leaders like Nehru who differed from the Mahatma's views.[173] Most of all, he entertained the ambition to assume the role which Gandhiji considered as his own prerogative, namely, launching and directing the national struggle in India, as he had done twice earlier. On the eve of Bose's re-election as President of the Congress, Gandhiji wrote:

> Although I am not in the Congress, I have not ceased to be of it. Congressmen still expect me to give the call when, in my opinion, the time for action has come. What is more, if God so wills it, I feel that I have strength and energy to lead a battle more strenuous than I have fought.[174]

Matters came to a head when Bose, who had held the office of President of the Indian National Congress, decided to seek re-election. Gandhiji and the majority of the Congress Working Committee were opposed to Bose's re-election and supported a rival candidate. Bose, no doubt, emerged victorious, but he soon found that the Gandhian group was determined neither to accept his lead nor to allow him to control the machinery of the Congress.[175] He found even the Congress Socialist Party, which helped his re-election, vacillating when the fight against the Gandhian group began.[176] It soon appeared that Gandhiji and the Working Committee would be satisfied with nothing less than Bose's expulsion. Twelve out of the fifteen members of the Working Committee resigned, with the declared object of enabling Bose to choose a homogeneous cabinet and enforce his programme without let or hindrance.[177] However, when the Congress met at Tripuri in March 1939, Pandit Pant introduced a resolution expressing confidence in the former members of the Working Committee, approving the policies followed by the Congress under Gandhiji's leadership and requiring the President to constitute the Working Committee in accordance with Gandhiji's wishes. Asked to choose between Gandhiji and Bose, the Congress opted decisively for the Mahatma. At Tripuri even the Congress Socialist Party remained neutral and facilitated the passing of Pant's resolution.[178] Gandhiji's refusal to propose any names made it impossible for Bose to comply with the Congress resolution.[179] There was no other alternative for Bose but to resign the Presidentship.[180] The ruthlessness and cunning that characterised the move against Bose was "more in keeping with Gandhi's character as a politician than as a saint."[181]

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[171] Girija Shankar, n. 133, p. 821.

[172] Bose, n. 39, p. 331.

[173] Penderal Moon, *Gandhi and Modern India* (London, 1968) p. 201; Bose, n. 39, p. 325.

[174] Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 201.

[175] Bose, n. 39, p. 333.

[176] *Ibid.*

The outbreak of the Second World War threatened the Indian National Congress with a major crisis. Personally Gandhiji was averse to a confrontation with the British. For him, moreover, the issue was one of pacifism not of India's freedom. But he had to contend with conflicting views within Congress circles. For Subhas Chandra Bose and many others it was "India's golden opportunity".[182] Significantly, Gandhiji found his views opposed by his own followers like Abul Kalam Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. Azad, who was President of the Indian National Congress in 1940, joined issue with the Mahatma and declared openly that the Congress was not a pacifist organisation but one for achieving India's freedom.[183]

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[177] Penderal Moon, n. 173, p. 200.

[178] Subhas Chandra Bose to Mahatma Gandhi, 25 March 1939, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, n. 82, p. 365.

[179] Mahatma Gandhi to Subhas Chandra Bose, 30 March 1939, *Ibid.*, p. 367.

[180] Bose, n. 39, p. 333. Bose resigned on 29th April 1939, and he immediately proceeded to form a new party within the Congress, called the Forward Bloc, with a view to rallying the entire left-wing under one banner. *Ibid.*

[181] Penderal Moon, n. 173, p. 200. It is significant that Jawaharlal Nehru made no secret of his disagreement with Gandhiji's viewpoint– Nehru to Mahatma Gandhi, 17 April 1939, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, n. 82. p. 379

[182] Bose, n. 39, p. 339.

[183] Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Calcutta, 1959, 1967 reprint) p. 29.

An open repudiation of Gandhian non-violence followed.[184] Most of these leaders, no doubt, changed their views, as they found Gandhiji vehemently opposed, on principle, to any participation in the War. They were also considerably influenced by the fact that the Indian struggle for freedom had attained its present dimensions under Gandhiji's leadership.[185] Yet, Gandhiji could not remain indifferent to the growing popularity of Bose's propaganda for 'direct action.' He seemed to have been more deeply concerned about the attitude of Jawaharlal Nehru, which brought Nehru close to Subhas Chandra Bose and posed the danger of a broad left front forming against Gandhian leadership.[186] By conceding the possibility of a campaign at the Ramgarh Congress, Gandhiji probably hoped to keep Nehru and Bose apart and the left wing of the party split.[187] Although the internal debate continued, when the All–India Congress Committee met on 15 September 1940, the President reaffirmed the faith in Gandhiji's leadership. The Mahatma was requested to guide the Congress in the action that should be taken.[188]

The last phase of the confrontation between the Indian National Congress and the British began in October 1940 when Gandhiji started Individual Satyagraha or limited civil disobedience.[189] The programme and results of the individual satyagraha brought to the surface the different view points that had remained subdued within the Congress ranks.[190] A split was averted mainly because the British had no generous offer to make in return for co-operation.[191] All differences remained eclipsed in the face of universal enthusiasm created by the Quit India Resolution passed in August 1942. C. Rajagopalachari resigned from the Working Committee in protest. The Socialists, on their part, repudiated the Gandhian technique of non-violent civil disobedience. They wanted the movement to be accompanied by widespread boycotts by students and strikes by workers. However, the Congress as an organisation remained wedded to the Gandhian ideal, and never officially accepted the responsibility for the Quit India Movement as it was conducted by the Socialists.

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[184] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

[185] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[186] Johannes H. Voigt, 'Co–operation or Confrontation? War and Congress Politics, 1939–42', in D. A. Low (ed.) *Congress and the Raj* (New Delhi, 1977) pp. 354–56.

[187] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

[188] Penderal Moon, n. 173, p. 211.

[189] P. D. Kaushik, *The Congress Ideology and Programme*, (Bombay, 1964) p. 245.

[190] *The Indian Annual Register*, 1941 (Calcutta) II, p. 30.

[191] Voigt, n. 186, p. 369.

In the changed political environment following the Quit India agitation, the distinct role that Gandhiji had been playing as a national leader lost its relevance. His unique role as a focus for unity had achieved its historic mission. The broad national front forged against the British Raj under Gandhiji's leadership had served its political purose. The moment of victory also meant the collapse of the Mahatma's position as a national leader. Gandhian leadership was no more indispensable, as the transfer of power became a certainty. This in turn undermined Gandhiji's influence in the Congress. Nehru and his colleagues, notably Vallabhbhai Patel, accepted Pakistan against the Mahatma's advice and wishes. Although they deferred to him and continued formally to seek his counsel, Gandhiji's voice no longer exercised the old authority. It could not have been accidental that on 14 August 1947, when independence was proclaimed, Gandhiji left Delhi for Calcutta where he stayed with a Muslim friend.[192]

In Gandhiji's life religion and politics blended in such frictionless harmony that Gandhi the politician often stood eclipsed before Gandhi the saint. The Gandhian impact that went deep down to the minds of many people was, as a result, more religious than political. Gandhiji's own words should, however, invite attention on Gandhi the politician. "Men say I am a saint losing myself in politics. The fact is I am a politician trying my hardest to be a saint."[193]

Since his ascendancy in 1920 Gandhiji had converted the Indian National Congress into an extensive political organisation. Under his leadership it had attracted the support and sympathy of a majority of literate Hindus throughout the country, and many of the illiterates in the urban areas. The movement, therefore, demanded a careful and intelligent co-ordination of diverse ideas, sentiments, attitudes and aspirations that were drawn into it. Gandhiji's personality, combined with his spirituality, had sufficient appeal to keep the different groups within the national organisation.[194] Thus he played the historic role of the great unifier. At times, no doubt, he was imperious enough to issue commands which had to be obeyed.[195] Yet, Gandhiji's leadership was characterised generally by the spirit of tolerance. He was never displeased with anybody for difference of opinion. He exhibited extreme patience. He never despaired of converting. The one thing he recoiled from was hypocrisy.[196] On the other hand Gandhiji had an inordinate affection for a strong and straight forward man. The best known example was Nehru.[197] His tolerant nature helped considerably to relieve the tensions and contradictions that plagued the national movement. As a politician Gandhiji had the tactical advantage that the confirmed Gandhians formed the only organised party within the Indian National Congress, acting under a centralised leadership.[198] But his successful moulding of consensus in varying contexts should bear testimony to remarkable skills in political management. "The significance of Gandhi," even to his unsympathetic critics, "lay in his consummate skills as a nationalist politician."[199] And as an inspiring pathfinder, he set the ideals and standards of the national movement for more than two decades. He roused the dormant greatness in the ordinary men, and made heroes out of them. A galaxy of leaders sprang directly from the Gandhian spirit and was shaped entirely by it. But it was the veneration he commanded from the non-conformists that made his leadership unique.[200] Small wonder, men of conflicting views and ideologies found themselves working together in common undertakings under his leadership, retaining their distinct identities. One significant role which the diverse groups had to play needs special mention. While some of the staunch followers of the Mahatma sought to make the movement a movement essentially of moral and spiritual regeneration, it required the other groups and parties in the Congress to supply it with political and economic objectives and programmes. Under Gandhian leadership they all combined to work up the sources of Indian mass motive power on a scale and to a degree unprecedented in the history of political activity in India.

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[192] Frank Moraes, 'Before and After Independence', in Frank Moraes and Edward Howe, (ed) *India* (Delhi, 1974, 1976 impression) p. 47.

[193] Quoted in Atulananda Chakrabarti, *The Mahatma and his Men–G. D.Birla* (Calcutta) pp. 21–22.

[194] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Freedom from Fear* (Bombay, 1960) p. 10.

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[195] *Ibid.*

[196] Atulananda Chakrabarti, n. 193, p. 3.

[197] *Ibid.*

[198] Bose, n. 39. p. 333.

[199] Tariq Ali, 'The Legacy of Gandhi' *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, 2 October 1983, p. 9.

[200] Gandhiji's place in Indian politics demonstrated the viability of a national leadership role – Judith M. Brown, 'The Role of a National Leader: Gandhi, Congress and Civil Disobedience, 1929-34', in D. A. Low, n. 186, pp. 133–59.

Lahul — An Outline History

BY

TOBDAN

Lahul forms one the two tehsils of the district Lahul and Spiti, the other one being Spiti, in the state of Himachal Pradesh. To the local people, however, their native land is known by two different names viz., Garzha and Swangla.

Progress in the Study of History after Independence

Although Lahul, since independence, has taken long strides in the field of education, yet no commensurate progress has been made in the study of its history, culture, etc. The statement made by the learned historian, P. L. Mehra, seventeen years ago that Lahul is a forgotton chapter in history,[1] is relevant. Among others, Hermann Goetz has presented an authoritative study on the temple of Margul in the perspective of Kashmir art.[2] A more serious study has been made by Madanjit Singh for he includes in his study different forms of art such as painting, sculpture, etc.[3] Cursory notes on the history of Lahul may be found in the works of Pran Chopra[4] and Ram Rahul.[5] This completes the record of all the works available in the subject pertaining to the post-independence period.

Work done on the Study of History before Independence

In the pre-independence period Moravian missionaries stationed at Kyelang made valuable studies in the different fields of linguistics, history, archaeology, etc. The Mission was first established at Kyelang in 1857.[6] It had opened a school, a dispensary and had a lithographic press. Rev. Jaschke who was among the first settlers wrote a booklet on the grammar of Bhoti language as spoken in Lahul, and printed it at Kyelang. He returned to Germany after staying in Lahul for eleven years. He then brought out his authoritative dictionary on Tibetan language specially based on the dialects spoken in Lahul, Ladak and Spiti. In 1865 Jaschke had presented a paper on the Punan dialect of Lahul establishing its relations with the Munda languages of the ancient tribes of Central India. This not only solved one of puzzles of linguists but also unfolded the history of Lahul to 4000 years back.

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[1] P. L. Mehra, Lahul and Spiti — A Forgotton Chapter in History, *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XLIV, part 1–3, April, 1966.

[2] Hermen Goetz, *The Early Wooden Temples of Chamba*, Leiden, 1955, pp. 90–100.

[3] Madanjit Singh, *Himalayan Art*, London, 1971, pp. 100–118.

[4] Pran Chopra, *On an Indian Borderland*, Bombay, 1964, pp. 42–53.

[5] Ram Rahul, *The Himalayan Borderlaud*, Delhi, 1970, pp. 95–100.

Of all the missionaries who stayed at Kyelang, A. H. Francke's contributions are most extensive and also most valuable, although he stayed in Lahul only for two years (1906–8). But because he stayed in Leh in Ladak for some years, he possessed better understanding of history, culture and languages of the region. Therefore his works are authentic. His monumental work, 'Antiquities' of Indian Tibet, among others, contains original texts of chronicles and genealogical tables of the three ruling families of Lahul with their translation and critical notes. This is a mine of source for the students of history of Lahul. Another work of his contains songs and stories based on historical events[7] and yet another one contains stone inscriptions[8] of historical and religious nature. These two booklets were printed and published from Kyelang. He has also devoted one chapter on the ancient history of Lahul in his work 'History of Western Tibet.'[9]

Alongwith the missionary scholars some distinguished government servants also exhibited keen interest in the study of history and culture of Lahul. In this respect works of Alexander Cunningham[10] and

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[6] H. A. Jascke, *A Tibetan–English Dictionary*, London, 1958 (first published, 1881), p. 67.

[7] A. H. Francke, *Die historischen and mythologischen, Erinnerungen der Lahouler*, Kyelang, 1907.

[8] A. H. Franeke, *Tibetan Historical Inscriptions on Rock and Stone from Western Tibef*, Kyelang, 1909,

[9] A.H. Francke, *A History of Western Tibet*, reprinted, (under new title 'A History of Ladakh' with a critical introduction and annotations by S. S. Gergan anq F. M. Hassnain) New Delhi, 1977.

[10] Alexander Cunningham, *Ladak: Physical, Statistical and Historical*, reprinted, New Delhi, 1970, (first published, 1853).

A.F.P. Harcourt[11] are noteworthy. Cunningham's work excels in scientific investigation and that of Harcourt in converting the widest number of subjects, like physical geography, communication, administration, history, religion, trade, etc. Harcourt remained in Kulu as Assistant Commissioner of Kulu Subdivision for two years. J.Ph. Vogel, an eminent archaeologist, made studies on the few ancient monuments existing in Lahul. These studies are now enshrined in his works 'Triloknath'[12] and 'Antiquities'.[13]

As a result of all these isolated studies made during this period, an article on the history of Lahul was compiled by J. Hutchison and J.Ph. Vogal, and was published in the 'Journal of Punjab Historical Society'[14] which was subsequently incorporated as a chapter in their work 'History of the Punjab Hill States'.[15] Till today this chapter is the only comprehensive work on the history of Lahul.

Early History

In fact history of Lahul starts with the history of Buddhism in Lahul. Its first historical mention is found in the travelogue of Hieun Tsiang of the 7th century A. D.[16] He mentions that there were several *sangharams* and many followers of Buddhism in Kulu and as such there must have been a good deal of influence of Buddhism in Lahul also. For, the two areas are contiguous and there always existed regular communication between them.

Now the question arises when did actually Buddhism reach Lahul. Historians generally hold that Buddhism was introduced into Lahul by Acharya Padmasambhava in the 8th century A. D., when he supposedly visited this place.[17]

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[11] A. F. P. Harcourt, *The Himalayan Districts of Kooloo Lahoul and Spiti* reprinted, Delhi, 1972 (first published in 1871).

[12] J.Ph.Vogel, *Triloknath*, Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. LXXI, Part I, 1902.

[13] J.Ph.Vogel, *Antiquities of Chamba State*, Part I, Calcutta, 1981.

[14] J. Hutchinson and J.Ph. Vogal, *History of Lahul*. Journal of Punjab Historical Society, Vol. VIII, 1919,

[15] J. Hutchinson & J.Ph.Vogal, *History of the Punjab Hill States*, Vol. II, Lahore, 1933.

[16] Samuel Beal, *Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Vol. I, London, 1884, p. 177.

[17] A. H. Francke, *A History of Western Tibet*, p. 178, Walter Asboe, Man 36 (78) 1936, J. Hutchison and J.Ph. Vogel, *History of the Punjab Hill States*, Vol. II, p. 478.

Vogel, however, holds that Triloknath temple is purely Indian in architectural style and must therefore be regarded as a monument of Indian Buddhism.[18] This clearly implies that the monument represented the existence of Buddhism in Lahul before the approach of Lamaism. Francke, who earlier held that Padmasambhava was the harbinger of Buddhism in Lahul, later changed his view on the strength of various archaeological evidences, and observed that the antiquity of the temples of Triloknath and Gandhola went back to the times of Nagarjuna.[19] Ahir too holds similar view and says that Buddhism reached Lahul sometime in the early centuries of Christian era.[20] Thus we may conclude that Buddhism first reached Lahul in the first–second century A. D. There are in fact reasons why we should rely on this contention. We know that this was the period of the great Kushan king Kanishka, a great patron of Buddhism, whose vast empire encompassed the areas of Kangra, Kulu and Ladak and most probably Lahul too. It is in his time that the Gandhara school of art developed, fourth Buddhist Council was held and Buddhism began to spread to Central Asia. Therefore it is most probable that the missionaries sent by this pious monarch reached Lahul also. Buddhist remains of his time, have been found in the surrounding areas of Ladak, Kulu an Kangra.

During the ensuing 7-8th centuries the temples of Gandhola, Triloknath and Margul may have been established, so that by the time of Padmasambhava Buddhism must have well established in Lahul. During this time Lahul was within the cultural empire of Kashmir.[21]

Acharya Padmasambhava was an energetic and dedicated missionary. He successfully re–established Buddhism in Tibet and the whole of the Himalayan countries by introducing the Tantric practices in Buddhism. In the Lamaist pantheon he is, therefore, recognised as the second Buddha. In Lahul he is worshipped in every *gompa* (temple) and in every home.

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[18] J.Ph.Vogel, *Archaeology of Chamba*, (Extract form Chamba Gazetteer), p. 106.

[19] A. H. Francke, in *Lha Lung Temple Spiti* by H. Lee Shutleworth, Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, No. 89, Preface, p. ii.

[20] D. C, Ahir, *Buddhism in the Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh*, New Delhi, 1971, p. 86.

[21] Hermann Goetz, *op, cit.*, pp. 23. 24, 67.

Ladaki Rule

Actual history of Lahul starts from the 11th century A.D., when Lahul fell under the the suzerainty of Ladak during the reign of Lha-chen Utpala (c. 1080–1110 A. D.). The Chronicles of Ladak do not mention this fact expressly, but state that the Ladaki king conquered Kulu and obtained the promise from the Raja of Kulu to pay tribute in kind or iron and *zo* (*zo* = a crossbreed of yak and cow specially used for ploughing fields). But because *zos* cannot withstand the warm climate of Kulu and are found in Lahul, historians infer that this must have come from Lahul.[22] Another fact supporting this supposition is that the direct route to Kulu from Ladak passes only through Lahul.

The Ladaki rule must have transformed Buddhism in Lahul completely into Lamaism. This was also the time of momentous literary and religious activities of the great translator Rin-chen Zang-po of Guge who erected the famous temple at Tabo in Spiti and many others in Ladak. Some scholars assign to him a few temples in Lahul but they are not confirmed from the literary or any other sources. However, his campaign must have had considerable impact on Lahul.

King Zain-ul-Abidin (1420–70 A. D.) of Kashmir found Kulu under the Ladakis, while passing through Lahul and Kulu after having completed a raid into Ladak. At this time Kulu must have taken opportunity to throw away the yoke of Ladaki rule. But the same cannot be said about Lahul.

Kulu and Chamba Rule

The earliest evidence of Kulu rule over Lahul is available in the reign of Bahadur Singh of Kulu (c. 1532–1559 A.D.). The Chronicle of Tinan (Lahul), which was compiled at the time of the death-ceremony of the Chief Hariya of Tinan, clearly concedes the supremacy of king Bi-dhur Singh (Bahadur Singh) whose capital, it states, was situated at *Magar-sa* i.e., Naggar in Kulu.[23] Kulu rule must have extended upto Tandi, covering the whole of Chandra valley. The Bhaga valley still lay under the Ladakis. The lower Lahul, the valley of Chanderbhaga, was perhaps annexed to Chamba. Chamba did this with the aid of Kulu as during this period the two principalities were having close relations.[24] A number of evidences affirming Chamba rule in this portion of Lahul are available there. The statue of Buddhist Vajravarahi was replaced by the present Mrikula Devi statue under the aegis of king of Chamba, Partap Singh Verman, in 1569–70 A. D.[25]

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[22] F. W. Thomas, in *Antiquities of Indian Tibet*, by A. H. Francke, p. 96; Hutchison and Vogel, *History of the Punjab Hill States*, p. 478.

[23] A. H. Francke, *Antiquities of Indian Tibet*, pp. 211–214.

Since the reign of Bahadur Singh the rule of Kulu over Lahul appears to have been unbroken, until both Kulu and Lahul were subdued by the Sikhs. The names of the next three rajas occur in a number of inscriptions, decrees and other documents found in Lahul.[26] This is further confirmed from a different source. Jesuit Father, Azevedo, while going from Ladak to Kulu, found Lahul subject to Kulu.[27] Jagat Singh (1637–1672 A. D.) won some more territory in Lahul at the expense of Chamba.[28]

During the period of Kulu reign the Hindu temple of Hirhima was erected at Yanaphel (Jalma) and established the custom of sacrificing yak[29] a custom like the buffalo–sacrifice in Kulu.

In 1683 A. D., during the invasion of Ladak by the Qalmaqs (Mongols) Lahul was also invaded.[30] It is remembered by the people of Lahul as *Sog-po* (Mongol) invasion and the Chronicles of Kolong record it as an invasion by Tibet. Later on the invaders were annihilated by Glacier near Tinan.

In Ladak the Raja sought the support of the Mughals and thus the Qalmaqs vacated the scene. In this war Kulu also helped the Mughals and Bidhi Singh received the Upper Lahul from Ladak as a reward from the Mughals.[31] His name is found in many inscriptions and documents in Lahul.

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[24] Hutchison and Vogel, *History of ihe Punjab Hill States*, p. 456.

[25] J.Ph.Vogel, *Antiquities of Chamba State*, Part I, p. 251.

[26] Hutchison and Vogel, *History of the Punjab Hill States*, p. 479.

[27] S. J. C. Wessels, *Early Jesuit Travellers in Central Asia*, The Hague, 1924, p. 113.

[28] Hermann Goetz, *Studies in the History and Art of Kashmir and the Indian Himalayas*, Wiesbaden, 1960, p. 115.

[29] *Punjab District Gazetteers*, Vol. XXXA, Kangra District, Part III, Lahul, 1917, p. 200.

[30] A. H. Francke, *Antiquities of Indian Tibet*, Vol. II, New Delhi, 1972 (first published Calcutta 1926), p. 202.

[31] Luciano Petech, *The Tibetan–Ladakhi Moghul War of* 1681–83, – Indian Historieal Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Sept., 1947, p. 193.

It is probable that the treaty made between Ladak and Kulu at the time of Utpala was also snapped in 1683 A.D. when Kulu annexed the Upper Lahul because Ladak at this time had become powerless under the Mughal suzerainty.[32]

Later on Raja Man Singh (1688–1719 A. D.) of Kulu in about 1700 A. D. had fixed boundary with Ladak at Lingti.[33] This Raja also entered into an agreement with the king of Ladak called trade contract.[34] Under the contract, according to the account given by Dondrub Myongpa of Kyor (Lahul),[35] Kulu sent each year more than one hundred coolie loads of iron in exchange for sulphur provided by Ladak. The people of Lahul had to buy one *bati* (two seers) of iron per house in Kulu, instead of paying field–tax, and then carried upto Lingti from where they returned with the load of sulphur. The exchange lasted till the Sikh occupation of Kulu and Lahul, according to Francke's calculation, uptill 1843 A. D.[36]

Raja Man Singh also built the Tinan castle and married a daughter of the Tinan Thakurs. His name is stated to have been found mentioned in an inscription in the Tinan castle and in a decree relating to the revenue of Gandhola monastery.

In about 1695 A. D. Raja Udai Singh (1690–1720 A. D.) of Chamba renamed Margul as Udaipur who then raised it to the status of a district centre in this part of Lahul.[37]

In the time of raja Pritam Singh (1767–1806 A. D.) a Lahul contingent assisted the Kulu raja in the war with Mandi at Bajaura (Kulu) under the banner of god *Gepang*.[38]

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[32] Hutchison and Vogel, *History of the Punjab Hill States*, pp. 480–81.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 482.

[34] *Ibid.*, p.433.

[35] A. H. Francke, *Antiquities of Indian Tibet*, Vol. II, p. 222.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 223 notc.

[37] J.Ph.Vogel, *Antiquities of Chamba State*, p. 11.

[38] A. H. Francke, *Die historischen and mythologischen, Erinnerugen der Lahouler*, pp. 14–16.

Bikram Singh's (1806–1816 A. D.) name is found mentioned in an inscription on a stone slab at Gemur monastery.[39] Name of Thakur Dharam Singh of Kolong whom Moorcroft met in 1820 A. D., is also found mentioned alongwith it.

When Moorcroft and Trebeck passed through Lahul in 1820, they found four villages still paying revenue to the state of Ladak,[40] although no part of Lahul was under Ladak at the time. This was probably done in order to preserve the peace of the border and trade connections, and the payments were continued until it was stopped by the British government in 1862.[41]

Sikh Rule

In 1840 A. D. a batch of Sikh force invaded Kulu,[42] and then Lahul alongwith Kulu came under the control of the Sikhs.[43] The Sikhs ruled in a very extortionate manner.[44] Their rule lasted till 1846 A. D., when Lahul was taken over by the British government.

British Rule

After the Anglo-Sikh War a treaty was concluded on 16 March, 1846 at Amritsar between the British government and Maharaja Gulab Singh. According to the terms of the treaty Lahul was handed over to the British government.[45] However, only that portion of Lahul was given over to the British government which lay under the Kulu rajas — it came to be known as 'British Lahul'. The remaining part was left with Chamba and was known as 'Chamba Lahul'.

Lahul was important for the British government because an important trade route passed through it to the Central Asia, especially Tibet.

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[39] A. H. Francke, *Secend Collection of Tibetan Historical Inscriptions*, pp. 28–30.

[40] W. Moorcroft and G. Trebeck, *Travels in the Himalayan Provlnces etc.*, reprinted, New Delhi, 1971, Vol. II, p. 198.

[41] *Punjab District Gazetteers*, Vol. XXXA, p.191.

[42] Hiranand Sastri, *Historical Documents of Kulu*, Archaeological Survey of India Report, 1907–8, p. 115; Hutchison and Vogel, *History of the Punjab Hill States*, p. 470.

[43] A. F. P. Harcourt, *op. cit.*, p. 39,

[44] Hutchison and Vogel, *History of the Punjab Hill States*, p. 470.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 482 and Appendix II.

In this respect Lahulis were considered "of material assistance" as they were having traditional trade connections with them. The British government continued to rule through the local chiefs whose office was known as '*Negi*'

Independence and Thereafter

In 1947–48 while Indian army were fighting in Jammu and Kashmir on the borders with the Pakistani armies, the Ladak region was left undefended and the Pakistani forces were moving forward unobstructed through the Nubra and Indus valleys. The whole of Ladak was in danger of being captured by the enemy forces. The people of Ladak were feeling panicky; they sought help from the government and sent telegraphic messages to Pandit Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India. They were also prepared to fight but they needed arms and ammunition and training in handling them.

At this critical time few Lahuli soldiers then serving in the army set an extraordinary example of courage and bravery. The officers in command of the 2 Dogra called for volunteers from the battalion. "The call for volunteers produced a remarkable response, every Lahuli volunteering and a large number of Dogras. A very strict medical examination was conducted. ... The only available route was via the Zogi La Pass, over the Great Himalayan Range, which was covered in snow to the depth of about thirty feet. ... No one had attempted to negotiate it under such conditions and to do so would be courting disaster."[46]

The volunteer contingent set on the journey with as much necessary articles, like food, winter clothing, etc., as were available in Srinagar. The contingent constituted of Major Prithi Chand, who was Column Commander, Major Khushal Chand, and Subedar Bhim Chand, all the three from Lahul, and nine other ranks from Lahul and seven from Ladak.

The party left Srinagar on the 10th of February, 1948, crossed Zoji La Pass on 26th February and reached Leh an 9th of March,, 1948, crossing a stretch of 200 miles long snow covered path in extreme winter season. Immediately on reaching in Ladak they collected local young volunteers and organised training programmes for them at different centres. While on the one hand they were engaged in preparing militia, on the other hand they were fighting on the front with all available means.

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[46] L, P. Sen, *Slender was the Thread - Kashmir Confrontation* 1947–48, New Delhi 1969, p. 195.

Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul reports: 'On arrival at Ladakh's capital, I met Lt. Col. Prithi Chand, who had occupied Leh overland earlier during winter, a creditable feat. He was a gallant and colourful soldier. We had about 400 men here as against the enemy's 1400."[47] The following gallantry awards were won by the Lahulis in the above war. Lt. Col. Prithi Chand, Maha Vir Chakra; Lt. Col. Khushal Chand, Maha Vir Chakra; Subedar Bhim Chand, Vir Chakra and Bar; and Sepoy Tobge Ram, Vir Chakra. Again in 1962, while fighting with the Chinese in Ladak, Havildar Tanzin Phunchog from Lahul got Maha Vir Chakra posthumously.

After Independence Lahul continued to be a part of Kulu Sub-division of the District Kangra in the state of Punjab. But the areas of Lahul and Spiti being remote and not easily accessible were raised to the status of district in 1960, with a view to bringing about effectiveness in the administration and step up developmental work. After the reorganisation of the Punjab state in 1966, the district alongwith other hill areas of Punjab, were merged with the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh which itself attained the status of full fledged statehood in 1971. In 1975 the portion of Chamba Lahul was integrated with the district Lahul and Spiti. Lahul has been declared as Scheduled area and its residents as Scheduled Tribe under the Constitution. Lahul, in fact, is very much backward in comparison with other parts of Himachal Pradesh mostly owing to its geographical conditions.

Despite all the odds, the brave and laborious Lahulis have been constantly progressing since independence. The government has opened schools in almost every village as a result of which at least about 40 per cent of the people have become literate which is a fairly good record of achievement. It produces the best seed potato and markets it through Co-operative society in different parts of the country. Kuth (costus root) is fetching higher price in the market and people are again switching over to the production of Kuth. Hop is a new cash crop which is becoming fastly popular among the progressive farmers. Some quantity of electricity is being produced locally at Beeling, Shansha and Sissu. Works on a large project is in progress at Thirot on completion of which Lahul will be having surplus power. Now there is a motorable road running through all the valleys. On the completion of the road along Chanderbhaga (Chenab) through Kishtwar (Jammu), Lahul will be open by road throughout the year. A limited helicopter service is available in winter between Kyelang and Chandigarh. The wheel of progress has thus been set in motion.

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[47] Lt. Gen.. B. M. Kaul, *The Untold Story*, Bombay, 1967, p. 111.

M. C. Raja, the Champion of the Depressed

BY

V. BALAMBAL

"Let us not talk of uplifting this or that but act in the spirit and the full belief that all are members of the same motherland and all are equal in the eyes of god and man." — Raja of Panagal.

Though many leaders have expressed this idea in words, only very few people practised it in their lives. One such person was Mylai Chinnathambi Raja, popularly known as M. C. Raja. He was born on 17 June 1883 at St. Thomas Mount in Madras. His grandfather participated in the Revolt of 1857 and his father Chinnathambi was a Deputy Manager and Cashier of the Madras Lawrence Asylum Press, now the Government Press.[1] He had his early education in Wesley College at Madras and continued his higher studies in Madras Christian College, Tambaram. He was a good cricket player and was interested in other games too. He joined as a staff of the Teachers' College at Saidapet, Madras in 1905 and took his B. T. Degree also from the same college. He was of very humorous and pleasing disposition. Being an Adi Dravida, he showed keen interest in educating the down-trodden people of the society.

During this time the condition of the untouchables was very deplorable. They were 'unwanted' persons in the society and they did not have the basic necessaries of life. M. C. Raja felt the need for a strong association of the Adi Dravidas. Hence he reorganised the Adi Dravida Mahajana Sabha. He was unanimously elected as the Secretary of the Sabha. The aim of the Sabha was to uplift the untouchables and get them due rights ond privileges. He held mass meetings and wanted representations of the depressed classes in the Legislative Council and other local bodies. He even went to the extent of sending a representation in 1917 to Lord Montagu, the Secretary of State and to Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy of India in 1919.[2]

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[1] The Asylum Press Almanack and Directory; Who's Who 132rd year of issue, 1933, p. 1525.

Impressed by the activities of M. C. Raja, Lord Willington, Governor of Madras nominated him to the Legislative Council in 1919 and he continued to serve that body till 1926.[3] He was the first Adi Dravida member of the Council.

When a three member Labour Advisory Board was constituted in 1920, along with Gilbert Slates, an European, and K. Ramanujachariar, a Brahmin, M. C. Raja, an Adi Dravida was also appointed as the third member.[4]

Being a member of the Legislative Council, he analysed the problems of the Depressed Classes and moved many resolutions for their upliftment. One such resolution requested the government to exempt the Adi Dravida students appearing for examinations from payment of examination fee.[5] Another resolution insisted the allocation of not less than 15% of the seats in professional schools and institutions and colleges for the Depressed Classes.

M. C. Raja was a member of the Justice Party from its inception. When it assumed office in September 1921 under the Government of India Act of 1919, M. C. Raja pleaded for reforms for the untouchables. Justice Ministry tried to enforce the principle of equality among the members of different castes and communities. A Labour Commission was appointed to study the needs and disabilities of the Depressed Classes and to elevate them from their degradation and debasement. Its report led to various suggestions such as allotment of free building sites or *Poramboke* lands to the Depressed Classes, formation of co-operative buying and selling societies, liberal aids to acquire lands for cultivation and occupation and adequate facilities for water supply, free education and free distribution of school books, cloths and midday meal to the pupils, construction of new public roads for all classes of people — because most of the regular and already existing roads were not open to the Depressed Classes — appointment of qualified persons from that class to public offices etc.

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[2] The Indian Year Book and Who's Who, p. 1064.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] S. Saraswathi, *Minorities in Madras State*, p. 115.

[5] Proceedings of the Madras Legislative Council, Vol. IV, December to January 1921–22, p, 2047.

Though outwardly the Justice Ministry expressed its support to the untouchables, actually they were not in favour of reforms and change. When M. C. Raja realised that the Justice Party was only for the betterment of caste Hindus, he was greatly disappointed. He exposed them to public at the right moment. When there was a mass strike conducted by 13000 labourers of the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills in 1921, some of the important Justice Party members like T. M. Thyagaraja Chetty supported it. But M. C. Raja told the Adi Dravidas not to take part in the strike. So Thyagaraja Chetty wrote to the Government to deport 2000 Adi Dravida families out of Madras. When M. C. Raja came to know of it, he condemned it in the Council.[6] M. C. Raja declared that the Depressed Classes were ready to sever their connections with the Justice Party.

M. C. Raja accused the Justice Party for its indifference in spreading free elementary education among the Adi Dravidas. As he was aware of the poverty of the Adi Dravidas, he suggested towards the close of 1922 in the Legislative Council that a meal at midday might be provided for the Adi Dravida boys in Government Elementary Schools. When it was placed before the Finance Committee, it was not recommended. Because most of the Justice Party members in the committee did not favour the suggestion as the total expenses estimated by the Director of Public Instruction was about 67 lakhs of rupees per year and the Government could not afford it. Again in 1923, M. C. Raja raised the same question in the Council but the Education Minister said that the scheme was already dropped. But M. C. Raja registered his protest.

Following this, a number of Adi Dravidas were killed in their huts in Pulianthope. Many huts were burnt. The caste fights continued for some more time.[7] In the Koilpatti session of the South Indian Adi Dravida Congress in 1923, M. C. Raja exposed the true colour of the Justice Party.[8] He blamed the Justice Ministry for not initiating house building schemes, not giving the Adi Dravidas the promised economic help, not developing free education, not instituting land distribution reforms and not visiting colleges to hear the grievances of the Ad Dravida students.[9] M. C. Raja resigned his membership in the Justice Party in 1923. He submitted a memorandum against the Justice Party to Governor, Willington for not doing anything substantially to the Depressed Classes in matters of nominating members to the Legislature and the local board and appointment to government services.[10]

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[6] Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd Session, Vol. III, October to November, 1921, p. 1012.

[7] Thiru Vi Ka Vazhkaikkurippukal, *Saiva Siddhanta Kazhagam*, p. 468.

[8] M. C. Raja, *The Oppressed Hindus*, p. 56.

Being a liberal Adi Dravida, M. C. Raja was well respected and given many offices. In 1917, he was nominated by Lord Pentland, the Governor, to the Elementary Education Commission.[11] In 1919, he served on the Select Committee instituted to study the Elementary Education Bill.

Most of the Adi Dravidas were illiterates. M. C. Raja wanted to put an end to that state of affairs as far as education was concerned. So in 1923, he moved a resolution in the Madras Legislative Council demanding an increase in the number of scholarships for the Depressed Classss and liberal fee remission. It is heartening to note that the scholarships were doubled to the Adi Dravidas because of his unceasing efforts. He was interested in the education of the girls too. As there were very few women teachers, the parents were reluctant to send their daughters to schools. So M. C. Raja suggested that the Widow's Home should be maintained in full strength so that a large group of women teachers might be available.[12]

Though the Department of Labour Commissioner was also incharge of the welfare of the Depressed Classes, M. C. Raja wanted a separate department for the Depressed Classes so that it would function in a better way; he preferred separate allotment for the welfare of the downtrodden and concentrate more on the welfare of the Adi Dravidas. Accordingly, a separate office of the Protector of the Depressed Classes was established.

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[9] Marguerite Rose Bernet, *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India*, p. 4.

[10] S. Saraswathi, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[11] J. Sivashanmugam Pillai, *The Life and Select Writings and Speeches of Rao Bahadur M. C. Raja*, p, 3.

[12] Council Proceedings, 4th Session, March 1926, Vol. XXVIII, p. 261.

The government decided to grant lands to the Depressed Classes. M. C. Raja insisted that the Adi Dravidas should not be given waste lands. Instead they should be provided with cultivable land with irrigational facilities.[13] He was greatly respected by the Provincial and Central Governments. In 1919, he was appointed as an Honorary Magistrate. Later, on 25th December 1922, A.X.Cox, the Collector of Madras presented him the Sanad and badge and honoured him with the title Rao Bahadur at a function held at Pachayyappa Hall.

In 1924, he was nominated to the Senate of the Madras University by Governor Lord Willington. Again in the same year, he was appointed as a member of the Chingleput District Elementary Education Committee and Advisory Committee of Education. In 1927 he was nominated to the Senate of the Madras University for the second time. In 1924 he was invited to give evidence before the Royal Commission on Public Services. He was elected as the Deputy leader of the South Indian Left Federation in 1925.

As a champion of the Depressed Classes, he headed the deputation of the Depressed Classes to Governor Goschem in 1925.. He brought to the notice of the government the need for reforms for the betterment of the Adi Dravidas.

Leaders of the Depressed Classes in various provinces held a conference in the Central Provinces in 1926. M. C. Raja presided over the All India Depressed Classes Leaders' Conference. They discussed and analysed various problems faced by the Adi Dravidas of India and resolved to fight for more rights and privileges. He was elected as the President of the All India Depressed Classes Association in the same year.

When the Government of Madras, under Rule 3 of the Madras Educational Rules, was instructed to nominate ten members to represent the following communities namely the Parayas, Pallans, Valluvans, Malas etc., M. C. Raja was nominated as the first member of the Depressed Classes to the Central Legislative Assembly in 1927 and he held that office till 1937.[14] When he went to England as a member of the Central Advisory Committee to the Simon Commission in 1928, he co-operated with the Simon Commission and submitted a report in favour of the Commission. Incidentally he brought to the notice of the British Government the pathetic condition of the Adi Dravidas and need for reforms. "Even animal is petted but the Depressed Class is tortured" — he lamented.

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[13] *Ibid.*, 1st session, Vol. I, 1921, p. 487.

[14] J. Sivashanmugum Pillai, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

The All India Depressed Classes Leaders Conference expressed that it had no faith in the caste Hindus.[15] In 1927, the Adi Dravida Mahajana Sabha presented a memorandum to the Indian Statutory Commission to grant separate Electorates for the Depressed Classes. M. C. Raja also expressed the need for sepatate electorate for 10 years in all the provinces. Regarding the franchise enjoyed by the Depressed Classes in the Madras Presidency, though their population was 1½ millions, the number of voters was 56756. Following the Poona Pact, of 26 September 1932, Moonje Pact was also concluded in the same year. M.C.Raja accepted the principle of Joint Electorate with reservation of seats for the Depressed Classes since he felt that, to begin with, Joint Electorate alone could strengthen the position of the untouchables.

M.C.Raja felt that as in the field of education, the Depressed Classes were not given any privileges in appointment in Public Services too. He insisted that the qualified Adi Dravidas should be given preference in that field also.

He pitied the untouchables who lived in most unhygienic slums and requested the government to open dispensaries in slums. He also stated that the slum dwellers should have an access to a lady doctor with phone facilities.

In 1933, M.C.Raja, with an idea of amending section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, sponsored the Untouchability Abolition Bill. It insisted that no civil or criminal court and no officer acting under government authority should base any judgement or order on a recognition of the custom by which some human beings were, by reason of their birth in particular castes, deemed as polluting what they touched or what was near to them.[16] But there was strong opposition to this bill from Pandit Satyendra Nath Sen and Rao Bahadur Krishnamachariar. Though the bill was not moved, M. C. Raja was greatly responsible for the Untouchability Abolition Act.

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[15] *Swarajya*, 29 April, 1926.

[16] B. R. Venkataraman, *Temple Entry Legislation—Reviewed with Acts and Bills*, p. 25.

The Adi Dravidas were not allowed to enter into any temple and offer worship. Reformers like Periyar E.V. Ramaswamy and others started Temple Entry Movement. The Ezhavas of Travancore started the movement and the Maharaja of Travancore proclaimed Temple Entry to the untouchables on 12 November 1936. Earlier in 1928 itself, the Hindu Mahasabha in its Jabalpur session favoured Temple Entry and equal rights in schools, use of wells, to sit in public places and walk along public roads. M.C. Raja sent a message to Mahatma Gandhi that he neither wanted separate temples for Harijans, nor believed in conversion. When Moonje, President of the Hindu Mahajana Sabha invited him to embrace Sikhism, M. C. Raja refused. He wanted the Adi Dravidas to remain as Hindus and claim their rights. He never wanted the Adi Dravidas to be pawns in the game of communal competitions and conflicts.

M. C. Raja believed if proper opportunities were given to the Adi Dravidas, they would shine in all fields. Lord Irwin supported M. C. Raja when the latter said that the Depressed Classes acquitted themselves with credit and proved worthy champions of their community's progress. Statesmen should guarantee them ways and means of peaceful upliftment.[17]

In 1935, a bill was sponsored for the removal of social disabilities among certain classes of Hindus. No untouchable should be prevented from being appointed to any public office, or enjoying or having access to any stream, well, tank or pathway. Rajaji, the then Premier of the Congress Ministry in Madras welcomed the bill and circulated it. But it was not taken up for consideration as M. C. Raja ceased to be a member of the Assembly.

M.C.Raja became the Minister for Development in 1937. He was a member of Madras Publicity Board, Madras Soldiers Board, Madras Labour Advisory Board, Madras Public Services and communal representation committee, and Madras Widow's Home Committee. By occupying these responsible offices, he served humanity, especially the Adi Dravidas. He wrote two books titled "The Oppressed Hindus" and

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[17] Sivashanmugam Pillai, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

"King George". Throughout his life, he fought for the cause of the Depressed people and his dreams were fulfilled after independence, by the Government of India. Indian constitution has sanctioned special rights and privileges to them. They are given free education, fee concession, preference in appointment etc. The foundation laid by M.C. Raja proved to be very strong that the Adi Dravidas have started shining in all walks of life. It is right to call M. C. Raja as "the Champion of the Depressed."[18]

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[18] The Civil and Military Gazetteer.

Reviews

INSCRIPTIONS OF ANCIENT ASSAM—by Mukunda Madhava Sharma, published by Gauhati University, 1978; pp. 329 with 65 plates; Price: Rs. 75.00

The value of inscriptions for the reconstruction of the lost history of all parts of ancient India is well known. This important task began about the close of the eighteenth century; but about the last few decades of the present century, the study of epigraphy and paleography is in an extremely pracarious condition because people are now eager to avoid troubles and difficulties. And indeed the study of the above subjects is very difficult since it requires knowledge of numerous epigraphic records, several languages and literatures, history, geography and other allied subjects. That is why there are very few successful epigraphists in the field today. We therefore congratulate the author and publishers of the volume under review.

A very learned collection of the ancient inscriptions of Assam was edited by P. N. Bhattacharya in his Bengali work *Kāmarūpa–Śāsanāvalī* (pp. xlv + 215, text in Nāgarī characters), published in the Bengali year 1338 (1931 A. D.), in which all records then known were included with brilliant introduction and efficient translations. Although Bhattacharya's study was confined more or less to ancient Assam, his work exhibits the depth and width of his knowledge and mastery of the subject. But it was written in a regional language and could not be thoroughly utilised in wide areas. The present book has been written in English and must be consulted by indologists all over the world. It not only contains the inscriptions published during the period of half a century that has elapsed after the publication of the *Kāmarūpa śāsanāvalī*, but also contains mostly the author's translation of the records into English, for which credit must be given to him even if one does not agree with him on all points of interpretation. Indeed, such differences of opinion cannot be avoided in a work of this kind.

However, there are certain weaknesses in his discussion of a few topics which the author should take the earliest opportunity to remove preferably in the next edition. To a few of these we are willing to draw his pointed attention.

Major part of the book must have been written out on the basis of old readings at least about fifteen years before the date of its publication. There are certain cases wherein we find that, on the author's attention being drawn to some new readings, he readily adopted them; but that required the total or partial omission and rewriting of the useless matter he had first written elaborately in support of the earlier wrong readings. Unfortunately, this he has failed to do, and this failure is likely to confuse the readers. To prove what we mean, it may be pointed out that most sections of the book were written out when the name of the capital of the Sālastambha line was believed to have been written as *Hārūppēśvara* in the records while there was then a controversy about the date of the Barganga inscription of Bhūtivarman as to whether it was the Gupta year 234 (553 A. D.) or 244 (563 A.D.). However, before the volume had been sent to the press, the author adopted the reading *Haḍappēśvara* for *Hārūppēśvara* from *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXIX, 1951–1952. pp. 145–59 (Parbatiyā plates) and the word *āyuṣkāmaṁ* for the Gupta dates suggesting 553 or 563 A. D. from *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXX, 1953–1954, pp. 62–67. But there was no satisfactory modification of what was originally written in the introduction to these subjects.

Another defect is the lack of wide interest and general knowledge, and this has sometimes led him to big pitfalls. Thus the Nidhanpur plates, originally issued by Bhūtivarman (c. 518–42 A. D.) and renewed by his grandson's grandson Bhāskaravarman (c. 600–50 A. D.), record the grant of a village standing on the Kauśikā in the Candrapurī–viṣaya, and this Kauśikā river has been identified by our author with the Kōsī falling in the Ganges at the south–western end of the Purnea District of Bihar while the gift village is also located in the said District. This is not a wise thing to say. In the first place, according to Gait's *History of Assam* (1926, pp. 10–11), even in the late medieval period, the said Kōsī was a tributary of the Karatōyā running between Bengal and Assam. Secondly, at least from the date of Kumāragupta's Dhaniādaha plate (432 A.D.) till that of the fifth Dāmodarpur plate of 543 A. D., Puṇḍravardhana–bhukti, i.e., North Bengal, formed a part of the Gupta empire. It was therefore impossible for a king of Assam to grant any village in North Bengal or Bihar during that period. Thirdly, even in the days of Bhāskaravarman, the Karatōyā river was regarded as the boundary between the territory of Puṇḍravardhana and the kingdom of Kāmarūpa, and Hiuen–tsang himself reached Kāmarūpa from Puṇḍravardhana after having crossed that big river. Fourthly, the village of Nidhanpur lies in the Sylhet (Śrīhaṭṭa) District while the Paścimbhāg plate of Śrīcandra (c. 925–75 A. D.), also discovered in the same District, speaks of the Kōsiyāra river in the Candrapura-Viṣaya which appears to be the same as the Kauśikā on the Candrapurī-viṣaya of copper-plates which are three (really four) centuries earlier.

At p. 8, the author refers to the controversy about the performance of Aśvamedha by either of the two Kāmarūpa kings Mahēndravarman (c. 470–94 A. D.) and Nārāyaṇavarman (c. 494–518 A. D.). He sides with those who believe that it was Mahēndra who celebrated the horse-sacrifice and considers the attribution of the sacrifice to Nārāyaṇa a hasty conclusion. We are sorry to disagree with this view, because Mahēndra was a contemporary of the Gupta emperor Budhagupta (c. 477–95 A. D.) whose dominions included at least East Malwa in the west and North Bengal in the east so that his empire was equal to several of the small kingdom of Kāmarūpa. Under the circumstances, petty Mahēndra is not expected to exhibit his foolishness by challenging Budhagupta's imperial position by the performance of an Aśvamedha. On the other hand, decline began to set in the eastern part of the Gupta empire after Budhagupta so that Nārāyaṇavarman was in a better position to assert his independence.

What has been said about Bhāskaravarman at p. 55 is equally weak. When Bhāskara made friends with Harṣa, the latter was the king of a small kingdom and had only an army of 5000 elephants, 2000 cavalry and 50,000 foot-soldiers while in 612 A. D. as an emperor his army consisted of 60,000 elephants and 100,000 cavalry (*Si–vu-ki,* trans. Beal, reprint, Vol. II, pp. 238-39). The position of his ally Bhāskara at the latter stage is clear from an anecdote recorded in the life of Hiuen–tsang (trans. Beal, p. 172). In 641 A. D., Harṣa left Kajaṅgala near Rājmahal for leading an expedition against Orissa and came back to Kajaṅgala in 643 A. D. He was annoyed that Hiuen-tsang did not return to Kajaṅgala from Kāmarūpa as he had advised him to do. So he sent a messenger to the Kāmarūpa king to send back the Chinese pilgrim at once. Bhāska replied, "He can take my head, but he cannot take the Master of the Law yet." Harṣa became greatly enraged and sent another who said in an abrupt manner: "Send the head that I may have it immediately by my messenger who is to bring it here." Bhāskara became greatly alarmed at the folly of his language and at once started for Kajaṅgala with Hiuen–tsang and his forces consisting of 20,000 elephants and 30,000 ships. What is even more important is that, on that occasion, Bhāskara stayed on at Harṣa's court for a very considerable period of time, and this hardly looks like the characteristic of an independent monarch because staying at the court of the overlord is a feudatory habit. When Harṣa was at the zenith of his position, Bhāskara appears to have been no better than his subordinate ally.

D. C. SIRCAR

POLITIC AND SOCIETY DURING THE EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIOD—Collected works of Professor Mohammad Habib. Volume Two. Edited by Professor K. A. Nizami, Centre of Advanced Study, Department of History, Aligarh Muslim University. People's Publishing House (P), July 1981. Pp. xxii + 447. Price Rs. 150.00

The name of Professor Mohammad Habib, one of the front-ranking historians of modern India and an early maker of the modern History Department of Aligarh Muslim University, is a household word to every student of medieval Indian history.

The book under review is the second volume of the series, "Collected works of Professor Habib, depicting politics and society during the early medieval period." The first volume, also edited by Professor K.A.Nizami dwells on his methodology ("Approach and Method"), the Asiatic environment of medieval India ("India and the Asiatic Environment") and the very subtle and abstruse subject of medieval mysticism.

The present volume, as its title and contents will amply show, is a collection of Professor Habib's occasional and valuable writings, dealing with Indian history from the Arab conquest of Sind to about mid–14th century, published in journals or in monographs during 1924–70. But though it is not a new unitary or synthetic book, the editor has so skillfully arranged the materials as to present an underlying unity to the volume. There are no chapters as such. The subjects are arranged, not according to the date of publication, but according to a rational plan, — the chronological sequence of the subject–matter. Hence chronologically the earliest article has come to occupy the last place in this plan. This is illustrated below: (i) The Arab conquest of Sind (1929) (ii) Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (1927); (iii) Shihabuddin of

Ghur (1930); (iv) Heritage of the Slave Kings (date not given); (v) The Campaigns of 'Alauddin Khalji, being the English translation of *The Khazainul Futuh* of Amir Khusrau, 1931); (vi) Muhammad bin Tughluk (1930); (vii) Life and Thought of Ziyauddin Barani (1958); (viii) Empire of Delhi in Early Middle Ages: Organization of the Central Government (1924).

Some of these writings were originally in the form of books that have now grown rare; some were published in well–known, standard but scattered journals like *Islamic Culture*, *Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference*, *Muslim University Journal,* but others in comparatively less known or less accessible magazines like *Intermediate College Magazine*, Aligarh. These are now made available in a handy volume for the convenience of the reader and the research scholar. True, many of Professor Habib's ideas and approaches are not now universally acceptable. True again that his views also underwent a change, reflected in his writings spanned by nearly half a century. Yet it must be admitted that he wrote some of his articles and books in the infancy of research on the Delhi Sultanate when most of the sources now known and worked upon were still unknown. He was a pioneer. Yet his writings retain an undisputed and lasting value, even after the publication of more detailed works by subsequent writers, who had come to be inspired by him.

The conception of publishing the present series is, therefore, an eminently useful one. The editor is entitled to the sincere gratitude of all serious scholars of medieval Indian History. The reviewer thinks it will be worthwhile to focus attention on some of the main ideas of Professor Habib.

One of the most valuable features of this volume is Professor Habib's critical assessment of the roles and characters of some of makers of the political history of India, foreign and Indian—Hajjaj, the reputed governor of Iraq, Mahmud of Ghazni, Muhammad of Ghur, and Muhammad bin Tughlaq. We do not have here any similar assessment of Alauddin Khalji. The omission appears very striking. But there is no scope of it in the translation of Amir Khusrau's famous work *Khazain ul Futuh*. One very much wishes that Professor Habib had given us the benefit of his penetrating interpretation of "the administrative and economic measures" of that "revolutionary ruler" as he characterises that Sultan. All may not agree with his incidental observation made in his essay on Sultan Mahmud: "The intellectual history of medieval India begins with the advent of Shaikh Mu'inuddin of Ajmer and its political history with the accession of Sultan "Alauddin Khalji..." (p. 80). None the less it is a thought-provoking statement, the true implications of its two parts have not been fully worked out. 'Abdul Aziz has, of course, written on the "intellectual history of medieval India" in his own way and Professor K.S.Lal has written an authoritative work on the "History of the Khaljis." But perhaps Habib's pregnant idea requires further working up.

Professor Habib's attitude, as reflected in his writings collected here, was that of a liberal historian, wedded to strict secularism, keeping theory and practice separate. The opening lines of the first essay on '*The Arab Conquest of Sind'* (1929) thus lays down as a guiding principles to be followed by historians: "If we are to study the history of eastern institutions aright, we must carefully distinguish the abstract principles of creeds from the motives actually governing the lives of the mass of their followers." (p. 1). We find instances of such a non-communal attitude again and again in his different essays in this volume.

He characterises his leading personalities discussed here in a few bold striking sentences and catching phrases. Some of his portrayals loosen our traditional views of eminent personalities. Thus Hajjaj, usually portrayed as a 'cruel tyrant' (as in Elliot and Dowson), never thought that the principles of Islam obliged him to interfere with the religious and social custom of the idolators." His tolerant attitude was motivated, as we learn, by "purely secular and political considerations"; and, again, "his unfailing political insight convinced him that a strong government which had no native Muslim population to support it, could only rest secure on the basis of religious toleration. He had not come to plunder but to govern...." (pp. 5–6).

So, too, his 17–year old brilliant cousin and son-in-law Muhammad bin Qasin, "scrupulously refrained from everything likely to wound the religious susceptibilities of the people". Comparing his enlightened policy with the Turks, Professor Habib observes that Qasim was "free from the sterile fanaticism of the later Ghaznavid and Ghurian Turks". (p. 15). Praising the Arab conqueror's "political insight", he observed that the Brahmanabad settlement was "a specimen of his political attitude and method" and that "as interpreted by Muhammad Qasim", the *jizya* "lost much of its individiousness.". (pp. 15, 24). In comparison with Muhmad of Ghazni and Shihabuddin of Ghur, Qasim "alone had a conscience". Hence the Professor's verdict on him is: "Alone among the many Muslim invaders of India Muhammad Qasim is a character of whom a conscientious Musalman need not be ashamed". (p. 23). But here he has taken, surprisingly enough, a subjective and personal attitude.

Perhaps Professor Habib was the earliest historian (1927) to distinguish between Sultan Mahmud's personal faith and his state policy stressing his outlook to be essentially secular and never allowing the priesthood to become supreme in the state (p. 45). He finds the explanation in that age which was "devoid of the higher spirit of faith', and inspired by the 'spirit of the Persian renaissance' which inaugurated the 'new imperialism' or 'secular empire' or 'saltanate". If political subservience to a monarch as 'Shadow of God' (zilullah) and as succesor as the divine Sassanian *Shahanshah* became a religious duty by twisting the *Shariat*, politics became secularised. (p. 73).

His Indian campaigns were motivated, not by Islam or any missionary spirit to propagate Islam, but by economic and political reasons. These were "not crusades but secular exploits ... for the greed of glory and god". (p.77).

Not only does he castigate his own hero in these words: "Islam sanctioned neither the vandalism nor the plundering motives of the invader; no principle known to the *Shariat* justified the uncalled for attack on Hindu princes who had done Mahmud and his subjects no harm". But he also strongly denunciates the false interpretation of those contemporary as well as later historians "who, by twisting one's conscience, utilized Islam "as an *a posteriori* justification". (p. 78). Sitting in judgment on them the Professor thunders " ... we have inherited from him (Mahmud) the most bitter drop in our cup. To later generations Muhmud became the arch fanatic he never was, and in that 'incarnation' he is still worshipped ..." (p.80). Undoubtedly Habib's 'Sultan Mahmud Ghazni' is an example of 'honest history', courageously presented. Dr. Nazim's later work 'Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna', based on more detailed studies of sources is somewhat colourless in approach.

Prof. Habib's reflections on Shihabuddin of Ghur would appear to be extraordinary in their content and manner of their presentation. The unique features of the Shansabani dynasty among the eastern ruling dynasties was 'the absence of fratricidal conflicts'. (p.105). Again 'the kingdom of Ghur on Sultan Ghiyasuddin's death in 1204 was "neither unitary, nor federal, nor feudal, — neither a satrapy of the Achemenian nor an empire of the Roman type". (p. 123). Three brothers ruled in different parts of the kingdom, all bearing the same title of Sultan; but the younger brothers, supreme in their own respective spheres, obeyed the elder, who never interfered in their affairs. It was, so to say, a 'three in one' kingdom. Professor Habib strikingly compares it with "the joint-family system of the Hindus", subject to some limitations, because once a Ghurian tribe had imbibed Aryan civilization along with Buddhism, and traces of Hindu social life survived (p. 124).

Few will disagree with his characterisation of Shihabuddin as "a man of unexpansive nature", who was "himself to blame" for his comparative insignificance (p. 144). Comparing Mahmud and Shihabuddin, Professor Habib writes that while Muhmud Ghazni was "every inch a king", Shihabuddin was "devoid of all moral ideals" (pp. 144–145). He was "a second-rate general and a second-rate administrator" (p. 145), but his success was due to his vaulting ambition backed by a tenacity of purpose" (ibid.) Having no son, he could not found a dynasty but he had organised a Turkish slave — bureaucracy, which, as he correctly diagonisad, became "the true heir of his achievements and hopes". (p. 147).

It is well-known that estimates of Muhammad bin Tughlaq have been as numerous as there are writers. Modern historians have characterised him as 'mad', as mixture of opposites', as an 'ill-starred idealist' and by other epithets. But few have succeeded in properly interpreting his measures or reconciling the apparent inconsistencies in his character and policy. It is, however, not a matter of common knowledge that as early as 1900 Professor Habib sought to solve this enigma and supply a reasonable interpretation of at least some of that Sultan's measures. How? Professor Habib not only rationally re-interpreted Barani's *Tarikhi-Firuz Shahi*, the most detailed account of the Sultan's reign along with other sources including Ibn Battuta's account but did something else that was unique. His study of contemporary mystic literature had made him realize its value as a source of political history (besides social). So in a little known, short, critical but illuminating article in a college magazine in 1930 he made the distinctive and pregnant suggestion to synthesize such non-political literature (esp. *Siyar ul Auliya* of Amir Khurd) with political literature for a proper understanding of medieval institutions. It is not generally known that this article became a "turning point", as the editor aptly remarks in assessing the character and measures of the Sultan. (p. xix), and inspired Dr. Agha Mehdi Husain's reputed work entitled *The Rise and the Fall of Muhammad bin Tughlaq*.

The Sultan was certainly not "mad" as he was supposed to be. He was conscious of what he was doing and he could gauge the extent of the widespread 'misunderstandings and suspicions' about him and his actions. But while the Professor did not blindly stick to his view about the extant but fragmentary autobiography when it was found by Dr. Nizami to be erroneous (p. xx), Dr. M. Husain persisted in believing in its authenticity (in *The Tughlaq Dynasty*, pp.567–72).

Professor Habib selected only two out of the several projects of the Sultan for detailed critical examination, — the token currency and transfer of capital. His discussions throw new light on both not to be supplied, even by other standard writers. The Mongol empire had a system of paper currency, obviating the need of transport of precious metals from distant provinces, and enforced it by a ruthless penal code to prevent forgery. The Persian Khanates, too, attempted to issue paper notes without suitable measures for redemption but shrank from enforcing the scheme. The Tughlaq Sultan could not issue any paper currency as India neither knew the art nor had the technical personnel. It required both paper and ink of special quality which was the monopoly of the Chinese. Professor Habib has delienated some special features of the Sultan's token currency, not found elsewhere. While other coins circulated owing to the value of the metal, the copper (really bronze) *tanka* "current" in the empire owed its value to the power and credit of the Sultan. When the copper or bronze *jital* was equated with the silver *tanka* without making forgery a penal offence, the result was a foregone conclusion. Professor Habib surmises that the alloy had some peculiarity, which the subjects might have detected. So he suggested a chemical examination of the metal of the token *tankas* often available. It is not known if this idea has been worked out.

As early as 1930 Professor Habib pooh-poohed the usual explanation of the transfer of capital, as the argument of the central position of Deogiri cuts both ways. Here again, it was his study of the contemporary mystic literature which enabled him to understand the Sultan's mind and to offer a rational explanation of the project. It is time that historians also considered this aspect of the case. The project was most unpopular but the Sultan was right in his own way. The government and the people had to be shifted together; for the majority of the population of Delhi depended on the government for livelihood and if only the government was shifted, the local people would have starved and rebelled. The capital had to be shifted to make the Deccan safe for Islam. The Hindustan was safe for Islam because of Sufi orders, the Deccan was not. The *Jamiran-i-Sadah*, intended to control the Hindus, were as dissatisfied as the Hindus themselves with the rule of the south by the north. The Sultan's relations with the priests (*ahl-i-Shariat*) were hostile, but those with the mystics (Sufis) were close. The latter he intended to make his instruments to exercise his power there.

Judged in this light the ruthless transfer of capital was really 'a movement of emigration'. It failed as an administrative project but eminently succeeded as a farsighted scheme of Muslim colonisation of the Deccan. The environs of Deogiri came to be littered with "graveyards of the Musalmans" (Barani). These became the nuclei of Muslim colonists, who supplied the much-needed "life-blood" to the Bahmani kingdom and the Deccani Sultanates (pp. 276-83). The Professor's verdict on the Sulan is as thoughtful as striking: He "was by training and temperament "revolutionist out of a new heaven and a new earth ... The Sûltan's principles should drive him to the greatest dilemma of his life ... began by doubting and ending by disbelieving in the moral basis of his own authority ..." (p. 284)

The value of the present volume is heightened by the Professor's highly illuminating assessment of the historiographical contribution of Barani in his 90-pages essay on 'Life and Thought of Ziyauddin Barani'. As the editor rightly observes that this is "perhaps the most thrilling account of the historian's approach and methodology, his hopes and failures, his predilictions and prejudices" (p. xx). Here the Professor, by dint of his historical imagination and blending the facts of the *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi* with the principles of the *Fatawa-i-Jahandari* has given a penetrating and threadbare analysis of Barani not only as an historian but also as a political philosopher (pp. 286-366).

Lastly Professor Habib was the earliest writer to dwell on the central structure of the Delhi Sultanate in his essay entitled "Empire of Delhi in Early Middle Ages: Organization of the Central Government" (1924). Though its source material was limited and it covered the period only up to 1398 and more detailed studies on the entire Sûltanate on the basis of exhaustive sources of different categories have been made by later scholars like Dr. R. P. Tripathi (*Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*,1936) and Dr. I. H. Qureshi (Administrative System of the Delhi Sultanate, 1944) and others, the value of the essay lies in the fact that it was the work of a pioneer, whose thought-provoking reflections, observations and expressions inspired them. A few examples only are given below:

Speaking of the Sultans he observed that their position was "one of many weaknesses and great strength'. Unlike the Mughals, they had no imperial tradition; some were of humble origin, while others belonged to middle class (p. 367). Again, the kingly office was a competitive post. Islamic law always regarded monarchy to be a non-legal institution. It was still in its cartilage (p. 368). The life of the people was subject to greater interference by medieval governments than today (p.370). As regards the ministers Professor Habib has quoted Bughra Khan's words of wisdom to Kaiqubad and referred to the distinction between *nadims* (courtiers and favourites) and *naibs* (ministers) given in Nizamulmulk's *Siyasatnama* (p. 373). Dealing with the ministry of war he has pointed out that medieval India had no Commander-in-Chief, as his office was potentially dangerous for the monarchy (p. 375). Referring to the imperial bureaucracy he rightly held that it was an absurd blunder to speak of medieval India as "feudal" (p.380). He sharply contrasts the Delhi empire, "a territorial state of the modern type" with the 'organized anarchy' of the Rajputs (p. 381). Another truism was that while Persia supplied the modal to the court and the central government of the Sultanate, its military administration followed the Turkish pattern (p. 383). Professor Habib also sought to solve the puzzle of Bernier who construed the strange absence of private property as socialism. That right did exist in medieval India but, says the Professor, it could not be claimed by those who themselves belonged to others. Hence Medieval India was not socialistic (pp. 384–85).

The works here collected by the editor, enable the reader to form an estimate of Professor Habib as a historian. To his profound scholarship and thorough grip over the original sources and innate faculties of original thinking, he added a fine historical imagination, a keen and deep human understanding as well as power of critical analysis. The decoction thus formed in the crucible of his analytical but sober intellect then flowed through his prolific pen in a clear channel like a pleasing, rippling stream. All these excellences combined to impart to his writings a freshness of perspective and a sense of inestimable value. It is never implied that all his writings and works are conclusive and perfect for no book is perfect. He wrote as a pioneer, when all sources were not available and his *uttarasuris* developed or modified his ideas or conclusions or corrected them. One wonders if it would not have been possible for the editor (as he had done only in a few limited cases) to add suitable notes at proper places by way of emendations, corrections, supply of data made available during the long gap intervening between the first publication and the issue of this edition. None else would have been more qualified to do so. This would have been a great service to the present and unborn generations of researchers.

A great merit is his method, — to delineate the spirit of the age, the environmental background of the events and the personalities for proper understanding. Another excellence noticeable throughout in these writings is his liberal and non-communal approach. He criticized the orthodox *ulama* for their attitude towards legislation in a country like India. He says, "... the law has been made for the fulfilment of man and not man for the fulfilment of law ..." (p. 319), and, again, ... "But the stupid prattle about the *shari'at* has continued. It was, and has been, the duty of a good Musalman to praise the *shari'at* and demand its enforcement, but there has been an even greater duty to evade its enforcement on the basis of "practical reason." (p. 320). Instances can easily be multiplied.

Another merit is his racy, vigorous and effective style. Ever on the hunt for the proper word, selected after repeated revisions (p. vi), he writes as a story-teller. Thus this bulky volume of 400 pages is highly readable and attracts one as a magnet. A few examples of his striking as well as significant expressions — sentences, phrases and words — are mentioned below.

Mahmud "was destined to surprise and stagger his contemporaries ... became a legend and a name". (p. 43); "From east to west, the Muslim world was torn in vain by sectarian feuds and the strong arm of the persecutor was called in vain to heal the troubles of a people weltering in fanaticism but innocent of faith." (p. 67). Professor Habib's choice of words in explaining the victory of the Turks is as picturesque as apt: "organised anarchy of the Indians"; again, as a corollary: "The Ghaznavids knew and obeyed their master; the Indians had no master to obey" (p. 75). To him Barani was "the reactionary historian of a revolutionary age" (p. 274). He "wanted men ... of true godliness who would spread Islam in the Deccan through the fume of their virtues" (p. 280). Their "graveyards made Islam indigenous in the Deccan" (p. 283). Barani's "governing class theory ... is the philosophy of the popular Hindu caste-system put into a Muslim mould." (p. 323). Professsor Habib admits that at times he has stated his conclusions without the reasoning process or references (p. 367). The editor has a few words of extenuation (v–vi). The reviewer, however, feels that the reader, particularly if he is a researcher,would have certainly profited from a detailed mention of these. At times, however, the Professor gives detailed notes and references.

The Editor has, in his valuable introduction, some of the merits and limitations of Professor Habib's articles (v–xxii) including mistakes in facts and topographical details, etc. (pp. v–xxii). These need not be repeated. The reviewer feels that there is some inconsistency in Professor Habib's remarks. At one place he writes about Sultan Mahmud: "But if his faith never rose to the heights of a sublime passion, neither did his stinginess amount to a disease. He did not gloat over his hoards like a miser but kept them intact for the financial stability of the government." (p. 44). However, he writes later that on the eve of his death the Sultan "ordered the precious stones of his treasury to be brought and displayed . . . gazed at them yearningly and with weeping eyes ordered them to be locked up again, without finding it in his heart to give anything in charity." (p. 65).

The Editor has criticised Professor Habib's Marxist interpretation of history (pp. xiii–xv), particularly with reference to Vol. I of this series. In this volume, however, Professor Habib himself writes in his essay on Ziyauddin Barani: "Today no precept of Barani has any practical value. But the wisest of political thinkers — Plato Aristotle Machiavelli, Karl Marx — are only wise for their time." (p. 304). If he himself holds this view, how then does he seek to interpret medieval India in the light of Marxism?

The get-up of the book is good. The reviewer, however, regrets that he cannot say the same thing about the printing. A cursory glance at a first sight will give a good impression. The type selected is bold and the print even in the foot notes does not tax the eyes. But this vanishes fast as one delves into the book. Perhaps the most blatant defect is the unpardonable use of broken types in the composing stage, which have played an unexpected havoc with punctuation as well as words. True, omission of dots or marks do not constitute as irremediable a defect as in Persian, yet it is certainly annoying. (As the comma (,) losing its tail, frequently becomes transformed into a full stop, sentences end abruptly, the flow of reading comes to a stand–still and the mind floats in the air. (e.g., pp. 144, 145, 272, 304, 335, 340, 344, 350).

Mutilated or deformed alphabets without their heads or tails litter different pages and at times the same page. The headless 'i' lies like a corpse. Many more lose their tails: thus 'g' almost becomes 'a'; 'J' almost T; 'L' looks like T, making 'Later' illegible; the capital 'Q' becomes 'O'; while 'q' almost becomes the first letter of the alphabet; a Roman 'y' becomes 'v', but an italicised 'y' becomes 'u'. (e.g., pp. 119, 272, 287, 311, 312, 314, 315 and 368). At times uneven application of ink seems to be at fault, 'written' (xx) has lost one 't'. Lastly, there are printing mistakes, of which only a few are noted below:

'persis' for Persia (xiii); 'requnred' for required (p. 44); 'idolatory' for idolatry (p. 52); 'same' for 'sane'; 'thnkers' for 'thinkers (p. 304); 'Tukhluq' for Tughluq (p.340), 'Harzar' for Hazar (p. 345), 'live' for life (p. 356), 'seventeenth, for seventeen (p. 363), 'Thughluqs' for Tughluq (p. 367); 'loyalty' for loyality (p.371); "meeting' for meteing (p. 379). But there is no errata.

On the whole the volume is a very useful reference book on medieval India from 8th to 14th century. It will long remain as an indispensable bibliographical work on Professor Muhammad Habib.

J. N. SARKAR

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY INDIA—Published by Professor A. P. Ibrahim Kunju Felicitation Committee, Trivandrum, Deluxe edition, Rs. 80, Paperback Rs. 60.00

Professor A. P. Ibrahim Kunju, who had a distinguished academic career, took up a college lecturer's job in 1950, became principal of a college in 1967 and joined the University of Kerala as a Reader in Islamic Studies. In 1976, he joined the University of Calicut as a Professor and retired sometime back. A list of his research papers (incomplete) and publications has been furnished. All these research works are generally of a regional character, but they transcend the regional boundary very often. It was indeed a happy idea to project the image of eighteenth century India, but as M.G.S. Narayanan has himself admitted in the Introduction (p. xvi) that "the title carries the pompous proclamation of a goal rather than a faithful clue regarding the scope of performance." In any case, apart from the veterans, the younger generation of scholars has also given a good account of themselves in the task set before them.

Of the nineteen papers published in the festschrift, two are of general nature, five are devoted to subjects connected with political and military affairs, six are on cultural, social and religious subjects, while four are devoted to trade, commerce and economic matters, and two are mainly biographical.

V. K. Sukumaran Nair in a brief but competent survey of the scene has introduced the eighteenth century in Indian history to the readers, but since the articles were published as they arrived, the article has occupied a later position in the volume. Of the five papers related to political and military affairs of the country, K. Rajayyan writes interestingly on the Poligars, who constituted an auxiliary power in southern India, creating almost like a princedom within a kingdom, but subservient to the sovereign power. B. Sheik Ali deals with the role of Malabar in the bigger military encounters between Haidar Ali and the English in the eighteenth century. It is a competent micro-study of one aspect of the drama. Tarasankar Banerjee writes with his usual acumen on "Bengal in the eighteenth century — a study of the pattern of growth of the English power." In it he traces the growth of British power in India in five stages between 1700 and 1765. P. Sarveswaran also makes an interesting micro-study of "The Nevayets of Arcot 1706–52", while K. K. Kusuman has devoted, a competent paper to the study of the great hero "Mārtānda Varma and the problem of the succession." In it, the author has, after a more or less detailed study, has emphasised the need to re-assess the role of certain dramatis personae in the sordid drama of murder and treachery affecting the dynasty's lineal succession after Martanda Varma who ruled between 1729 and 1758.

In the cultural, social and religious sphere, there are six papers, which open with K. N. Panikkar's "Social and cultural trends in eighteenth century India — an overview." The politico-military milieu of eighteenth century India facilitated the gradual extension of the British power in India on the disintegration of the Mughal empire. Unless the national life had become degenerated to the extent it was, it is impossible to conceive of such a situation. Well-known scholars who have studied the original sources of the eighteenth century India, such as Jagadish Narayan Sarkar ("A Study of Eighteenth century India", pp. 423–445 for original and secondary sources), have delineated the century as one of decadence, but K.N. Panikkar, in his over-view of the social and cultural trends in the eighteenth century India has drawn our attention (p. 23) to the fact that "detailed historical investigation into the nature of creativity in art and literature and changing patterns of patronage in the eighteenth century are yet to be undertaken." A poverty ridden peasantry, affluent nobility, luxury, licentiousness and treachery among those who mattered in those days paved the way for English penetration, despite isolated heroic efforts by the rulers of Mysore, Maharashtra and the Punjab. There was no centripetal force to stem back the tide of disintegration, and this favoured the western powers. K. N. Panikkar is however right in stressing that the creative impulse of the eighteenth century was not entirely dead and has to be adequately studied. I think, as the two phenomena are not mutually antagonistic in the overall context and regional variation, the creative urges of some people in some parts of India are really the first notes of the next century's cultural renaissance in many parts of India.

Regarding Indian feudalism, my perception is somewhat different from that held by other scholars. This is mainly due to the methodology pursued by such scholars, as I shall presently explain. About it, T.K.Ravindran has rightly stated that in the Indian context its definition is still imprecise and that it does not exactly connote what it meant in its European set-up. As the non-Aryan India of the ancient period was several times vaster than the Āryadeśa, the more important facets of feudalism naturally differed in the multi-lingual and multi-racial societies of India from region to region. The study of Indian feudalism can be undertaken only on the basis of identifiable ethno-linguistic social formation for particular regions and epochs. Slavery, economic servitude, caste-stratification in specific regions dominated by particular ethno-linguistic entities naturally created conditions for feudalism, but the feudalism of one region differed from another due to uneven growth of their societies. The Indian type of feudalism seems to have flourished much later, when the land-man ratio narrowed down to a critical level. I think the contour of feudalism in India can be better understood when regional studies have established its regional identity: its identity on an all-India scale is just unthinkable. Equally, general data can not be applicable to specific areas in this context.

As regards social phenomena, K. R. Hanumanthan has creditably utilised two Tamil kaifiyuts called Itankai-Valankai Cathiar Varalaru and the Valankai Cathi Varalaru found in Taylor's *Catalogue-Raisonne*, Vol. III, on the basis of which he has presented us with an account of destabilising social factors relating to petty social privileges and precedence. A depressing repors on the status of Kerala women in the eighteenth century is given by R. N. Yesudas in an article on the basis of accounts left by foreign travellers and missionaries. History of Christian Missions in South India" by B. Sobhanan, "Islam in Kerala in the eighteenth century" by T. P. Sankarankutty Nair and "some documents showing the religious policy of Tipu Sultan in Kerala" by C. K. Kareem offer us an insight regarding various aspects of Christianity, Islam and Hinduism prevalent in southern India.

Regarding the articles on trade, commerce and economic life of the people, some remarks are called for about certain points mentioned in the article entitled "Transport and Communications in early modern India" by K. S. Lal. The author of the article on p. 84 as well as T. P. Sankarankutty Nair in his paper "Islam and Kerala in the eighteenth century" on p. 259 have repeated the old mistake that Sulaimān the merchant wrote his small but very interesting account in A. D. 851. The referenee occurs in the body of the text called 'Akhbār al-Sīn wa'l-Hind. It was edited and translated by Sauvaget into French in 1948. The editor has pointed out on p. xix of the introduction that the author was an anonymous person, who wrote it before A. D. 851. Sulaimān's name occurs in the text only incidentally, probable as an informant. On p. 90, the author has made a general remark that a voyage from Cambay to Cochin took "a few months", but in the text of the anonymous author we read "... then the ships sail to the countries of India and put in first at Kūlam–Malī (Quilon), a month's voyage from Masqat with the wind aft. . . " Cochin is not far off. The earliest Arabic author to refer to the stretch of the journey from Sindh to Sri Lanka was Ībn Khurdādhbih (c. 844–48). According to him, the passage took 33 days + the time consumed in covering the unaccounted 37 parasangs (1 parasang = 3 to 3½ miles). It is not necessary to quote other Perso-Arabic or western sources. Among the ports on the eastern coast of peninsular India, none expects the list to be exhaustive, but one can not ignore the medieval ports Moṭupalli and Parādvīpa called Fāradīb in medieval Arabic texts like the *al–'Umdat al–Mahrīyah fī Ḍabṭ al–'Ulūm al-Najmīyah* (MS Arabe 2559 Bib.Nat., Paris), of which extracts have been furnished in P. Wheatley's *The Golden Khersonese*, p. 234. Regarding the design and construction of the early medieval Indian boats, Moreland, whom the author quotes (p. 87) was not right in stating that there is no record on the Indian method and plan of construction of the Indian ships. Apart from many Chinese references on these points, both Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Gibb, *Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*. p. 243) as well as Duarte Barbosa (*The Book of Duarte Barbosa*, Vol. II, p. 76, ed. Dames) have left some details about these. As I consider this article to be one of the best presented in the festschrift, I have referred to these points in some details.

The subject of trade and economy has been well represented by S. Ramachandra Nair's incisive paper on the "History of government monopoly on pepper in Travancore. An equally well–written paper is by K. G. Vasantha Madhava on "Sea-faring activities in the coastal Karnataka in the eighteenth century".

Among the biographical sketches, P. N. Chopra presents "Alexander Csoma de Koros, the great Tibetologist, "and writes in a pleasing way on his initiating Tibetan studies in India. There is hardly any exaggeration in the remark of Sir William Hunter that "Csoma single–handed did more than the armies of Ochterlony and not less than the diplomacy of Hodgson to pierce the Himalayas." It is but natural that the Asiatic Society of Calcutta, where Csoma worked under great financial stress, observed his biocentenary and many important papers were read on that occasion.

Another interesting study is T. K. Vijayamohan's "Rājā Keśava Das and the English." The author has succeeded in bringing out the great administrative ability of Kesava Das, who was the first dewan of

Travancore and largely contributed to the making of its history from 1789 to 1799.

The papers are generally well-written. As pointed out in the introduction by M. G. S. Narayanan, the papers mainly concern south Indian history and culture of the eighteenth century. These are particularly related to the creative side of life in the eighteenth century, the feudal character of the society and the process of British occupation of Bengal. Unfortunately, the printing mistakes are an eyesore, but in spite of these, to judge by the quality of the papers, the festschrift is a fitting tribute to the scholarship of the great scholar. The Felicitation Committee is to be congratulated for the production of the volume.

H. B. SARKAR

ROMANCE OF HISTORIOGRAPHY—by Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, Ratna Prakashan, Calcutta, 1982, pp. 86, Price Rs. 40.

The work comprises a broad survey of non-European historiography from Shah Alam I to Shah Alam II. It makes an assessment of the works produced by writers of this period belonging to different "nationalities" and in different languages— Persian, Marathi, Rajasthani, Assamese, Gurmukhi, Bengali and Urdu. "It touches different aspects of historiograhpy —archival materials, chronicles . . . relating to imperial, regional and local histories, biographical works and autobiographical memoirs, administrative manuals, epistles, and metrical histories" (Preface). The contributions of Hindu historians and memoir writers too have been discussed.

This is rather a very ambitious bill of fare to which full justice cannot possibly be done in a volume of this size. However, Professor

Sarkar has made a good attempt at focussing attention on the most salient features of the historiography of the period. He has tried to analyse why there was proliferation of historical writing in the eighteenth century. According to him, some authors have stated that the study of history was their principal interest. A few like Inayat Husain wrote history to instruct their sons while others like Harsukh Rai composed works for edification and instruction. Some were excited by the stirring events of the century, by the decline of the Mughal monarchy and invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Durrani. The bards and chroniclers of the various surging nationalities within the empire seeking to establish their separate identities like the Marathas, the Rajputs, the Jats and the Bundelas, sought to perpetuate their glories and achievements of their peoples and leaders. The result is that there is a plethore of historical source material for the eighteenth century in Persian *Tawarikhs*, Marathi *Bakhars*, Rajasthani *Khyats* Bahis etc., the Gurmukhi *Prakash*, Assamese *Buranjis* and works in other languages. "What is very striking is that the arena of historiography was now invaded by an army of Hindu writers (mostly of middle class) writing in Persian," says the author (pp. 2–3). He gives short biographies of chroniclers and contents of their works. He deals with works written in north and south and east and west and arrives at the conclusion that "historiography of eighteenth century India, as of any other period, is not synonymous with complete histories of critical professional, sober and impartial historians.... it is only 'a dense and tangled jungle' or an unchartered ocean of source materials" (p. 54). But he charitably concedes: "Generally speaking, however, it may be said that (although) their (the chroniclers') success was limited judged by modern standards, (yet) their performance was quite creditable, and marked an advance as compared to the previous age, both in volume of output and approach" (p. 69).

In view of this, the title of the book *Romance of Historiography* is rather flamboyant, for it is a review of works of a period of confusion, disintegration and decline, the works themselves lacking in scientific approach. A very important source of historical material for this period is the writings of Europeans. These are kept out of the purview of this work but a couple of pages on these would have filled the lacunae which seems apparent throughout the course of the study of this work. One cannot take pride in the quality of printing. The work abounds in errors (see e. g., preface p. ii and p. 69). The Errata does not mention all the errors.

However, Professor Jagdish Narayan Sarkar is an experienced and prolific writer. He has authored more than a dozen books and rendered great service to the cause of medieval Indian history and historiography. This volume is a welcome addition to his *History of History writing in Medieval India* and bears the impress of his erudition. By collecting in one place historical material of the eighteenth century in various languages and pertaining to various regions in one place, he makes his work indispensable for scholars concentrating on the study of late medieval Indian history.

K. S. LAL

FEUDATORIES OF SOUTH INDIA, 800–1070 A. D.—by Dr. (Mrs.) V. Balambal, Chugh Publications, Allahabad, 1978; Price Rs. 50, pp. 1–210, with 2 sketch maps and 6 plates.

By and large, broad spectrum researches into the dynastic history of ancient South India have hitherto attracted the primary attention of scholars. Much has been written on the rise and fall of the Cholas, Pallavas, Pandyas and so on, and they constitute what may be called the macro-history of ancient South India. Behind the great edifice of dynastic histories, smaller powers — feudatories, which tended to gravitate to this power or that according to the changing big power structures, got almost lost and neglected by scholars as well. The volume under review is a very welcome exception to this trend and has taken up the role played by feudatories during the period between 800 and 1070, as subject of fresh and careful examination. Dr. Balambal has chosen this particular period because it saw a new watershed of the changing power structure in South India. As the author has observed, "this period saw the fall of the Pallavas, the Pandyas and the Rashtrakutas and the rise of the Cholas and the Western Chalukyas of Kalyani" (p.2). For any intensive study, one has also to make a selection of the feudatories, and the author has taken up (1) The Banas; (2) The Nolambas; (3) The Vaidumbas; (4) The Muttaraiyars; (5) The Kodumbalur Velirs; (6) The Paluvettaraiyars. But Sm. Balambal does not state the reasons why only these few have been selected for her investigation; though from a perusal of the work it may be inferred that these feudatories were particularly relevant to the changed power structure in the South. We can appreciate the difficulties of the author to reconstruct the history of the feudatories on the basis of scanty, often incomplete and at times, confusing sources. Nevertheless, the frame work of any study is as important as the sources available to a scholar. Towards the end of the 'Introduction', the author made it clear that her study was intended to be primarily political and not cultural as well as social.

Initially, the readers may have a rub with the very title of the book; and one can argue that a semantical problem is writ large, which may create a confusion to a casual reader. There cannot be any feudatory of South India, as it did not have a single political identity during the review. Only there could be feudatories to big powers in *South India* — the Cholas, the Pallavas, and the like. Certainly, the author's intention was to project the feudatories in South India as a geographical expression.

After a refreshingly good panoramic description of the 'political condition' of South India during the period under study, the author has given as detailed account of each of the six feudatory dynasties she has selected for examination. Without going into ths details of them which are quite comprehensive, it can be pointed out that the entire study remains primarily a narrative account of one feudatory ruler succeeding another. Even where there is a gap in the genealogy, the scholar has not in any way tried to provide an explanation which can be plausible. As an example, we can refer to the substantial gap of 36 years between Kandan Amudanar (c. 913-921 A. D.) and Kodandan Tappilidharman (c. 957-960) of 'The Paluvettaraiyars'. About Amudanar's rule, the author commented that "no record is traceable after this date" (921 A. D.) and came to the conclusion that "probably after 921 A. D. he ceased to be a ruler or died." She then came straight to Kodandan Tappilidharman and put his dates as "c. 957–960" without commenting on the substantial gap that was there.

A discriminating reader may not always be satisfied with a bare descriptive account. He will be disappointed not to find answers to the following vital questions to satisfy his curiosity: Did the geo-political positions of the feudatories have no relevance to the course of their history vis-a-vis their overlords? What was exactly the nature of the relationship between a feudatory ruler and his overlord in a given period of time? Qualitative differences crept in, as in the case of the

'The Banas', when the political status of a feudatory changed. It is also not without significance that even in constructing monuments, "the feudatories followed the style patronised by their overlords" (p. 5). The reviewer feels that the study could have been more remunerative if the author posed such probing questions herself in her work and tried to find answers. Perhaps, this is the reason why she has not added a chapter giving her 'conclusion'. The absence of this essential feature is unfortunate and leaves the work rather inconclusive. However, the reviewer finds some significant observations made in the 'Introduction' which could have been taken out of that place, developed with a little amount of imagination and put at the end of the work as the concluding part. It is really striking to note that "the balance of power was not altered to a considerable extent because of these feudatories." The reviewer is also in full agreement with the comment that "the political events taking place in a small area have their repercussions on the fortunes of a large one" (p. 1), though we disagree with the opinion that "similarly, the history of the feudatory powers constitutes the history of the major powers (p. 1).

At the end it must be pointed out that the two sketch maps and the six genealogical tables have enhanced the value of the book. It is somewhat surprising, that the author has not added an 'index' at the end which is an essential as well as helpful guide to any reader of a research work. Notwithstanding this, the reviewer has no hesitation to say that the present work has opened a new vista in our knowledge about the micro-problems of the history of ancient South India.

TARASANKAR BANERJEE

THE APOTHEOSIS OF IMPERIALISM, INDIAN LAND ECONOMY UNDER CURZON—by Dr. V. C. Bhutani. Sterling Publishers, Delhi, 1976, pp. 191, Rs. 50.

This is one of the few well written books on the study of colonialism in India in the perspective of Land revenue administration. The book contains four long chapters on Land revenue policy and administration during the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon. In the preface the author has analysed certain trends in modern Indian historiography which probably does not have much relevance to the main theme. It has been admitted by him that a comprehensive view of the impact of British rule in India cannot be formed by selective studies.

The Introduction provides a helpful approach to the problems of Land revenue administration discussed in great detail in the subsequent chapters, apart from giving a general account of the growing public criticism against the exploitative measures adopted by the Government. It has been aptly remarked that the primary interests of the British Government were not the welfare of the Indian people, but their own prosperity. In this connection the author has of course made certain naive generalisations like those in para 3 at page 11). In the last paragraph (at page 12) he has summarised the history of India's freedom movement in the present century which appears bit out of tune with the title of the book.

The author has made a critical study of the Land revenne assessment policy of the colonial Government in chapter one on the basis of the Private Papers of Lord Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India (1895–1903), the Revenue and Agricultural Proceedings of the Government of India and some useful secondary sources. He has very convincingly shown that the policies of assessment and laws for land revenue administration were neither uniform throughout the country nor beneficial to the peasants. The rate in which agricultural indebtedness increased proved that the Government pursued oppressive measures reducing the rural population to utter impoverishment.

Lord Curzon's attitude and policies have been scathingly analysed in chapter two. The sources referred to by the author are of a wider range and authentic. He has examined the policy of suspensions and remissions in its correct objectivity. The Famine Commission of 1901 had suggested that suspension and remission of land revenue was to be regarded as a preventive measures of constant application in all adverse years and a measure of relief during famine. Although rules had been provided for in all provinces, they were sparingly used. In this context the public reaction ought to have been given due weightage. Statements such as "Collections of land revenue and allied cesses simply served to accentuate the peasants' sufferings while perennial remittances to England and export of grain so drained away wealth that India was sinking lower and lower in adversity under the heels of a foreign autocratic Government" (p. 62) are neither supported by adequate statistics nor source of information. These emotional outbursts, though true, sound more like the oft repeated slogans of the nationalists of the early twentieth century.

In examining the Agricultural policies and Famine relief (Chapter Four) the learned author has made use of the proceedings of the Council of Governor General of India, Revenue and Agriculture, Reports of the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) and relevant correspondence between the Central and Provincial Governments. He has a word of appreciation for Lord Curzon's efforts to make agriculture a profitable profession by providing funds from the State exchequer. Several expensive irrigation projects were sponsored by the Government. He writes, "Under his (Curzon's) guidance the Government abandoned its attitude of indifference and unconcern and boldly came forward to give a significant lead to the people for the improvement of agriculture (p. 126). But there seems to be a self contradiction when the learned author concluded, saying, that such policies "touched only the fringes of the question." According to him the crux of India's agrarian problem was neither frequent famines, nor lack of irrigation amenities, but faulty principles on which land revenue was over assessed. In his opinion, the Indian economic condition was in an unenviable state not for the agriculturists but for the constraints imposed by the Government and the industrial class.

The major conclusions drawn by the author are derived from the private papers of Lord Curzon and Lord Hamilton. By and large, he supports their prognostication on the shape of political developments in the offing. Curzon was definitely right when he wrote in his characteristic style, "We shall never continue to hold the country except by convincing the mass of the people that our rule in juster, purer, more beneficent than either any other foreign rule could be, or than would be the rule of their own men." In his inimitable style of functioning with prodigious energy, Curzon behaved as a typical Tory. As an enlightened despot, he tried to bring changes in several administrative departments, notwithstanding his awareness to the "carping criticism, incessant fault finding and endeavour to render the task of administration impossible" (p. 132). The relation between the Government and the people of India was fast deteriorating. Very few members of the civil service could resist the temptation of flying back home to avoid the impending crisis. The Native Press had begun a sustained and strident attack against the discriminatory policies of the British Government stating that although India was the key stone of the Imperial fabric she was badly mauled. The repeated slogans about her poverty and gross exploitation sank deep into the nationalists' heart. How Lord Curzon inspite of his administrative ability and political wisdom failed to arrest the growing unrest among Indians is a well-known fact.

In the long series of imperialists who ruled India on behalf of the British Crown, Curzon was one of the most competent and farsighted one. His viceroyalty was one of the most eventful periods of Indian history, a turning point. Dr. Bhutani has selected a very interesting aspect of colonial administration when the British Imperialism was at the meridien. At the turn of the century it was a new India that seemed to be emerging from the encircling gloom. Inspite of his best intentions Curzon began the process of liquidating the empire by provoking the forces of nationalism. He tried to implement the policy of Divide et impera at a wrong moment of Indian history and left behind a legacy of trouble for his successor.

The book covers a short but significant period of Indian history (1899–1905). It is well written and provides a deep insight in to a much neglected aspect of Indian economy. Dr. Bhutani deserves congratulations on having written a good account of colonial administration.

P. K. MISHRA

THE BHAKTI-RATNĀKARA OF ŚAṄKARADEVA AND THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF BHAKTI—by Maheshwar Neog, (Punjab University, Patiala, 1982) pp. XIV + 170 + 204; 2 Plates. Rs. 75.00.

The book under review is divided into two parts. The introductory part deals with the history of the concept of *bhakti* and the second one is a critical edition of the *Bhakti-Ratnākara*, a treatise on *bhakti* by Śaṅkaradeva (A. D. 1449-1568). It is apparent that Professor Neog has utilized more of his time, critical ability, historical perspective and appropriate methodology in editing the *Bhakti-Ratnākara* than on tracing the evolution of the concept of *bhakti*.

Borrowing heavily the conclusions of earlier scholars, Professor Neog has described the stages in the history of *bhakti* from the days of the *Ṛgveda* to the time of Śaṅkaradeva of Assam in a perfunctory manner. His emphasis is on the Vaiṣṇava concept. He conveniently forgets Śaivism and Śāktism.

No doubt he correctly points out the changes in the Viṣṇuite / Vaiṣṇava concept till the twelfth century of Christian era. The exposition of the *bhakti* cult in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, Nārāyaṇīya section, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, *Harivaṁśa*, *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and in the compositions of the Āḻvar saints and early Ācāryas of Śrī Vaiṣṇava sect has been indicated clearly. But it is not intelligible why he ignored the contributions of Rūpa Gosvāmin, who was a contemporary of Śaṅkaradeva. The *bhakti-rasa-śāstra* was first systematised by Rūpa Gosvāmin, in his *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu* and *Ujjvala-nīlamaṇi*. The first work appears to have been completed in Śaka 1463/A. D. 1541. Orthodox rhetoricians considered *bhakti* as a *bhāva* or 'emotion' and not as *rasa* or sentiment. In his own inimitable way S. K. De wrote that Rūpa Gosvāmin "gives an elaborate exposition of the medieval sentiment of Love, sublimated into a deeply religious sentiment, by bringing erotico-religious ideas to bear upon the general theme of literary Rasa, especially the Erotic Rasa" — (*Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal*, p. 123). Similarly the contributions of Kamban and Vaiṣṇavas writing in Telugu language have been ignored by Neog.

At several places Neog refers to monism. But it is surprising that nowhere does he refer to the recognition of *bhakti* as a means of spiritual realisation by Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, particularly on III. 2.24, IV. 1.12. Śaṅkarā explains *saṁrādhana* as *bhakti*, *dhyāna*, *praṇidhāna* etc.

A few inaccurate and unwarranted statements have crept into the introductory part of the book under review, as for example, "bhakti began very early to travel to the South" (p. 31), "Kulaśekhara was a king of Malabar" (p. 33), Caitanya "acquired notable adherents like King Pratāpa–Rudra of Orissa and his brahmin minister, Rāmānanda Rāya" (p. 58). It is extreamely doubtful that the concept of *Bhakti* was enunciated first in Northern India and then introduced in South India. It is now well established that Kulaśekhara Āḻvār is identical with Sthāṇuravi Kulaśekhara (A. D. 844–883) of the Cēra kingdom, with the capital at Mahodayapuram (*Vide* Proc. Indian History Congress Bhubaneshwar Session (1977) p. 138). It is well known that Gajapeti

Pratāparudra of Orissa paid homage to Caitanya. There is no satisfactory evidence to prove that this king was actually converted to Caitanyaism. Bimanbehari Majumdar, S. K. De and Prabhat Mukherji have pointed out that the king received only grace (*anugraha*) of Caitanya. The eighth Act of Kavikarṇapūra's *Caitanya-candrodaya* is devoted mainly to the grace of Caitanya to Pratāparudra, who calls at his feet at the time of the car festival at Puri. Incidentally it may be stated here the reviewer does not subscribe to the view of S. K. De that the *Sarasvatī-vilāsa* was a compilation of Pratāparudra of Orissa. Again, if Kṛṣnadas Kavirāja's *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* (*madhya-īllā*) is to be believed. Ramananda Rāya was not a Brāhmaṇa but Śūdra. Bimanbehari Majumdar considers him to belong to Karaṇa-*Jāti* (*Śrīcaitanya– cariter upādāna,* 2nd ed. p. 680). No original text states that Rāmānanda was a minister. Of course, he definitely held some high office. Before he came to Puri, he lived near Rajamundri on the bank of the Godavari and not Cuttack, the capital of Pratāparudra.

We hope that in the next edition of this book Professor Neog will enlighten readers on definition and classification of *bhakti* on one hand and the way of or practical realisation of devotional sentiment on the other separately through the ages. It is also expected that a more critical exposition of the ideas of Rāmānanda and his disciples, Vidyāpati, Guru Nanak, Tulasīdāsa etc., would be attempted.

The truly useful contribution of Professor Neog is the editing and English translation of Śaṅkaradeva's *Bhakti–ratnākara*. He has pointed out the variant readings of all the 573 verses in the two recensions of the text. The spotting out of the sources of these verses in commendable. Scholars will welcome the references to the *Vaiṣṇavānanda-laharī*, a rare Sanskrit text. Notes on the differences between the verses in the extant printed editions of the *Bhāgavata* and the reading of the same verses in the *Bhakti-ratnākara*, would have enhanced the quality of the work done by Neog. For illustration, we refer here to verses 22, 199, 265 of the *Bhakti-ratnākara*.

A large number of misprints and errors in diacritical marks is noticeable in the book, Many of them have been detected by the author himself. He however failed to point out that the *Nālāyira Prabandham* has been wrongly printed as *Nālāriya Prabandham* in pages 33 and 38.

The Punjabi University, Patiala deserves congratulations for publishing this highly useful research project of Professor Neog. It is also a contribution to the concept of national integration in the field of devotional literature of India.

B. P. MAZUMDAR

HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DYNASTIC HISTORY OF ORISSA—by Dr. Dilip Kumar Ganguly (Punthi Pustak, Calcutta, 1975, pp. XIV + 311 Price Rs. 85).

The book containing a Foreword by the renowoed epigraphist Dr. D. C. Sircar and an illuminating Preface by the author is divided into two parts: Part I (Chapters I to IV) dealing with the Historical Geography of Kalinga, Tosala Utkal/Odra and Dakshina Kosala and Part II (Chapters I–IV) with the Political History of ancient Orissa upto the rise of the Imperial Gaṅgas in 1038 A. D. Part I also includes two Appendices on the mountains and rivers of Orissa. There are two Appendices in Part II as well, on the political history of the Nalas and the early coins of Orissa. The Select Bibliography provided at the end of the book along with an Index are quite exhaustive and helpful.

Since the publication of Dr. N. K. Sahu's *History of Orissa*, Vol. I (Utkal University, 1964) there was no scholarly work available on Orissan historiography for a systematic and lucid presentation of historical facts from the early historic period upto the rise of the Imperial Gaṅgas. This long felt desideratum was satisfactorily met by the book under review which earned Dr. Ganguly the Ph.D. degree of Viswa Bharati University in 1970.

A comprehensive study of the history of any country depends upon a thorough knowledge of its geography. As such, the study of Orissan history without the perspective knowledge of geography is incomplete. The emergence of centralised kingdoms of Tosali and Kalinga in the third and first centuries B.C. respectively, the impact of Samudragupta's invasion and the rise and fall of sub-regional kingdoms of the Śailodbhavas, Bhauma–Karas, Eastern Gaṅgas, Somavaṁśis, and the Bhañjas can be explained only through a proper study of the role geography had played on historical developments. That the territorial segmentation was the outcome of geographical factors is borne by the fact that the small and large kingdoms of Tosali, Koṅgoda, Kaliṅga, Oḍra, South Kosala and the numerous Maṇḍala States which flourished in the early medieval period with ever changing frontiers grew up in specific nuclear regions created by river valleys, mountainous plateaus and inaccessible forests. Dr. D. K. Ganguly's work aims at establishing the theory that topography and historical changes operated as mutually complimentary forces in Orissan history.

Since the author has made a thorough discussion of the historical geography of ancient Orissa in Chapters I to IV in Part I, he is quite aware of the fact that the region of his study was not known as Orissa before the 12th century A. D. nor the people living in the region spoke Oriya language. In view of this the title of the book appears misleading. The author has made an indepth study of the sub-regional state formations in the early medieval period when the present Orissa country was divided and variously known as Kaliṅga, Utkala, Oḍra, and South Kosala. On the basis of numerous epigraphs and ancient literature he has most competently delineated the territorial shapes of the above subregional kingdoms, identified the location of the controversial units like Trikaliṅga and highlighted the importance of leading urban centres. However, one is tempted to make a few observations. In the context of the scope of the book the discussion on Puri and Koṇārka (pages 22 to 25) appears to be incongruous. The emergence of these two centres of Brahmanical cult worship should have been discussed in proper historical perspective. While discussing the location of Koṅgoda (page 49) the author should have referred to the territorial extent of Koṅgoda maṇḍala inorder to emphasise its importance as an urban centre. The discussion on 'Cuttack' (page 82) as a town of South Kosala under the Somavaṁśis lacks historical support because Mahābhavagupta I Janamejaya's dominion did not include any part of the coastal Orissa and the present Cuttack city emerged during Anaṅgabhīma III in the 13th century A.D. Cuttack, better spelled as 'Kataka' denoted a military cantonment and the present Cuttack city bears no relevance to the Somavaṁśi King Mahābhavagupta I Janamejaya whose territory was confined to the upper Mahānadi valley.

The political history of ancient Orissa from the time of Buddha upto the rise of the Imperial Gaṅgas has been discussed in Chapters I to IV in Part–II of the book on the basis of archaeological and literary sources. The author has thrown new light on the identification of

Nandarāja, original home of the Chedis, chronology of the Chedi rulers and the Kuṣāṇa rule in Orissa. He has studied all the available works on the topics and formulated his own views objectively. But it is not known how the Guntupally Inscription of Khāravela has escaped the notice of the learned scholar. The interesting theory of Muruṇḍa rule in Orissa propounded by Dr. A.S. Altekar has been criticised by Dr. Ganguly in the context of the numismatic findings of Śiśupālgarh excavation. It is however difficult to agree with his view that 'Gaṇa' of the Bhadrak Stone Inscription who bore the title of Mahārāja was an independent ruler. Similarly, the date of Tivaradeva remains controversial. In trying to settle the controversy on the initial date of Bhauma era, Dr. Ganguly has accepted the arguments of Dr. D. C. Sircar though the accepted date of Bhauma era by all other scholars working on Orissan history is 736 A. D. and not 821 A. D.

The chapters on political history have been well written. Though some of the sub-chapters appear to be too brief, the author has successfully presented a coherent description of essential points without taking the risk of complicating his objective analysis. However, one wishes the author had taken pains to throw some light on the history of the Maṇḍala States like Khijjiṅga and, Khiñjali, Kodālaka, Yamagartta, Airāvaṭṭa and Boṇāi etc., which played a very significant role as buffer zone during the eastward expansion of the Somavamśis of South Kosala.

Dr. Ganguly deserves our congratulations for having written a good book at a time when such scholarly works are essential in Orissan historiography. In fact he became a trend setter for a number of scholars to work upon the dynastic history of early medieval Orissa. It is gratifying to note that there are today not less than six published works on the political history of the period and cognate themes and an equal number of unpublished Ph.D. dissertations awaiting publication.

P. K. MISHRA

JAINISM IN EARLY MEDIEVAL KARNATAKA—by Dr. R.B.P. Singh; Published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, pp. XIV + 176 and a map, Price Rs. 35.00

As is well–known, in South India the region of Karnataka has been the most prominently hospitable for the spread and development of Jainism at least from about 5th centuary distinctly. There are numerous inscriptions and Jaina basadis, sculptures of the different periods in almost every part of Karnataka. A few of the places are even now the celebrated Jaina centres as e.g. Śravaṇabeḷgola, Humcha etc. The contribution of the Jaina writers to Kannada literature let alone to Sanskrit, is indeed remarkable and pioneering. Thus there is enormous scope for the study of Jainism of this region in its various ramifications through the ages. But there are very few books dealing with Jainism in South India of which only two are particularly concerned with the sect in Karnataka respectively in outlines and of a particular period. The present book under review, critically examines the literary and epigraphical sources and provides an excellent narration of the spread and growth of Jainism in Karnataka from the 5th to 12th century and is a welcome addition in this field of study.

Opening with a Foreword by no less an eminent historian than Professor A. L. Basham, Chairman of the Dept. of Asian Civilizations, Australian National University, Camberra, the book is divided into six chapters suffixed with an exhaustive bibliography two appendices, index, errata and a map.

Chapter I by way of introduction deals with the geographical boundary, extent, and antiquity of Karnataka region; reviews summarily but critically the previous works on Jainism in South India; antiquity and spread of the sect in Karnataka and touches upon the factors probably responsible for its decline from about 12th century onwards. Chap. II has a good review of the Digambara Jaina literature both in Sanskrit and Kannada of various kinds and of inscriptions. The next three chapters are devoted for the study of the various aspects of Jainism in great detail on the basis of the literary epigraphical evidences such as the worship of Thirthankara images, their forms, stages and purpose; the rise in importance of the Jaina Yakshis in relation to Tantrism; the emergence of priest class (Chap III); rituals and practices such as Sallekhana, initiation for the gradual adoption of ascetic life, rituals to be performed by the house-holders, *dana* and the disciplines and practices to be followed by the monks and nuns (Chap IV), the origin and elaborate development of the Jaina monastic life, its branches and various aspects (Chap. V). Chapter VI embodies some important observations that the author could make in his substantial study. Thereafter are two useful appendices: dstrictwise list of the inscriptions in Karnataka stating about the construction of Jaina basadis, grants made, etc., and a list of the names of persons who died by observing Sallekhana rite mostly in the Jaina pilgrimage, Śravaṇabeḷgola.

Some of the observations that the author has been able to make about the Jainism in Karnataka are particularly noteworthy, nay valuable the influence of Tantrism̃ on the sect resulting in the popularity of the worship of the Jaina Yaksis; the gradual laxity in the austere life of the wandering Jaina monks strictly forbidden from material possession, ultimately resulting in their well settled comfortable life possessing wealth and authority and the conscious and perhaps inevitable, adoptations of the Brahmanical traditions and practices for its not only survival but also popularity such as the Varṇa dharma in which Jaina Brāhmaṇās figure prominently the Samskāras and the mode of worship of the Tīrthankara images. But his observation that "the comparative paucity of evidence of the mercantile support to Jainism during 5th–10th centuries may be attributed to the decline of trade and commerce which undermined the economic and social status of merchants during this period" (p. 144), appears to be unconvincing in view of the fact that the Ayyavole Ainurvaru was the most powerful and famous trade guild in South India from about 7th c. onwards and that there was vigorous temple and basadi building activities by those other than the kings during the Badami Chalukyan and Rashtrakuta periods implying the ever-increasing economic prosperity. On the other hand the gradual liberalisation in the earlier rigid, unattractive and severe religious life; the adoption of the widely popular Brahmanical traditions and practice and the popularity of the worship of the Jaina Yakshis for material prosperity by about 10th–11th centuries as rightly marked by the author must have attracted strikingly more a large section of the people including the merchant class to be either the followers or the patrons of the sect than in the preceding periods.

The author is rather unsympathetic in his remarks while reviewing the previons works on Jainism in South India Karnataka (p. 4), by S. R. Sharma, S. B. Deo, P. B. Desai. Sharma is said to have *omitted* certain facts pertaining Jaina system of worship etc. Deo is charged with *ignorance* of the literary texts of the Digambara Jainas. These pioneering authors did work then possibly under certain limitations and were probably controlled by the scope of the work they were required to set forth. In fact the author of the present work, also, may be expected to have a chapter giving an account of some important Jaina centres like Śravaṇabeḷgola, Humcha etc., the antiquity of which goes back to at least c. 8th century as well as an outline of Jaina architecture and sculpture.

The foundation of the Ganga kingdom in Mysore is stated to have been in the 2nd c. A.D. (p. 6). But the probable period according to the consensus of the well argued opinions of the recent scholars of the History of Karnataka, is early or middle part of 4th century A. D.

The term Bhoja or Bhojaka of the Early Kadamba period are taken to mean a class of officiating priests (p.48). But it should be remembered here that there was ruling Bhoja dynasty more or less at the same time exercising their suzerainty over Konkana and northern part of Uttar Kannada district whose two copper plates (of Bhoja Aśankitarāja and Kāpalivarma) are known. It is therefore questionable if the term implies a class of priests or the descendants of the Bhoja dynasty. The Ganga king Avinita (p. 101) is said to have granted a village, Badaneguppe to Śrīvijaya jaina temple in Talavananagara in 466 and land and house to a Jaina temple in Pullura in 570 (printing error ?). Obviously the latter date could be 510 since the approximate reign period of the king is c. 466–529 A. D.

The author could have been descreete by referring to some available standard and authentic maps of the recent time to define the extent of Karnataka region rather than quoting from an antiquated work by Wilks; by using the names of the places as prevalent in the region from the past rather than following blindly the old British way of pronunciation (under-stable on their part) in 1974–75 as e.g. "Seriranga-patam" (p. 2), Kanarese (p. 10). In Errata (p. 176), the author has given that the correct spelling of the name of the place Koppal as Kopbel. In fact the former is correct and certainly not the latter on any count. The locations of a few of the places in the useful map at the end are inaccurate. For instance Banavasi shown in the coastal belt somewhere between Ankola–Kumtha, is actually in the upghat area of Sirsi Taluka. The title of the book in view of the period covered (i.e., 5th–12th cent.) endorsed hy Basham in his Foreword does not seem to be precise. In Karnataka history there is hardly any distinct new development affecting the ancient traditional political social and religious systems and practices upto 12th c. when Vīraśaivism emerged as a powerful and distinct sect and a little later when the devastating Muslims invasions occurred that had undeniable respective impact on the existing religious and political conditions and order. It is not known by what standard the 5th–7th centuary period in Karnataka could be taken as early medieval. The expression Early and Medieval would have been more appropriate. Of course periodization in Indian history and particularly the South is still a debatable point.

On the whole, the book indeed provides a well co-ordinated literary and epigraphical account of the development of the Jaina religion in Karnataka as comprehensively as possible in an unambiguous and lucid style. That the author hailing from a non-Kannada region of our country has earnestly tried his best to acquaint himself with the Kannada sources and history (and in such case a few inaccuracies of the types mentioned above are likely to creep in) and produced a much needed, authentic account, is indeed praiseworthy and he therefore deserves our warm congratulations.

A. SUNDARA

COINS AND ICONS, A STUDY OF MYTHS AND SYMBOLS IN INDIAN NUMISMATIC ART—by Dr. Bhaskar Chattopadhyaya; Punthi Pustak, 34 Mohan Bagan Lane, Calcutta, 1977, Plates IX, pp. XII + 336, Price: Rs. 128.00.

It is well known that the antiquity of image making mostly for worship in accordance with the prevailing sectarian or popular beliefs probably goes back to the later Vedic period. The Grihya Sutras such as *Pāraskara* etc., Patanjali's *Mahābhāṣya* respectively refer to Dēvātāyana etc. and Skanda Viśākha etc. that were worshipped. But so far no icons or temples of these periods and earlier, if there be any, have been found. Secondly, during the last three centuries preceding the beginning of the Christian era,, the Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism, besides Buddhism and Jainism, had been crystalising into almost well developed sects involving image worship. Although icons of Yakṣas and Yakṣis, Tīrthankars and Buddha began to appear in the 1st c. A. D. and slightly earlier, there are scarcely any icons of gods and goddesses of Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava sects in anthropomorphic forms earlier than 2nd or 3rd c.A.D. Brick enclosures, temples of c.1c.B.C–1st c.A.D. dedicated to Vāsudeva Samarṣhaṇa, Viṣṇu, Kārtikēya have been found in the excavations at Hāthibaḍa (Nagari, Rajasthan), Besnagar, Mathura, Nagarjunakonda etc. But with the exception of Nagarjunakonda no icons were discovered in these places. The problems are how the gods and goddesses of these sectarian religions were represented and what were the stages if there be any, in the modes of representations. Thirdly, the north-western part of ancient India was during c. 3rd c.B.C. — 2nd c.A.D. exposed to powerful Iranian, Graeco-Roman and Central Asian influences. And Gandhara region was then pre-eminently known for its Graeco-Roman Art which is but essentially Buddhist. But it is hardly known if particularly the Iranian and Greek religious thoughts also were adopted in that part of the country. It is against this background the coins of the Indo-Greeks, Saka–Pahlavas and of the Kuṣāṇas found fortunately in considerable number and variety are of immense value.

It was Anandacoomaraswamy and Foucher who first realised the importance of the Numismatics for the study of early Indian iconography, as rightly pointed out by the author of the above book. J. N. Banerji has no doubt considerably discussed the coin evidence in his study on the development of Hindu Iconography. But in view of the varieties and value of the coins and their bearing on early Indian iconography, they deserved an independent, complete and thorough study. It is in this respect Dr. Bhaskar Chattopadhyaya has done commendable work in bringing out the above volume and thus fulfilled the important need in this field of study.

There are seven chapters respectively dealing with (i) Religious background of Numismatic Art, (ii) Religious symbolism, (iii) Greek divinities on Indian coins, (vi) Iranian deities, (v) Brahmanical deities and their emblems, (vi) Numismatics: a source of Religious History and (vii) Numismatics and Iconography followed by bibliography, index and key to the plates. In the first chapter he has narrated briefly but cogently the prevalence of different religious cults: Saiva, Vaiṣṇava, Saura, Buddhist etc., intrusion of the practice of worshipping Greek and Iranian deities and relatively the occurrence of various coin types and kinds of the Indo-Greeks, Śaka–Pahlavas and Kuṣāṇas that reflect these trends.

Brief reference to the coin types of North India upto the Muslim conquest and as well as of South India is also made. After summarising the views of various scholars on the probable significance of the different symbols, animal motifs etc., on the punch marked coins etc., in the second chapter, the author elaborately describes the iconographic traits of various Greek, the Iranian and the Brahmanical deities and discusses their identifications in the following three chapters. Then follows a discussion on the prevalence of the religious beliefs in different regions such as Ayodhya, Kausambi, Taxila etc., exclusively on the basis of the coins. And in the last chapter he examines how the coin evidence sheds welcome light on the antiquity and early stages of the development of Indian iconography from symbolic to anthropomorphic through theriomorphic stages that can not be correctly and fully known from the early sculptural art. In this context he vividly points out the close similarities among the Greek, the Iranian and the early Indian deities in their iconographic traits. Pertinent coin types have been illustrated at the end.

Thus the author has been comprehensive and exhaustive in the study covering all aspects of the coins as a source of religion and especially art. But here and there are some minor lapses amounting to inaccuracies mostly. For instance while surveying the religious trends in ancient India in the first chapter, he points out (p. 4) that the worship of the mother goddess was in vogue "in the Chalcolithic period in the valley of the river Indus." In fact it was in practice in other parts of India also. The Chalcolithic site in Inamgaon (Maharashtra) has produced absolutely remarkable evidence of the mother goddess worship. Similarly, he follows the old theory that the "cult of Gaṇapati" came into vogue sometime in the Gupta period" (p. 5) whereas recent studies of the Gaṇeśa sculptures from Kabul, Gokarna (Karnataka), indicate an earlier beginning. While referring to the royal emblems of the ruling dynasties of South India he miserably stumbles, strangely enough. For instance, he states (p. 14) that bull, Hanuman and bull were respectively those of the Rashtrakutas, the Kadambas and the Gangas. It is too well known that their emblems were Garuda, lion and elephant. He refers to the Harappan seals as found in the "Prehistoric sites" of the Indus valley (p. 13). The sites are Proto-historic. Describing the iconography of Buddha on the coin he points out (pp. 234–35) "that in most cases the right hand is found raised, most probably in the act of blessing (Varadamudra)." But this mudra is abhaya. Here he should have been indeed careful when the main theme of his book is the numismatic art. He observes (p. 274) that aniconism prevalent for a long time among the Indian people, had been modified by an ideal of iconism introduced by the Greeks. This is not correct. Iconism was undoubtedly prevalent in India at least from the Chalcolithic period as best illustrated by the Inamgaon evidence mentioned above. The question is whether the forms of the Indian deities represented on the coins are in any way indebted to the corresponding Greek ones. Also he notes (p. 283), "so long the images of Śiva, Kārtikēya or Mother goddess of the early centuries of the Christian era were not available . . ." But the Bhita (Rajasthan) and Gudimallam (Andhra pradesh) lingas with Śiva in the anthropomorphic form of c. 1st c.B.C, sculptures of Kārtikēya, Lajjāgaurī (mother goddess) of 3rd c. A. D. from Nagarjunakonda are very well-known.

The author appears to be somewhat casual in giving references. No particular uniformity has been followed in quoting the references e.g. in pp. 139-247, Banerjea's book: *The development of Hindu Iconography* referred to many times, has been mentioned in different ways. Occasionally the author of a book quoted is not mentioned as e.g. no. 9, on p. 132. Anyway these secondary incorrect points in no way deter the merit of the book.

The author clearly displays clear perception and balance in expressing his views. He has undoubtedly good command over the subject and is exhaustive in the treatment. He deserves congratulations from the scholarly world for having produced a valuable book on the subject that is much needed.

A. SUNDARA

DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST RELATIONS IN AGRICULTURE—by A. Ghosh and K. Dutt, pp. vii + 216, PPH, 1977, Rs. 30.

The study of transition from one socio-economic formation to another involves a set of complex problems of investigation and definition. Karl Marx, who is usually charged with putting India under single mode of production designated as 'Asiatic Mode of Production, had noted the capacity of the pre-capitalist modes of production in India and China to cause the erosion of influence of the British commerce by the middle of the 19th century. Marx's formulation of the Indian socio-economic system was that of a system which was multi-structural. And it has been so. However, it did not and does not exclude the possibility of there being or emerging a predominent formation. This is in itself a vast subject that demands an equally vast interest. Fortunately, there has been such an interest to be found not only among the formal academics but also among the political activists of the left. The issues involved are highly academic, fundamentally ideological and something evading agreement. Hence, one cannot find any difficulty in agreeing to the author's 'Preface' which says "The difficulty that arises in identifying social relations is both theoretical and emperical." Obviously, it is this difficulty which leads to more than one definition or identification of the Indian socio-economic formation made by the different scholars. However this difficulty cannot be overcome by suggesting that the question of identification is or should be controversy free. Unfortunately, this is what the work under review seems to suggest in the concluding phase (ch.xx) where one reads:

> Identification of modes of production sometimes get confused in semantic controversy on the connotation of Marxist terminology. Even when agreement is reached on the broad features, differences persist on the labelling of a system. Such controversies are puerile and are to be avoided in any meaningful discussion.

It is an argument with an escapist tendency. Theoretically, and perhaps more so ideologically, the controversies in this regard are not caused only by 'the connotations of Marxist terminology.' Here the Marxist practice will he more important.

The genesis to emergence, and development of capitalism in India has been subject of historical studies the Indian and non-Indian social scientists. D. R. Gadgil, H. Sinha, Irfan Habib, N. K. Sinha, T. Raychaudhari, Bipin Chandra, A. Guha, A. Tripati are the Indian names which come at once to one's mind. Recently, V.I. Pavlov has, in his work, *Histori:al Premises for India's Transition to Capitalism* (1978) given a comprehensive view of the whole problem. He has suggested a 'multi structural' and 'multi-sectoral' approach. Leaving aside this, N. K. Sinha, A. Tripathi, and A. Guha have been writing on the economic history of Bengal with which the present work is concerned. In this background, one fails to appreciate the view expressed by the authors being reviewed that, "Reliable and adequate data pertaining to agrarian relations are not easy to come." (Preface). V. I. Pavlov calls it customary "Complain" which there is no reason to believe in (*ibid.* p. 26). It is curious that A. Ghosh and K. Dutt speak, on the one hand, of the dearth of source material, and tell us. on the other hand, that while studying Permanent Settlement (with which the book begins and thereby implying as if the capitalist relations were suddently germinated by Warren Hastings in 1793) they do not feel it necessary to consider the work done in this connection. No one likes to have repetitions. But historical events have meanings in the historical context. Straight and simple beginnings lead to simple and flat conclusions. To take just one example.

While summarising the effects of the Permanent Settlement on the Bengal society, the monograph under reference says:

> The landlords thus from being part of a ruling class were reduced who lived on the peasantry with the help of and the gracious permission of the British Collector...to rentier class. The Zamindar class was thus a new class in rural society" (p.6).

And again, "we thus see a gradual transformation of economic power and proprietorship from the typical landlords (to) ... The 'new' landlord (who) was an outsider element... (pp. 18–19)"

Thus according to these authors, with the Settlement of 1793, the 'Chiefs' and traditional landlords disappeared from the scene and their place was occupied by the traders and moneylenders, the mahajans turned new landlords. Now it is true that something like this happened. But did it happen so smoothy, so completely and in a manner sugg–ested in the book. Neither the old ruling class did quit the historical stage so calmly nor the 'new' landlords were so new as has been rightly shown in Ratna Ray in her comprehensive study (Ratna Ray, *Land Transfer and Social Change under the Permanent Settlement,* (Journal of Economic and Social History Review, Vol. I, March, 1974.)

Although the authors do not spell out the object of their compiling this monograph, yet a few things can be made out. One can legitimately and fruitfully study the phenomenon of capitalism on the regional level. The choice of Bengal region is too obvious to warrant any discussion. The book's sub–title 'A Case Study of West Bengal 1793–1971' can be explained by the fact that the source material available on Bengal after 1947 shall be limited to the State of West Bengal alone. Technically speaking, the monograph comprises of two parts, dealing with the pre and post–independence periods. In the first part of fifteen chapters, the first five are devoted to the Permanent Settlement and its effects, particularly, the tax–mechanism and its negative role for the overall economic decline. Three chapters (from vi to viii) deal with the economic change begetting 'new landlordism'. The next three chapters refer to the factors arresting this transformation. The last four chapters of Part One show the sociological impact of the limited economic change. The first four chapters of Part Two narrate the changes in the agrarian relations induced by the vigorous state intervention. The last chapter is theoretical, introducing us to three modes of production, namely 'semi-feudal; a mode having, semi-prolietartan (peasant) economy' and 'capitalist mode'. The 'Second Mode' is quite new and hardly distinguishable from the first. Inspite of this, the work is extremely simple and reads like a text-book. It's reasonable price shall help it in reaching the students at the college and university levels, although the book is without a bibliography.

NAZER SINGH

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FORM IV

(*See Rule 8*)

Statement about ownership and other particulars about the Journal of Indian History to be published in the first issue every year after the last day of February.

1.	Place of Publication	.. Trivandrum
2.	Periodicity of its Publication	.. April, August and December
3.	Printer's Name	.. Rev. Br. Emmanuel, O.C.D.
4.	Nationality	.. Indian
	Address	.. Manager, St. Joseph's Press, .. Trivandrum.
5.	Publisher's Name	.. Dr. T. K. Ravindran
	Nationality	.. Indian
	Address	.. Professor and Head of the .. Department of History, University of Kerala, Trivandrum.
6.	Edior's Name	.. Dr. T. K. Ravindran
	Nationality	.. Indian
	Address	.. Professor and Head of the Department of History, University of Kerala, Trivandrum.
7.	Names and Address of individuals who own the newspaper and partners or shareholders holding more than one per cent of the total capital	.. University of Kerala

I, Dr. T. K. Ravindran, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date : 31-12-1983

Dr. T. K. Ravindran,
Signature of Publisher.

JOURNAL OF KERALA STUDIES

Journal of Kerala Studies, a new research quarterly, published by the Department of History reflects the views, ideas and findings of scholars in the history of Kerala and other disciplines like anthropology, politics, literature, sociology, art and architecture, philosophy, linguistics, folklore, religion, law, music and sciences which have a bearing on Kerala.

Journal of Kerala Studies, published in March, June, September and December, includes research articles, book reviews, document studies and unpublished manuscripts.

Copies can be obtained from the Editor, Journal of Kerala Studies, Department of History, University of Kerala, Kariyavattam – 695581.

Annual Subscription: Rs. 25/– (inland) and Rs. 50/– (foreign).

(Continued from page 1)

THE PROBLEMS OF THE INDIAN IMMIGRANTS TO MAURITIUS, 1834–1878 —by Pravina Bhim Sain .. 175

THE HIMALAYAN FRONTIER DURING THE BRITISH RULE IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE BHUTANESE FRONTIER—by Kapileshwar Labh .. 185

LANDHOLDERS AND LAND TENURE IN PANCHMAHAL DISTRICT DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY A.D.—by B. Suryavanshi .. 197

GANDHI'S LEADERSHIP OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL MANAGEMENT—by P. K. Jose .. 219

LAHUL–AN OUTLINE HISTORY—by Tobdan .. 261

M. C. RAJA, THE CHAMPION OF THE DEPRESSED—by V. Balambal .. 273

REVIEWS .. 281

Printed at St. Joseph's Press, Trivandrum

27/11/87